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Abstract 
Administrations and administrative elites are key to the understanding of the history of 
the European Union. While they are protagonists in the integration of Europe, they 
have been severely neglected in historical research. T11is thesis makes a significant 
contribution to the historiography of the European integration process by combining 
the study of the origins of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel 
Community and the Commission of the European Economic Community with an 
analysis of the biographies and careers of European civil servants. The study is based 
on extensive archival research in ten archives in seven countries and on semi- 
structured interviews with former officials of the High Authority and of the 
Commission. 
The thesis covers three main themes. It firstly sheds new light on how the 
European administrations emerged and which structures, staff recruitment 
mechanisms and working methods they adopted. The recruitment patterns in particular 
invite the analysis of the role of external influences of member state governments and 
interest groups on the European administrations which could undermine their 
independence. The thesis thus unfolds the conflicts and difficulties faced by the High 
Authority and the Commission and their officials. It reveals that many decisions 
concerning the administrations and staff recruitment were guided not by 
considerations of practicality and pragmatism but by the aim of gaining legitimacy for 
the supranational administrations. Secondly, the study examines the biographical 
background of the first European high officials. Here, the concept of generations helps 
to highlight and put into perspective similarities and differences between officials and 
contributes to explaining why these individuals chose to invest their careers in the 
European integration process. The thesis also studies socialisation mechanisms within 
the administrations which facilitated a European identity formation among the civil 
servants. By focusing on administrative cultures that emerged in the Commission, the 
third theme combines the study of administrative structures with that of individuals. 
The thesis examines the examples of the common agricultural policy and competition 
policy and shows how administrative cultures and actor socialisation can impact on 
preference formation and ultimately influence the shape of Community policies. It 
thus demonstrates that analysing administrative cultures and socialisation processes 
are crucial for understanding Community policies. 
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Introduction 
1. Theformation of a European administrative elite 
'A new race of man was emerging in the Luxembourg institutions, as if in a 
laboratory. " Jean Monnet, the first president of the High Authority of the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSQ, expected the personnel of the High Authority to 
develop into a new European man. This new species was to take on a pioneer role in 
the European integration process and take the lead in uniting European countries. The 
first European civil servants are generally described as the idealistic generation of 
convinced Europeans. These men and (very few) women, while coming from diverse 
national, cultural and social backgrounds, allegedly formed a European administrative 
elite working together to shape Europe and to define European interests. Although 
acting mostly in the background, they had a vital influence on the European 
integration process. This thesis investigates the biographical background of this 'new 
race of man', the European officials, and their motives for entering the European 
administrations, examining if and how they adopted European values and aims. Did 
they become 'European' through administering Europe? 
The study of this 'new race of man' has to be placed in the context of the 
European administrations. The creation of the ECSC and the European Economic 
Community (EEC) triggered the bureaucratic integration of Europe. For the first time, 
European nation states partly renounced national sovereignty by transferring 
responsibilities in key policy areas to these new European organizations. The 
institutional framework laid down in the ECSC treaty, signed on 18 April 1951 by the 
governments of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, 
' Monnet 1978: 376. 
11 
was based on four pillars: the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the Common 
Assembly, the Special Council of Ministers and the High Authority. 2 Ile High 
Authority was to watch over the implementation of the ECSC treaty, generate a 
European interest and have decision-making powers of its own. 3 Less than six years 
after endorsing the ECSC treaty, the Heads of State and Goverment of these six 
countries ('the Six') signed the Treaties of Rome on 25 March 1957, establishing the 
European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(EAEC or Euratom). 4 The EEC marked a move away from sectoral integration 
towards horizontal integration. Its task was to realise a common market, integrating 
the entire economies of the member states. The institutional framework of the EEC 
was modelled after that of the ECSC with a slight shift in the distribution of power 
and competences. It included the Council of Ministers, the European Court of Justice, 
the European Parliamentary Assembly, which renamed itself European Parliament in 
1962, and the European Commission. The Council of Ministers was assigned a more 
important role as the main decision-making body of the Community. While in theory 
the Commission was slightly less powerful than the High Authority, the treaty still 
made it the guardian of the treaty, responsible for furthering the common interest, and 
the mediator between institutions. The Commission was also responsible for 
administering policies and for representing the Community in economic matters vis-A- 
2 On the history of the High Authority see Spierenburg and Poidevin 1994. Throughout the thesis the 
term 'High Authority' is used to describe both the institution as such and the college of nine members 
designated by the member states presiding over the institution. The same goes for the term 
'Commission', which usually describes the institution as such but is sometimes also used to refer to the 
college of Commissioners. 
3 Poidevin 1998: 155. 
4 On the so-called 'Relance europ6nne' see Serra 1989. On the treaty negotiations see Misters 1982. 
However, a comprehensive account of the treaty negotiations based on archival sources is still lacking, 
however. 
A highly specialised organization with a mixed balance-sheet, Euratom was soon in the shadow of the 
EEC and shall play no role in this study. On the emergence of Euratom see Weilemann 1983; for a 
short balance-sheet cf. Nugent 2001: 33-35. 
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vis third countries. 5 Crucially, it had executive-type functions such as the right of 
initiative with which it could initiate Community policies and legislation and oversee 
implementation of these rules. Without proposals from the Commission there would 
be no European policies. This right of initiative was, and still is, part of the originality 
of the Community system and decisively distinguishes the Commission from 
permanent secretariats of international organizations. 
Another distinctive trait of the European administrations that could be 
important for the emergence of the European 'race of man' was the creation of a 
European civil service in the High Authority and subsequently the Commission. The 
notion of 'European' civil servant, however, seems like a contradiction in terms. 
Bureaucracy and civil servants played an important role in the rise of nation states in 
the 18 th and 19'h centuries. Against this backdrop it may seem surprising that this 
concept was transposed to the European level. This is striking evidence for the 
interconnectedness of national and European administrations and the influence of 
national models on the latter. Many of the early High Authority staff came from 
national civil services and continued to perceive themselves as civil servants. Early 
memoranda and working documents of the High Authority administration frequently 
6 
employed the terms fOnctionnaire and Beamter (civil servant). Importantly, these 
officials did not want to loose any of the privileges that were associated with this 
status. The fact that many of them, who served their home countries as civil servants, 
were suddenly required to develop similar links and solidarities with the European 
5 Cf for a detailed account of the Commission's roles Coombes 1970: 78-86. 
6 Cf. for example CEAB 3 387, Cesare Balladore-Pallieri, Vorschlag flir den Verwaltungsausschuss, 30 
June 1953,116. In the sources, the staff of the European administrations are referred to asfonctionnaire 
in French and Beamter in German. This corresponds to the English terms civil servant and official. The 
terminology in the sources, and the fact that the personnel statute introduced a career system similar to 
that of a national civil service, justify applying the terms 'civil servant' and 'official' to the staff of the 
European administrations. 
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bureaucracies could give rise to loyalty conflicts. Yet, the European civil service was 
sometimes seen as the civil service of a future European federal state. This service 
could also further the development of a stable and independent 'supranational' 
workforce in the European administrations. Permanent staff brought continuity and 
could possibly develop stronger loyalties with the organization they were serving, as 
their career depended on it. 
The civil service of the High Authority became the point of reference for the 
Commission. In 1958 it was not a question anymore of whether Commission officials 
should become European civil servants. The personnel statute of the EEC and 
Euratom, introduced in 1962, was modelled after the ECSC statute of 1956 .7 It 
introduced four staff categories, or careers: A, B, C and D. 80fficials of the A career, 
that is the leading positions in the administration occupied by officials normally 
holding university degrees, are at the centre of this study. Their length of service, 
skills and in-depth knowledge of decision-making processes make senior civil 
servants particularly suitable for studying socialisation processes in the European 
bureaucracies. The thesis will not focus on the High Authority members and the 
Commissioners. These were nominated by the governments of the member states and 
only remained in the European administrations for a limited period of time. 
Administrations and administrative elites are key to the understanding of the 
development of European Union (EU) policies and the Community as a whole. They 
are protagonists in the integration of Europe. However, they have been severely 
7 Politisches Archiv des Auswdrtigen Amtes, Berlin (henceforth PAAA), Europdische Gerneinschaft ffir 
Kohle und Stahl (B 18), Vol. 7, Anlage zu Tgb. Nr. 213-395, Texte d6finitif adopt6 le 28 Janvier 1956, 
Statut du personnel de la Communaut6, undated. The statute did not contain a requirement to publish 
the document. Hence, the statute was circulated in semi-official documents to member state 
F overnments and other interested parties. Cf. Conrad 1992: 66. 
Statut der Beamten der Europdischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und der Europdischen 
Atomgemeinschaft. Official Journal of the European Communities, No. 1389/62,14 June 1962. 
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neglected in historical research. By combining the analysis of European 
administrations with a prosopographical. study of European civil servants, this thesis 
breaks new ground. 
2. Towards a supranational history of the EU 
Until the 1990s the historiography of the European integration process concentrated in 
the main on member states and their attitudes, politics and policies towards Europe, 
and occasionally, on emerging European policies such as the common agricultural 
po icy (CAP). 9 These studies were written in the tradition of diplomatic and political 
history, assuming that governments had the power to formulate European policies 
without significant domestic constraints and were pursuing 'national interests'. 
Whenever particular actors were taken into account in this narrative, they were the so- 
called founding fathers like Robert Schuman, Paul-Henri Spaak, Alcide de Gasperi, 
Konrad Adenauer and Jean Monnet. 10 
In recent years, however, the historiography of European integration has 
experienced a shift in focus. Increasingly, historians acknowledge the importance of 
non-state actors and European institutions that are part of what could be called the 
incipient European political system. " The trend favours the evolution of a 
supranational and transnational historiography of the European Union. 
' 2 This research 
also became more interested in actors at the European level, the interplay between 
9 Varsori 2006: 9. 
10 For Schuman see Poidevin 1986; for De Gasperi see Kohler 1979, Conze, Corni and Pombeni 2004 
and Craveri 2006; for Spaak see Dumoulin 1999; for Konrad Adenauer see Misters 1983, Schwarz 
1986 and 1991; and for Jean Monnet see Fontaine 1988, Duch8ne 1994, Roussel 1996 and Monnet 
1978. 
11 Rasmussen 2008. 
12 One of the first who used the term 'supranational history' is Laursen 2002. While it has certainly 
been practised for a long time, the concept of 'transnational history' has only been developed 
during the 
last decade. See for example Milza 1998; Osterhammel 2001. 
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actors and institutions at the EU and the national levels, and non-state actors. 13 The 
range of institutions in this European political system is broad. It encompasses 
member state governments and administrations, European institutions, including the 
Commission, the European Parliament, the Council and other institutional actors such 
as the Economic and Social Committee, as well as pressure and interest groups and 
political parties. 14 In his book The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s, 
Piers Ludlow aims at writing a 'supranational history' of the EEC. ' 5 He is one of the 
few historians who takes up the challenge to write EU history by taking into account 
the multinational and multi-institutional nature of policy making in the Community. 
Moreover, in several articles Ludlow has analysed the development of the Community 
and its policies from a multilateral perspective, including formal and informal 
Community institutions such as the Commission and the Permanent Representatives 
Committee (Coreper). 16 For him, the contribution of Community institutions - and not 
just that of member states - to the development of the EEC and its policies needs to be 
taken into account for understanding fully the 'workings of a supranational, system'. 17 
Such a historiography would require a detailed knowledge of the structure and 
functioning of the European institutions and of their personnel. However, historical 
studies focusing on the European administrations of the High Authority and the 
Commission are few. In 1993 Ludolf Herbst stressed the lack of research on the 
European bureaucracies. 18 Since then matters have improved only slightly and there 
still is a significant research gap in this field. There are works that at least partly 
13 For an overview over recent publication trends see Kaiser 2006b. 
14 See Dumoulin 2007 on the European Conuýnission; Ludlow 2005a on the Coreper; Varsori 2006 on 
the Economic and Social Committee, Poidevin and Spierenburg 1994 on the High Authority; Kaiser 
2006a and 2007 on Christian democrats' networks; Kaiser, Leucht and Rasmussen 
2008 for 
supranational and transnational European integration history. 
15 Ludlow 2006a. 
16 Idem. 2006b, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 1998a, 1998b. 
17 Idem. 2006a: 212. 
18 Herbst 1993. 
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address this gap. In 1994 Dirk Spierenburg and Raymond Poidevin published their 
important History of the High Authority. 19 However, the authors do not pay much 
attention to the internal organization, staff policy and administrative staff of the High 
Authority. These issues are addressed in more detail in Yves Conrad's MA 
dissertation, published in 1989, and in a special issue of the Yearbook for European 
Administrative History on the beginnings of the European administration, published 
three years later. 20 Conrad's work is important in that he maps out the elements that 
constituted the administration of the High Authority with great attention to detail. 
However, it is not so much a critical history of the beginnings of the High Authority. 
Both studies contain pioneer work, but this work urgently needs to be continued, 
updated and expanded. While these volumes concentrate on aspects of the High 
Authority administration, a special issue of the journal Storia Amministrazione 
Costitudone focuses on the Commission's administration. 21 Published in 2000, the 
contributions cover different characteristics of the Commission under the presidency 
of Walter Hallstein (1958-1967) and thus provide a valuable introduction to the topic. 
However, the contributions vary in their quality. 
Although Geoffrey Edwards and David Spence have lamented a general lack 
of studies on the European Commission, 22 the number of works on this European 
institution is still considerably higher in public administration and political science 
than in contemporary history. Since the late 1950s, the administrations of the High 
Authority and the Commission in particular have received considerable attention. 
Researchers were interested in the originality of these multinational bureaucracies that 
resembled more national than international administrations. In addition, in the 1960s 
19 Spierenburg and Poidevin 1994. 
20 Conrad 1989; Heyen 1992. 
21 Storia Amministrazione Costituzione 2000. 
22 Edwards and Spence 1994: 1. 
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and 1970s, social scientists observed an increased influence of bureaucracy in modem 
society generally, 23 which is why the 'Eurocracy' in Brussels was also given more 
attention. Political scientists analysed both the structure of the Commission's 
administrative services and the European administrative Staff. 24 These works were 
often based on interviews with European officials, They therefore provide valuable 
insights into the atmosphere of the European administrations in the 1960s and 1970s. 
However, much of this research was conducted with the aim of testing or proving the 
neofunctionalist 'spill-over' theory, in which supranational. institutions play an 
important role. 25 With this in mind, and the necessary caution, the thesis will utilise 
these studies mainly as source material. 
The range of actors in the incipient European political system is at least as 
diverse as the range of institutions, if not more so. The list includes politicians, policy 
entrepreneurs, representatives of interest groups, members of the High Authority, the 
EEC and Euratom Commissions, the European Assemblies, the ECJ and, last but not 
least, civil servants at the national as well as at the European levels. While they are 
still understudied according to Wilfried Loth, 
26 these European actors are becoming 
more the focus of historical research. Two recently published volumes mark this trend. 
Bernd Bühlbäcker focuses on German actors in the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund 
(DGB), the German Federation of Trade Unions, and in political parties such as the 
Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) who were 
23 See for example Downs 1967; Jacoby 1973. 
24 Haas 1958 and 1968; Lindberg 1963 and 1965; Lindberg and Scheingold 1970; Scheinman 1966; 
Coombes 1968 and 1970; Lerner and Gorden 1969; Michelmann 1978a and 1978b. 
25 For neofunctionalist scholars such as Ernst B. Haas integration was a process 
in which integration in 
one policy area would result in integration of another, related policy sector. 
This so-called 'spill-over' 
effect was facilitated by supranational institutions and by the socialisation of elites 
into adopting the 
9 oals of integration. 
6 Loth 2001: 104-5 
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involved in the negotiations leading to the ECSC treaty. 27 He explores how a small 
elite group dealt with the challenges of European integration in the early 1950s. Some 
of them, like Franz Etzel, later entered the High Authority. However, the focus on 
German actors necessarily implies that Biihlbdcker does not take into account either 
the transnational dimension of the emergence of the ECSC, or the multinational 
dimension of the High Authority. Moreover, the endpoint of his study is 1952 when 
the High Authority took up office. Hence, he does not consider potential socialisation 
processes within the European institutions and changing attitudes towards Europe, 
possibly resulting ftom them. 
Achim Trunk analyses the European identity of political elites between 1949 
and 1957. He develops and applies convincingly a theory of collective identities 
which he defines as forces profondes (Pierre Renouvin), or deep forces, underlying 
and influencing the political process. 28 More precisely, he studies the discourse of 
politicians of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and the ECSC 
Parliamentary Assembly. Trunk concludes that there was indeed a European identity. 
However, this was based more on a negative reaction to perceived threats from the 
Soviet Union and the United States and a feeling of European decline, than on a 
positive identification with a common European history or symbols. 
29 This important 
study of political elites of several countries during, what Trunk calls, the 
(experimental phase' of European integration, shows the importance of collective 
identities for policy-making. It also demonstrates that purely economic explanations 
of European integration, as in Alan S. Milward's seminal study The European Rescue 
27 Biihlbdcker 2007. 
28Trunk 2007: 8. 
29 
Ibid., 316. 
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of the Nation State, 30 are too limited in scope. While Trunk mentions European 
institutions as potential triggers of European identity formation, he does not attribute 
them much influence during the period he studies. 31 Neither does he refer to the 
personnel in these newly founded European administrations, who could be seen as 
pioneers of European identity formation. 
Another small set of studies deals with the members of the High Authority and 
the EEC Commission. In 1980 Hans Dichgans, himself a former member of the 
Consultative Committee of the ECSC and the European Parliament, published a book 
on the 'human capital', as he called it, of the ECSC. His study is based on letters and 
interviews with fon-ner members of the Consultative Committee, the European 
Parliamentary Assembly and members and leading officials of the High Authority. 
Dichgans's main merit is to have collected crucial information on the biographies of 
these actors. In a more academic study, Nicole Condorelli-Braun explores the 
biographical background, the recruitment modalities and careers of the members of 
the High Authority, the Euratom and EEC Commissions and the judges at the ECJ. 32 
Writing in 1972, her research relies on published sources, such as Community 
legislation or newspaper articles, as she did not have access to Community archives. 
More recently, in her PhD thesis Mauve Carbonell has written a source-based 
collective biography of the members of the High Authority, something which is 
lacking for the EEC Conunission. 33 Surprisingly, for the Commission there are only a 
handful of works dealing with Commission members. Among them is the volume by 
Beate Neuss which deals with the German members of the Commission. 
34 Her aim is 
30 Milward 1992. 
31 Trunk 2007: 323. 
32 Condorelli-Braun 1972. 
33 Carbonell 2006b. 
34 Neuss 1988. 
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to test whether the alleged importance of 'Europe' for the different governments of the 
Federal Republic was expressed in their personnel policy towards the Commission. 
The study is thus trapped in the paradigm of Germany 'loosing out' in Europe by 
sending second rate Commissioners. Moreover, Neuss, a political scientist, did not 
take archival sources into account, but based her study entirely on interviews, 
memoirs and newspaper articles. As to research on individual Commission members, 
a biography of Commission Vice-President Sicco Mansholt was published recently. A 
biography of Commission President Hallstein, however, is still lacking. 35 
The permanent administrative staff of the High Authority and the EEC and 
Euratom Commissions are even more severely understudied. Among the exceptions is 
Conrad's MA dissertation which also touches upon the administrative staff of the 
High Authority. 36 However, he does not study the European civil servants in a 
systematic way. The same can be said about the recently published History of the 
V.. 
European Commission. One of the aims of this volume is to introduce the 
Commission civil servants, these 'behind the scene' actors, into the historiography of 
37 
the EU. The study relies heavily, and not unproblernatically, on oral history accounts 
of former civil servants. While the second and longer part of the book is concerned 
with the different policy areas, the first part deals with the administration and its 
personnel. However, here the main focus lies on the college of Commissioners 
although one chapter is dedicated to the long-serving secretary general of the 
Commission, Emile Nodl. 38 This history of the Commission grants high officials a 
more prominent role in European integration history, but it is not a study of 
Commission high officials. In summary, none of these historical studies provides a 
35 For Mansholt see Merridnboer 2006. For Hallstein see Loth and Wessels 1998 and Sch6nwald 2001. 
36 Conrad 1989. CE also Conrad 1992. 
37 Dumoulin 2007. 
3' Bossuat 2007. On No6 see also Previti Allaire 2004. 
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collective biography of European civil servants, analyses recruitment mechanisms or 
focuses on socialisation processes within the European administrations. 
Images, stereotypes, values and mentalities can influence behaviour. So far, 
the 'images of Europe' of European senior civil servants have only been investigated 
by political scientists like Liesbet Hooghe. 39 Based on questionnaires and structured 
interviews, she analyses the biographical and career background of senior 
Commission officials, aiming to explain their different attitudes towards concepts 
such as supranationality and intergovernmentalism, democracy and technocracy. 
Although, according to her study, most officials preferred supranationalism to 
intergovernmentalism, it also reveals that the European Community has not succeeded 
in creating recruitment and socialisation mechanisms that are able to generate a 
consistent and uniform 'European attitude' among the European officials. 40 It is 
doubtful, however, whether any organization, even a national administration, can 
achieve a uniform attitude amongst its staff. In a recently published article, Jarle 
Trondal attributes a stronger socialisation power to the Commission than Hooghe. 41 
His results challenge Hooghe's study by showing that national officials seconded to 
the Commission do adopt supranational. values, even though they are less likely than 
permanent Commission officials to adopt 'European attitudes'. Moreover, Trondal 
writes that 'actor-level supranationalism' can strengthen the autonomy of the 
12 
European administrations vis-a-vis member state governments. Such an attempt to 
analyse and account for socialisation processes at the European level is lacking in the 
historiography of European integration. 
39 Hooghe 2001; 1999a; 1999b and 1999c. 
40 Hooghe 1999c: 365. 
41 Trondal 2007: 1113. CE also Trondal 2004. 
42 Ibid., 1112. 
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Hence, concerning both the history of the institutional organization of the 
European bureaucracies and the European administrative staff crucial areas remain to 
be explored. Firstly, the High Authority and Commission administrations have never 
been researched in a comparative perspective. Secondly, a study of recruitment 
patterns of the first intake of staff for the High Authority and the Commission is 
lacking. Linked to this is, thirdly, the question of to what extent member state 
governments and interest groups could influence staffing and the administration in 
general. Lastly, the administrative staff and their alleged European esprit de corps 
have not yet been the subject of historical analysis and, importantly, an analysis of the 
European officials' biographical background and of socialisation factors they were 
subjected to in the High Authority and the Commission is still missing. Accordingly, 
this thesis combines a study of the set-up of the administrative structures and 
recruitment patterns with an analysis of the biographies and careers of the European 
civil servants, as these two dimensions influence each other. By analysing the origins 
of the European administration and the formation and Europeanization of a European 
administrative elite, this project seeks to make a significant contribution to a 
supranational history of European integration. 
3. Concepts, approaches and method 
As the study deals with such different dimensions as institutions, individuals and 
socialisation processes, it is informed by several theoretical concepts and approaches. 
This multi-conceptual approach will help guide the analysis of primary sources in 
relation to the research questions underlying the thesis. 
For the institutional dimension of the thesis, the works of sociologist A 
Rainer Lepsius provide a useful conceptual tool. Lepsius defines institutions as social 
23 
structures. The principles and legitimacy underlying these structures are expressed in 
sym 0 S. 43 Accordingly, one aspect of Lepsius's institutional analysis focuses on 
'central ideas', or, to put it differently, on the ideological foundation of an institution. 
These central ideas have an effect on the structure of institutions, and/or structure, 
behaviour in the institutional context. Lepsius calls this process the constitution of 
criteria for rationality, that is, behavioural norms. The compliance with these norms is 
considered as 'rational' and serves as a code of conduct, which subsequently becomes 
independent of subjective motivations and interests. 44 'Supranationality' as the central 
idea is at the centre of the analysis of the High Authority administration. 
Supranationality was part of the High Authority's self-understanding. With the 
Schuman Plan and the treaty establishing the ECSC, the term 'supranational' entered 
the debates about European integration. Article 9, ECSC treaty, described the High 
Authority as being 'supranational'. The term described something - be it an institution 
45 
or a policy - as standing above nation states. While the Commission shared many of 
the High Authority's characteristics, the term became discredited and did not enter the 
treaty establishing the EEC, as the political circumstances in the mid- 1950s made it 
less likely for member state governments to accept a rhetoric of supranationality, in 
particular after the French National Assembly had rejected the European Defence 
Community (EDC) in 1954. However, the institutional set-up of the ECSC with a 
supranational administration was maintained and transferred to the EEC and members 
of the Commission like Hallstein and Mansholt pursued the ideal of supranationality. 
Therefore, supranationality is also an underlying principle for the Commission. 
43 Lepsius 1995: 394. 
44 Ibid., 395. 
45 Cf also Thiemeyer 1998. 
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Actors are the key to institutions and institutional culture, not least in terms of 
the constitution and conservation of an institutional memory and institutional values. 
Accordingly, Maurizio Bach, a sociologist studying the European administration of 
today, adds a human, or actor, dimension to Lepsius's institutional analysis. 
According to Bach, in order to survive, institutions need social groups whose 
motivations and solidarities shift towards the realisation of the aims of the institution. 
They thus internalise the norms of the institution and their (professional) success 
depends on reaching the targets inherent to the institution. 46Similarly, Ernst B. Haas 
emphasizes that 'supranationality in operation' 'depends on the behaviour of men and 
groups of men'. 47 Hence, the institutional and the human dimensions are inseparable 
and it is vital to reconstruct the working environment of high officials when 
researching the formation and Europeanization of a European administrative elite. 
The concept of Europeanization in turn is useful for both the institutional and 
actor dimensions of the thesis. Europeanization is a term used by different disciplines, 
mainly the social sciences, to describe a variety of phenomena and processes. Mostly, 
these are defined as processes of adaptation of domestic structures of EU member 
states, accession countries or new member states to EU policies, norms, values, 
48 
legislation or policy-making styles. Referring to the European political system, 
however, Thomas Risse, Maria Green Cowles and James Caporaso describe 
Europeanization as 'the emergence and development at the European level of distinct 
structures of governance 949 , alluding to 
institutions and institution-building and to 
policy networks. Although elite socialisation, mostly referring to adaptation of elites 
46 Bach 1995: 384. 
47 Haas 2004: 59. 
48 On the term Europeanization in general see Risse, Green Cowles and Caporaso 2001; Featherstone 
and Radaelli 2003; Olsen 2002. For Europeanization processes in Central and 
Eastern Europe see the 
contributions in Schimmelfennig and Sedelmaier 2005. 
49 Risse, Green Cowles, Caporaso 2001b: 1. 
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in the member states to these structures of governance, is named as a factor, -50 the 
concept does not seem to have been applied to individuals or groups of people acting 
at the European level. Claudio Radaelli defines Europeanization as 'processes of (a) 
construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, 
procedures, policy paradigms, styles, "ways of doing things" and shared beliefs and 
51 
norms'. Whilst his explanation is also more geared towards change in member 
states, the definition could be used, firstly, to describe the process of institution 
building, for example of the European administrations in Luxembourg and Brussels. 
Moreover, when replacing 'institutionalisation' with internalisation, it could, 
secondly, be applied to individuals. Europeanization can thus be defined as a 
socialisation process whereby people adopt norms, values and aims of European 
institutions such as furthering European integration and extending the power and 
influence of the High Authority or the Commission. This definition of 
Europeanization as a process of institution building and of the emergence of new rules 
and norms at the European level, and as a socialisation process of actors adopting 
these rules and nonns, informs this thesis. 
At the same time, the thesis has to deal with the difficulty of ascertaining 
socialisation effects. This will be done by looking at the incentives individuals had to 
adopt the rules and norms of the European administration and the aim of furthering 
European integration. Such a motivation could, firstly, result from the morally 
grounded conviction that a united Europe is the only way for citizens of Europe to live 
in peace. Secondly, it is possible that European civil servants were more pragmatic 
and less guided by idealistic motives. In this case, Europeanization would flow from 
50 M. E. Smith cited in Featherstone 2003: 13. 
51 Radaelli 2000: 4; and idem. 2003: 30. 
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their 'rational' considerations of what attitude might further their career and how they 
could extend the power of the Conunission, and with it their own influence and 
prestige. 52 The thesis will explore what motives guided action of European officials 
and whether they developed a homogeneous sense of the Community, and attitude 
towards it, and if so, which factors incited them to do so. 
To ascertain a Europeanization of officials, it has to be established if and 
which internal factors inherent to the officials' biographies and which external factors, 
that is, the influence they were subjected to in the High Authority and the 
Commission, facilitated or obstructed Europeanization. Trunk, for example, argues 
that collective traumatic experiences, such as war and other catastrophes, can lead to, 
or facilitate, the redefinition of identity. 53 Identities are not monolithic blocks, 
however, but new identities develop and coexist side by side with old identities. 
Therefore, utilising the concept of 'multiple social identities' seems appropriate as it 
opposes the assumption that one new European identity supplants national, regional or 
other identities. 
54 
For analysing internal Europeanization factors of civil servants, the concept of 
generations or cohorts can be a useful analytical tool. It could help, for instance, to 
detect and explain similarities between the experiences, biographies and motives of 
European civil servants. In his seminal article, Das Problem der Generationen, 
published in 1928, Karl Mannheim first conceived of a generation as marked by 
specific 'generational experiences' dating back to the childhood and youth which had 
an impact on entire groups of people born in specific time spans. 
55 Following 
52 For a contemporary study of these questions see the works of Liesbet Hooge 1999a, 1999b, 1999c 
and 2001. 
53 Trunk 2007: 5 1. 
54Risse 2003: 198-9; idem. 2004: 166. CC also Trunk 2007: 40. 
55 Mannheim 1978 (reprint of 1928). 
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Mannheim, Helmut Fogt developed a theory of 'political generations' in the 200 
century. These generations describe age groups or cohorts that are confronted with 
similar key events that lead them to consciously assess ideas and values of the 
political regime under which they grew up. Each generation has in common a basic 
understanding of attitudes, conduct, norms and values of political relevance. 56 Mainly 
applied by German historians and sociologists to the German case, I will utilise the 
generational approach and test whether it can be applied fruitfully to analyse officials 
of the High Authority and the Commission. The important aspect here is the 
subjective dimension defining a generational experience. 57 It is not about taking 
specific years of birth and imposing a meaning on them. Keeping this in mind, the 
concept may help detect and explain group identities. The high officials analysed here 
were bom between 1897 and 1935. These years correspond roughly to two distinct 
generations: the Jahrhundertgeneration, or century generation, and the 45ers. The first 
refers to individuals bom in the period of circa 1900 to 1912. The latter includes 
58 
individuals bom between circa the 1920s and up to 1935. Research on the 45ers in 
Germany shows that they were deeply marked by World War II and the need to create 
a peaceful order in (western) Europe. As a consequence they generally had a positive 
59 
attitude towards the European integration process. It needs to be tested whether this 
is also the case for European civil servants from the six member states. As to the 
century generation, one assumption is that, contrary to the 45ers, the members of this 
generation were too old and too much influenced by their experiences in World War I 
and the inter-war period to become very much involved and to invest a lot of energy in 
the European integration projec . 
56 Cited in Herbert 2003: 96. 
57 Reulecke 2003: VHI. 
58 Moses 1999. 
-59 Herbert 2003: 105. 
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Finally, institutional structures and administrative personnel are part of what 
anthropologists call organizational or institutional culture. Institutional culture is 
composed of values, norms and aims of the institution, as well as its history and 
particular rules of the game. 60 This concept can be applied to the Commission as a 
whole, or parts of it - numerous studies have pointed to the internal fragmentation of 
the Commission. 61 This thesis analyses aspects of the administrative cultures in the 
Directorates-General (DG) for Competition (IV) and Agriculture (VI). To demonstrate 
the importance of administrative cultures for the development of these policy areas, it 
is useful to draw on a more recent approach in European integration theory: historical 
institutionalism. Scholars of this school such as Paul Pierson developed the concept of 
'path dependence'. 62 They claim that early events in a sequence of events are 
disproportionately important and that the longer a particular 'path' remains 
unchanged, the greater is the possibility of a solution being 'locked in'. 63 It is likely, 
but would need to be confirmed in the thesis, that the founding years of an 
organization and the institutional culture developed during this early period are vital 
as they determine the 'path' an organization, and the policies developed by it, will 
take. 
While these concepts and approaches are used heuristically for informing the 
research questions of this thesis, the method used to address them is a critical analysis 
of a wide range of primary sources, the nature of which is outlined in section five 
below. 
60 For an overview see Allaire and Firsirotu 1984; for an anthropology of the Commission cf. also the 
works of Bellier 1995; Ab6l6s and Bellier 1996; Bellier and Wilson 2000a and 2000b. 
61 See Smith 2004: 4 for an overview. See also the study of V6ronique Dimier on the Directorate- 
General for Development, Dimier 2004. 
62 Pierson 2004. Cf also Rasmussen 2008 for an overview of different institutional isms. 
63 Pierson 2004: 18. 
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4. Structure of the thesis and research questions 
The thesis is divided into two parts, a shorter part A dealing with the High Authority 
and a longer part B dealing with the Commission. In terms of the administrative 
history of Europe, the High Authority certainly has to be considered as a model for the 
Commission. Its institutional legacy is arguably stronger, however, than its influence 
on the integration process in both political and economic terms. The study thus does 
consider the High Authority, but puts more weight on the Commission in the analysis. 
The executives of the ECSC, Euratom and the EEC were merged in 1967. The EEC 
Commission imposed its structure and working methods on the unified Commission, 
the merger being more of a take-over of the other two administrations. The 
Commission thus had the greater long-term impact on EU history. 
The time frame of the thesis is restricted to the founding years of the High 
Authority and the Commission, respectively. The early years of an institution are 
regarded as crucial. Once in place, administrative structures, working methods but 
also core values of the organization are difficult to modify. This leads to the 
assumption, which needs to be investigated in the thesis, that core features of the High 
Authority and the Commission were established in the early years, but created long- 
term 'path dependencies' defining corridors for the future evolution of the 
administration. 64 Consequently, for the High Authority, the core period explored is the 
presidency of Jean Monnet (1952-55). The chapters on the Commission mainly 
concentrate on the early years of the presidency of Walter Hallstein (1958-67). 
Chapters Al and BI analyse the administrations of the High Authority and the 
Commission. The core concerns of these chapters are firstly, the organizational 
decisions taken at the beginning and what consequences these decisions had. The 
64 For the Commýission this is confirmed by Nugent 2001: 19. 
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second concern pertains to the particular difficulties encountered when setting up a 
supranational administration in terms of organization, working methods and staff 
recruitment. Thirdly, assuming that the members of the High Authority and the 
Commission could not act in a vacuum, the impact of different administrative models 
and pressures of national governments and societal actors on the High Authority and 
the Commission need to be assessed. One hypothesis is that the independence of these 
European administrations was most challenged in the area of staff recruitment, the 
patterns of which are also explored in these chapters. These three aspects link up, 
fourthly, with the question in what respect these emerging bureaucracies were 
genuinely 'European', or, to put it differently, whether a European administrative 
culture emerged in the Commission and the High Authority. 
These organizational structures constituted the social environment in which 
European civil servants interacted. Biographical studies of selected groups of high 
officials (83 for the High Authority and 109 for the Commission) are at the centre of 
chapters All and BIL Chapter BIl focuses in particular on officials of the DGs IV and 
VI, as competition and agriculture were two of the most successful policy areas of the 
Commission. First and foremost, these chapters try to answer the simple, but central, 
question who the first European officials were. The chapters systematically study the 
biographical background of these officials, examining their origins, previous 
experiences and their motives for entering the European administrations. This should 
help ascertain whether they had similar backgrounds and experiences and even a 
similar attitude towards European integration. The two chapters, moreover, study 
socialisation mechanisms within the administrations which could 
have facilitated the 
officials' adoption of institutional values, norms and aims and which 
in turn could 
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have resulted in the creation of a European esprit de corps, and ultimately a European 
administrative elite with a similar outlook. 
Chapter BlIl explores the possibilities of linking the results of chapters BI and 
BlI to policy outcomes in DGs IV and VI. According to the concept of path 
, 
A, a tependence, early decisions in a policy area are particularly important as they 
determine the path a policy will take and which is difficult to modify later on. This 
chapter asks, firstly, if and in what way DG IV and DG VI developed distinctive 
administrative cultures. And if so, what were the key elements of these specific 
cultures? Secondly, the chapter examines whether high officials were socialised into 
adopting these cultures. The chapter aims to show how these factors might have 
contri ute to mplementing and reinforcing the path to which the Commission, and in 
particular the DGs, became committed in competition and agricultural policies. 
5. Sources 
There are obstacles to studying what Antonio Varsori calls a 'slippery topic'. 65 One of 
the reasons why the administrative staff of the European institutions have been 
neglected so far lies in the lack of availability of, and access to, source material. As 
personal files are not subject to the 30-year rule and remain closed, the first difficulty 
is finding and accessing sources that give information on the European administrative 
staff. 66 This obstacle was overcome in the thesis by multi-archival research in 
Community, national, political party and private archives in seven countries combined 
65 Varsori 2006: 11. 
66 Article 4§I (b) excludes personal data from the right of the public to access Community documents. 
Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 
regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, Official Journal 
of the European Communities, L 145/43,31 May 2001. 
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with semi-structured interviews with former High Authority and Commission 
officials. 
The historical archives of the Commission and the European Union in Brussels 
and Florence, respectively, were the starting points. However, historians interested in 
the administrative history of the Commission encounter difficulties. For example, the 
files of the Executive Secretariat and the DG for Administration, the two units mainly 
concerned with the administration in the Commission, are not accessible. The lack of 
these sources can partly be compensated by studying minutes of the Commission's 
meetings. While these only reflect the decisions that were taken and not the views of 
individual Commissioners, the decision-making process becomes visible in the third 
part of the minutes. These are the hand written notes of Nodl and constitute the most 
interesting part of the minutes. For the thesis, I have taken into account No#, I's 
minutes of the years 1958 to 1961, inclusive. The situation for the High Authority 
administration is considerably better, as the sources of the Secretariat and DG 
Administration are accessible. Lastly, the archives in Florence hold personal papers of 
a few high officials such as Nodl, Max Kohnstamm and Pieffe Uri. Due to these 
officials' important roles within the administrations, their papers contain important 
source material not only on their biographical background but also with regard to the 
administrative history of the EU. 
Sources of the High Authority and the Commission such as policy proposals 
are generally very technical and give away little about the authors, let alone the 
authors' attitude towards European integration. Records of Community archives thus 
have to be complemented by documents from a range of different archives such as 
governmental archives in the member states and archives of 
foundations and political 
parties. These documents can, for example, convey an outside view of member state 
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governments on the High Authority and the Commission and their personnel. Some 
archives also hold personal papers of key actors such as Monnet, Hallstein, Mansholt 
and Hans von der Groeben. Final-ly, the focus of the thesis on officials from DG IV 
and DG VI has guided the choice of archives. As arguably the main actors in these 
DGs and policy areas were German, French and Dutch, national and non-Community 
archives in Italy and Belgium were not taken into account. 
Given the general shortage of information on high officials in archival sources 
and the technical character of many official sources, these have to be complemented 
with eye-witness interviews. I have conducted 39 semi-structured interviews with 
former civil servants of the High Authority and the Commission. 67 Moreover, I have 
used interviews that were conducted by other researchers for their own research 
projects. 68 The lack of personal files make interviews an important source of 
information on the biographical background of European civil servants. Moreover, 
archival sources rarely convey the atmosphere of a place, or the interpersonal relations 
in the High AuthoritY and the Commission. Such insights gained from interviews are 
extremely valuable for reconstructing the history of the High Authority and 
Commission bureaucracies. Also, in the age of the telephone, it is often not possible to 
trace conversations and decisions in the sources. As Wolfram Kaiser writes, 'to 
compensate for the fragmented written documentation, contemporary historians need 
to make greater use of interviews with key actors in a more systematic way than they 
did in the past' . 
69 No doubt, there are shortcomings of interviews as a source, in 
particular if the interviews take place at a much later date than the actual events. 
67 On oral history and some of the problems this research method entails see 
for example Yow 1994. 
"A large number of interviews is deposited in the Historical Archives of the 
European Union 
(henceforth HAEU) in Florence and the Fondation Jean Monnet pour I'Europe (henceforth FJM) in 
Lausanne. I would like to thank Sibylle Hambloch and JUrgen Elvert for making the 
interviews they 
conducted with former civil servants and Commissioners available 
to me. 
" Kaiser 2005b: 30. 
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Interviewees tend to overemphasize their personal contributions or idealise their time 
in the European administration as their halcyon days. To a certain extent, however, it 
is possible to compare the statements in interviews with written sources, contemporary 
studies and interviews that other researchers have conducted in the 1960s and 1970s, 
thus nearer to the date . 
70 Therefore, if balanced with archival sources and 
contemporary reports as far as possible, interviews can be a useful tool in historical 
research. 
The autobiographical writings of actors entail similar problems. Memoirs were 
rarely written by European civil servants but more often by former members of the 
High Authority and the Commission .71 These have different levels of informational 
value, reliability and accuracy. Moreover, most 'pioneers' of European integration 
often spare the details of the establishment of the institutions' administration and are 
thus generally not very infonnative in this respect. One exception is Robert 
Lemaignen, writing in 1964 with a fresh memory of the difficulties encountered by the 
Commission in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 72 Another, more particular, problem is 
posed by the memoirs of Jean Monnet. 73 It is likely, and sometimes evident, that these 
were read widely by former High Authority and Commission civil servants. This 
background could then influence and even distort their own memory of events, which 
they contributed to interviews or round table discussions, for example. All in all, 
however, a multilateral and multi-archival approach combined with eye-witness 
70 For example Peterson 1971,1974/5; Michelmann 1978a, 1978b. 
7' Exceptions are: Uri 1991 and von Staden 2001. Memoirs of former members of the High Authority 
and the Commission were written by Potthoff 1973, Lemaignen 1964, Madolin 1986, and von der 
Groeben 1995. 
72 Lemaignen 1964, see esp. the first two chapters 'Origines et premiers pas' and 'Le T. E. E. "Bruxelles 
-Paris" 73 Monnet 1976 and 1978. 
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interviews and autobiographical writing provides a sufficiently wide source basis to 
answer the research questions of this thesis. 
36 
A The High Authority of the ECSC 
1. Establishing a supranational administration, 1950-1955: 
challenges and constraints 
Introduction: supranationality in operation 
The High Authority was to be an institution of a new kind. Neither an international 
organization nor a national administration, it was a hybrid between both models: a 
supranational organization, or even, as many thought, 'Europe's first government'. 1 
After taking up office in Luxembourg on 10 August 1952, the High Authority's main 
task was to set up and manage a common market for coal and steel in which neither of 
the industries or governments of member states would receive preferential treatment 
nor be discriminated against. Jean Monnet, the first president of the High Authority, 
had conceived the first European administration as a supranational organization. 
During his presidency, he and his colleagues sought to build an administration that 
could meet this principle. Therefore, the central idea underlying the High Authority 
was supranationality. Living up to the supranational principle was considered 
necessary, not least because the ECSC was seen by many as a first step towards the 
2 
construction of a united Europe. Hence, it had to be a success from the start. In a 
commentary of the ECSC treaty, dating from October 195 1, the French negotiation 
team declared that supranationality was at the basis of the ECSC, and of the High 
Duch8ne 1994: 235. 
Archives Nationales, Paris (henceforth ANP), Archives du Conunissariat du Plan (81 AJ), 160, Note 
E. Hirsch, R6flexions sur l'organisation de la Haute Autorit6, undated. 
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Authority in particular. 3 Some of its institutional features stipulated in the treaty were 
declared as being the gateway to supranationality. These were, for instance, the 
number of High Authority members (nine) which did not correspond to the number of 
member states (six) or the absence of a rule of unanimity for the decisions taken by 
the college of High Authority members. Not least, the report assumed that a higher 
degree of supranationality would soon be attained through the esprit d'equipe that 
would inevitably develop between individuals who collaborated in the High Authority 
and who were 'joint together by the same task, [that is] to really create this 
supranational idea which is the foundation of the treaty'. 4 
In this chapter, supranationality as the central idea of the High Authority and 
the underlying norm for setting up the organization, defining working methods and 
recruiting staff, will be tested against the administrative reality in Luxembourg during 
the Monnet presidency (1952-1955). In three fields of analysis, namely the 
organizational set-up, working methods and recruitment patterns, the chapter 
investigates in what way the ideal of supranationality influenced the choices that were 
made. It examines where the High Authority had to make concessions and deviate 
from the central idea of supranationality. In a similar vein, the chapter analyses how 
independent, vis-A-vis member states and interest groups, the High Authority was in 
recruiting staff and, accordingly, how much independence could be expected of the 
administrative personnel thus appointed. 
3 European Commission, Historical Archives, Brussels (henceforth ECHA), Fonds High Authority 
(henceforth CEAB) 2 34, R6publique Franqaise, Minist6re des Affaires Etrang6res, Rapport de la 
D616gation Frangaise sur le Trait6 instituant la Communaut6 Europ6enne du Charbon et de I'Acier et la 
Convention relative aux dispositions transitoires sign& A Paris le 18 Avril 195 1, Paris, Octobre 195 1. 
4 Ibid., 21. All citations from sources and literature written in French, German and Dutch were 
translated into English by the author. 
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1. The institutional set-up of the High Authority 
The ECSC treaty was extremely vague about the administrative organization and the 
status and number of personnel that the High Authority would need to appoint. In very 
general terms, it stated that the 'High Authority shall make all appropriate 
administrative arrangements for the operation of its departments' (Article 16). It also 
stipulated that the tasks of the High Authority should be carried out with a 'minimum 
of administrative machinery' (Article 5). The college of the members of the High 
Authority was composed of nine 'independent individuals' chosen with regard to their 
general competencies (Article 9) of which eight were nominated by the governments 
of the member states and one was co-opted, thus emphasizing the independent 
5 
character of the High Authority. The members' term of office was six years, with one 
third of the members to be renewed every two years (Article 10). Article 16 assigned 
the president a strong role in administrative matters: 'Under the general rules of 
organization to be adopted by the High Authority, the President shall be responsible 
for the administration of the departments and for the implementation of the acts of the 
High Authority. ' In administrative questions, therefore, the members of the High 
Authority, and the president in particular, were given great autonomy. 
Nevertheless, between the signing of the treaty and it coming into force in 
August 1952, the governments of the member states and the industries concerned 
embarked on preparations for the organization and staffing of the High Authority. The 
coal and steel industries held consultations both at national level and in transnational 
meetings where they discussed staffing and organizational schemes. At the national 
5 The members appointed in 1952 were: the Frenchmen Jean Monnet (President) and Lhon Daum; the 
Belgians Albert Copp6 (Vice-President) and Paul Finet (co-opted member); the Germans Franz Etzel 
(Vice-President) and Heinz Potthoff, the Dutch Dirk Spierenburg; the Italian Enzo Giacchero and 
Albert Wehrer from Luxembourg. 
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level, according to Ulrich Sahm of the German foreign ministry or Auswdrdges Amt 
(AA), a powerful lobby organization of the iron and steel industry in Germany, the 
Wirtschaftsvereinigung der Eisen- und Stahlindustrie (WVESI), had already decided 
on which individuals to put forward for posts in the High Authority that were of 
interest to them. 6 At a transnational. level, in May 1952, representatives of the steel 
industries of the six countries held a meeting in Luxembourg at which they discussed 
the implications of the Schuman Plan for their industry and different organizational 
schemes for the new supranational administration. 7 According to Charles Barthel 
these preparations had little consequences and did not result in more transnational 
cohesion between the coal and steel industries of the Schuman Plan countries. 8 
However, these preparations may have facilitated collaboration between industries, 
enterprises and interest groups in the medium term. 
As to the governments, these also devised plans to influence the organization 
of the High Authority. Some of them were discussed in the Interim Committee in 
which government representatives met several times between April 1951 and July 
1952.9 One example for such a preparatory document is the so-called Spierenburg 
report of February 1952, drafted by Dirk Spierenburg, a high official in the Dutch 
ministry of economics, leader of the Dutch negotiation delegation and future member 
of the High Authority. Spierenburg urged that the problem of the internal organization 
6 Cf. for example ECHA, Fonds Commissions of the EEC and of EURATOM (henceforth BAC) 
233/1980 33, Sekretariat fik Fragen des Schuman Plans, Dr. Sahm, Aufzeichnung fUr die Sitzung am 
Montag, den 11. Februar, betr. Vorbereitende Mal3nahmen fUr den Schumanplan, undated [Feb. 1952], 
10- 15, here 11. Founded in 1874 as the Verein Deutscher Eisen- und Stahl-Industrieller, the association 
was renamed Wirtschaftsvereinigung der Eisen- und Stahlindustrie 
in 1946. 
7 PAAA, Personal Papers of Walter Hallstein, Vol. 14, Max C. Mfiller to Hallstein, 9 May 1952. For 
different organizational schemes in particular of the steel industry see also 
Barthel 1996; for the 
German coal and steel industry and trade unions cf. Bijhlbdcker 
2007 and Biihrer 1986. 
8 Barthel 1996. 
9 The interim Committee did not take any decisions on organization and staffing of the High Authority, 
not least because Germany withdrew the 
internal organization and personnel for the new administration 
from the agenda of the first meeting on 17 May 195 1. Gillingham 
1991: 294. 
40 
of the ECSC institutions should be tackled before the members took up office in order 
to guarantee a smooth start. As the president of the High Authority had particular 
competencies in administrative matters, Spierenburg thought it would be advisable to 
discuss in advance basic questions of the organizational structure of the High 
Authority with him. 10 Indeed, Monnet was involved in preliminary discussions before 
the High Authority's inception. 
Monnet's conceptions of the High Authority's administration were both vague 
and precise. It is worthwhile taking them into account for Monnet had a vital influence 
on shaping the High Authority administration - not least because the president was 
given the necessary powers in the treaty. ' 1 Monnet was, on the one hand, convinced of 
the crucial importance of institutions as regulators in the relations between states. 12 
Contrary to people, who come and go, he considered institutions a factor of stability 
where experiences and knowledge are accumulated. 13 On the other hand, he was very 
cautious when it came to establishing rigid and thus possibly irrevocable structures in 
the High Authority. Similarly, the importance he attributed institutions did not result 
in a penchant for large and bureaucratic machineries. A model he favoured was, for 
instance, the Tennessee Valley Authority in the USA, an independent expert based 
administration set-up in 1933.14 Monnet had introduced a similar structure at the 
French Planning Commission, or 'Plan', which he founded in 1946 to revive and 
modernise the French post-war economy and which he headed until 1952.15 For 
1() BAC 233/1980 33, Vorbereitung einiger formeller und organisatorischer Fragen betreffend die 
Einsetzung der Organe der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl, [no author, 'Bericht 
[Report] Spierenburg' added in handwriting to the document], 19 February 1952,31-39. 
11 Morgan 1992: 1. 
12 Monnet 1978: 360. 
13 Ibid., 449. 
14 Cf. ibid., 398 and Ekbladh 2002 on the TVA. 
15 Monnet 1978: 275f The French Planning Commission was responsible for setting up and 
implementing the Plan de modernisation et d6quipement de ]'Union franqaise, the French national 
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Monnet, the Plan was the proof that an efficient administrative body did not 
necessarily have to be large. 16 He preferred a small and flexible administration de 
mission. In his memoirs, Monnet explained how he expected the High Authority to 
work: 'A few hundred European officials would suffice to let thousands of national 
experts work and to incite the powerful machineries of the enterprises and the member 
states to serve the purpose of the treaty. " 7 The High Authority should not rival 
national administrations but collaborate closely with them as well as with industries, 
interest groups and experts. A small homogeneous team, filled with 'European spirit' 
and capable of adapting to the respective problems and tasks would suffice. 18 They 
should be supported by a small number of departments, as decreed by the treaty 
(Article 5), to assist them in theirjob. 
These concepts did not remain unchallenged. A meeting between Monnet and 
Franz Etzel, a prominent Christian democrat and member of the German Bundestag 
and future vice-president of the High Authority, in July 1952 illustrates the clashing 
views between him and member state governments. The latter were eager to see rigid 
structures introduced to the High Authority from the outset; structures which they 
could, ideally, influence. Monnet explained, however, that introducing a rigid 
organizational structure right from the start would not be appropriate for the High 
Authority, given the novelty of the tasks it had to fulfil. On the contrary, the 
organization of the High Authority should be gradually adapted to the experiences 
programme for modernization and reconstruction. This is often referred to as Monnet Plan or French 
Plan. On the French Planning Commission see Mioche 1987 and Mioche and Caz6s 1990. 
16 Mioche 1987: 75-6. 
"' Monnet 1978: 436. 
18 BAC 233/1980 33, ErwAgungen Ober die Organisation der Hohen Beh6rde, no author, undated 
[19521. 
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gained. 19 He was thus not inclined to accept the proposals and the organizational 
scheme forwarded by Etzel in the name of the German government. Shortly before the 
establishment of the ECSC, in a meeting of Dutch, German and French participants, 
most of them future members and officials of the High Authority, drafts were 
presented by the German delegation for general organizational rules and working 
methods, a reglement d'organisation and a reglement int, 6rieur, provided for in the 
treaty. 20 Monnet rejected both drafts. 
Other member governments such as the Dutch with the Spierenburg report also 
thought about the administration of the High Authority. 21 One of the main concerns of 
the Spierenburg paper was how to avoid the small member states being dominated by 
the large member states. The government of Luxembourg had similar concerns. It 
devised an organizational scheme in which it intended to limit the powers of the High 
Authority president by introducing the post of a secretary general at the top of the 
administrative hierarchy. 22 This draft, which was classified as 'strictly secret', shows 
23 
that the Luxembourg govermnent mistrusted Monnet. All these drafts and schemes 
were attempts to influence the organization and, subsequently, policy-making in the 
High Authority. Not surprisingly, Monnet tried to prevent this kind of influence 
taking. In a similar vein, he opposed the idea of having a permanent German 'mission' 
established in Luxembourg, something the German government envisaged. He 
thought the High Authority as a supranational organization should be enabled to 
19 Ibid., Aide-Memoire Uber die Besprechung mit Herm Etzel, Zeitplan Ober die Inkraftsetzung des 
Schuman Plans, 16 July 1952. 
20 CEAB 3 37, Duits; Voorstel [rest illegible], 4 August 1952,8-17. The participants at this meeting 
were: Jean Monnet, Uon Daum, Pierre Uri, Jacques van Helmont, Etienne Hirsch, Heinz Potthoff, 
Ulrich Sahm, Franz Etzel, Max Kohnstamm and Richard A. Hamburger. 
21 Conrad 1989: 52, mentions projects of the Belgian government and the Belgian coal industry. 
22 Archives Nationales, Luxembourg (henceforth ANL), Fonds Affaires Etrang&es 11384, Plan 
Schuman- Wgociations, Rapports d'ensemble sur I'6volution des n6gociations 1950, document 
STRICTEMENT SECRET, undated [ca. August/September 1950]. 
23 Ibid. For similar fears of the Belgian government that Monnet could dominate the High Authority see 
Conrad 1989: 41. 
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communicate directly with governments of the member states. 24 From these 
preliminary discussions one can derive that Monnet had very precise ideas regarding 
the role, the independence and the supranational character of the first European 
administration. Initially, at least, he succeeded in defending his ideaS. 25 
1.1 The establishment of the High Authority administration 
Faithful to Monnet's initial strategy of maintaining the administrative apparatus small 
and the hierarchies flat, the nine High Authority members and their collaborators 
attempted to organize the administrative services according to functional principles. A 
first draft organizational scheme, drafted by a group of high officials, the comiti de 
d6marrage, envisaged the creation of only four to five large divisions plus a 
Secretariat. 26 The proposal was rejected by the High Authority, not least because this 
would not provide a national of each member state with the leadership of a division. 
More organizational schemes circulated in the High Authority in August and 
September 1952. It was Uri's proposal of 25 September which seems to form the basis 
of the organization as it contained the main divisions and services that were created a 
week later. 27 In the 10 meeting, the High Authority decided to set up twelve 
divisions and services: Economics, Production, Investments, Market, Social Affairs, 
Transport Service, Statistics Service, Legal Service, Financial Affairs Service, Internal 
24 BAC 233/1980 33, Aufzeichnung über die Besprechung bei Herrn Monnet in Paris am 4. August 
1952,2. 
25 Monnet also seems to have succeded in excluding organizational and staff related questions from the 
agenda of the meetings of the Interims-Committee. See PAAA, Abtlg. 2, Sekretariat ffir Fragen des 
Schuman-Plans, Bd. 186, Bl. 1-3, Sahm to Hallstein, Aufzeichnung. Betr.: Gesprdch mit dem Mitglied 
der Belgischen Schuman-plandelegation Herm Vinkh (sic! ), 18 February 1952. 
26 FJM, Personal Papers of Jean Monnet, AMH 31in, Note sur Forganisation de la Haute Autorit6, 
annotations manuscrites de J. M. Corrections manuscrites de P. Uri, undated. 
27 FJM, AMH 3/3/14, P. Uri, Note sur Forganisation initiale du travail et des services, 25 September 
1952. 
44 
Affairs Service, Interpretation and Translation Service and a Secretariat. 28 In an 
interview, Pierre Uri, a close collaborator of Monnet, bemoaned that the first 
organizational chart had been rejected for reasons of nationality, thus deviating from 
the ideal of supranationality. Eventually, 'more directorates were created than initially 
planned' . 
29The 
minutes of the High Authority's meetings do not reveal these quarrels 
about the organizational structure. It is likely that the members discussed these 
questions informally, not least because Monnet thought it important to uphold the 
unity of the college, as least towards the outside. 
The High Authority took a fundamental decision in not dividing the 
administration in coal and steel departments. This was contrary to the opinion of coal 
and steel experts in the High Authority such as the Belgian Frangois Vinck who 
argued that the sectors were too different to treat them in the same divisions. 30 In a 
speech addressed to the organizational committee of the Parliamentary Assembly, 
Monnet explained this decision: 'Had we separated our administration in coal and 
steel, inevitably, the means and ways the High Authority would have embarked upon 
would have been different and would have jeopardised our target of creating a 
common market. '31 Effectively, not separating coal and steel had already been 
envisaged by Monnet before the High Authority took up office. 
32 It can be seen as a 
political move, as blazing a trail for the common market with the possibility of 
extending it to other sectors of the economy and was thus in conformity with the 
supranational ideal. 
28 CEAB 2 713, Proc6s-verbal (PV) of the High Authority, I" October 1952, (pt. 3), 68-70, here 68-69. 
29 Historical Archives of the European Union, Florence (henceforth HAEU), DEP PU 2(g, Entretien 
Pierre Uri-Eric Westphal, Paris, 14 February 1966,4. 
30 FJM, AMH 3/3/29, Note pour Monsieur le Pr6sident, 19 September 1952. 
" FJM, AMH 3/3/23, Expos6 de M. Jean Monnet, Pr6sident de la Haute Autorit6, devant la commission 
d'organisation [de IAssembl6e commune] de ]a Communaut6 europ6enne du 
Charbon et de I'Acier, 18 
November 1952. 
32 PAAA, Abtlg. 2, Sekretariat flir Fragen des Schuman-Plans, Bd. 186, B1.73-77, [Monnet], 
Aufzeichnung Ober die Organisation der Hohen Beh6rde, 16 July 1952. 
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One of the original organizational features of the High Authority was the 
principle of multiple leadership. Responsibility for a service was often not assigned to 
one person but to two or even three. Monnet explained that the traditional form of one 
director heading one division would not have been an appropriate solution for the 
High Authority where a 'balanced judgement' of decisions was particularly 
important. 33 This fon-nula implies that multiple leadership was a shield protecting 
against accusations that the decisions of the High Authority were biased. 
Supranationality was thus put on the defensive and maintaining a high degree of 
independence necessitated extraordinary measures. Also, the president explicitly 
wanted to boost the team spirit among the officials by attributing the leadership of a 
division to individuals with different national backgrounds. Especially the Tranco- 
Gennan couples' were important to Monnet. His 'special relationship' with Vice- 
President Etze134 was thus reflected, at the administrative level, by the pairs Uri and 
his deputy Rudolf Regul in the Economics Division, in the Legal Service by Michel 
Gaudet and Robert Krawielicki and in Transport by Roger Hutter and Werner Klaer. 
The Market Division was headed by the 'three kings' 35 : the German Hermann 
Dehnen, the Belgian Vinck and Tony Rollman from Luxembourg. Multiple leadership 
did not survive the administrative reform of 1959/60, however, when the twelve 
divisions were merged into seven DGs, each headed by one director-general. 36 
Dehnen thus took over DG Coal and Rollman became responsible for DG Steel. ne 
reform was essentially a realignment of the High Authority's administrative structure 
33 FJM, AMH 3/3/23, Expos6 de M. Jean Monnet, Pr6sident de la Haute Autorit6, devant la commission 
d'orgartisation [de I'Assembl6e commune] de la CommunaW europ6enne du Charbon et de I'Acier, 18 
November 1952. 
34 Monnet 1978: 450. 
35 FJM, AMH 4/2/9, Note pour M. Monnet, n. a. [M. Kohnstamm], undated. 
36 CEAB 2 588, Communiqud, 24 November 1959,1-3. For the reform cf. Spierenburg and Poidevin 
1994: 479-486. 
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and hierarchy with that of the EEC Commission in Brussels. It can also be seen as a 
normalisation: there was no need anymore for multiple leadership to demonstrate the 
impartiality of the High Authority. Also, the fact that Dehnen had been responsible for 
the coal sector and Rollman for the steel sector within the Market Division was 
sanctioned by the creation of separate DGs for Coal and Steel. The decision not to 
separate coal and steel was thus reversed once the EEC was set up, because it was 
certain that the competencies of the ECSC would not be extended to other sectors of 
the economy and, not least, because the non-separation had revealed itself to be 
impractical. 
1.2 The influence of high officials on the organization of the High Authority 
High officials had a considerable influence on the organizational structure of the High 
Authority. This was, on the one hand, due to a power vacuum in the High Authority. 
The nine members of the college, of which only three, Monnet, Spierenburg and 
Wehrer, had participated directly in the ECSC treaty negotiations, relied heavily on 
the expertise of a core group of officials, most of whom had either been present at the 
negotiations or were experts in the coal and steel sector. On the other hand, Monnet 
had transferred his working methods from the French Planning Commission to 
Luxembourg. At the Plan he used to surround himself with a core group of 
collaborators who were closely involved in the decision-making process. 
37 in 
Luxembourg, Monnet remained faithful to this practice. Officials such as Uri were 
closely involved in conceptualising High Authority policies and the organizational set- 
up. In particular the members of the comite de d6narrage had a lot of influence on the 
organization. In its first meeting, the High Authority had established this 'kick-off 
37 Uri 1991: 1956. 
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team composed of Uri, Vinck, Richard Hamburger from the Netherlands, the German 
Rolf WagenfUlu, the Italian Cesare Balladore-Pallieri and Christian Calmes from 
Luxembourg. 38 Their main task was to establish an overall working programme for 
the High Authority but they were also asked to draft its organizational structure. 39 Uri, 
especially, authored several memoranda on the organization of the High Authority in 
August/September 1952. His memorandum about the priority tasks of the High 
Authority was a key text in which he established a working programme and drafted an 
initial organizational scheme for the administration. 40 The Economics Division that 
figured in this document was tailored to Uri and to his expertise in economic 
matters. 41 Moreover, he advocated the idea to place the coal and steel sectors in the 
wider context of the economies of the member states. The Economics Division should 
thus be seen as the future European ministry of economics. 
Max Kohnstamm, the secretary of the High Authority, was another confidant 
of Monnet. He tried to use this influence on Monnet to bring more structure into the 
administration and to improve the working methods. Kohnstamm also played an 
important role as a go-between between the different members of the High Authority 
on the one hand and between the members and the administration on the other. 
42 
However, there were limits to the influence of high officials in the High Authority. 
Some of the members disapproved of Uri's extended role and his acting as a 'tenth 
member' of the High 
Authority. 43 The autonomy of high officials was somewhat 
restricted and canalised by the working parties that were introduced in late 1953. 
38 CEAB 2 713, PV of the High Authority, I" session, II August 1952,3. 
39 CEAB 2 713, PV of the High Authority, 8 session, 4 September 1952,35. 
'40 CEAB 9 26, P. Uri, Memorandum über die Gliederung der zuerst anfallenden Aufgaben der Hohen 
Beh6rde, 23 August 1952. 
41 See FJM, Interview Roberto Ducci and Maria Grazia Melchionni with Pierre Uri, Paris 21 September 
1984. 
42 Cf. also Spirenburg 1994: 74. See also chapter AII for a short 
biography of Kohnstamm. 
43 Cf. for example CEAB 2 715, PV of the High Authority, 82 session, 15 
April 1953; Spierenburg 
1994: 69; 72; Interview Katja Seidel (K. S. ) with G6rard Wissels, Overijse, 22 April 
2004. 
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These working parties were formally incorporated into the general organizational 
regulations of November 1954 and presided over by High Authority members. 44 
2. Establishment of practices and working methods 
'Provided with a collegiate structure by the treaty [ ... ] and vested with supranational 
responsibilities and powers, the High Authority had to invent an original working 
method. 945 This note on organizational problems, dating from November 1952, 
suggests that, as a consequence of its supranational character, the High Authority had 
to develop a unique working method. However, one gets the impression that the 
working methods of the early High Authority mainly responded to original 
difficulties. The members of the High Authority had to maintain the principle of 
collegiality and the non-hierarchical structure of the administration had led to a 
situation where directorates and services existed side by side 'deprived of a joint 
leadership apart from the High Authority itself . 
46 Finally, and not least of the 
difficulties, was Monnet's reluctance to introduce stable administrative structures. All 
these problems had to be incorporated in an 'original working method'. 
2.1 Organizing the work in the High Authority 
One of the main characteristics of the launching period was what could be called 
Monnet's personal leadership. For instance, he had a preference for frequent meetings 
with his colleagues and leading officials whom he would summon whenever he 
44 CEAB 1908, Annexe II au Proc6s-Verbal de la 224e s6ance de la Haute Autorit6, Rýglement G6n6ral 
d'Organisation de la Haute Autorit6 du 5 novembre 1954, article 9. 
45 CEAB 1821, J. P. [J. Poincarfl, Organisation du travail de la Haute AutoritC 27 March 1954. 
46 FiM, AMH 6/6/1, Projet de directive du Msident de la Haute Autorit6, undated [January 1953]. 
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deemed it necessary - regardless of the time of the day, whether it was a holiday or a 
weekend. 47 Personal leadership may have been an appropriate working method at the 
very beginning, when a constant exchange of ideas and a high degree of inventiveness 
were necessary to set up the organization and to establish the common coal and steel 
market, but it could not be a permanent solution. Officials soon felt overworked, in 
particular those working in Monnet's entourage. Similarly, the meetings of the High 
Authority were randomly summoned, unorganized and exceedingly long. 
48 There 
were early attempts to regularise the meetings, 49 but these were fruitless as the 
50 
members again tried to introduce ajourfixe for their meetings in the middle of 1955. 
These arbitrary working methods combined with the ideal of the High Authority as a 
'think tank' prevented the institution from becoming a 'normal' administration for a 
long time. Nonetheless, Monnet's personal leadership has become legendary and is 
part of what could be called the founding myth of the High Authority. Franqois 
Duch8ne wrote: 
The atmosphere of permanent emergency he [Monnet, K. S. ] generated (and to 
which quite a few strongly objected) drove people of different and stubborn 
traditions to overwork together and, almost without knowing it, to develop a 51 
corporate identity and pride. 
initially, for Monnet, the principle of collegiality required avoiding all premature 
distribution of tasks among the High Authority members. 
52 For instance, he and his 
collaborators thought that assigning a division to each member would cause suspicion 
in the member states: Ille nomination of the directors is already accompanied by 
" HAEU, INT 609, Interview Gdrard Bossuat with Jacques-Ren6 Rabier, no location given, June 1998; 
Duch8ne 1994: 240. 
" Spierenburg 1994: 78. 
49 CEAB 2 713, PV of the High Authority, 14 session, I October 1952, pt. 1,68-70, 
here 68. 
50 CEAB 2 268, PV of the High Authority, 268 session, 6 June 1955. 
51 Duch8ne 1994: 239. 
52 BAC 233/1980 33, ErwAgungen Uber die Organisation der Hohen Beh6rde, undated 
[ 1952). 
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distrust: at least they have collaborators with a different national background in their 
departments. On the contrary, a member of the High Authority to whom a service is 
entrusted would be in the limelight. v53 Maintaining a high degree of collegiality was 
thus synonymous with preserving the supranational character of the High Authority. 
Not least, according to Barthel, the coal and steel industries strongly advocated the 
collegiate principle, thus hoping that Monnet would be counterbalanced by his 
colleagues. 54 Consequently, it was necessary to find a working method enabling the 
High Authority to address its tasks without abandoning the principle of collegiality. 
In their 15'hmeeting, the High Authority members discussed their working 
methods and a possible distribution of tasks. 55 Monnet felt that these questions were 
closely linked to the role the president would assume within the college. Maurice 
Lagrange, Advocate-General at the ECSC Court of Justice, advised Monnet in this 
matter. 56 Of primary importance for Lagrange was the question of who would have the 
authority vis-A-vis the administration. The treaty made the president head of the 
administration but also provided for the possibility of delegating presidential powers 
to other members (Article 16). Finally, any possible distribution of tasks should not 
prevent the college from keeping an overview of the High Authority's policies and 
from taking decisions in joint deliberations. Monnet, following Lagrange, proposed 
two alternative ways of realising these principles. Either he could assume the role of a 
President-Directeur General who alone would be responsible for the administration 
and the supervision of the preparation and the execution of decisions. A President du 
Conseil was the other solution, whereby each member would be assigned a division or 
53 FJM, AMH 3/3/3 1, P. Uri, Note pour le Pr6sident sur la r6partition des d6partments entre les 
Membres de la HA (confidentiel), 4 October 1952. 
'4 Barthel 1996: 243. 
55 CEAB 2 713, PV of the High Authority, 15 session, 2d October 1952. 
56 FJM, AMH 3/3/18, M. Lagrange, Note sur le fonctionnement des services de la Haute Autorit6,6 
October 1952. 
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a service by delegation of presidential powers. The High Authority would thus 
resemble a Council of Ministers. 57 The minutes of the High Authority meetings do not 
reveal if any decision was taken in this matter. It is likely that neither solution satisfied 
Monnet's colleagues, the first solution assigning too much power to the president and 
the second sacrificing the principle of collegiality. The High Authority thus missed 
out on an opportunity of clarifying competences and defining working patterns early 
on. 
A year later, in autumn 1953, finding a solution became a pressing need as the 
lack of co-ordination between the services on the one hand, and the college and the 
58 administration on the other, seriously affected work in the High Authority. 
Spierenburg, who thought one year of experimenting with the administration was 
more than enough, presented a draft for a reglement general d'administration and a 
59 
scheme for five working groups to be created, chaired by High Authority members. 
This time, Monnet was prepared to delegate some of his powers to his colleagues. The 
options were either to create a 'Council of Ministers' with each member taking over 
responsibility for a division or the establishment of working parties. 60 Monnet 
favoured the first solution whereas Kohnstamm and Spierenburg urged him to opt for 
the latter model in order to maintain the principle of collegiality. 61 In a memorandum 
to his colleagues, Monnet established a sort of balance sheet of the first year of 
activity. According to him, the members had tried to maintain the college as the High 
Authority's decision-making authority even though the services had worked rather 
57 CEAB 2 713, PV of the High Authority, 15 session, 2 nd October 1952. 
58 FJM, AME 6/4/38, M. Kohnstamm, Note pour Monsieur Monnet (IH), 21 November 1953. 
59 CEA13 2 586, D. Spierenburg, Note pour les membres de la Haute Autorit6,21 November 1953,8- 
12; including the documents 'Projet de R6glement Gdn6ral d'Administration' and the 'Propositions' for 
working groups. 
60 One of the first drafts of an overview of the working parties to be established dates back to early 
September 1953. FJM, AMH 6n16, M. Kohnstamm, Note pour Monsieur Monnet, 7 September 1953. 
61 FJM, AME 617n, M. Kohnstamm, Note pour Monsieur Monnet, 17 November 1953; see also the 
documents in FJM, AMH 6/4/38 and BiffilWicker 2005: 35-36. 
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autonomously when preparing the decisions. While this had been acceptable in the 
launching period, Monnet came to the conclusion that in the future the preparation of 
decisions should not be separated from their execution. After the opening of the 
common market for coal and steel in early 1953, the preparation of new decisions had 
to be inspired by the execution of previous ones. 62 Having said that, Monnet 
cacknowledged that [ ... ] the various services needed some kind of permanent points of 
63 
contact on the highest level' . He then suggested delegating some of his presidential 
powers to his colleagues so that he could concentrate on the overall co-ordination of 
the High Authority, the negotiations with the US on a loan to the High Authority and 
the association of the United Kingdom with the ECSC. 64This suggestion entailed that 
the members took over responsibility for a certain sector of the High Authority. 
Etzel's chef de cabinet, Wolf von der Heide, analysed both Monnet's and 
Spierenburg's proposals and came to the conclusion that Monnet's suggestion would 
weaken the collegiate principle. 65 He was not the only one to make this conclusion as 
the High Authority opted - Monnet, was outvoted - for setting up six working parties 
composed of three to four members each, to the presidents of which Monnet delegated 
his executive powers. 66 However, Monnet remained responsible for the 
implementation of decisions. 67 One reason for Monnet's defeat in this matter was 
mentioned by von der Heide: the collegiate principle was a guarantee for member 
states for the impartiality of the High Authority. 68 With a government-like structure, 
62 CEAB 2 1239, J. Monnet, Memorandum du Pr6sident pour les Membres de la Haute Autorit6,24 
November 1953. 
63 Morgan 1992: 9. 
64 CEAB 2 1239, J. Monnetý Memorandum, 24 November 1953. 
65 CEAB 2 586, W. von der Heide, Vermerk, 28 November 1953,47-49. 
66 CEAB 2 586, Protokoll der 134. Sitzung der Hohen Beh6rde, 26 November 1953,57-59, with the 
final decision being taken on I" December: CEAB 2 718, PV of the High Authority, 137 session, I' 
December 1953. 
67 CEAB 2 718, PV of the High Authority, 137 session, I" December 1953, pt. 1. 
68 CEAB 2 586, W. von der Heide, Vermerk, 28 November 1953,47-49, here 48. 
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where every member took over responsibility for one policy area, it would sooner or 
later be this member who would be decisive in the decisions taken in this area. The 
High Authority thus decided against extending its supranational rule and risking a 
hostile reaction from the member states. 
The six working parties that were created were: Market; Investments, Finance 
and Production; Labour; External Relations; General Objectives, Long-term Policy 
and Short-term Economic Situation; Administrative Matters. This system was 
maintained until the merger treaty came into force in 1967, when the High Authority 
was amalgamated with the Commissions of Euratom and the EEC. The working 
groups' role was to 'coordinate the activities of several divisions interested in similar 
problems; [... ] to direct the studies carried out by the division; to bring final proposals 
to the High Authority for decision; and to oversee the execution of those decisions. ý69 
Efficiently co-ordinating tasks, maintaining the supranational principle and the 
collegiate character of the High Authority had been the main motivations for creating 
working groups. Decisions continued to be taken within the college and each member 
had the right to make suggestions to any working group and to be informed about the 
progress of work in the working parties. Monnet tried to minimise the significance of 
the working parties, however. He emphasized that they were internal working groups 
which would not be visible outside the High Authority. 70 The image towards the 
outside world should be that of a united High Authority, not least because not every 
member, and thus not every member state, was entrusted with the leadership of a 
working group. The introduction of working parties and the delegation of presidential 
authorities were an important step towards a more regularised administration. 
69 Mazey 1992: 41. 
70 FJM, AMH 617/28, [J. Monnet], untitled, 4 December 1953. 
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Similarly, the introduction of the general regulations of organization and the 
internal rules of procedure of the High Authority, mentioned in Articles 16 and 13, 
respectively, of the ECSC treaty, was a long overdue step towards institutionalising 
rules and practices. It had taken the High Authority two years to decide on these 
general regulations of organization, working methods and recruitment that were 
finally introduced on 5 November 1954.71 Monnet's reluctance to fix procedures and 
structures too early, before the administration worked efficiently, explains this delay. 
Thus, there can be no doubt that Monnet's conceptions of the working 
methods of a supranational administration shaped the early history of the High 
Authority. The rather chaotic conditions at the beginning, the endless discussions in 
the frequent but irregular High Authority meetings and Monnet's notion of personal 
leadership, in short, the omnipresent figure of Monnet have become part of the 
founding myth of the first European administration. However, Monnet was 
counterbalanced by members such as Spierenburg, or collaborators such as 
Kohnstamm, who did not believe that an unclear distribution of tasks and 
disorganization were essential features of a supranational administration. It was often 
perceived that only with the advent of Monnet's successor, Ren6 Mayer, did the High 
Authority turn into a smoothly running bureaucracy. 72 Nonetheless, the foundation 
was laid under the Monnet presidency with the introduction of working groups and the 
evolution of the role of the Secretariat within the High Authority. 
71 CEAB 2 223, PV of the High Authority, 224 session, 5 November 1954, Annex I and Annex Il. 
72 Cf. HAEU, INT 659, Interview R. P. B. H. Dingemans, J. Schrain with Edmund Wellenstein, The 
Hague, 10 July 1998. 
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2.2 The role of the Secretariat 
Even before the High Authority took up office, Monnet had suggested the Dutchman 
Kohnstamm for the post of secretary of the High Authority. 73 As Monnet wanted to 
maintain flat hierarchies, the Secretariat was - in theory - not to be interposed 
between the college and the administration. It was therefore not conceived as a 
powerful Secretariat-General that one finds in many international organizations. 74 In 
reality, however, it came close to becoming such a Secretariat-General as it 
subsequently turned into the co-ordinating body that the High Authority was 
75 
otherwise lacking. Although at first reluctant to assign too many tasks to the 
Secretariat, Monnet sanctioned this development. 76 Much of this is due to the initiative 
of the first secretary of the High Authority. Kohnstamm's notes and letters to Monnet 
show the insufficient organization and overlapping responsibilities in the 
administrative services and the need for a co-ordinating body. Through Kohnstamm's 
initiative, the Secretariat became the heart of the High Authority. Importantly, Monnet 
assigned it responsibility for co-ordinating and facilitating the flow of information in 
the High Authority. Notes from the divisions that were initially sent to the members 
77 directly soon had to be forwarded to them via the Secretariat. Also, the divisions 
were to keep the Secretariat informed about their work. 78 In addition, secretaries were 
introduced in each division who met in weekly meetings chaired by Kohnstamm. He 
73 BAC 233/1980 33, Aufzeichnung über die Besprechung bei Herr Monnet in Paris am 4. August 
1952. 
74 Interestingly, the Secretariat of the EEC Commission was conceived in a similar way and 
subsequently experienced a similar development. Anxious not to create a too powerful Secretariat, the 
members of the Commission created an 'Executive Secretariat', situated at the same level as the DGs in 
the hierarchy. However, under executive secretary Emile Nodl, the Secretariat soon developed into the 
power house of the Commission (see for example Kassim 2004). Cf. chapter B 1. 
75 FJM, AMH 6/6/5, W. Ernst, M6moire demand6 par M. Kohnstamm A l'intention de M. Etzel, 30 June 
1953; Spierenburg 1994: 74. 
76 FJM, AMR, 6/4/15, Letter M. Kohnstamm to J. Monnet, 7 August 1953,2. 
77 CEAB 1 82 1, J. Monnet, Note A MM. les Directeurs, I October 1953,4. 
78 Ibid., J. Monnet, Note pour messieurs les Membres et Messieurs les Directeurs, 16 September 1953,3. 
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had suggested these meetings to Monnet in the first place in order to be able to keep 
79 the members informed on what was going on in the High Authority. In reality, 
therefore, the secretary was interposed between the members and the directors. A 
80 
collaborator of the Secretariat called it the 'Cabinet of the nine members'. Since 
September 1953, the Secretariat distributed weekly reports of activities, including 
important dates and events of the High Authority. 81 These reports were established in 
addition to the monthly report of activities of the ECSC for which the secretaries of 
the divisions co-ordinated the contributions of the High Authority. 82 Finally, 
Kohnstamm was also responsible for putting together the agenda of the High 
Authority meetings and for writing the minutes. 83 
In March 1953, it was Kohnstarnm who urged Monnet to establish working 
groups. Otherwise, he argued, the High Authority would reach a dead end and the 
divisions would take on a life of their own and nobody would know what was going 
on. 84 Again in November 1953, Kohnstamm asked Monnet not to create 'mini 
85 
ministers' by assigning the members responsibility for a division. After the 
constitution of the working parties, the information flow was mainly directed via these 
groups. 86 However, the Secretariat was still in charge of co-ordinating the working 
parties, of establishing timetables and reports of their meetings for the members. 
87 It 
thus preserved its influential role in collecting and channelling information. In his note 
to his successor, Monnet wrote that he relied on the Secretariat to keep him informed 
79 FJM, AMR 6/4/15, Letter M. Kohnstamm to J. Monnet, 7 August 1953. 
80 FJM, AMH 6/6/5, W. Ernst, M6moire demand6 par M. Kohnstamm 4 l'intention de M. Etzel, 30 June 
1953. 
81 Cf. CEAB 2 1190-1195. 
82 CEAB 2 1187, Sitzung der Sekretdre der Hauptabteilungen zwecks Vorbereitung des Monatsberichts, 
3 September 1953,1-4. 
83 FJM, AMH 6/6/1, Projet de directive du Pr6sident de la Haute Autorit6, undated [Jan. 19531. 
84 FJM, AMH 6/4/5, M. Kohnstamm, Note pour Monsieur Monnet, 26 March 1953. 
85 FJM, AMH, 6/4/38, M. Kohnstamm, Note pour Monsieur Monnet (111), 21 November 1953. 
8" CEAB 7 405, Note E. Wellenstein to the Directors of the Market Division, 12 October 1956. 
Spierenburg 1994: 74. 
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on everything that was going on in the High Authority as well as concerning the 
relations between the High Authority and the other institutions of the ECSC. For him, 
the Secretariat even substituted a 'cabinet presidentiel'. 88 
2.3 Introduction of the Cabinet system 
Ministerial Cabinets, that is the personal staff of a minister, have been an important 
feature in the French administration since the early 19'h century, but they are also 
known in Italy and Belgium. 89 The High Authority introduced such a Cabinet system. 
However, the sources show no trace of the motives underlying this decision. It is 
probable that Cabinets were introduced on the suggestion of the French, but also the 
Belgian and Italian members of the High Authority who were familiar with this 
system. Seeing the benefits of having one or more personal collaborators, the other 
members would not have objected. The Cabinets were small, with only one and later 
two members, the chef de cabinet and the deputy chef de cabinet. Cabinet officials, as 
personal aides and advisers, were to assist the member in their daily tasks, preparing 
opinions on policy matters and informing them on what was generally happening in 
the High Authority. " Cabinet members were entitled to request information from the 
divisions and services but they could not take part in the meetings of the directors. 
91 
Neither did they have regular meetings amongst themselves like those introduced in 
the Commission. 92 Also, unlike in the Commission, they were not allowed to take part 
in the meetings of the High Authority and/or replace an absent member in these 
88 CEAB 2 91, [J. Monnet], Projet de note du President Monnet pour son successeur, undated [1955], 7. 
89 Ritchie 1992: 96-7. 
90 Interview K. S. with G6rard Wissels. 
91 CEAB 2 1239, A Kohnstamm, Note A MM. les Membres de la Haute Autoritý, 21 October 1953. 
92 The contribution of Jean Degimbe, in: CECA 1952-2002, 
Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communitites 2002,94. 
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meetings. 93 The directors, on the contrary, were frequently called to participate in a 
High Authority meeting. Cabinet officials could, however, represent their member in 
the meetings of the working parties. 94 Another important task of Cabinet staff was to 
maintain contact to governmental bodies and institutions in the members' home 
countries. 
95 Importantly, in the multinational administration of the High Authority, the 
Cabinet staff, which was mainly composed of people having the same nationality as 
the member, was a source of trust. For example, Cabinet members advised their 
members on the possible implications a policy proposal could have in their country of 
origin. 96 Moreover, the Cabinet members' advantageous employment conditions 
suggest their importance for High Authority members. In case the member they 
worked for left the High Authority, they were guaranteed further employment in an 
equivalent position, or they would receive a generous compensatory payment in case 
they had to leave the administration. 97 On the whole, however, Cabinets did not play a 
very important role in the High Authority. They were significant in that they 
constituted a national element in the supranational administration. Crucially, Cabinets, 
introduced by the High Authority, developed into a core feature of the European 
administration and became very influential in the European Commission. 
93 CEAB 2 574, PV of the High Authority, 574 session, 6n April 1960. 
94 CEA. B 2 577, PV of the High Authority, 577 session, 5 May 1960; Interview K. S. with G6rard 
Wissels. 
95 Cf. Bundesarchiv, Koblenz (henceforth BAK), B 102, No 8628, Etzel an Rust, 25 November 1954. 
' interview K. S. with Winrich Behr, Diisseldorf-Hubbelrath, 14 June 2005. 
97 CEAB 3 387, Statut du Personnel des Cabinets des Membres de la Haute Autorit6, I July 1953,119. 
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3. Personnel policy and recruitment patterns 
This section focuses on recruitment patterns in the High Authority before the 
introduction of a regularised recruitment procedure or 'concours' in 1957. The 
haphazard and personalised recruitment of the beginnings had long-term 
consequences for the institution, as many of the initial staff stayed in the High 
Authority for the remainder of their careers, some of them even transferring to 
Brussels before or after the merger of the executives in 1967. The recruitment 
mechanisms exemplify characteristics of the European administration. Moreover, the 
choice of high officials is important with regard to the question of the formation of a 
homogeneous European civil service. According to Monnet and his collaborators, the 
supranational. and independent character of the High Authority should not only be 
reflected in the institutional setting but also in the recruitment patterns. The ideal of a 
nationally autonomous workforce recruited independently by the supranational High 
Authority emerged from an early note on the organization. The skills and the 
personality of the applicants should be decisive and not whether the person was 
presented by a government or 'some kind of organization': 
Naturally, they [the European civil servants, K. S. ] have to be chosen 
indiscriminately among the countries of the Community without favouring one 
country. It will be sufficient to avoid all national preference and to focus on 
the personal skills so that, spontaneously, nationals of the six countries see 
themselves integrated in the services in balanced proportions. 98 
Was the High Authority able to live up to the supranational principle when it came to 
appointing its administrative staff? After all, a strong impact of nationality on 
'8 FJM, AMH 3/l/7, [P. Uri], Note sur l'organisation de la Haute Autorit6, Annotations manuscrites de 
J. M. Corrections manuscrites de P. Uri, undated. 
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recruitment could have obstructed the development of an esprit de corps among the 
administrative staff. 
3.1 Initial recruitment of leading officials of the High Authority 
The treaty negotiations in Paris were considered a good recruitment ground for 
European officials with the right attitude to work in the supranational High 
Authority. " Monnet regarded the participants of the negotiations as a source of 
'European spirit' that they could endow on the High Authority from the outset-100 He 
thought that this hard core of Schuman Plan exPerts should serve as the basis of the 
organization. 101 The national delegations in Paris were composed of a small number of 
people, mostly lawyers and economists and experts of the industries concerned. The 
often described cordial atmosphere at the negotiations and Monnet's ability to 
persuade the delegations not to negotiate against each other but to pursue joint 
solutions contributed to the 'corporate feeling developed in the Schuman 
conference'. 1 02 However, the Luxembourg government, for one, had other reasons for 
proposing members of its negotiation team for posts in the High Authority. Because 
these people had become experts in matters concerning the ECSC treaty, had 
developed a mutual understanding and worked well with Monnet and his colleagues, 
only they would be able to control and restrict the power of Monnet as High Authority 
president who 'wants to dominate this organization to be, [and] surround himself with 
men who obey'. 103 The Luxembourg ambassador in Paris could have a point here as 
Monnet did not regard everyone who had taken part in the negotiations as apt to work 
99 CE ANP, 81 AJ 160, E. Hirsch, R6flexions sur l'organisation de la Haute Autorit6, undated. 
100 FJM, AMH 3/1 /1, Aide-m6moire sur la conversation avec M. Etzel, Correction manuscrites de J. M., 
16 July 1952. 
"' Monnet 1978: 436. 
102 Duch8ne 1994: 220. 
103 ANL, Affaires Etrang6res No. 11393, Le Ministre de Luxembourg en France to Bech, 20 June 1952. 
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in Luxembourg. Hinting at Sahm. from the Schuman Plan department in the AA, 
Monnet emphasized that 'national forces' were not welcome in the High Authority. 104 
Monnet suspected that Sahm was acting on behalf of 'probably Westrick', 105 state 
secretary in the German ministry of economics. The sources do not shed light on 
whether these allegations were true or whether Sahm actually aspired to a post in 
Luxembourg. However, Monnet's reticence regarding Sahm shows his suspicion of 
the German economics ministry, which was not enthusiastic about Monnet's sectoral 
integration model and even less about economic planning. In addition, Monnet could 
have been aware of Sahm's activities as head of the Schuman Plan department in 
securing a sufficient representation of Germans in the High Authority 
ministration. 106 It is very likely that Monnet thus concluded that Sahm would not be 
able to assume the role of an independent European official. 
Clearly, an important obstacle for entering the European administration was 
Monnet's consent and his understanding of who was to be considered a 'European'. it 
was only a handful of national civil servants, economists, trade unionists and coal and 
steel experts who first entered the High Authority in August 1952: Pierre Uri (French 
Planning Commission), Rolf Wagenfiffir (economic advisor to the DGB), Richard A. 
Hamburger (ministry of economics, Netherlands), Hans vom Hoff (DGB), Walter 
Much (ministry of justice, Germany), Frangois Vinck (ministry of economics, 
Belgium), Tony Rollman (Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva (ECE), Arbed, 
Luxembourg), Max Kohnstamm (Dutch foreign ministry), Charles Reichling (foreign 
ministry, Luxembourg), Christian Calmes (foreign ministry, Luxembourg) and Cesare 
Balladore-Pallieri (Italian ministry of finance). 
104 BAC 233/1980 33, Aufzeichnung über die Besprechung bei Herr Monnet in Paris am 4. August 
1952, pt. 9. 
105 CEAB 3 37, Letter R. Hamburger to D. Spierenburg, 5 August 1952. 
lw BAC 233/1980 33 (1952), Auswärtiges Amt, Konferenzsekretariat Tgb. Nr. 1189/52,18 July 1952. 
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The core group of collaborators soon had to be extended. The members agreed 
that each of them would establish a list of candidates for leading posts in the High 
Authority. 107 Monnet wished to discuss these candidacies with each member 
individually. 108 Accordingly, the minutes of the High Authority meetings do not 
mirror discussions on the appointment of leading officials. This way of proceeding 
suggests that recruitment was a very sensitive topic. It is plausible that the members 
confided in Monnet where particular interests of their governments lay and where they 
would be able to make concessions. In November 1952, the High Authority decided 
on the recruitment of the directors. 109 The bulk of leading officials seems to have been 
appointed by January 1953, according to staff lists. 110 The newly appointed directors 
and deputy-directors were invited to suggest candidates for other posts in their 
divisions. In theory, these nominations were subject to approval of the Administrative 
Affairs Committee, III and of a member, usually the member with the same nationality 
as the candidate. 112 In reality, however, the directors, who knew best which abilities 
were needed for a certain task, were free to recruit the candidates of their choice. 
' 13 
These personalised recruitment patterns at the beginning were at the same time 
inevitable and problematic as they could give rise to favouritism. As Sonia Mazey put 
it: 'Internal cleavages - along national, sectoral and ideological lines - which existed 
107 CEAB 2 713, PV of the High Authority, II session, 18 September 1952,59. 
108 CEAB 2 713, PV of the High Authority, 15 session, 2"d October 1952,3-9, here 3. Cf. also CEAB 2 
713, PV of the High Authority, 18 session, 14 October 1952,94-95. 
109 CEAB 2 713, PV of the High Authority, 23 session, 4 November 1952,118-121, here 120-121; and 
CEAB 1 1414, Situation g6n6rale des services du personnel de la Haute Autorit6,29 November 1952. 
110 CEAB 1 1415, Administration Haute Autorit6,27 January 1953. 
11 Cf. Conrad 1989: 64-5 on the role of the Administrative Affairs Committee. 
112 CEAB 1 908, Annexe 11 au Proc6s-Verbal de la 224' s6ance de la Haute Autorit, 
6, Rýglement 
G6n6ral d'Organisation de la Haute Autorit6 du 5 novembre 1954, article 
6. 
113 Spierenburg 1994: 76. 
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wi n the college of the High Authority were thus quickly reproduced and reinforced 
at the administrative level. ' 
114 
3.2 Contacts, networks and the wider implications of recruitment 
High officials who were sent to the High Authority by member state governments 
were certainly chosen for their expertise. However, they were also selected because 
they were associated with certain social, political and economic worldviews and 
preferences which should ideally prevail at the European level. ' 15 Importantly, staffing 
the High Authority appeared no less than a matter of determining the future economic 
and social order of Europe. The question was, for example, whether Europe would be 
governed by a more dirigiste economic policy and economic planning, the path France 
chose after World War H, or a more market oriented policy like in Germany. One of 
the earliest documents raising such concerns came from the foreign ministry in 
Luxembourg mentioned above. In the text, written after the summer break of the 
Schuman-Plan negotiations in August/September 1950, the administrative staff were 
considered as a source of power for whoever would head the High Authority 
administration. The text goes so far as to point out that the recruitment of certain 
persons could entail the danger that social conceptions would be put into practice 
which were not in the interest of the citizens of Luxembourg and which could be 
harmful for the economy and the living standard in the Grand-Duchy. 1 16 From the 
perspective of the governing Christian democrats, Monnet and his collaborators stood 
for (socialist) statism. Having the right people in the right post in the administration 
114 Mazey 1992: 39. 
115 CE BOhlb5cker 2007: 14. 
116 ANL, Affaires Etrang6res, No. 11384, Concerne la guestion des pouvoirs du Pr6sident et la cr6ation 
des services administratifs, STRICTEMENT SECRET, undated [ca. August/Sept. 1950]. 
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was thus considered important, not least in order to guarantee that the appropriate 
(philosophy' would reign in the European administration and, ultimately, in Europe. 
In the notes of a telephone conversation Hamburger, the Dutch official and European 
civil servant to be, and his counterpart in Luxembourg agreed that staffing should not 
be left to the High Authority, not least because they feared that Monnet's personnel 
policy would disadvantage the small member states. 117 
While it was the members of the High Authority who presented the lists of 
potential candidates, 118 these lists were most likely established in close collaboration 
with governments and interest groups in the member states. Experts of the coal and 
steel sector and representatives of trade unions as well as civil servants figured 
prominently on these lists. As the High Authority's main clients, representatives of the 
coal and steel industries had been extremely sceptical about this supranational 
organization deciding their fate. ' 19 The members of the High Authority facilitated the 
entry of personnel from these interest groups into the administration. The candidacy of 
the Luxembourg steel expert Rollman from the steel consortium Arbed, for instance, 
is a case in point. Recruiting him should have accommodated fears in the Luxembourg 
government - and, no doubt, in the Arbed - that the local steel industry would not be 
adequately represented in the services of the High Authority. 
120 Other candidates with 
expertise in, and ties to, the coal and steel sector were Max Schensky, a former high 
official of the German mining administration, Caspar Berding from the Netherlands 
and G6rard Delarge, a former director of a mine in the Borinage in Belgium. German 
industrialists attempted to infiltrate the High Authority's administrative services with 
117 ANL, Affaires Etrang6res, No. 11387, T61. de M. Hamburger (Minist&e des Affaires Etrang6res, La 
Haye) with R. [presumably C. Reichling], 2 April 1952. 
118 See FJM, AMH 4/3/186, AMH 4/3/187, AMH 4/3/188, AMH 4/3/190, AMH 4/3/191, AMH 4/3/192 
and AMH 4/3/193; list of Etzel: CEAB 
12 55, List of Vice-President Etzel, undated, 136-141. 
119 Barthel 1996. 
120 ANL, Affaires Etrang&es, No. 11384, Report Wehrer to Bech, 2 August 1950. 
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trustworthy candidates, as they also feared the statism of Monnet and his collaborators 
from the Plan. When it became clear that the members of the High Authority would 
not be representatives of the industries, they focused on the administrative ranks. 121 
For instance, Etzel secured Wilhelm Salewski, Hauptgeschdftsphrer or chair of the 
WVESI, the director post of the Investment Division. 122 Similarly, Ren6 Tezenas du 
Montcel of the French Groupe de Contr6le Charbon, which was part of the economic 
committee at the High Commission to Germany, was the candidate of Charbonnages 
de France, the French state owned coal-mining company. ' 23 It is thus misleading if 
Barthel argues that Monnet attracted distrust among the industries concerned because 
he rarely opted for experienced people with a coal and steel background. 124 In fact, 
these people actually dominated the technical divisions of the High Authority. 
Certainly, Monnet brought with him a group of officials from the Plan and the 
French civil service such as Uri, Jean-Jacques Rabier, Michel Gaudet, Frangois 
Fontaine, Jacques van Helmont, Andr6 Lamy and young high-flyers such as the 
Inspecteur des Finances, Jean Guyot, who, at the age of 3 1, became director of the 
Financial Service in the High Authority. 125National administrations were generally an 
important source of officials. Many of those who had taken part in the ECSC treaty 
negotiations had served in ministries of the member states. The files of the German 
ministry of economics (BMWi) highlight that national administrations identified and 
presented candidates to the High Authority. Future leading High Authority officials of 
German origin, such as Schensky, Regul (German Coal Administration, Deutsche 
Kohlenbergbau-Leitung, DKBL), Hans Michaelis (BMWi) and Dehnen (DKBL) had 
121 Bührer 1999: 217. 
122 BAC 233/1980 33, Aufzeichnung über die Besprechung bei Herr Monnet in Paris am 4. August 
1952. 
'23 FM, AMH 4/3/339, 'Candidatures pr6sent6es par Charbonnages de France', 29 September 1952. 
124 Barthel 1996: 243. 
" Monnet 1978: 45 1. 
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already been in the focus of the ministry since November 195 1, long before the 
members of the High Authority were even nominated. 126 In fact, the majority of 
leading German officials in the High Authority, employed by January 1953, were 
suggested by the BMWi. 127 While this seems to contradict the supranational. attitude 
Monnet initially sought to maintain when recruiting personnel, a pre-selection of 
candidates at the national level was indispensable as the High Authority 
administration would not have been able to manage and process thousands of 
applications from six member states. 128 Moreover, the bulk of the 1,800 candidacies 
the BMWi collected was not taken into consideration by the High Authority. After all, 
it had autonomy in recruitment matters and civil servants at the BMWi like Hans von 
der Groeben complained that 'suggestions of the BMWi do not have priority'. 129 
Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the High Authority had to compromise in 
recruitment matters. Civil servants in the French foreign ministry pondered how best 
to include officials from the Direction des Affaires tconomiques et Financi6res, the 
ministry's economics and finance directorate, in the High Authority administration. 
These should form a link and a source of infon-nation for the French administration. In 
particular, having French officials of the Quai d'Orsay in the entourage of the High 
13 Authority's president, the centre of decision-making, was of interest. 0 For the 
German government there was more to it than merely having a link in the High 
Authority. It particularly tried to advance individuals who were convinced market 
economists. For example, when a vacancy in Uri's Economics Division came up, 
1 26 BAK, B 102, No. 8614, Kellermann an Dr. Krautwig, Betr.: Organisation der Schumanplan- 
Beh6rde, 27 November 195 1. 
127 BAK, B 102, No. 8614, Deutsches Personal bei der Hohen Beh6rde, 19 January 1953. 
128 CEAB 3 389, C. Balladore-Pallieri, Vorlage ffir den Verwaltungsausschuss, undated [presumably 
1953], 38. The personnel division of the High Authority was inundated with 4,300 applications. 
129 BAK, B 102, H. von der Groeben to StaatssekretAr L. Westrick, 25 May 1953. 
130 Minist6re des Affaires Etrang6res Paris, (henceforth MAEF), DE-CE Coop6ration 6conomique 
1945-1966, Communaut6 Europ6enne du Charbon et de I'Acier, Vol. 527, Note of the direction des 
Affaires Econorniques et Financi6res, 29 July 1952. 
67 
leading BMWi officials sought to get someone into the post who was a market 
economist and could counterbalance the tendencies of planning and dirigisme that 
they believed existed within the High Authority. 131 It was a general concern for the 
German government which economic model would ultimately prevail in Europe. The 
administration of the High Authority was also a battleground of the major tendencies 
in economic governance of the time. 
Obviously, the trade unions were also interested in being represented in the 
services of the High Authority. Whereas Paul Finet was a candidate of the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) at the level of the High 
Authority members, the trade unionists Hans vom Hoff and Guiseppe Glisenti were 
employed at the administrative level. Like Finet, both vom Hoff and Glisenti had 
taken part in ICFFU meetings. 132 In addition, vom Hoff had been the DGB 
representative in the German delegation at the ECSC treaty negotiations and the DGB 
had asked Adenauer to secure a post for him in the High Authority. 133 Vom Hoff thus 
became conseiller in the High Authority. However, the sources of the High Authority 
reveal very little about these discussions as it was never openly acknowledged by 
Monnet that the High Authority employed people because they had a certain 
background or useful contacts. 134 This would have gone against the principles of 
independence and supranationality. Also, once in the High Authority, these people had 
to prove themselves. In the case of vom Hoff, for example, the BMWi deplored that 
he 'was not able to assert himself . 
135 In general, however, trade unionists had 
13 1 BAK, B 102, No. 8614, Vermerk ffir Herm Min. Dgt. Solveen von Dr. Spandau, 6 January 1955. 
132 Cf. International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam (henceforth USH), ETUC 261, 
Conf6d6ration Internationale des Syndicats, Libres. Commission pour le Plan Schuman. Rapport sur la 
s6ance du 3 juillet 1952 A Berlin. 
133 BAK, B 102, No. 8615, Letter DGB to Adenauer, 27 September 1952. 
13" FJM, AMH 4/3/124, Letter J. Monnet to A. Cools, undated [end of 1952/beginning of 1953). 
135 BAK, B 102, No. 8614, Note H. von der Groeben to Staatssekretiir Dr. Westrick, 28 May 1953. 
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excellent relations to Monnet and also Mayer and the European administration was 
one of the few career opportunities outside the trade unions. According to Patrick 
Pasture 'the transnational European trade union elite [... ] shared a common culture 
with the burgeoning European administration' particularly in those divisions dealing 
with social concems. 
136 
One would have expected the International Ruhr Authority (IRA) to be a 
source of well-qualified personnel for the High Authority. The RZA's secretary 
general, H. E. Georges Kaeckenbeeck, tried to persuade Monnet to employ officials of 
the IRA in the ECSC but, as he acknowledged, his attempt was not veiy successful. 137 
However, the High Authority did employ some former IRA staff such as Marcel 
Jaurant-Singer 138 , T. F. Noyon and Ernest Steinmetz. In addition, the High Authority 
benefited from the well qualified secretarial and translation staff of the IRA. 139 For 
political reasons, however, Monnet sought to avoid any obvious continuity between 
the IRA and the High Authority because of the different 'esprit' that should develop in 
the latter, i. e. it should have a strictly non-discriminatory approach. 140 Not 
surprisingly, the German government was only too content to see the IRA dissolved 
and replaced by the ECSC where the Germans were treated as equal partners. 
136 Pasture 2005: 123. 
137 Dorfey 1999: 214, FN 29. 
138 See FJM, AMH 4/3/188; MAEF, EU Europe 1944-1960, Allemagne 1944-1949, Vol. 797 Autorit6 
internationale de la Ruhr (A. I. R. ) (7-10/1943), Telegramm. Le Conseiller Politique an Diplomatie- 
Paris. Baden-Baden, I August 1949. 
139 Interview K. S. with Marcel Jaurant-Singer, Paris, 22 January 2005. 
140 A document even stated that, according to Uri, it should be avoided 'at all costs' to appoint IRA 
personnel. ANL, Affaires Etrang6res No. 11384, 
Concerne la guestion des R2uvoirs du Pr6sident et la 
cr6ation des services AdMinistratifs STRICTEMENT 
SECRET, undated [ca. August/Sept. 19501. 
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3.3 The national balance 
While Monnet and Uri stated repeatedly that the nationality of the candidates should 
not play a role in recruitment, the reality was different. Governments of the member 
states and industries wanted to see their nationals represented in an acceptable 
number, not convinced that their concerns would be sufficiently looked after in an 
institution with a supranational label. For example, the German steel industry did not 
trust an unbiased 'Europeanness' to develop in the High Authority soon, and therefore 
emphasized the need of 'national' criteria in recruitment in order to defend their 
corporate interests, for example the abolition of discriminatory regulations and 
production controls. 141 In spite of the supranational rhetoric, in October 1952 Uri 
presented a note on the 'balanced distribution' of posts which took into account the 
figures of production and consumption of coal and steel, the seats in the General 
Assembly and the population of the member states as criteria for filling posts in the 
High Authority. 142 From the outset, a 'certain equilibrium' between nationalities was 
agreed upon by the members. 143 But these rules should be flexible. 144 It seems the 
resolution to keep a flexible approach towards the national balance was soon 
abandoned. The High Authority admitted difficulties in maintaining a national 
equilibrium because well qualified people with the desired national background were 
often not willing to come to Luxembourg. Especially people from Italy were often not 
prepared to live permanently north of the Alps. 
145 However, the national balance 
meant that it was hardly possible to appoint a more qualified candidate with a different 
14 1 BUhrer 1999: 208-10. 
142 FJM, AMH 4/5/2, P. Uri, Note sur la "repartition 6quitable" pour les postes dans les services, 15 
October 1952. 
143 CEAB 2 713, PV of the High Authority, 23 session, 4 November 1952,118-12 1. 
144 CEAB 2 713, Note A MM. les Membres de la Haute Autorith concernant un entretien informel qui a 
eu lieu le vendredi, 5 d6cembre [1952], 165-7, 
here 166. 
145 CEAB 2 1419, E. Wellenstein, Note pour Monsieur Dinjeart, 30 October 1958,19. 
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passport. 146Sometimes less well-qualified candidates were employed in order to fulfil 
the national quota. 
147 
The departure of high officials and the search for suitable successors triggered 
discussions about whether they had to be replaced with officials of the same 
nationality as this would limit the field of candidates and might discriminate against 
other, more capable, candidates. 148 In these discussions the members usually sought 
that their nationality would not be discriminated against, also because they would be 
pressurised by their governments if they did not ensure the 'adequate' representation 
of their nationality in the administrative services of the High Authority. 149 According 
to Uri the candidate of a government had to be accepted as it was considered a taboo 
to judge the candidate of another member state. As a consequence, he thought that a 
number of candidates were forwarded not with the benefits of the Community in mind 
but, for instance, to get rid of unwanted personnel. 150 In his note of November 1953, 
Monnet stated that the initial phase was characterised, by the careful choice of 
collaborators, 'taking their competencies into account as well as showing 
consideration for national sensibilities - indispensable in the first phase of the 
supranational. organization' . 
15 1 This 'first phase of supranationality' was not followed, 
as Monnet had hoped, by a second phase where the nationality of staff would not play 
a role. Under pressure of member state governments the formula of recruiting 
personnel on a 'wide geographical basis' entered the ECSC personnel statute (Article 
28) and subsequently the personnel statute of the EEC and Euratorn. Lastly, the 
146 CEAB 2 1419, E. Wellenstein, Note pour Monsieur le Directeur du Personnel et de I'Adn-ýinistration 
et Monsieur le Chef du Service Budget et Contr6le, 8 October 1958,18. 
147 CEAB 2 1419, E. Wellenstein, Note pour Monsieur Dinjeart, 30 October 1958,19. 
148 CEAB 2 726, PV of the High Authority, 268 session, 6 June 1955, pt. 4. 
149 CEAB 2 352, PV of the High Authority, Sonderprotokoll des geheimen Teils der 352. Sitzung der 
Hohen Beh6rde vom 19. Dezember 1956, um 19 Uhr in Luxemburg. 
l-"O HAEU, DEP PU 204, Entretien Pierre Uri-Eric Westphal, Paris, 14 February 1966,25. 
151 CEAB 2 1239, J. Monnet, Memorandum du Pr6sident pour les Membres de la Haute Autorit6,24 
November 1953. 
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national balance had another implication. The number of posts given to German 
nationals compared to the number of posts occupied by French nationals expressed, 
for the German government, the degree of equality for Germany realised in the High 
Authority. 152 
3.4 Daily allowances - contracts - personnel statute 
The situation of the first collaborators in Luxembourg was precarious. The 
'Convention about the dispositions of the transitional period', annexed to the ECSC 
treaty, provided for recruitment on a contractual basis before the Committee of Four 
Presidents 1 53 _ composed of the presidents of the Court of Justice, the General 
Assembly, the High Authority and the Council of Ministers - would meet for the first 
time (§ 7, Article 3 of the Convention). This controlling body should establish an 
overall estimated budget, decide on salary levels, the overall number of staff and their 
statute in the ECSC institutions (Article 78(3) ECSQ. At first, the High Authority 
remunerated its collaborators on the basis of - generous - daily allowances which they 
received on top of their normal salary. ' 54 A 29-year old official in the German finance 
ministry could earn an incredible 4,541.40 German mark per month in Luxembourg 
on top of his meagre public sector salary of 518 German mark. 
155 Thus, on the one 
hand, it was very lucrative to work for the High Authority under the daily allowance 
scheme. On the other hand, many individuals who came to Luxembourg sought 
security in their jobs rather than financial advantages. 
156 Recruitment of new staff 
152 BAY, B 102, No. 8614, Dr. Menges an Referat Z2 jiber 1H D (von der Groeben), 30 August 1957. 
153 CC Conrad 1992: 61-63 for the tasks and the work of the Four Presidents Committee. 
1' 4FJM, AMH 313n, Technischer Aufbau, Note, n. a., undated. 5 
155 BAK, B 102, No. 8214, Hartmann [Finance Ministry] to the Minister of Economics, 8 October 1952, 
citing the example of Heinrich Gems. 
1-56 FJM, AMH 3/4/2, R. Hamburger, Chronologie de 1'ex6cution des mesures d'organisation, 10 
October 1952. 
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seems to have been hampered by the lack of job stability. A conu-nitment towards 
European integration or the momentary benefits of high remuneration was not enough 
to keep officials working in the High Authority. Very soon, they demanded secure 
jobs and the opportunity of a career in the European administration. In 1954 
Kohnstam. m. notified Monnet of a general dissatisfaction among staff. 157 The main 
causes were the delay in the introduction of the statute and the randomness of the 
salary levels attributed to individual officials, leaving people doing a similar job and 
having the same qualifications with a different salary. Moreover, the individual 
situation of the officials differed: personnel coming from the Dutch civil service, for 
instance, were only granted up to six months of unpaid vacation from their employer. 
After this period, they had to decide whether they wanted to return to their old job or 
stay in the High Authority. ' 58 Monnet and officials such as Balladore, however, 
thought that the contractual period - with a three months period of notice - was an 
opportunity to test the future European civil servants, to keep the most apt and send 
away the weakest. 
159 
From the outset it was not clear whether staff in the ECSC institutions would 
benefit from a statutory regime similar to that of a national civil service. 160 Article 16 
of the ECSC treaty merely stated that the 1-figh Authority 'shall make all appropriate 
administrative arrangements for the operation of its departments'. Article 7 of the 
dispositions of the transition period attributed the Committee of Four Presidents the 
task to elaborate a personnel statute but did not state which fonn this statute should 
157 FJM, AMH 6/4/47, Letter M. Kohnstamm. to J. M., 16 July 1954. 
1-58 FJM, AMH 3/4/4, R. Hamburger, Note A MM. Les Membres de la Commission pour les Questions 
administratives, 20 October 1952. 
159 CEAB 2 89, C. Balladore-Pallieri, Plan de travail dans le secteur administratif, 13 July 1953. The 
three months notice period is mentioned in CEAB 3 515, Arbeitsgruppe flir Verwaltungsfragen, 
Protokoll fiber die Sitzungen vom 30. Juni, 7,13. und 14. Juli 1954,15 July 1954,22-36, here 25. 
160 In the framework of this thesis, the preparatory works on the personnel statute of the ECSC, its 
provisions and implications can only be treated in a cursory manner. 
For the statute of the ECSC, the 
EEC and Euratorn see Sassi 2000. 
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have. Jacques Rueff, judge at the European Court of Justice, explained that the 
supranationality of the High Authority was one of the reasons for introducing a 
statute: 'We thought that a corps of supranational officials (fonctionnaires) was, in 
fact, virtually a corps of national civil servants who had supranationality as their 
nationality. And that made us decide in favour of a statute. ' 161 In December 1952, the 
Committee of Four Presidents set up a 'Comitd statut' in charge of elaborating a 
personnel statute and a provisional statute. ' 62 The decision to attribute the staff of 
ECSC institutions the status of European civil servants was thus taken already four 
months after the inauguration of the ECSC. However, work on the statute progressed 
slowly because Monnet did not prioritise this project. 163 He did not want the statute to 
become 'the preamble of the general Statute of the European civil service'. 164 Instead, 
it should be short and adapted to the particular problems of the ECSC. In addition, 
discussions at the level of member state governments hampered work on the statute. A 
point of discord between the member states was, for instance, the detachment 
procedure. High officials in the Quai d'Orsay wished to uphold the possibility of 
sending, or 'detaching', French civil servants to the Community administration where 
they would stay for a limited period of time and then return to the French civil 
service. 165 In this, the French were supported by Gennan officials in the AA and the 
161 CEAB 12 73, Compte rendu de la r6union 'Statut du personnel', 28 October 1953,43. 
162 CEAB 2 1146, An die Herren Mitglieder der Hohen Behörde, Aufzeichnung über die Sitzung des 
Ausschusses der vier Präsidenten vorn 19. Dezember 1952, Vertraulich, 22 December 1952,4-6. 
'63 Conrad 1992: 65. However, it took the United Nations seven years to adopt a personnel statute. See 
CEAB 3 542, Colloque international sur la formation et le perfectionnement des fonctionnaires 
europ6ens, Observations pr6liminaires pr6sent6es par 
M. A. R. Courtois, Pr6sident du Comit6 Ex6cutif 
de la FICSA, 20 October 1955,36-39, here 37. 
" FJM, AMH 4/l/3 1, J. M., M6morandurn du Prdsident de la Haute Autoritd sur le statut des 
fonctionnaires, 25 October 1954. 
165 MAEF, DE-CE Coop6ration 6conomique 1945-1966, Communaut6 Europ6enne du Charbon et de 
I'Acier, Vol 527, Note pour Monsieur le Ministre de I'Industrie et du Commerce de Relations avec 
]a 
Communaut6 Europ6enne du Charbon et de IAcier, 18 March 1955. 
74 
BMWi. 166 Monnet was opposed to incorporating detached national civil servants in 
the services of the High Authority. On his initiative, Article 27 of the draft statute 
comprised a paragraph that required national civil servants to quit their post in the 
national administration before they could take up a post in one of the ECSC 
institutions. 167 This paragraph was eliminated, however, and did not appear in the final 
version of the statute. After Monnet resigned from his post as president in November 
1954 and left Luxembourg in June 1955, Spierenburg seems to have been the only 
member left to fight the detachment procedure, arguing that it would not guarantee the 
necessary degree of independence of an official. 168 The other High Authority members 
claimed, however, that if officials were guaranteed reintegration in their home 
administration, this would make them even more independent. ' 69 Finally, a very 
important reason for the High Authority members to abandon the principle of 
incompatibility between national civil service and European civil service was pressure 
from the German and French governments. 170 The High Authority adopted the 
personnel statute in December 1955 and Article 2(3) provided for the possibility of 
incorporating officials temporarily in the ECSC services. 17 1 Detachment and national 
balance were the elements that underline most the grip of the member state 
governments on the High Authority's staffing policy. Conrad sees in this a gradual 
166 PAAA, B 18, Bd. 15 1, Dr. Mfiller-Roschach, Kurzprotokoll der Ressortbesprechung Ober das 
Personalstatut der EGKS, 9 December 1955. 
167 Cf. Conrad 1992: 69. 
168 CEAB 2 294, PV of the High Authority, Points secrets du procýs-verbal de la 294ýme s6ance de la 
Haute Autorit6 du 30 November 1955. 
169 CEAB 2 294, PV of the High Authority, Points secrets du proc6s-verbal de la 294A-me s6ance de la 
Haute Autorit6 du 30 November 1955. 
170 PAAA, B 18, Vol. 7, Dr. MUller-Roschach, Aufzeichnung, 12 January 1956,3. The Benelux 
countries were in favour of European officials quitting the national civil service. 
Cf. ibid., Dr. Motz to 
the Ministers of the Interior, Finance and Economics, 19 January 1956. 
171 CEAB 2 297, PV of the High Authority, 297 session, 21 December 1955. CEAB 12 153, Statut du 
Personnel de la Communaut6, undated [July 1956]. 
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sacrifice of supranational principles under Monnet's successors. 172 However, for 
people who defended supranationality, such as Kohnstamm, the statute was 
nevertheless of crucial importance for the formation of a high quality 'corps of 
European officials'. 
173 
Conclusion: consolidation and bureaucratisation 
'Under no circumstances will we create an administration. We want to maintain our 
organization as reduced as possible and avoid all tendencies of bureaucracy. ' 174 
However determined Monnet and his collaborators may have been to maintain the 
High Authority as a small and flexible administration, bureaucratisation seems to have 
been inevitable, not least because of the increasing complexity of the tasks the High 
Authority had to fulfil. More staff and rigid structures had become indispensable. 
According to Bach, bureaucratisation is a process of consolidation and persistence of 
the supranational institutional framework. 175 This is a positive view of a process that 
was often perceived as hampering innovation, flexibility and rationality within the 
administration. The members and staff did not perceive the High Authority as an 
organization that worked in a smooth and rational way. 176 In interviews, former High 
Authority officials frequently underlined the anarchical character of work under the 
172 Conrad 1992: 70. 
173 FJM, AMH 6/4/3 1, M. Kohnstamm, Note pour Monsieur Monnet, 22 October 1953. 
174 FJM, AMH 3/3/23, Expos6 de M. Jean Monnet, Pr6sident de la Haute Autoritd, devant la 
commission d'organisation [de I'Assembl6e commune] 
de la Communaut6 europ6enne du Charbon et 
de I'Acier, 18 November 1952. 
175 Bach 1995: 370. 
176 CEAB 7 8, C. Balladore-Pallieri, An die Herren Direktoren, 15 March 1953. 
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Monnet presidency where working hours did not exist. 177 Nevertheless, the chaotic 
beginnings and the heavy workload seem to have contributed to forging a 'team spirit' 
among the High Authority staff. Anecdotes such as officials catching a couple of 
hours of sleep in the office, stretched out on the floor under their desks, became part 
of the founding myth of the European administration, also passed on to, and 
propagated by, officials who had entered the ffigh Authority long after Monnet's 
dep, -ulure. 
178 
Another persisting problem under the Monnet presidency were overlapping 
responsibilities and duplication of work between the divisions, which were a result of 
an ambiguous demarcation of responsibilities. Defining the scope of the divisions 
seems to have caused serious problems that were still not solved long after the 
working groups had been established. 179 For Potthoff a clear demarcation of 
responsibilities between the divisions and services was a first step towards a 
4 rationally' organized administration. 180 It was only when work on the statute reached 
its final stages in spring 1955 that the High Authority saw the need to know the 
structure of its divisions, the number of the different tasks as well as the internal 
hierarchy of each division. 18 1 Before then, there was no detailed organizational 
scheme of the different services and divisions and their internal hierarchies. The lack 
of co-ordination between the divisions also seems to have facilitated an unintended 
increase in staff numbers. Divisions tended to feel responsible for an area, for which 
177 See for example the interviews K. S. with Marcel Jaurant-Singer and with Max Kohnstamm, Fenffe, 
26 April 2004. 
178 Cf. the interviews K. S. with Antoon Herpels, Tervuren, 13 April 2004 and Kees Zijistra, Sneek, 26 
February 2005. 
179 CEAB 3 516, Arbeitsgruppe, ftir Verwaltungsfragen, Protokoll Uber die 9. Sitzung vom 25. 
September 1954,29 September 1954,10-11. 
180 CEAB 7 10, Dr. H. Potthoff, Notiz an das Sekretariat z. Hd. von Herm Ernst, 27 February 1953. 
181 CEAB 12 99, P. Finet, Note pour Messieurs les Directeurs, 29 March 1955,56-7; Spierenburg 1994: 
72. 
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they demanded and employed personnel, that was also covered by other divisions. 182 
The High Authority was thus not able to live up to the aim of retaining a small and 
flexible administration. At the beginning of January 1953, the High Authority had 280 
employees. 
183 At the end of 1958, the number of staff had more than tripled to 938.184 
Increasing staff numbers are an indicator for bureaucratisation but also for the 
changing role of an administration: '[Wlith the opening of the common market, the 
administrative services became increasingly involved in the daily management and 
adjustment - i. e. the execution - of Community policies. '185 The High Authority had 
lost its initial character as think tank working with external experts, dear to Monnet, 
because the services soon aimed at undertaking all the work themselves. ' 86 
By trying to keep the administration small and flexible, did Monnet 'defy 
organizational logic', as Mazey suggests? 187 It is more likely that, with his experience 
at the Plan, Monnet really believed that the High Authority could remain a small 
administration de mission. However, there were external factors that played against 
him, such as member state governments requesting the creation of supplementary 
divisions and observing the national balance. Another factor why Monnet could not 
succeed in keeping the administration small and flexible was that the staff pressed for 
job stability. The statute was thus necessary, but at the same time limited the High 
Authority's flexibility in recruiting and dismissing staff. 
182 CEAB 3 516, Arbeitsgruppe ffir Verwaltungsfragen, Protokoll Uber die 9. Sitzung vom 25. 
September 1954,29 September 1954,10. 
183 CECA, Haute Autorit6, Expos6 sur la Situation de la Communaut6,10 Janvier 1953,18. However, 
another staff list counts only 100 employ6es, 
CEAB 3 389, Situation du Personnel et des Services A la 
date du 27 j anvier 195 3,6- 10. 
184CEAB 2 472, Sonderprotokoll der 472. Sitzung der Hohen Beh6rde vorn 17. November 1958,13 
December 1958,141. 
"' Mazey 1992: 43. 
186 CEAB 2 319, PV of the High Authority, 319 session, 17 May 1956. 
187 Mazey 1992: 45. 
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Even though the Monnet presidency is often described as a period of job 
insecurity, chaotic working methods and disorganization, it was precisely under this 
president that the High Authority took far-reaching decisions on its organizational 
form and introduced working methods that would continue to be used until the High 
Authority ceased to exist in 1967. Similarly, work on the personnel statute had already 
begun in late 1952, but it was only introduced in July 1956, after Mayer had 
succeeded Monnet at the presidency of the High Authority. The introduction of 
working parties guaranteed that the members continued to take decisions as a college 
until 1967, thus preserving a supranational decision-making procedure. The first 
intake of staff had a great impact on the High Authority and the first to arrive were 
often those who stayed longest in the administration as will be shown in chapter AH. 
However, this also resulted in the blocking of high level posts. The 'three kings', for 
example, dominated the coal and steel departments of the High Authority until the 
mid- 1960s. The same can be said for the members of the High Authority. People like 
Coppd, Wehrer, Potthoff and Finet remained in the High Authority, not least because 
they lacked career opportunities in their home countries. The technical nature of the 
High Authority's task made it difficult to trigger further integration and to gain 
attention in the media and among the citizens of the member states. After the 
departure of both Monnet and Mayer, the High Authority would have needed 
members with an 'image of Europe'. Monnet and officials such as Kohnstamm had 
insisted on the wider political impact of High Authority policies and under Monnet's 
presidency there were attempts to reach the public and to make more of the High 
Authority than just the coal and steel authority. ' 88 Still, Mazey's claim that the 'High 
188 Cf. FJM, AMH 614n, M. Kohnstamm, Note pour Monsieur Monnet, Personnel et confidentiel, 30 
March 1953. 
79 
Authority was more intergovernmental than supranational in character"89 overstates 
the influence of the member state governments. She leaves aside all considerations of 
'Europeanization' of High Authority members and staff and of individuals of member 
state governments, industries and trade unions who participated in the Council of 
Ministers or the Consultative Committee and who were certainly affected by the 
structures, working methods and ideas that were at the heart of the High Authority. 190 
In spite of the High Authority not being able to totally live up to the supranational 
ideal, it is likely that working in a multinational administration with a claim of 
supranationality had an effect on its administrative staff and created a corporate 
identity and loyalties with the institution. The next chapter discusses factors that could 
have facilitated or obstructed a Europeanization of high officials in the High 
Authority. 
189 Mazey 1992: 46. 
190 The study of Carbonell 2006b shows that the 
High Authority members did indeed undergo a 
Europeanization in the High Authority. See also Dichgans 1980. 
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11. Towards a European administrative elite? The first European 
high officials 
Introduction 
This chapter examines a group of the first European civil servants in the High 
Authority. Their biographies and careers fonn the basis of the chapter, which focuses 
in particular on possible Europeanization factors. Europeanization processes, as 
defined here, consist of socialisation mechanisms which could facilitate a shift of 
loyalties to the European level and the European officials' adoption of a sense of 
community and supranational aims and values. ' I will test whether in terms of its 
administrative staff the High Authority indeed became a ... hothouse" for 
supranationalism'. 2 The first section considers internal factors of Europeanization, that 
is, the officials' biographical background including their education, experiences and 
careers before entering the High Authority. The second section explores external 
factors that could have triggered or enhanced Europeanization processes such as living 
and working in Luxembourg. The final section features three biographies of European 
high officials. 
The A career, ranging from Al (director) to A7 (administrator), generally 
required a university degree and relevant professional experience. Directors were at 
the top of the administrative hierarchy and headed the largest administrative units in 
the High Authority. Highly qualified civil servants, they served the High Authority 
members as advisers and were responsible for policy drafts devised in their division 
and submitted to the High Authority. The main focus of this chapter will be on A 
1 CE Haas 1968: 13-15 and Deutsch, K. W. et al. (1957): 6. 
2 Trondal 2007: 1112. 
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officials of the Market Division 3, Economics Division and the Secretariat. This choice 
allows the study of a wide range of officials, with one technical division concerned 
with the coal and steel market, the other division dealing with more general economic 
questions and the Secretariat playing a vital role in the smooth running of the High 
Authority. 
Staff numbers in the High Authority changed constantly and are difficult to 
determine. According to the internal ECSC Monthly Bulletin, in July 1956 the High 
Authority had 662 employees, of which 171 A, 54 B and 389 C officials and 48 L 
(language) Staff. 4 Of the 171 A officials, twelve worked in the Economics Division, 21 
in the Market Division and seven in the Secretariat. Altogether, this chapter includes 
19 officials from the Economics Division, 25 from the Market Division and 26 from 
the Secretariat (including the External Relations Division, the Legal Service and some 
5 
officials who served in Cabinets). In addition, 13 officials, randomly selected across 
other divisions of the High Authority, serve as a comparison group. Due to the fact 
that not all officials worked in these divisions at the same point in time but moved on 
to other divisions or left the High Authority, the number of officials studied here is 
higher than the staff numbers given for the individual divisions in 1956. The study 
thus comprises 83 officials which is quite a high proportion of the 171 A officials, 
given that biographical information for the High Authority officials is hard to come 
by. Many of these first European officials bom in the late 19'h and early 20'h century, 
died before it became more common to conduct interviews with witnesses of 
3 In 1959 the Market Division was split into a Directorate-General for Coal and a Directorate-General 
for Steel. 
4 Monthly Bulletin cited in: CEAB 12 89, Note h I'attention du Pr6sident, 18 July 1956,1-2. However, 
according to another document, dating from July 1956, the High 
Authority had 695 officials, 177 of the 
category A, 110 B, 356 C and 52 linguistic staff. 
CEAB 12 89, Note A I'attention du Pr6sident, 18 July 
1956,1-2. 
5 These figures refer to civil servants who spent their entire career or at least part of it in these divisions. 
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European integration since the 1990s and they left few traces in archival sources. 
Some officials, therefore, are merely known by name and by the position they held 
within the administration. For others it was possible to obtain biographical details. 
Due to the fragmented source material, the picture that emerges of the High Authority 
personnel is not exhaustive. However, it is a crucial step towards a fuller analysis of 
the first administrative staff of the European administration in Luxembourg. 
1. Internal factors of Europeanization: the officials' biographical background 
The ideas and ideologies, political convictions and values, and aims and objectives of 
individuals are the result of their accumulated experiences. What (generational) 
experiences did the High Authority's civil servants share? To understand their 
convictions, aims and, importantly, their actions, it is essential to explore and assess 
their biographical backgrounds. 
1.1 Age and social background 
In order to place the officials in a generational context, determining the age groups 
they belonged to is vital. The average year of birth of officials in the first intake of 
Secretariat staff is 1918.6 They were bom between 1905 and 1929. The typical civil 
servants in the Secretariat were in their early to late thirties when coming to 
Luxembourg. Compared to the Secretariat, officials of the Market Division were 
significantly older. Their average year of birth is 1906 with three officials bom in the 
6 18 out of 26 officials. Of five officials the date of 
birth is not known and three were not taken into 
consideration as they entered the High Authority 
in the late 1950s or early 1960s, and thus do not 
correspond to the first intake of staff. 
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19 th century, one in 1897 and two in 1899. Tbree were bom shortly after the turn of 
the century, in 1902 and the youngest was bom in 1922.7 When entering the High 
Authority the officials in the Market Division were on average over a decade older 
than their colleagues from the Secretariat. Finally, with 1915 as the average year of 
birth of staff, the Economics Division was more similar to the Secretariat. The oldest 
official was bom in 1899 and the youngest in 1928. If one includes the officials who 
entered the High Authority after 1956, the average year of birth rises to 1918 in the 
Economics Division. 8 While this renders the Market Division the oldest by far, the 
officials of the comparison group were born in 1910 on average, with two officials 
born in 1899. This corresponds more to the results for the Market Division and shows 
that this higher average age was not exceptional. 
The age distribution suggests that the High Authority staff was heterogeneous. 
However, the officials' years of birth indicate that they may have shared certain 
generational experiences. 9 As explained in the introduction, the concept of generation 
can be a useful analytical tool to determine similarities and differences between 
groups of individuals and thus to reach more general conclusions on these groups. 
JUrgen Reulecke coined the term Jahrhundertgeneration, or century generation, which 
he applied to Germans born between circa 1900 and 1912.10 At first sight century 
generation corresponds to the seemingly unique German experience of defeat in 
World War 1, political and economic crisis in the inter-war years and the rise of 
national socialism. However, I argue that individuals born in these years shared some 
experiences across national borders. They grew up during World War I and 
7 This number includes 14 officials out of 25, of seven the year of birth is not known and four entered 
the High Authority after 1956 and were not taken into consideration. 
8 Twelve out of 19 officials were included. Of six the year of birth is not known. 
9 Mannheim 1978. 
'0 Reulecke 2003. 
84 
experienced political and/or economic instability in the 1920s and 1930s which did 
not only hit Germany but also Italy, France and the Netherlands, for example. Italy 
saw the rise of fascism in the 1920s and during the war France was governed by the 
nationalist collaborationist government of Marshal Philippe P6tain (1940-44). While 
taking into account the diversity of the different personal experiences, the concept of 
century generation can thus be applied to individuals from the six member states and 
was not a generational Sonderweg of German officials. 
Born on average in 1918, the staff of the Secretariat and the Economics 
Division is nearer to the so-called 45er generation, a generation that was profoundly 
marked by World War H and 1945 as an important turning point in their lives. " This 
generation dominated the Commission and is discussed in more detail in chapter BU. 
What impact did the generational background of the officials have on their ability to 
adopt European values? The members of the century generation reached the height of 
their careers in the 1930s and 1940s. Thus the possibility of supporting European 
integration as a new way of peaceful cooperation between European states opened up 
to them relatively late in life. Ulrich Herbert attributes them a high degree of 
rationality and dispassion. 12 Arguably, they were less likely to adopt and internalise 
European values and aims. Considerably younger at the end of World War H, the 
45ers were more likely to adapt to the multinational suffoundings in the High 
Authority. Herbert also attributes them a particularly positive attitude towards the 
European integration projeCt. 13 
" Moses 1999. 
12 Herbert 2003: 98. 
13 Herbert 2003: 105. 
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1.2 Educational background 
Exploring the educational background and previous professional experience of 
officials is vital for comprehending their preferences and decision-making 
behaviour. 14 This subsection explores whether the diversity in age is complemented by 
a diversity of the officials' educational background. This is likely as the tasks of the 
divisions and services of the High Authority were diverse and required a range of 
different skills. Indeed, Table I suggests that there are such variations in the 
educational background among staff of all four groups. 
Table 1. Educational background of high officials. 
No Law Economics Law/ French Engineering Other Not 
university Economics Grande /Mining known 
studies tcole 
Secretariat - 5 4 5 5 - 1 6 
Market 2 1 - I - 14 2 5 
Division 
Economics - 3 9 1 4 1 2 8 
Division I I I I I 
Compari- 1 21 2 - 11 3 
son group I 
With five lawyers, four economists, five with a double degree in law and economy, 
five graduates from a French elite Grande Ecole and one, Kohnstamm, holding a 
degree in modem history, the Secretariat was dominated by generalists. In contrast, 
the Market Division was clearly a division of experts. Fourteen officials held a degree 
in engineering, of which nine specialised in mining. However, at least two of the three 
directors of the Market Division, namely Rollman and Dehnen, had not studied at a 
university but received training on the job. Dehnen had worked in a bank before 
14 Trondal 2007: 1116. 
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embarking on a career in different enterprises in the German coal industry and 
Rollman had left school at the age of eighteen with a certificate of the Ecole 
Industrielle et Commerciale in Luxembourg. He then worked in steel enterprises in 
France and Luxembourg. 15 Of Vinck, the third director, it is not known for sure 
whether he obtained a university degree. It is probable that he, too, trained on the job 
in the Belgian coal industry. 
The Economics Division was, like the Secretariat, a division composed of 
generalists with the exception of one engineer. But the educational background of 
officials of the Economics Division was more complex. Several officials held degrees 
in more than one subject. This can be explained by the fact that in France it was 
common to study more than one subject and French officials were in relative majority 
in this division, or at least in the group studied here. In this respect, the Gennan 
deputy director Regul fitted well into this group as he held degrees in history and 
economics. With philosophy, law, economics and a diploma of the tcole Nationale 
d'Administration (ENA), Uri accumulated the most degrees. While it would go too far 
to compare the Economics Division to the French Planning Commission, it is true that 
with Uri being responsible for recruitment in his division, a network of French 
economists entered the High Authority. Uri, Pierre Pujade and Jacques Cros had 
studied at the Institut de Sciences 6conomiques appliqu6es under the economist 
Frangois Perroux who had connections with Robert Maijolin and the Plan. 
16 Finally, 
the educational background of officials from the comparison group is more balanced 
with generalists and specialists evenly distributed. All in all, judging by the age and 
15 Documentary 'Tony Rollman, une aventure europ6enne', directed by Delphine Kiefer, Luxembourg 
2004. 
16 Information from HAEU, INT-ECH 716, interview Yves Conrad et Julie Cailleau with Jacques-Ren6 
Rabier, Brussels, 8 January 2004. Franqois Perroux (1903-1987) was the founder of the Institut de 
Sciences Economiques Appliqu6s and was among other things Professor at the Colfte de France. 
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eAUcational background, the High Authority staff seems to have been divided into two 
groups: younger generalists of the 45er generation and older coal and steel experts of 
the century generation. 
1.3 Professional background 
The officials' professional background before entering the High Authority can be 
divided into five categories: national civil service; business; interest groups; 
universities and research institutions; and international organizations. 
Table 2. Professional background of group of high officials 
National Business (in Interest University/ International Other Not 
Civil particular groups Research/ organisation 
Service coal and (industry, known 
steel trade unions 
industry) etc. ) 
Secretariat 12 3 3 1 1 4 2 
Market 8 11 2 0 2 2 0 
Division 
Economics 7 - 2 2 0 2 6 
Division 
Comparison 3 3 6 1 2 
group I I I I I I I j 
The bulk of officials had worked in national administrations in the member states. In 
the Secretariat alone twelve officials came from the national civil service. In the 
Market and Economics Divisions, eight and seven officials, respectively, had been 
civil servants. It is not surprising that the group of fonner civil servants was not the 
strongest in the Market Division. In this division expert knowledge of coal and steel 
markets was needed and this was best available from practitioners having worked in 
businesses operating in this sector. This explains the high number of officials (eleven) 
from private enterprises working in the Market Division. On the contrary, the number 
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of officials from private enterprises is nil in the Economics Division and negligible in 
the Secretariat and the comparison group. The number of people from interest groups 
is very low in all three divisions studied here. At first sight, this seems to confirm 
Monnet's claim of the High Authority's neutrality. However, this first impression has 
to be modified when looking at the comparison group where former interest group 
employees constitute the largest group of officials. This suggests that the number of 
former interest group employees in the High Authority as a whole was not negligible. 
1.4 War experience 
In the present study war experience refers to World War H, although some High 
Authority officials had experienced World War 1.17 Set up only seven years after the 
end of World War 11, it is unlikely that the war did not play a role in the High 
Authority - if not in the decisions of the High Authority, then at least in the everyday 
working life of the officials. It is difficult to reconstruct from the sources, however, in 
what way these experiences had an impact. While interviews give some idea, they 
have to be treated cautiously. The war experiences of the officials were diverse and 
include fighting as a soldier against Nazi Germany or in the Wehrmacht, activities in 
the resistance, imprisonment, persecution, experiencing occupation or suffering the 
loss of ftiends and relatives. The question is which mechanisms allowed the officials 
to overcome possible feelings of resentment and mistrust against, especially, their 
German colleagues. Georges Berthoin, Monnet's chef de cabinet, recounts that after 
he had arrived in Luxembourg he invited all the chefs de cabinet to dinner and asked 
them what they did in 1943, including Winrich Behr, then an officer in the General 
17 There seems to be only one official in the Market Division, Otto Hotzel, who fought in both World 
War I and World War 11. 
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Staff of the Wehrmacht. Further, they discussed how to deal with the situation, 
whether it was possible to forgive and forget. The majority of the French and Dutch 
colleagues said, according to Berthoin, that they could neither forget nor forgive but 
that they were determined to look ahead and 'to construct the future together'. 18 If this 
was the motto for dealing with the past, it did not prevent officials from meeting their 
German colleagues with mistrust and even hostility. The Luxembourger Calmes, for 
example, had been imprisoned in the Concentration Camp Hinzert near Trier. 19 In an 
interview he stated that his first reaction to the Schuman Plan was hostile. The only 
positive aspect he found in the proposal was, according to him, that it would lead to 
peace. 20 He also 'tested' his German colleagues, confronting them with what he had to 
endure during the war. Behr recaUs such an encounter when he and his wife were 
invited to dinner by Calmes and Calmes showed them the wrought-iron coat rack he 
had made in captivity. 2 1 However, the attitude of a 'fresh start' without forgetting the 
past was displayed by other officials including Kohnstamm, who had himself been 
imprisoned several times during the war. He befriended Behr and described his first 
encounter with him: 
You walked into my office and said that you were a regular officer. I said that 
was none of my business and that we were here to talk about the future, not the 
past. Later, we talked about the past and there comes a time when this is 
indispensable. But there are times when action has to be forward-looking. 22 
18 HAEU, RqT-ECH 702, Interview G6rard Bossuat and Anais Legendre with Georges Berthoin, Paris, 
31 January 2004. 
19 Calmes wrote a book about his ordeal: GeNes sanglantes. Pr6face de Pierre Frieden. Luxembourg: 
Editon 'Letzeburger Bicherfrenn' 1948. 
20 HAEU, Int 34, Interview Jean-Marie Palayret with Christian Calmes, 12 October 1991. 
21 HAEU, Int 489, Interview Frangois Duch6ne with Winrich Behr, Diisseldorf-Hubbelrath, 29 April 
1987. 
22 Pierre Calarne, The building of Europe: Some lessons for the future, 2 May 1996 (report of a 
discussion between Max Kohnstamm, Winrich Behr, Georges Berthoin, Emile Noti, Michael Palliser 
and Jean Ripert), http: //www. alliance2l. org/en/themes/global/docs/PIC-euro-en. rtf 
(last accessed 5 
June 2008), 5. 
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Calmes and Kohnstamm stand for two ways of dealing with the immediate past. 
Clearly, the 'fresh start' was not always very smooth. 
Also of interest is how the Gennan goverment dealt with the role that 
potential German candidates for the High Authority may have had during World War 
111. The Federation for the Victims of the Nazi Regime urged the Gennan chancellery 
and economics ministry to carefully consider candidates' backgrounds and careers 
during the period of National Socialism and to exclude compromised individuals. 23 
While Hallstein required information on whether the members of the German 
delegation at the Schuman Plan negotiations had been NSDAP members, 24 this was 
not followed through rigorously when it came to staffing the High Authority. 
However, a certificate of 'denazification' was among the criteria Gen-nan candidates 
had to fulfil. The files of the economics ministry reveal a case where a candidate was 
considered unsuitable for working in an 'interstate organization' because of his 
membership of the Waffen-SS. However, it was merely out of consideration of the 
opinion in other member states that this candidate was excluded and not because of a 
conviction of the German government that these individuals should generally not be 
able to make a career in the public sector . 
25 Surprisingly, the German government 
seems to have lacked consideration when it came to the German High Authority 
members. While not a member of the NSDAP '26 Vice-President Etzel, born 1902, had 
a background in the vdlkische Bewegung, or nationalist movement, of right-wing 
student corporations in Germany in the inter-war period and he fought in the 
23 BAK, B 102, No. 8614, Abschrift. Bund der Verfolgten des Naziregimes (BVN) an das 
Bundeskanzleramt und das Bundeswirtschaftsministerium, 21 July 1952. 
24 PAAA, Abteilung 2, Sekretariat, Vol. 90, Bl. 27, Sahm to Hallstein, 31 October 1950. 
25 BAK, B 102, No. 8615, Vermerk Buff, Abtlg. Z2k an HI D 1,28 July 1959. At roughly the same 
time, however, the Commission employed former SS-Obersturmftihrer Siegfried Korth. 
26 A negative search result by the BA Berlin-Lichterfelde confirms that 
Etzel had not been a member of 
the NSDAP. Letter to K. S., 5 May 2008. 
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Wehrmacht during the war. These corporations were traditionally anti-Semitic, 
revanchist and anti-French . 
27 With regard to Etzel and Fritz Hellwig, an anti-French 
nationalist before and during World War H, BiffilbAcker concludes in his study that the 
'federal government displayed a considerable moral indifference' when it came to the 
assignment of posts in the High Authority to politically incriminated individuals. 28 At 
first sight, Heinz Potthoff, a trade unionist and candidate of the DGB, seems to have 
been chosen because he had not been a member of the NSDAP. Yet, Potthoff was 
only second choice because the DGB's first candidate, Heinrich Deist, had been a 
NSDAP member and Adenauer feared that his candidature would be criticized or even 
rejected by the other member states on this ground . 
29However, consideration for the 
other member states was only a pretext for Adenauer to reject Deist's candidature, as 
his economic orientation, which tended towards economic planning, could have 
caused problems for Etzel who was supposed to defend the values of the social market 
economy in the High Authority. 30 
All in all, the German government did not pursue a convincing policy to 
exclude all individuals with a dubious past from entering the High Authority. In a 
way, Etzel's and Hellwig's biographies are representative for Germans of the century 
generation. It is also not untypical that after the war both became convinced 
democrats. In this respect, the choice of Etzel, a co-founder of the CDU, as vice- 
president of the High Authority was logical because he was a prominent personality in 
western Germany and close to Adenauer. His candidature should signal the 
importance the German government attributed to the ECSC. Combining the former 
27 On Etzel see BUhlbAcker 2007: 149-88. 
28 Ibid., 355. 
29 234. Kabinettssitzung, II July 1952, TOP A (>Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung< online) 
http: //www. bundesarchiv. delcocoonlbarchII020AA1952klkapl-21kap2-541para3-l5. 
html (accessed 7 
January 2008). 
30 BUhlbAcker 2007: 287. 
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nationalists Etzel and Hellwig with Monnet and other High Authority members, some 
of whom had fought in the resistance movement such as Giacchero, could have led to 
conflicts - unless they granted each other the right to renounce old beliefs and the 
ability to change. Moreover, at the origins of the fruitftil collaboration between 
Monnet and Etzel was certainly also the attitude of 'do not forget but look ahead'. 
However, this attitude could sometimes be forced upon the High Authority members 
as they had to accommodate the candidate choices of member state governments. This 
becomes evident in the case of Etzel's successor at the High Authority, Karl-Maria 
Hettlage (1959-1967), a former member of the SS and close collaborator of Albert 
Speer. 31 Neither the governments of the other member states nor the High Authority 
protested against Hettlage's candidature, which was considered a matter of intra- 
German affairs. 
32 
1.5 International experience 
International experience can point to a greater ability of individuals to adapt to new 
work and life-related circumstances. It can render people more open, tolerant and 
flexible. In the case of European officials it could mean that they responded in a 
positive way to the multinational experience in the High Authority and, ultimately, 
adopted the goals of European integration. According to Trondal, officials with 
international experience 'may be conducive to supranationalism' and are more likely 
to adopt 'supranational role perceptions'. 
33 Looking at the proportion of officials who 
had such an experience, and at the nature of this previous international experience, 
31 Carbonell 2006a. Cf also Condorelli-Braun 1972: 84. 
32 Condorelli-Braun 1972. 
33 Trondal 2007: 1116-7. 
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will thus round off the picture of internal Europeanization factors. Table 3 lists the 
international experience of High Authority officials. 
Table 3. Previous international experience of high officials 
International University International Work abroad Other None/not 
organizations studies negotiations known 
Secretariat 2 9 2 1 4 9 
Market 7 4 4 1 2 8 
Division 
Economics - 3 1 1 - 15 
Division 
Comparison 4 2 3 - 8 
group II I I I I j 
The overall figure for international experiences exceeds the number of officials 
analysed because some individuals had accumulated two or more such experiences. 
The figures in the 'none or not known' column are high. It is likely that a large 
proportion of officials in this column actually did not have any international 
experience before entering the High Authority. Otherwise the proportion of officials 
having such an experience would seem excessively high for the early 1950s. 
In the Secretariat, the most widespread international experience was studying 
abroad (nine). Only two officials worked for international organizations and another 
two participated in international negotiations. The overall picture is that of a very 
mobile Secretariat staff. However, the high number of university studies in another 
country, as opposed to other experiences such as working abroad, is also accounted 
for by the relatively young age of the Secretariat staff, in comparison to, for example, 
officials from the Market Division. The former often had not 
had the time to gain 
more experiences before entering the High Authority. 
The officials of the Market Division had the most diverse international 
experience. Seven had worked temporarily 
for international organizations such as the 
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United Nations and the OEEC. For example, Dehnen presided over the coal 
committee at the OEEC. 34 Vinck participated in the Schuman Plan negotiations and 
had been the president of the coal committee of the United Nations. The case of 
Rollman, who had diverse international experiences, is discussed in detail in section 
three. All three leading officials had international experience linked to their industrial 
sectors. With four officials having participated in the Schuman Plan negotiations, the 
Market Division seems to have absorbed the core of the small negotiation team that 
entered the High Authority. Officials in the Economics Division had the least 
international experience. Three studied abroad, including Uri, who also participated in 
the Schuman Plan negotiations. Officials in this division were rather young with a 
large proportion raised in the French elite education system where a stay at a 
university abroad was not necessarily an advantage for a successful career in France. 
The general picture that emerges from this analysis is that of a considerable 
mobility of High Authority officials. Part of this mobility goes back to the 
transnationally organised coal and steel industry in the inter-war period and initiatives 
concerning these industries in the post-war period. To name another example in 
addition to Rollman, the Frenchman Ren6 Tezenas du Montcel had been the director- 
general of a Polish mining company in the 1930s. After the war he worked for the 
French administration of the Allied Control Commission in Berlin in the industrial 
production division. In addition, the young and mobile staff in the Secretariat accounts 
for a lot of the High Authority officials' mobility. For example, the German Klaus 
Ewig spent several months abroad on work experiences in Great Britain and 
Switzerland during his studies and wrote his PhD thesis in France. 
35 Three 
34 CEAB 12 55, F. Etzel to J. Monnet, 25 September 1952,136-141, here 139. 
35 Interview K. S. with Klaus Ewig, Strasbourg, 21 March 2005. 
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assumptions emerge from this picture. Firstly, the high proportion of internationally 
experienced staff suggests that the High Authority attracted a more than average 
mobile and flexible staff. Secondly, it is likely that these officials possessed an 
increased ability to adapt to work in a multinational and multilingual administration 
where the main working languages were French and, to a lesser extent, German. 
Thirdly, because of their openness, they were more likely to adopt European values 
and aims. Their motives to enter the High Authority may clarify whether this mobility 
coincided with a particular interest in European integration matters. 
1.6 The high officials' motives for working for 'Europe' 
Was it idealism or pragmatism or something entirely different that enticed officials to 
leave their home countries, move to Luxembourg and work for the newly founded 
ECSC? Idealism and pragmatism seem to be the two extremes between which a range 
of motives is situated. However, these motives do not necessarily have to be mutually 
exclusive as individuals can have a set of different motives. No doubt, with regard to 
the long-term success story of the European Communities, in eye-witness interviews 
the number of those who claim they acted out of idealism, and who would like to be 
counted among the pioneers of European integration, is greater than those who admit 
that they were led by pragmatic motives. In an interview Behr said, half ironically, 
that there is hardly any retired European civil servant who does not claim to have had 
this European impetus while working at the High Authority. 
36 
Certainly, some individuals were drawn to the High Authority because they 
wanted to contribute to the success of this first supranational administration and to 
European integration generally. In the main, these idealistic motives were drawn 
from 
36 interview K. S. with Winrich Behr. 
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experiences in World War H. Some individuals worked hard towards getting a post in 
Luxembourg, like the Dutchman G6rard Wissels whose initial application to the High 
Authority was unsuccessful as he lacked professional experience. Wissels then 
worked in the harbour of Rotterdam to gain this experience, reapplied and entered the 
Cabinet of Spierenburg in 1954.37 Typical for a Gennan official, Wolfgang Ernst 
mentioned the 'moral shock' of the Germans after the war and the doubt he and others 
had about whether other countries would ever treat Gennany as an equal partner. 
However, when Ernst met Monnet, he 'became convinced that the Monnet line was a 
real [ ... ] perspective 
for a common European future'. 38 In the case of Ernst and also 
Behr39, idealism was complemented by a political motive, namely contributing to a 
project that allowed Gennany's return to the international political scene and to 
negotiation tables as an equal partner. Some officials date their interest in European 
affairs back to their engagement in the resistance movement. Berthoin was active in 
the Union des 6tudiants patriotiques in Grenoble where he met Simon Nora, another 
V-- RLench official. According to Berthoin they discussed plans for Europe's future 
because they thought a situation similar to that after World War I, a new Versailles, 
had to be avoided. 40 It was thus from a historical perspective that these officials saw 
the need for a united Europe. Kohnstamm had similar motives when he thought that 
after the war Germany should not be oppressed but stabilised, and integrated into the 
intemational community. 41 
Pragmatic motives range from pecuniary or career advantages to simply being 
sent to Luxembourg by an employer. As shown in the previous chapter, work 
in the 
37 Interview K. S. with G6rard Wissels. 
38 HAEU, Int 29, Discussion with Wolfgang Ernst (from the series 06 - , Les origines 
de 
I'administration communautaire", Table ronde organis6e par HUE, 09/07/1991). 
39 Interview K. S. with Winrich Behr, Diisseldorf-Hubbelrath, 14 June 2005. 
40 HAEU, INT-ECH 702,1 nterview with Georges Berthoin. 
41 Mak 2005: 680. 
97 
High Authority was indeed lucrative, at least at the beginning. In March 1953 Monnet 
made it explicit that the High Authority aimed at attracting and maintaining highly 
qualified staff by paying them a high salary comparable to those paid in the private 
sector. 42 Financial reasons may thus have facilitated the officials' decision to become 
expatriates. Allowances compensated for the fact that the officials had to move to 
another country, such as a five per cent residency allowance which the officials 
received on top of their salary. 43 
A motive that has to be situated between pragmatism and idealism was that of 
finding a solution for the European coal and steel industry. After World War H 
leading coal and steel experts such as Salewski and Rollman but also Vinck, Dehnen 
and Schensky pondered the question how the European coal and steel industry could 
survive, particularly in the face of US competition, and came to the conclusion that the 
only possible solution was a close cooperation or even integration of these industries 
at the European level. 44 Writing in the late 1940s, Salewski had been in favour of a 
revival of the inter-war steel cartel of the 1920s45 - for him the ideal form of 
transnational industrial cooperation. 46 Although he finally supported the Schuman 
Plan, his candidature to the High Authority was not uncontested. Etzel and Potthoff 
insisted on Salewski, but Monnet and Uri feared 'that he is too well networked and 
47 
has been linked for too long with the German steel cartels'. Rollman also had the 
survival of the European steel industry in mind but, as he had become an 
internationally accepted steel expert working for international organizations, he was 
42 CEAB 14 2, Commission des quatre Pr6sidents, Proc6s-Verbal de la deuxi6me sdance tenue 
Luxembourg, le jeudi 26 mars 1953,7. 
43 CEAB 1 1347, Personalordnung der Gemeinschaft, undated [1956], 103-135, here 105-110. 
44 For Salewski see Bi1hrer 1986; for Rollman see the biography in section three below. 
45 For the international steel cartel see Barthel 2006. 
46 Bahrer 1986: 93. 
47 CEAB 3 37, Letter R. Hamburger to D. Spierenburg, 5 August 1952, pt, 4. 
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less associated with a particular business or interest group. Therefore, his candidature 
was not contested. 
2. External factors of Europeanization: living and working in Luxembourg 
2.1 Careers in the High Authority 
The length of service can facilitate socialisation processes within an organisation. 
Socialisation theory sees a link between duration and intensity of service and the 
development of an esprit de corps and of a 'perception of group belongingness'. 48 
What kind of a career did the first European civil servants have and how long did they 
stay in the High Authority or European Community institutions? The majority of 
officials studied for this chapter entered the High Authority in 1952 or 1953 (15 of the 
Secretariat, 16 of the Market Division, eight of the Economics Division and twelve of 
the comparison group). A further two officials entered the Secretariat in 1954, three in 
1955 and three more were recruited after 1955.49 Four officials joined the Market 
Division in 1954 and four entered later than 1955 . 
50 The Economics Division recruited 
13 of the officials studied here between 1952 and 1956 and six after this date. 
Civil servants from the Secretariat spent an average of 15.7 years in the 
services of the High Authority, the EEC or the Euratom Commission. Eight officials 
stayed less than ten years, three between ten and 20 years, five between 20 and 30 
years and two over 30 years. 51 One could assume that those who stayed less than ten 
years were the least committed to European integration, especially if they did not 
Trondal 2007: 1118. 
Of three officials the entry date is not known. 
Of four it is not known. 
51 For eight officials the length of service is not known. 
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simply retire but went back to their home countries to pursue their careers. The latter 
is certainly the case for individuals such as Jean Poincar6 and Paul Delouvrier, two of 
the so-called French high flyers, who were offered leading posts in the French 
administration in Algiers. However, among those who served less than ten years are 
also Monnet's close collaborators Franqois Fontaine and Kohnstamm who left the 
High Authority shortly after Monnet and continued to serve him outside the High 
Authority. In their case, time does not seem to have been a determinant factor of 
Europeanization as they already had strong idealistic motives to enter the High 
Authority in the first place. Kohnstamm, for example, believed that he could serve the 
cause of European unity better at Monnet's side than in the High Authority which was 
limited to the coal and steel sector. 52 
With 15.2 years the average length of service of Market Division officials is 
similar to that of Secretariat officials as are the 15.8 years of average service of 
officials in the Economics Division. In the latter, the length of service was between 
53 
three and 32 years. Eleven officials of the Market Division worked ten years or 
longer in the High Authority and only three stayed for less than ten years. 
54 The Italian 
Carlo Facini, who started his career in the Market Division, even worked in the EC 
administration for a total of 35 years. In summary, an average of more than 15 years 
of service for all three divisions is quite long. However, counting from 1952/53, it 
implies that on average these officials left the High Authority before the merger of the 
executives in 1967 or shortly thereafter. Older officials retired and younger officials 
moved on, like Behr who took a job in private business in 1960, at the age of 
42. The 
officials in the Market Division, in particular, were on average 
15 years away from 
52 Interview K. S. with Max Kohnstamm. 
53 This is the average length of service of eleven people. Of eight 
it is not known. 
54 For ten officials the length of service is not known. 
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their retirement age when entering the High Authority. Finally, this average length of 
service is less than the average length of service for officials in the Commission's DG 
IV and DG VI (22 and 24 years). This does not necessarily point to a lesser degree of 
loyalty of High Authority staff towards their institution but can also be explained by 
the younger average entry age of Commission officials, outlined in chapter 1311. 
The possibility of pursuing a career within an institution facilitates the 
development of loyalty links between this institution and its staff. It is thus important 
to find out whether European officials had the chance to make a career in the High 
Authority or, subsequently, in the Commission. Of the Secretariat officials two, 
Kohnstamm and Wellenstein, reached the position of secretary/secretary general 
which corresponds to A1 or director-general. In 1968 Wellenstein became director- 
general of DG External Relations in the Commission. Rabier also became director- 
general in the Commission while Behr was made deputy executive secretary (A2) 
there. Three officials reached the post of director-general in the High Authority, two 
became directors (A2) and two deputy directors (A2). One official became speaker of 
the High Authority. 55 Another two officials became heads of division (M) in the 
Commission, one was conseiller hors classe in the High Authority, usually a position 
corresponding to AI but not necessarily influential. A conseiller was a consultant, but 
often with a reduced amount of responsibility compared to a director-general. Such a 
post could be created to reward someone, for example if a suitable high post was 
lacking, but it could also be used to promote someone to free the post for a more 
talented person. One official reached the post of head of division (M) in the High 
55 After the reorganization of 1961 this should correspond to an A2 post. Cf. Spierenburg and Poidevin 
1994: 482. 
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56 Authority and one reached A4. Four officials had been chefs de cabinet (A2). One of 
them, Wissels, reached the post of deputy director-general (A I) in the Commission. A 
total of seven officials from the Secretariat served in Cabinets at one point in their 
career. 
Of the officials from the Market Division four reached the post of director- 
general in the High Authority and three in the Commission - Vinck among them who 
had already been director-general in the High Authority. Eight officials became 
director in the High Authority and one in the Commission. Another official became 
conseiller in the Comn-iission. Two officials were heads of division in the High 
Authority, one in the Commission. One official ended up as head of the information 
office of the Commission in Geneva and one became chief adviser in the External 
Relations Division. 57 The Economics Division finally counts four directors-general 
(all in the Economics Division) and one deputy director in the High Authority. Robert 
SOnnen first became chef de cabinet and then director in the Commission. Another 
official also ended up director in the Commission. Two officials remained A4 in the 
High Authority and another two became heads of division in the Commission. 58 
Judging from the positions they reached in the hierarchy of the European 
administration, these officials were among the most influential civil servants in the 
High Authority and its coal and steel policy. No official remained in a position below 
A4. Some officials continued to have influential positions in the Commission. In 
particular younger officials were drawn to the Commission long before the merger. 
Facini, Behr and Pujade went to Brussels in 1958 where they were offered good posts. 
56 While in the Commission the deputy chefs de cabinet were attributed A3, in the High Authority they 
were lower on the payscale. For example Spierenburg's 
deputy chef de cabinet Wissels was an A5 in 
1956. See CEAB 12 813, Bulletin mensuel de la Communautý A l'usage du personnel des institutions, 
February 1957,16. 
57 Of ten officials in the Market Division the final career position 
is not known. 
58 Of three officials in the Economics Division the final career position 
is not known. 
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They were attracted by the scope of tasks of the new European administration and 
thought that the future lay in Brussels . 
59Hans Michaelis was one of the few High 
Authority officials who went to the Euratom Commission in the late 1950s where he 
was promoted to director-general. The Bulletin of the ECSC in 1960 shows clearly a 
rising number of people leaving the High Authority. 60 The bulk of High Authority 
officials, however, went to Brussels after the merger in 1967. Overall, former officials 
from the Secretariat and the Cabinets seem to have made longer careers and ended up 
in more senior positions in the Commission. This is not surprising given their younger 
average entry age. With their more general professional training they were also more 
versatile than, for example, a higWy specialised mining engineer. Sfinnen, an 
economist from the Economics Division, said he had no problem adapting to work in 
DG Regional Policy in the Commission. 61 All in all, officials were able to make good 
careers in the High Authority. This could have triggered Europeanization processes. 
Analysing the working and living conditions will add more potentially significant 
dimensions. 
2.2 Living in Luxembourg 
Accounts of the first months after the High Authority took up office can take on a 
nostalgic and mythical note. The officials felt they were part of something new and 
different. 'Creation' and 'invention' are notions which they evoke frequently when 
taMng about the early days in Luxembourg. 
62 When comparing contemporary 
accounts with memories and eyewitness interviews from a later date there seems to be 
59 Interview K. S. with Winrich Behr. 
60 CEAB 12 814, Bulletin mensuel CECA, October - December 1960. 
61 interview K. S. with Robert Sfinnen, Brussels, 9 December 2003. 
62 Cf. for example HAEU, INT-ECH704, Interview Yves Conrad and 
Ghjiseppu Lavezzi with Michel 
Bonnemaison, Brussels, 12 February 2004. 
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an element of truth in these stories. In a letter of October 1952, Kohnstamm. described 
the atmosphere in Luxembourg to a friend. What stands out in his account is his 
impression of the remoteness of Luxembourg, both in a geographical sense and in the 
sense that people were deprived of their usual contacts. 63 They therefore did not have 
a choice but to get involved. In these conditions the dynamics that unfolded and 
developed within the High Authority between high officials were probably more 
intense than if the High Authority had been in Paris or Brussels. It is in smaller and 
more remote places like Geneva, where Monnet gained his experience as an 
international civil servant at the League of Nations, and Luxembourg that international 
or supranational civil servants as well as national representatives learned to think in 
transnational and supranational categories through communication and transaction. 
According to Ren6 Girault, the European institutions and international organizations 
in Europe became milieus in which national perspectives were overcome. 64Former 
High Authority officials' descriptions of the unique atmosphere in Europe's smallest 
65 
capital are in confomfity with Girault's statement. 
Yet, the fact that Luxembourg was only the provisional seat of the High 
Authority had negative repercussions for the lives of its personnel. Faced with job 
insecurity and problems such as schooling for the children, many officials refrained 
from bringing their families to Luxembourg immediately. 66 Later, the permanent 
move of the family to Luxembourg was a difficult decision to make as it could mean 
exchanging bustling capitals such as Paris and warmer climates such as Italy for a life 
in the Grand Duchy. The transport connections were poor, there was no airport, an 
63 HAEU, DEP MK 1, Letter Kohnstamm to Dr. W. A. Visser 't Hooft, Secretary General of the 
,, World 
Council of Churches", Geneva, 24 October 1952. 
64 Girault 1995: 88. 
65 Cf. for example Rabier 1993 and the interviews K. S. with Winrich Behr and Max Kohnstamm. 
m CEAB 2 1146, Gesamtbericht des Ausschusses der vier Präsidenten über die Sitzung in Luxemburg 
am 26. März 1953,54-62, here 59. 
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underdeveloped rail network and no motorways. The Frenchman Michel 
Bonnemaison vividly recalls his move from Paris to Luxembourg where the shops 
closed at five o'clock in the afternoon and the local population was hostile, not least 
because the 'invasion' of ECSC staff had caused a rise in property prices. 67 niS 
isolation contributed to creating close links between the officials - forced links as they 
could hardly escape each others' company. Groups of officials organized their spare 
time or weekends together; for example, the families of Gaudet, Kohnstamm, Behr 
and Wellenstein became friends. 68 Other important meeting places were the European 
parishes, organized on the initiative of ECSC officials. Here the divide was less 
between nationalities than between Protestants and Catholics. 69The High Authority 
also organized activities for its staff. In July 1953 the director of the administration, 
Balladore-Pallieri, spoke of the officials' 'moral isolation' and suggested the High 
Authority should encourage initiatives of officials to develop social relations by 
founding a club . 
70 This initiative was pursued and the Amicale des fonctionnaires was 
founded in October 1953, offering a restaurant, evening classes, sports events and 
excursions. 71 One has to contrast this with Brussels, a larger city where people lived 
further away from each other and where the transport connections, for example with 
Paris, were better. Wissels stated that at first the officials who relocated to Brussels 
tried to 'do it like in Luxembourg', that is, meet with colleagues of all nationalities. 
72 
However, soon a sort of Dutch club emerged. Rabier, who also had insight into both 
administrations, thought that in Luxembourg the relations between officials from 
67 HAEU, INT-ECH 704, Interview Yves Conrad and Ghjiseppe Lavezzi with Michel Bonnemaison, 
Brussels, 12 February 2004. 
" Interview K. S. with Winrich Behr. 
69 Conrad 1989: 111 and interview K. S. with Ferdinand Kuhn-Rdgnier, Luxembourg, 16 March 2005. 
70 CEAB 2 89, Cesare Balladore-Pallieri, Plan de travail dans le secteur administratif, 13 July 1953. 
71 Interviews K. S. with Ferdinand Kuhn-R6gnier and Antoon Herpels. Cf also Conrad 1989: 110-1. 
72 Interview K. S. with G6rard Wissels. 
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different national backgrounds were closer than in Brussels. 73 Not least, this was due 
to both the city and the administration being smaller. The choice of the seat of the 
ECSC certainly turned out to be a lucky one when it came to facilitating more 
cohesion and integration of its multinational staff. G6rard Bossuat cites Gaudet about 
Luxembourg's powers of integration and, ultimately, of transformation of mentalities: 
Luxembourg was a lieu de rencontre, a place of encounters, and place of close 
contacts. There were people with whom one had been unfamiliar, if I may say 
so. Germans who one saw for the first time in a totally different light than one 
used to see them for several generations; people from countries of the north like 
the Netherlands. We met and got to know each other and friendships were 
formed which, thank God, still exist today. Through these friendships we 
collectively discovered what these different countries stood for, what animated 
them in their activities, in their strive for creation and their vision of the ftiture. 74 
The officials' families were part of this transformation process and one important 
medium was the European school. 75 Schooling proved to be a problem at the 
beginning. The existing schools were unable to provide lessons in all the children's 
mother tongues and were also seen as provincial. This problem was attended to early, 
however, as many leading officials had small children and pressed for a solution. A 
temporary remedy was to provide transport to the nearest schools in Belgium, France 
and Germany. 76 While this worked well for older children attending secondary school 
in Arlon, Thionville and Trier, the long commute was strenuous for smaller children. 
Moreover, Italian, Dutch or Flemish speaking children had no access to schooling in 
their mother tongue. To remedy the situation, officials of the ECSC institutions in 
Luxembourg founded the Association des int, 6rets Mucatifs et familiaux des 
73 HAEU, INT-ECH 716, Interview Yves Conrad with Jacques-Ren6 Rabier, Brussels, 8 January 2004. 
74 Cited in Bossuat 2006: 77. 
75 Cf. Conrad 1989: 120-130 for a more detailed account on the founding of the European school. 
76 CEAB 3 20, Urnfrage, 10 November 1952. 
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77 fonctionnaires non-luxembourgeoises de la CE. CA ., chaired by the Belgian 
Registrar at the Court of Justice, Albert van Houtte, to advance the cause of the 
European school. The High Authority allocated resources for the school to the 
association and rented a house in the avenue Pasteur in LuxemboUrg. 78 The first 
measure was to install an infant school in May 1953. The infant school should prepare 
the children for the 'atmosphere of the future European school' . 
79 on I s' October 1953 
the primary school opened its doors. This proved to be a success. In early 1954 the 
school had 141 pupils. 80 A year later, in October 1954, a secondary school followed, 
also financed by the High Authority. 81 While this was a rapid development, it took 
another three years until the school was attributed a statute and, more importantly, 
until the school's diploma was recognised in European countries. 82 The European 
baccalaureat was finally established in July 1957.83 This means that after five years 
some parents still sent their children to Trier or to their home countries for secondary 
school education to make sure that they could continue their education at universities 
without problem. 84 
While a single school for children of all nationalities was necessary because 
there were too few children sharing one mother tongue to justify separate schools, 
ideological reasons for a school educating the children of six countries together were 
77 CEAB 1 1501, tcole Europ6enne A Luxembourg: Ouverture, undated. 
78 ECHA, Communaut6 Europ6enne du Charbon et de I'Acier, Haute Autorit6,3' Rapport G6n6ral, 
D6penses administratives de la Communaut6 durant le deuxiýme exercice financier (I " juillet 1953-30 
um 1954), 39 and 65. 
9 CEAB 3 386, Cesare Balladore-Pallieri, Note pour ]a Commission Administrative, undated[ 19531, 
137 and ibid., Balladore-Pallieri, Note aux fonctionnaires chefs de famille, 6 April 1953,138. 
so CEAB 12 63, Commission des quatre Pr6sidents, Proc6s-Verbal de la sixi6me s6ance, 19 March 
1954,96. 
81 CEAB 12 63, Commission des quatre Pr6sidents, Procýs-Verbal de la septi6me s6ance, II October 
1954,124-125. 
82 CEAB 1 1501, Statut de Itcole Europ6enne, October 1956. 
" Spierenburg 1994: 77-8 and ibid., 77 footnote 152. 
84 In 1957 Uri sent his son to a French Grammar school near Paris where he could specialise in 
philosophy. CEAB 9 554, P. Uri, Note A la Division du Personnel et de I'Administration, 31 October 
1957,258. 
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also advanced. The children should adopt a 'European attitude' by receiving a 
'European education' from the start. 85 Already in the first year, they learned a foreign 
language, German or French, in which they were taught subjects such as history and 
geography. 86 Older children could take up a second foreign language. However, this 
was optional and, looking at the timetable suggested by the association, lessons in the 
children's mother tongue clearly predominated. 87 As the school should also prepare 
the children for secondary education in their home countries, they had supplementary 
lessons in 'national and local history and geography'. Like the European officials, 
their children should also be rooted in their own language and culture while learning 
to understand, interact and work with other cultures and languages. Overall, the 
European school was a central institution for High Authority officials. It contributed 
to forging friendships and acquaintances as parents met through their children. 
2.3 Role models and working methods 
Role models can trigger processes of imitation and social learning. When writing 
about role models in the High Authority, it is appropriate to discuss Monnet first. In 
many eye-witness accounts, Monnet has been described as a quasi-mythical figure. 
For many, he personified the High Authority during the founding years. In the first 
instance, it was the experience of the team spirit of the treaty negotiations, facilitated 
by Monnet, that united the core staff of the High Authority. In January 1953 Walter 
Much, who entered the Legal Service in late 1952, wrote to Hallstein: 'To keep this 
spirit [of the treaty negotiations, K. S. ] alive in the rough climate of reality 
is my daily 
85 CEAB 3 387, A. van Houtte (chairman of the board for studying school problems), 
Entwurf flir eine 
Schule der Gemeinschaft, undated [1953], 152-162, here 152. 
86 Ibid., 154. 
87 Ibid., 160. 
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task. 88 Those who worked with Monnet often conveyed the appeal it had for them to 
work for him. George Ball described Monnet's dynamism and unusual working 
methods in the following terms: 'He was oblivious to the need for allocating time to 
other requirements, such as sleeping or even eating. [ ... I That he seemed always able 
to find men willing to submit to his stimulating but exasperating methods of work 
testified to his extraordinary charisma [ ... 1. '89 In an interview Gaudet recalled 
Monnet's ability to bring people together and to focus their attention and their abilities 
on a certain problem. 90 According to Duchene and Kohnstamm, Monnet was able to 
make people feel important and he let them know that they were making a significant 
conthbution. 91 
Monnet's working methods clearly focussed on participation. During his 
presidency, high officials frequently took part in the meetings of the High Authority. 
According to Wellenstein, 'all officials who had something to do with the problem at 
hand practically had access to the meeting-room of the High Authority. It was always 
a very crowded place. ' 92 At the beginning, there was a 'creative chaos. All opinions 
were allowed. Everybody in the rather large circle around Monnet could suggest 
things, and they were even taken Up., 93 This accounts for the influence of high 
officials in the decision-making process in the High Authority, also shown in the 
previous chapter. Participation certainly contributed to creating loyalty links between 
officials and High Authority members, and, moreover, towards the High Authority as 
an institution and its values and aims. Gaudet claimed that Monnet succeeded in 
88 pAAA' Private Papers Walter Hallstein, I. Privatdienstliche Koffespondenz 1950-1955, Vol. 14, 
Much to Hallstein, 7 January 1953. 
89 Ball 1982: 73. 
90 HAEU, Int 500, Interview Franqois Duchene with Michel Gaudet, Paris, 12 April 1988. 
91 Ibid., and the interview K. S. with Max Kohnstamm. 
92 HAEU, Int 532, Interview Franqois Duchene with Edmond Wellenstein, The 
Hague, 16 May 1989. 
Cf also ibid, Int 500, Interview Frangois 
Duchene with Michel Gaudet, Paris, 12 April 1988. 
93 HAEU, Int 532, Interview Franqois Duchene with Edmond Wellenstein, 
The Hague, 16 May 1989. 
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convincing the entire staff of the High Authority that, in fact, their work was not about 
coal and steel but about European unity. 94 However, the working methods seem to 
have changed under Monnet's successors. Participation of high officials in the 
meetings of the High Authority was less frequent and was transferred from the High 
Authority to the working groups. In 1960, under President Piero Malvestiti (1959-63), 
Spierenburg intervened in favour of high officials participating more in the decision- 
making process as they lacked insight into what was going on in the High Authority. 95 
However, Herpels recalls the openness of discussion in working groups where even 
lower-ranking officials were heard and felt they were part of the decision-making 
process. This was 'fantastic also for the pride of the official 9.96 Also, in their volume 
on the High Authority, Spierenburg and Poidevin underline that the High Authority 
never stopped to 'call on the heads of services. [ ... ] Thus, the upper echelons of the 
High Authority continued to be much more closely involved in the decision-making 
process than their counterparts in Brussels. This system [ ... ] developed a momentum 
of its own and did much to prepare the ground for the European civil service. 
07 
It is difficult to grasp the real influence of Monnet on High Authority officials. 
There is no doubt that he was able to engage and motivate his close collaborators. 
People like Dehnen remained in contact with him long after Monnet left the High 
Authority. He certainly won over some of the experts to his views on European 
integration. Retrospectively, however, other officials were sceptical regarding 
Monnet's abilities and impact. The chaos of the first years of the High Authority 
dominated their memories. For them, Mayer was the 'saviour' who turned the High 
94 HAEU, Int 500, Interview Frangois Duch8ne with Michel Gaudet, Paris, 12 
April 1988. 
95 ECHA, CEAB 2 577, PV of the High Authority, 577 session, 5 May 1960. 
96 Interview K. S. with Antoon Herpels. 
97 Spierenburg and Poidevin 1994: 486. 
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98 Authority into a well functioning organization. Wellenstein recalled about Mayer: 
'He had a great sense of orderly administration, orderly procedures, orderly meetings, 
with an agenda [ ... ] which with Monnet was never, never, never the case. f ... ] He 
[Mayer] gave the High Authority a very strong political face, but in a totally different 
way. '99 Mayer thus has to count among the role models as well. Finally, there were 
role models outside of the institution with less day-to-day impact like Robert 
Schuman. A great admirer of Schuman, French official Bernard Zamaron even 
founded a 'Centre Robert Schuman pour FEurope'. 100 
2.4 Factors prone to obstruct Europeanization 
Some factors that could hamper Europeanization of High Authority officials such as 
the national balance were discussed in the previous chapter. According to Copp6, the 
national balance in the High Authority was observed but in a less strict manner than in 
the Commission. There were no 'flags' on certain posts. 101 There is evidence, 
however, that, like in the Commission, the High Authority members defended what 
they saw as the interests of their country of origin and watched over the national 
balance. In one case Giacchero even urged his colleagues to accept any candidate he 
might present to readjust the geographical balance in favour of Italy. 102 Thus, in the 
High Authority the national balance could lead to blocked careers and cause 
98 Interview K. S. with Marcel Jaurant-Singer. 
99 HAEU, Int 532, Interview Frangois Duch8ne with Edmond Wellenstein, The Hague, 16 May 1989. 
100 Interview K. S. with Bernard Zamaron, Luxembourg, 15 March 2005. The Centre is near Metz and is 
not to be confounded with the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches europ6ennes 
Robert Schuman in 
Luxembourg. 
101 HAEU, Int 28 Albert Copp6 (from the series 06 -,, Les origines de l'administration communautaire", 
Table ronde organis6e par l'IUE, 9 July 199 1). See also CEAB 2 713, PV of the 
High Authority, Note A 
MM. les Membres de la Haute Autorit6 concernant un entretien informel qui a eu lieu le vendredi, 5 
December [19521,165-7, here 166. 
102 CEAB 2 1419, E. Wellenstein, Note pour Monsieur Dinjeart, 30 October 1958,19. Cf. also ibid., E. 
Wellenstein, Note pour Monsieur Dinjeart, 8 October 1958,18. 
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frustration among officials. Also, a phenomenon that began to be a problem in the 
High Authority in the mid- 1950s was filling leading posts by 'parachuting' in 
individuals who were external to the European administration. 103 
Likewise, the detachment procedure could cause loyalty conflicts. Member 
states wanted to retain some influence on the European administration and detachment 
continued to be an important source of qualified employees for the High Authority. 
This guaranteed a supply of personnel but possibly not the most independent and 
committed staff. Relations between national administrations and these officials in the 
High Authority remained particularly close. However, the national affiliation of 
officials could also serve as a pretext for accusations of partiality. In one case an 
official was accused of experiencing a loyalty conflict as his recommendations went 
against the perceived interests of a member state. Nora, a detached official and French 
Inspecteur des Finances, took over the Economics Division in 1960 but resigned 
already in December 1962 to return to the French civil service. After he had handed in 
his notice, Nora participated in an important study on the coal sales companies in the 
Ruhr that recommended not to authorise the constitution of two new sales companies. 
When the High Authority discussed the recommendations in its weekly meeting, the 
German member Hellwig considered the fact that Nora had already resigned, and 
would return to his home administration, as an important factor. He thought that this 
would have 'psychological consequences' [in Germany], as the 'negative conclusions 
of the report were largely due to the fact that Nora played a significant role in writing 
the report'. 1 04Hellwig accused Nora of acting on behalf of the French government 
against German interests. The High Authority was divided over the matter with the 
103 CEAB 3 554, P. Finet, Note pour MM. les Membres de la Haute Autorit6,18 January 1955,1. 
104 CEAB 2 713, PV of the High Authority, 717session, 16 January 1963. 
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two French members actually on Hellwig's side. However, the smaller member states 
outvoted them, and the High Authority decided in favour of notifying the 
Ruhrbergwerke that their request could not be granted in the present form. It seems 
probable that the French members decided to take sides with their German colleagues 
to distance themselves from Nora and to prevent any future retaliation by German 
members should a similar situation arise concerning a sales agency in France. 
Interest group affiliation could cause loyalty conflicts, too. The High Authority 
was under great pressure to incorporate diverse political and economic interests. As 
shown above, it needed the cooperation of these interest groups to succeed in its work. 
Conflicting loyalties could also result from previous experiences that strongly 
influenced an individual. For example, Frenchman Jaurant-Singer was deeply marked 
by his experience of fighting with the British and Canadian troops to liberate France 
during World War Il. He belonged to the Special Operations Executive (SOE), set up 
by Winston Churchill in 1940, which consisted of volunteer agents who were trained 
in Britain and parachuted into France. For Jaurant-Singer contributing to the liberation 
of his country, together with British and Canadian troops, was a formative experience 
and therefore possibly more important than the experience at the High Authority. He 
has since been engaged in Franco-Canadian relations trying to preserve the history and 
memory of his fellow soldiers of the SOE. Moreover, before entering the High 
Authority he had already worked for international organizations and he did not find 
the High Authority any different from them. 105 Nora recounts how the Maquis, a 
group within the French Resistance movement, had an impact on him and his friends 
as an experience that taught them 'a certain number of values, 
[.. ] patriotism, 
11 Letter Marcel Jaurant-Singer to K. S., 19 December 2004 and Interview 
K. S. with Marcel Jaurant- 
Singer. 
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solidarity, fraternity'. 106 They became part of a technocracy eager to reconstruct and 
modernise France from within the highest levels of the administration. 107 In the case 
of another official, Berthoin, these resistance values could be transferred to the 
European level but these officials' loyalties remained primarily towards the French 
administration. 
3. The biographies of three High Authority officials 
This section discusses the biographies of three High Authority officials. They 
represent different types of officials typical of the High Authority in the period 
studied. However, the three individuals chosen are exceptional in that they were able 
to exert more influence on High Authority policies and administration than the 
average official. They are also exceptional in that they have actually left sufficient 
source material that allows analysing their roles. 
Pierre Uri represents the generalist official. Not a coal or steel expert, Uri was 
concerned, after the war, with the reconstruction of France and, subsequently, Europe. 
Other generalist officials were, for example, the economists Regul and WagenfUhr, the 
lawyers Gaudet and Krawielicki, and Behr. All of them were convinced of the 
necessity of European integration and thought that horizontal integration was 
preferable to sectoral integration. The generalist is followed by the expert type 
official, represented by Tony Rollman. Like the generalists, the experts came to be 
convinced of the necessity of European integration. However, they had been first and 
foremost concerned with finding a solution for the European coal and steel industry. 
" Interview K. S. with Simon Nora, Paris, 13 January 2005. 
107 Nora cited in: Hugounenq and Ventelou 2002: 38-9. 
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Other experts were Salewski, Schensky, Dehnen and Vinck. Max Kohnstamm, finally, 
stands for the realistic idealist. The realistic idealists' engagement for European 
integration exceeded their day-to-day work in the High Authority and became a life- 
long occupation. This is a rare type of official. Rabier, Wissels, who became Secretary 
General of the Union of European Federalists, Berthoin, Fontaine, Wellenstein and 
Zamaron can be counted among them. For all three types World War H marked a 
caesura in their lives which induced them to choose European integration as a solution 
for post-war societies. Finally, these types of officials partly match with types that can 
be found in the Commission discussed in chapter BR. However, with Rollman, the 
steel expert, and Uri and Kohnstamm, Monnet's close collaborators, the individuals 
presented here also account for the particular conditions of sectoral integration in the 
ECSC. 
Pierre Uri: philosopher, economist and 'planificateur a lafranCaise' 
Born in Paris in 1911, Uri studied at the ENA, obtained the Agregation (a French state 
diploma enabling its holder to teach at schools and universities) in philosophy and 
embarked on an academic career teaching at Reims university. Uri, a Jew, lost his 
teaching post following the Loi du 3 octobre 1940 portant statut des Juifs, or law 
against Jews, passed by the Vichy government. He used this forced break to study 
political economy, economics and law at the Centre de Perfectionnement aux Affaires 
de la Chambre de Commerce in Paris, an evening school for professionals. Although 
keeping a low profile in Paris, he had to flee to Lyon to avoid imprisonment. 
108 After 
the war Uri definitely turned to economics and entered the Institut 
de Sciences 
tconomiques Appliqu6es of French economist Perroux. Like Uri, Perroux was close 
108 Cf. his autobiography Uri 199 1, esp. 34-43. 
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to the Socialists and both favoured a Keynesian policy to overcome France"s 
economic problems after the war. Uri entered the French Planning Commission in 
March 1947 and soon made his way into the inner circle around Monnet. Part of Uri's 
self-understanding and self-confidence is certainly due to the impression of having 
contributed to the modernisation of France at the Planning Commission. 109 Uri then 
contributed to the drafting of the Schuman Plan which he partly revised. For him, the 
appeal of the Schuman Plan lay in its solution to the German question but also in its 
capacity to resolve France's economic problems. 110 Together with Monnet and 
Etienne Hirsch, Uri played an important part in the interstate negotiations leading to 
the Treaty of Paris in 195 1. By then, Uri was taken with the idea of European 
integration, not least because he found a task where he could successfully employ his 
problem solving capacity. In 1952 he wrote an article about Europe's future in which 
he predicted a spill-over process from integration in the coal and steel sector to other 
sectors of the economy. ' 11 These are the ideas Uri took with him to the High 
Authority. 
Uri's role in the High Authority cannot be underestimated. He first chaired the 
groupe de dgmarrage and then took over the directorship of the Economics Division, 
the scope and capacities of which he had sketched out himself' 
12 At the 1-figh 
Authority Monnet employed working methods that had proved successful at the 
Planning Commission. He continued to rely on Uri's capacities to devise complex 
solutions for political and technical problems. However, while the other members of 
the High Authority respected Uri's abilities, relying solely on Uri could not be a 
" Uri 1991: 60. 
110 HAEU, DEP PU 244, P. Uri, L'Europe se ressaisit, R6alit6s, July 1950. 
111 Ibid., La prosp, 6rit6 par I'Union, Wafit& [May] 1952. 
112 Already two weeks after the High Authority took up work, the group submitted the 
'Memorandum 
fiber die zuerst anfallenden Aufgaben der Hohen Beh6rde', which was mainly 
drafted by Uri. CEAB 9 
26,23 August 1952. 
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permanent solution in a multinational administration. In 1953, Kohnstamm reported to 
Monnet an 'outburst' of High Authority members against Uri's dominance in the High 
Authority. ' 13 It was not least due to the deficient organization in the early days that 
Uri could play such a prominent role which was claimed back by the High Authority 
members when the working groups were introduced at the end of 1953. Not 
surprisingly, Uri defended the technocratic element of the High Authority. According 
to him, only the expert knowledge concentrated at the supranational High Authority 
and the Commission, and not representatives of members states, could generate the 
common interest. ' 14 It is likely that his disregard for diplomatic or political solutions 
was also a reason why he never became a member of the High Authority or the 
Commission, something to which he aspired. 
Uri's idea of Europe was essentially an economic one. In his speeches he 
rarely mentioned the European Political Community (EPQ or the EDC which were 
important to Monnet and Kohnstamm. In 1955 Uri contributed to the so-called 
6relance europ6enne', first by drafting a paper on economic integration of Europe in 
April 1955. For him economic integration was essential to ensure the survival of the 
European economy vis-A-vis that of the United States and the Soviet Union. Europe 
had to become an economic 'third force'. ' 15 Uri claims to have presented the idea of 
horizontal integration to the Genuan State Secretary in the AA, Friedrich OphUls in a 
meeting with him and Monnet. Monnet passed on the memorandum Uri drafted to 
Paul-Henri Spaak. 116 According to Uri, however, the passages on horizontal economic 
113 FJM, AMH 6/4/14, M. Kohnstamm to J. Monnet, I August 1953. 
114 Cf. for example HAEU, DEP PU 197, Conf6rence de M. 
Pierre URI A la SocietA Italiana per la 
Organizzazione Internazionale - Roma, 28 March 1957. 
115 HAEU, DEP PU 53, P. Uri, Premi6res r6flexions sur le document intitudd o 
Consid6rations sur le 
robl6me de la Coop6ration ou de HWgration >>, 
5 April 1955. 
F1 
6 HAEU, DEP PU 53, [P. Uri], Projet de Nclaration, 13 April 1955. See also 
Monnet 1978: 471-473 
and Gerbet 1989. 
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integration were not taken up as both Mormet and Spaak preferred further sectoral 
integration. Instead, it was the project of Dutch Foreign Minister Johan Willem Beyen 
of 1952 that constituted one of the bases of the Benelux memorandum of 18 May 
1955. It is likely that of Uri's text the passages on sectoral integration in the sectors 
transport, energy and atomic energy, which he had included on Monnet's request, 
were taken up in the Benelux memorandum, but not the passages on horizontal 
integration, so important to Uri. ' 17 However, by co-drafting the so-called Spaak report 
in April 1956, and by participating in the Val Duchesse negotiations, Uri contributed 
to the Common Market after all. He then served the Commission in an expert group, 
drafting a report on the economic situation in the member states. Not having obtained 
a post as a member of the High Authority or the Commission, Uri was stuck in his 
post as director of the Economics Division and left the High Authority in 1959.11 8 Not 
least because he was considered the prototype of French planning mentality, the 
German government opposed a greater role for Uri in any of the supranational 
administrations. He also lacked the necessary backing in the French government. 119 
In 1961 Uri took over the post of Director General of the Atlantic Institute for 
International Affairs in Paris where he wrote extensively on European integration and 
the relations between the United States and Europe. 120 Moreover, he was charged with 
several missions, studies and reports in Europe, South America and also in his native 
117 It is difficult to measure the contribution of individuals to the events preceding the Messina 
conference. See the round table discussion in Serra 1989: 175-6. 
118 HAEU, DEP PU 189, P. Uri an Ben. T. Moore, 29.07.1959. 
"9 Uri 1991: 140; 141 and 150; HAEU, DEP PU 189, Letter F. Walter to P. Uri, 31 July 1959. 
120 The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs was founded in 1961 as a Brainchild of the NATO 
Parliamentarians. For example Uri 1963, or HAEU, DEP PU 249, P. Uri, For a Community of the Free 
World, in: R6alit6s, December 1961. 
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France. In interviews in later years Uri tried to enhance his reputation as a 'founder of 
Europe'. 121 
Between Japan and Luxembourg: the steel expert Tony Rollman 
A keen amateur film-maker, Tony Rollman captured much of his life on film. The 
audio-visual material was put together in a documentary by the Luxembourg film 
maker Delphine Kieffer in 2004.122 In this respect Rollman is exceptional among the 
experts of the century generation who remain among the least well known European 
civil servants. Having spent much of his life travelling to the most remote comers of 
the world and having lived nearly a decade in Japan, the title of the film, 'a European 
adventure', is somewhat too limiting. 
Born 30 March 1899 in Reisdorf, Luxembourg, Rollman started working for 
the Arbed at the age of 22. Until 1944 he travelled the world in the service of the 
Arbed sales organisation Columeta. After the war he worked for the Luxembourg 
government, became economic councillor in the Luxembourg legation to Brussels and 
participated in the Marshall Plan negotiations in Paris in 1947. In 1948 he became the 
chairman of the steel division of the Economic Commission for Europe in Geneva 
(ECE, United Nations). In Geneva Rollman presided over works on a report entitled 
'European Steel Trends in the Setting of the World Market', published in November 
1949.123 The study concluded that if no measures were taken, the European steel 
industry would generate eight million tons of excess steel by 1953. For Rollman, these 
were alarming prospects and he saw the urgent need to co-ordinate the 
European steel 
market. The steel report was discussed in the European press. 
For example, the west 
"' Cf. for example HAEU, Int 3 2, Interview Roger Morgan with 
Pierre Uri, Florence, 6 June 199 1. The 
subtitle of his autobiography 'Penser pour 
I'action' is 'un fondateur de I'Europe'. 
122 Documentary 'Tony Rollman'. 
123 United Nations, Steel Division, Economic Commission for Europe, 
1949. 
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German weekly, Die Zeit, concluded that 'in Tony Rollman and Gunnar Myrdal 
European unity has powerful and courageous advocates'. 12A In early 1950 Myrdal, 
head of the ECE, invited Rollman to present his ideas to the Socialist federalist and 
former French Economics Minister Andr6 Philip, who at that time was a member of 
the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. 125 It is uncertain what was really 
discussed at this meeting. Rollman's thinking was probably informed to some extent 
by the cooperation of steel makers in the International Steel Cartel of 1926.126 
However, as far as it can be established, Rollman did not envisage a revival of the 
steel cartel of the inter-war period but seems to have endorsed the competitive 
principle that should govern the ECSC. Moreover, ideas of cooperation in the iron and 
steel sector were being developed in all six founding countries at that time, with the 
Benelux countries being advanced because of their experience with the Belgian- 
Luxembourg Economic Union (1921) and the Benelux customs union (1944). 127 
Monnet, who knew Philip, invited Rollman to come to Paris to discuss his thoughts. 128 
Suggestions such as Rollman's were taken up and incorporated by the drafters of the 
Schuman Plan. 129Nearly forty years after the events Rollman wrote a short note about 
this period of his life. In retrospect it is difficult to separate Rollman's ideas from 
Monnet's whose memoirs Rollman had certainly read, when he wrote in 1986: 
Because I was a steel expert, I had the idea to start with steel and its raw 
materials, coal and ore. And from this emerged very valuable political 
124 Edgar Gerwin, Der Stahlrahmen ffir Europa, Die Zeit 01/1950,5 January 1960,6. In: 
http: //www. zeit. de/1950/01/Der-Stahl-Rahmen-fuer-Europa (accessed 10 February 2008). Between 
1947 and 1957 the Swede Myrdal was the executive secretary of the United Nations Economic 
Cornmýission for Europe in Genf. 
'25 Dichgans 1980: 34. 
126 The International Steel Cartel is often seen as a precursor of the ECSC. Cf. Gillingham 1986. 
127 Stefan Krebs: Rezension zu: Rasch, Manfred, Düwell, Kurt (Hrsg. ): Anfänge und Auswirkungen der 
Montanunion auf Europa. Die Stahlindustrie in Politik und Wirtschaft. Essen 2007. In: H-Soz-u-Kult, 
19.02.2008, <http: //hsozkult. geschichte. hu-berlin. de/rezensionen/2008-1-138>. 
128 Dichgans 1980: 33. 
129 For a detailed discussion of the emergence of the 
Schuman Plan and other post-war initiatives 
targeted at European integration see Leucht 2008a, chapter 
3. 
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considerations. Coal and steel are needed by any war industry. If one withdrew 
these two materials from the rule of nation states and put them under control of a 
European authority, nation states would be deprived of the possibility of starting 
anew war in Europe. ' 30 
Rollman participated in the Schuman Plan negotiations in 1950-51 as a member of the 
Luxembourg delegation. 131 Subsequently, he was an obvious choice for the High 
Authority. 132 Rollman was already 53 years old when in 1952 he became director in 
the Market Division and became responsible for integrating the steel markets of the 
Six. Convinced of the necessity of his work, Rollman deplored the lack of 
collaboration from the trade unions and member state governments. They were 
reluctant to endorse the market principle in the steel sector. As to the enterprises, 
Rollman deplored that the leading figures were against the supranational principle. He 
claimed that they had, against the rules of the treaty, favoured concentration in the 
steel industry and informal close cooperation, effectively reconstituting the old cartels. 
When Rollman retired from the High Authority at the age of 65, he concluded, 
somewhat wearily: 'In 1964,1 had been at the ECSC for twelve years already; twelve 
years during which I tried to bring to bear the supranational conceptions that were at 
the basis of the High Authority. ' 133 
With the problems of the European steel industry as a starting point in the late 
1940s, Rollman seems to have endorsed the supranational principle of the High 
Authority. However, at the High Authority, Kohnstamm thought that Rollman and 
some of his expert colleagues lacked strong faith in Europe. In August 1953, he wrote 
to Monnet: 
130 Tony Rollman, in: Rieben, Clappier, Hirsch, Rollman, Fontaine, Holveck 1986: 78. 
13 1 ANL, Affaires Etrang6res, no. 11345, CONVERSATIONS SUR LE PLAN SCHUMAN. Liste des 
d6l6gations & ripartition au sein des groupes, undated. 
132 FJM, AME 4/3/193, Candidatures pr6sent6es par Monsieur Wehrer, I October 1952. 
133 Documentary 'Tony Rollman'. 
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The difficulty with Rollman, to take an example, [ ... I is that at the end of the day he does not believe in the possibility of a revolution of the European economy 
[ ... ]. He is afraid of these enticing prophecies which he considers being disconnected from reality. The truth is that the only means to reach our aim, that 
is, a united Europe, is to give people new hope and to tell them: "the limit is the 
sky". One tends to forget the plain biblical truth that a prophecy is an act of faith 
and not of mathematics. It is this faith that many people here are lacking. And it 
is precisely this faith that we need to have in Europe. It is obvious, that one 
cannot convey to others what one does not believe in oneself 134 
Max Kohnstamm: Dutch, European and world citizen 
Max Kohnstamm was the European conscience of the High Authority. As the 
Secretary of the High Authority, he thought that the role of the institution exceeded 
coal and steel. The High Authority was the first and until then only supranational 
institution and so had to serve as a model. 135 Born in Amsterdam in 1914, Kohnstamm 
came from a family of academics. He studied modem history in Amsterdam and spent 
the academic year 1938-39 at the American University in Washington DC. 136 
Kohnstarnm was impressed by the hands-on approach of the Americans, for him a 
stark contrast to the Europeans petrified by the coming war. 
137 Appalled by the 
appeasement policy of the French and British governments, Kohnstamm and his 
family did not have any illusions about the nature of the National Socialist regime in 
Germany. Although he was half-Jewish Kohnstamm returned to the Netherlands. 
During the war, he was active in the Dutch Resistance and was imprisoned several 
times between 1942 and 1944. After the war he served Queen Wilhelmina as private 
secretary before taking over the German department in the Dutch 
foreign ministry. 
Kohnstamm was one of the first Dutchmen to travel to Germany after the war, 
134 FJM, AMH 6/4/14, Kohnstamm to Monnet, I August 1953. 
135 CEAB 1 920, Entwurf für die Funktionelle und Strukturelle Organisation des Sekretariats der 
Hohen 
Beh6rde, 21 January 1953. 
136 For this period see the edition of Kohnstamm's correspondence with 
his father. Kohnstamm 2003. 
For Kohnstamm's biography see also Mak 2005: 676-685. 
137 Interview K. S. with Max Kohnstamm. 
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participating in a meeting between Dutch and German Protestants in 1947 where he 
also met Gustav Heinemann. 138 Finding a solution to the German question and 
avoiding a new Versailles was important to Kohnstamm for two reasons. Firstly, the 
economy of the Netherlands was dependent on that of its larger neighbour and 
secondly, a politically and economically stable Germany was important to 
Kohnstamm on a personal level after his experiences in the 1930s and during 
captivity. Therefore, in Kohnstamm's eyes, the Schuman Plan provided an ideal 
solution: equality but at the same time integration and thus control of Germany. 139 
Kohnstarnm volunteered to participate in the negotiations leading to the Treaty of 
Paris where he met Monnet. The two got on very well, not least because they had both 
spent time in the United States and, according to Kohnstamm, for both European 
integration was only a step towards a new world order. Monnet's ideas promised a 
transformation of international relations. The creation of supranational institutions 
would lead to legal certainty as member states gave up part of their sovereignty. This 
was vital for Kohnstamm who had experienced despotic rule under German 
occupation. 
140 
Kohnstamm's role as Secretary of the High Authority between 1952 and 1956 
has already been discussed in the previous chapter. What stands out is that he tried to 
see the overall context of European integration in his everyday work. Not least 
because of his high expectations and hopes, he was soon disappointed by the 
administrative reality of coal, steel and scrap in Luxembourg. 
141 When the EDC failed 
in August 1954, Kohnstamm thought that Monnet had to leave the High Authority to 
138 Gustav Heinemann (1899-1976) was a member of the Council of Protestant Churches in Germany 
(1945-67). He held several posts as minister in western Germany and was elected president of the 
Federal Republic in 1969. The meeting is described in MUller-Armack 1971: 39-40. 
139 Interview K. S. with Max Kohnstanim. 
140 Mak 2005: 682. 
141 HAEU, DEP MK 1, M. Kohnstamm to J. van Helmont, 23 February 1954. 
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gain room for manoeuvre to launch new initiatives and he was ready to accompany 
him. 142 Kohnstamm entered Monnet's Action Committee for the United States of 
Europe as its vice-president in 1956. Like Monnet, Kohnstamm became convinced of 
the necessity of securing Europe's energy supply through cooperation in the atomic 
energy sector. 143 In 1956-57 Kohnstamm therefore also served as secretary general to 
the Committee of the Three Wise Men, consisting of Louis Armand, Franz Etzel and 
Francesco Giordani. The Committee was in charge of preparing a report on the 
possibilities of integrating the atomic energy sector and of cooperating with the United 
States' government on this question. 144 This report constituted a preparatory document 
for Euratom. After this interval, Kohnstamm served the Action Committee full-time. 
While he believed a spill-over from economic integration to political union would 
occur in Europe, 145 during the 1960s he realised that no progress was being made 
towards political integration. Kohnstamm feared that de Gaulle's hostility towards 
British accession to the EEC would establish Europe as a 'third force' between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. For him, however, a united Europe including 
Britain with close relations to the United States was the precondition for a peaceful 
organisation of the western world, and, in the distant future, the whole world. 146The 
Action Committee was eventually dissolved in 1975. Kohnstamm then became the 
first President of the European University Institute in Florence. Contrary to Uri, 
Kohnstamm tried to minimise his own contribution to European integration. When he 
142 HAEU, DEP MK 2, M. Kohnstamm to Tommy, 9 February 1955. 
143 HAEU, DEP MK 4, M. Kohnstamm, Notiz flir Herm Etzel ftir eine Gespr5ch Uber EURATOM und 
den Gemeinsamen Markt, 2 September 1956. Cf. also Duchene 1994: 299-315 for Kohnstamm's 
engagement for Euratom. 
144 CEAB 2 735, PV of the High Authority, Sonderprotokoll des geheimen Teils der 352. Sitzung der 
Hohen Beh6rde vom 19. Dezember 1956, um 19 Uhr in Luxemburg. See also the documents in HAEU, 
DEP MK 5 2/1957-3/1957 Travaux du Comit6 des Trois sages; and DEP MK 6 4/1957-5/1957 Rapport 
du comit6 des Trois sages. 
145 CEAB 2 640, M. Kohnstamm, L'exp6rience CECA, undated ( 1956], 5. 
"' Cf for example HAEU, DEP MK 32, Monnet 7187, entry 19 January 1959. 
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was awarded the Franklin Roosevelt Freedom from Fear medal, 'my first thought was: 
why me? My next thought put my mind somewhat at ease. The medal must have been 
awarded to me in order to honour the two statesmen who taught me the force of hope: 
President Roosevelt and Jean Monnet. ' 
147 
Conclusion 
In terms of its staff, the High Authority was a divided administration. On the one 
hand, there were the members of the century generation, mainly coal and steel 
veterans like Salewski, Rollman, Dehnen and Schensky. On the other hand there were 
the generalists and realistic idealists such as Kohnstamm, Gaudet and Behr who were 
more open, more multinational and multilingual than their counterparts. Arguably, 
they adopted European values more easily. For Schensky, for example, the work in the 
High Authority did not constitute a break in his career. In his farewell note of March 
1967 he wrote that his time in the High Authority was a satisfying end to his career in 
mining which spanned 46 years. 148 Although he spent the last 15 years of this career in 
a European administration, there was not a word about European integration. While 
experts such as Salewski and Rollman believed that transnational cooperation was 
primarily necessary to secure a future for their industry in Europe, they were open to 
Europeanization effects. A note from Kohnstamm to Monnet of October 1953 
suggests that a Europeanized staff developed in the High Authority, which had 
adopted supranational values: 
147 Max Kohnstanun, Acceptance speech, 19 April 2004 (in possession of K. S. ). 
"' CEAB 7 1570, M. Schensky to D. Del Bo, 2 March 1967,112. 
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In my opinion it is remarkable to see how the supranational spirit has 
developed in the High Authority during the first year of our work. Guyot told 
me the other day how he was delighted with the objectivity with which people 
such as Salewski and Regul worked on questions concerning investments. Uri 
made a similar remark concerning Dehnen and Regul. 149 
In his neofunctionalist study Haas wrote that supranationality also depended on the 
150 'behaviour of men and groups of men'. It appears that the lack of supranationality 
in the administrative structure and working methods, as shown in chapter Al, was at 
least partly counterbalanced by the attitude and corporate identity that developed 
among the staff. After the merger, many of the High Authority officials who went to 
Brussels thought that in Luxembourg the administration had been more 'European', 
more informal and based on personal relationships between colleagues. All in all, it 
was considered less hierarchical than 'Hallstein's machinery' in Brussels. ' 
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149 FJM, AMH 6/4/3 1, M. Kohnstamm, Note pour Monsieur 
Monnet, 22 October 1953. 
150 Haas 1968: 59. 
'5' Interviews K. S. with Antoon. Herpels, Bernard Zamaron, 
G6rard Wissels, Klaus Ewig, Ferdinand 
Kuhn-ftnier and Robert SUnnen. 
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B The Commission of the EEC 
1. Prudence and pragmatism: the institutional establishment of the 
Commission 
Introduction 
In the 1960s and early 1970s bureaucracies were a popular object of research. In 
numerous studies academics analysed what they called the 'bureaucratic 
phenomenon', or even 'the bureaucratization of the world'. ' In the near future, these 
researchers predicted, the western world would be governed by bureaucracies. This 
corresponded to the strong belief in technical progress and in the manageability of 
technical, economic and political problems, which characterised this period. 
Bureaucracy was seen as a modem way of policy making. The establishment of the 
Commission has to be considered within this temporal and ideological context. The 
Commission was a child of this period and thus part of a trend - an institution with a 
future, or so it seemed. The European administration has often been described as an 
expert based administration. Not yet the government of Europe, it defined itself 
through expertise, one of the main sources of bureaucratic power, and attempted to 
gain reputation and recognition by acting like a competent actor and interlocutor. 
2 In 
1958 the nine members of the Hallstein Commission were optimistic: they were going 
to construct Europe. 3 Moreover, neofunctionalist scholars attributed an important role 
1 This is the title of a book by Henry Jacoby 1973. See also Downs 1967: 1; 255-66; Putnam 1973; 
Brugmans 1967: 337. 
2 This aspect is also mentioned by Ludlow 2006b: 42. 
3 See for instance the passage in Mansholt's biography: Merridnboer 2006: 243-4. 
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to institutions for furthering integration, and the Commission's successes in the early 
1960s seemed to prove the theory right. 
In the 1970s, the Commission's reputation was suffering. This can be put 
down to several intra-Community factors such as the crises of the mid- to late 1960s 
and internal administrative problems. 4 However, it also suffered because 
bureaucratisation became increasingly unpopular. The European bureaucracy, accused 
of lacking democratic legitimacy, was subjected to harsh criticism, especially in the 
5 European press. Nevertheless, the 1960s bureaucracy hype has left its imprint on the 
Commission. Early decisions on the organization and working methods taken in this 
ambience of optimism and belief in its problem solving capacity left to be an 
important legacy on its administrative services and, what is more, its personnel. 
Anthropologists Marc Abdles and Ir6ne Bellier rightly define the Commission 
as a continuous creation and as a 'cultural compromise', in which different identities 
6 
and affiliations were combined 'in the name of a common project'. The 
administrative structure the Commission adopted was necessarily an answer to the 
Community's pluralism. Some political leaders such as Charles de Gaulle feared that 
the Commission could become a 'technocratic and deracinated Areopagus'. 
7 
However, I will demonstrate that the Commission did not intend to create a 
bureaucracy that was aloof and disconnected from the member states' interests and 
needs. Instead, the Commission and especially its first president, Walter HaRstein, 
showed a high degree of consideration towards these interests when designing the 
administration and recruiting personnel. 
4 For the crises of the Community in the 1960s see Ludlow 
2006a. 
5 See for example the article 'Half Kafka and Half Chaplin'. 
In Time Magazine, 9 December 1974,10; 
Scheuer and Weinstock 1977 are addressing the problems of 
bureaucracy and democratic deficit. 
6 AW16s and Bellier 1996: 432. 
7 Charles de Gaulle about the EEC Commission at a press conference on 
9 September 1965 in Brussels, 
Touchard 1978: 218-9. 
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Ile scope of this chapter is limited to the set-up period of the Commission's 
administration, covering primarily the years between 1958 and 1962, the year the 
personnel statute was introduced. The initial period is salient because administrative 
structures were established, practices and principles institutionalised, working 
methods tested and either adopted or rejected and the first intake of staff was 
completed. The fast section of the chapter considers the institutional set-up of the 
Commission while the second section examines the working methods the Commission 
established. The focus of the third section will be on problems connected to staffing 
the Commission's administrative services. From the beginning, the Commission was 
aware of the shortcomings of its creation. The fourth section wiff therefore analyse the 
Commission's efforts to reform the administration and improving its efficiency. 
1. Towards a European adndnistrative organization: the Institutional set-up of 
the Conunission 
1.1 Principles, models and concepts: decisions in early 1958 
The Treaty. of Rome establishing the EEC was the legal basis for the set-up and 
functioning of the Commission. Similar to the ECSC treaty, however, the EEC treaty 
contained few precise provisions on the shape of this institution! Ile Commission, 
the treaty merely decreed, should be headed by a college of nine Commissioners, 
designated by the governments of the member states 'on the grounds of their general 
competence' (Article 157(l), EEC). The Commissioners, appointed at a conference of 
foreign ministers of the Six on 6 and 7 January 1958 in Paris, were Walter Hallstein 
I The Comitd int6rimaire, a preparatory committee set up by the six governments to operate between 
the signature of the treaty and the establishment of the EEC, did not take any decisions regarding the 
shape of the institutions or their future personnel. On the CDmitd inarimaire see Dumoulin 2006. 
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(president, Gennany), Piero Malvestiti (vice-president, Italy), Sicco Mansholt (vice- 
president, Netherlands), Robert Maýolin (vice-president, France), Robert Lemaignen 
(France), Giuseppe Petrilli (Italy), Michel Rasquin (Luxembourg) who, after his death 
in April 1958, was replaced by Lambert Schaus, Jean Rey (Belgium) and Hans von 
der Groeben (Germany). The Commissioners should act independently from the 
member states (Article 157(2), EEC). Their term of office was four years, renewable. 
Few treaty articles referred to the administration and its personnel. Article 212, 
however, contains the important provision that staff regulations should be established, 
thus creating a European civil service. Until this personnel statute entered into force, 
the institutions should recruit their staff on a contractual basis (Article 246(3), EEC). 
The members of the Hallstein Commission were thus free, in principle, to adopt for 
their institution the administrative structure they saw fit. 
Although the college of Commissioners acted quickly and took major 
decisions on the administration between January and March 1958, during the first 
months the Commission did not have an organization to speak of At first, the 
Commissioners were assisted by personal collaborators they brought to Brussels. To 
address the initial and most urgent tasks set by the treaty, the college established ad 
hoc working groups. A working group composed of Marjolin, von der Groeben and 
Mansholt, for instance, was in charge of administrative questions. 
9 In their choices 
and decisions regarding the Commission's administration, the Commissioners were 
certainly influenced by experiences they had gained in their previous occupations - be 
it in their home countries' governments or civil service or in international 
organizations. Mad0lin, for example, frequently evoked the case of the Organization 
9 BAC 209.1980, PV of the EEC Conunission, I" session, 16 January 1958, pt. 12; and IISH, Archief 
van Sicco L. Mansholt, No 104, Jaap van der 
Lee, Eerste vergadering Europese Commissie Resum6 der 
beslissingen, 18 January 1958. 
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for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) where he had been secretary general. 10 
When taking decisions on the shape of the administration and on working methods, 
the Commission thus discussed, ruled out, adopted or adapted examples of national, 
European and international administrations with which they were familiar. These 
served as a pool of possible models and ideas for the new European bureaucracy. 
Some elements from national administrations, when employed in the Commission, 
turned out to be ill-suited. For instance, by imitating the structure of German 
ministries, a division for 'general affairs and matters of principle' was installed in 
nearly every DG. In retrospect, Hallstein's chef de cabinet Karl Heinz Naýes thought 
these units were 'more of a hindrance than a help'. " Moreover, the college decided 
that when naming the different administrative units it would use terms which already 
existed in the member states rather than inventing new ones. 12 Aligning the 
Commission's administration with the civil services of the member states should 
facilitate interaction between Commission officials and civil servants from national 
administrations. 
Given these national and international models, how far was the High Authority 
a model for the Commission? Firstly, the differences need to be acknowledged. The 
Commissions of the EEC and Euratom. were founded under different political 
circumstances. Following the failure of the EDC in 1954, in the mid-1950s member 
state goverm-nents were less inclined to attribute powers and funds to a supranational 
organization. It is also likely that the member states had drawn a lesson from the 
experience of the High Authority and chose to keep the new supranational institutions 
under closer control. For example, unlike the ECSC treaty the EEC treaty 
did not 
'0 Cf. for example HAEU, DEP EN 722,21.9. -9.11.60 
(117e A 123e r6union de ]a Commission), II 
October 1960. 
11 Narjes 1998: 113. 
12 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 22 session, 23-24 June 1958, pt. 
14. 
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provide for a Committee of Four Presidents which could decide autonomously on 
administrative and staff related questions. While the High Authority was given its own 
resources and far reaching budgetary autonomy, the Commission had not been granted 
this degree of independence and financial security. On the contrary, each year it had to 
negotiate with the Council of Ministers the number of posts it could create and the 
salary of staff it could employ. This financial dependence in budgetary, and therefore 
staffing, matters limited the Commission's autonomy in administrative matters 
considerably. Executive secretary Nodl deplored this dependence on the goodwill of 
the finance ministers of the Six. ' 3 It was therefore a disappointment for the 
Commission when, in the merger treaty, the member states did not confer the High 
Authority's budget autonomy to the entire single Commission. 
Secondly, in terms of administrative structure, the High Authority certainly 
served as one model for the Commission. Moreover, it assisted the Brussels 
administration in the initial period, for example by providing it with staff and funds. 
The Luxembourg experience helped the Commission to take quickly those decisions 
of a more practical nature such as on contracts for personnel, salary and insurance 
matters. 14 The experiences made in the High Authority prevented the Commission 
from making similar mistakes. For instance, it did not adopt the short-term contract 
system which had led to great dissatisfaction among High Authority staff. On 25 
January 1958 the Council decided that the Commission would provisionally adopt the 
regulations of the High Authority in terms of salary and pensions for high officials. 15 
However, eager to manifest their independence and convinced of the importance of 
13 HAEU, DEP EN 815, E. Not], La fusion des Communaut6s Europ6ennes, talk given at the Centre 
Europ6en Universitaire, Nancy, University year 1965/66,8. 
14 See for example BAC 209/1980, PV of the EEC Commission, 4 session, 7-10 February 195 8, pt. 10. 
15 ECHA, Rapport de la Commission de contr6le relatifs aux comptes de 1'exercice 1958, undated, 57. 
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the EEC, the Commissioners were keen to establish their own (institutional) identity 
as soon as possible. 
1.2 Shaping the administration 
The Commission opted for an organizational structure with nine directorate-generals, 
or DGs, corresponding roughly to the policy areas stipulated in the EEC treaty and, 
importantly, to the number of Commissioners. The DGs were: External Relations (1), 
Economic and Financial Affairs (11), Internal Market (HI), Competition (fV), Social 
Affairs (V), Agriculture (VI), Transport (VII), Overseas Countries and Territories 
(VIH) and Administration (IX). 
16 In addition, the Commission set up an Executive 
Secretariat and three common services, namely Press and Information, Statistics and 
Legal Service, which it administered together with the High Authority and the 
Euratom Commission. Within the DGs a hierarchy was created by subdividing them 
into directorates and divisions. According to a note of 1962, the DGs were considered 
as 'ministerial core', or proto-ministries, that would one day become the ministries of 
a European government, an assumption which is characteristic both for the 
Commission's ambition and its optimism at that time. 17 Each DG was to be presided 
over by a group of three to four Commissioners, with one Commissioner acting as 
group president. 
18 
The EEC treaty, contrary to the ECSC treaty, did not make the president head 
of the administration; this was possibly to prevent the Commission president from 
becoming as strong a figure as Monnet had been at the High Authority. However, as 
the Commission could decide on the internal structure and distribution of work among 
16 See BAC 209/1980, PV of the EEC Commission, 10 session, 20 March 1958, pt. 2. 
17 BAK, N 1266/1253, Dem Herm PrIsidenten, n. a. [Cabinet Hallstein], 21 November 
1962. 
18 BAC 209/1980, PV of the EEC Commission, 6 session, 24-26 February 1958. 
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the Commissioners, Hallstein subsequently claimed and obtained similar 
administrative powers as his counterpart in the High Authority. In the Commission's 
second meeting, he took over responsibility for the institution's personnel policy, a 
task he shared with two other members of the college. 19 This marked the beginning of 
the president's strong position and influence on recruitment and the administration. 
Hallstein subsequently took over responsibility for DG IX by chairing the working 
group 'Administration' composed of himself and the three vice-presidents. The 
Commission thus created its own 'Committee of Four Presidents'. This shows that 
Hallstein understood his role as president as keeping an overall view of Commission 
policy making and not being absorbed in one policy area. It also demonstrates the 
importance he attached to administrative - and especially staff related - questions for 
strengthening his position of power and influence in the Commission. 
The shape of the administration did not solely follow functional considerations 
but was also guided by concerns for a balanced and just distribution of posts among 
nationals of the six member states. In some cases, this even led to the creation of 
supplementary administrative units. Vice-President Malvestiti, for instance, stated that 
in order to ensure the adequate representation of Germans in his DG he would have to 
set up an additional directorate. 20 The institutional set-up did not progress smoothly, 
not least because the Commissioners disagreed on what dimension the bureaucracy 
should have. During 1958 the Commission recruited more than 1,000 people. Majrjolin 
warned his colleagues that 'our system will be attacked', adding, 'our fundamental 
interest is to have a minimum staff constituted of capable people' . 
21 His ideas of the 
Commission's administration resembled more Monnet's concept of a small and 
19 BAC 209/1980, PV of the EEC Commission, 2 nd session, 24,25 and 27 January 1958, pt. 9-10. 
20 Document inserted in: HAEU, DEP EN 701,12.4. -25.5.60 (10le A 105' r6union de la Commission), 
session 13/14 May 1958. 
21 HAEU, DEP EN 705,1.10.1958-19.11.1958 (3 1' A 38' r6union de la Commission), 2 October 1958. 
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flexible organization while Hallstein was in favour of creating ta large 
administration'. 22 Conflicts within the college and with the Council were bound to 
anse. 
Another problem affecting work in the Commission in the early days was the 
question of the seat. Brussels had only been declared the provisional seat and the 
member states failed on various occasions to agree upon the definite seat of the 
Commission, or the Community institutions in general. This meant that, at first, the 
Commission was obliged to hold meetings in Luxembourg, Strasbourg and other 
places throughout the Community and this made it more difficult to get the 
administration to run smoothly. Not least, this insecurity about the seat entailed 
insecurity for the Conunission's personnel. Finally, in mid-1958, Brussels was 
declared 'siege de fait'. 23 The unresolved question of the seat is symptomatic for the 
chaotic early days of the Commission. However, the first Commission led by Hallstein 
is said to have developed a great team spirit, not least because the president sought to 
organize the meetings of the Commissioners in an informal and intimate atmosphere, 
trying to limit the number of participants to a minimum. According to Lemaignen, 
these meetings in small and cramped offices in the absence of an audience to impress 
gavýe their discussions a feeling of intimacy. 24 
22 Ibid. See also the memoirs of Hallstein's chef de cabinet, Berndt von Staden 2001: 179-80. 
23 For the decision for Brussels as the 'sfte de fait' see HAEU, DEP EN 702,3/6 - l5n11958 (20' bis 
24' r6union), 2 July 1958. For the difficulties caused by this insecurity, see Lemaignen 1964: 33-36. 
24 Lemaignen 1964: 32. 
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1.3 President Hallstein's ideas on Europe and the Commission's role in it 
As the case of Monnet has shown, the president of a European administration is more 
than an equal among equals. While any president's leadership qualities are generally 
important for the success of organizations such as the High Authority or the 
Commission during their term of office, it is the first president of a newly founded 
organization who has a strong impact on shaping its administration, culture and 
working methods. It is therefore vital to discuss Hallstein's ideas on European 
integration and the role he attributed to the Commission in this process. 
Hallstein was a German law professor, former State Secretary in the AA and 
member of the CDU. 25 Heading the German delegation at the negotiations on the 
ECSC treaty and being closely involved in those on the Rome Treaties, meant that he 
had extensive experience in European integration affairs. As a federalist, he was 
influenced by people like Monnet. The two men met for the first time at the Schuman 
Plan negotiations in Paris 195015 1, and Hallstein was deeply impressed by the 
Frenchman. Both Monnet and Hallstein preferred close economic and political 
integration to loose market integration as for instance in a free trade area, propagated 
by the German Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard, for example. 26 For both men, 
effective supranational institutions and clear rules of the game were the precondition 
for successful and durable integration. A transformation of European consciousness 
could only be achieved with the help of institutions, Hallstein believed. 27 Despite the 
failure of the EDC in 1954, he was still convinced - not least as a consequence of 
World War H and the Cold War - of the inevitability of political integration. 
28 He 
25 On Hallstein see the volume Loth, Wallace and Wessels 1995. 
26 Sch6nwald 1999: 273-4. 
27 For Hallstein's concept of institutions see Sch6nwald 2001: here 159. 
28 Archiv ffir Christi ich-Demokratische Politik, Sankt Augustin, (henceforth ACDP), Personal Papers of 
Hans von der Groeben, 1-659,070/2, Der Staatssekretlir des Auswdrtigen Amtes [presumably 
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therefore saw his role of Conunission president as a political one. According to 
Jonathan White, the works of neofunctionalist academics influenced Hallstein and his 
collaborators. 29 The successes of the Commission in the 1960s in turn influenced the 
scholars of this school. Neofunctionalism is said to be a "'translation" into academic 
terminology of the EC Commission's original strategy' . 
30 In the mid- 1990s Cris Shore 
argued that neofunctionalism has remained at the basis of the Commission's self- 
image, that is, that 'it would emerge as the future government of this new 
supranational state'. 31 Accordingly, for Hallstein integration was a process, a 
continuous creation. Economic integration for him was not only a step towards a 
political union but it was already a political act in itself. 
32 In his book Europe in the 
making - the German edition is entitled Der unvollendete Bundesswat (the unfinished 
federal State) - he takes up the notions of Sachlogik, or material logic of integration, 
engrenage (interlocking) and 'spill-over' to describe this process. The latter term was 
33 coined by the neofunctionalist scholar Haas. For Hallstein, the Community was 
intended as a federation and its constitutional structure was 'clearly federal in intent 
and design'. 34 Hallstein's model for the European federation was the United States of 
America. 35 
Ly- 
He qualified the administrative services of the three executives of the ECSC, 
Euratom and the EEC as 'the modest embryo of what will one day be a truly European 
Hallsteinj, Erwiderung auf die Gedanken des Herrn Bundeswirtschaftsministers zu dem Problem der 
Kooperation oder der Integration, 30 March 1955. 
29 White 2003. 
-'0 Wessels 1998: 244. 
31 Shore 1995: 220. 
32 See Hallstein 1972: 46 and 28. 
33 Haas 1968 [1958]: 283. 
34 Hallstein 1972: 34. 
35 Schönwald 2001: 164. 
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administration'. 36 This explains some of the choices Hallstein made for the 
Commission in which he saw Europe's future government. His goal was, therefore, to 
create an independent, well-structured and sufficiently sized administration which 
could match the ones in the member states. The administrative staff of the 
Commission should be on a par with civil servants of the member states and 
representatives of industry and interest groups. Hallstein described the Commission as 
the executive of the Community, representing the common interest vis-A-vis member 
states and the outside world . 
37 The nine Commissioners - the college - had to be 
united in this task and to constitute a unified and independent body. He underlined 
this, for example, in his farewell speech to the European Parliament in June 1967.38 
While aiming at extending the influence of the Commission, Hallstein had, however, a 
realistic view of the powers given by the treaty to the member states on the one hand 
and to the Commission on the other. According to him, upholding the balance 
between the national and 'what could be called the European element' was important: 
The Communities have not been designed to make states disappear but rather as 
a kind of union between them. [ ... I It goes without saying that the Commission has to encourage this rapprochement [of the member states' economic policies, 
K. S. ] through proposals and initiatives and for this work it would need the 
support of national authorities. 39 
In the course of the 1960s, Hallstein substituted the term 'supranational' with the 
concept of 'Community'. In order not to offend, he renounced ýcalling 'a spade a 
spade'. 
40 
36 ACDP, 1-659,002/3, Communication de A le Pr6sident, Projet. Fusion des Ex6cutifs, 12 February 
1964,2. 
37 Hallstein 1972: 58. 
38 Ibid., 59. 
39 Hallstein 1958: 6-7. 
' See Sch6nwald 2001: 156. 
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[B]ecause the use of the word "supranational" appears to some to imply that we 
are bent upon destroying national identities. The "Community" concept, by 
contrast, implies - and rightly - that states renounce merely a part of their 
sovereignty, or rather that they put parts of their national sovereignty into a 
common pool which is controlled by "Community" institutions whose decisions 
are in fact their own. 41 
Even though avoiding the term 'supranational', Hallstein aimed at defending the 
Commission's prerogatives in the Council. Whenever the governments of the member 
states attempted to take a decision in which Hallstein thought the Commission should 
be involved, he made this known. Reminding the governments of the member states to 
abide by the articles of the treaty was often the only weapon the Commission had to 
preserve its prerogatives. 42 As a law professor Hallstein defended a legalistic 
perspective of the European Community founded upon law. For him, the Community 
as a Rechtsgemeinschaft, or community of law, was a guarantee for a peaceful and 
prosperous Europe. 
Although defending the Commission's rights granted by the treaty, Hallstein 
was also a pragmatic leader. Compared to Rey, Mansholt and sometimes M, -ujolin, he 
often took a moderate position in the Commission's meetings. In 1962, for instance, 
Rey wanted the Commission to play a much more active political role in the 
Community. He asked his colleagues: 'Shouldn't the Commission be ready to fight 
and, from time to time, put the virtues of courage in front of those of caution? 
Shouldn't it make its existence as an authority [vis-A-vis the member states, K. S. ] be 
felt more, and, as a consequence, shouldn't it render itself more respected and even 
41 Hallstein 1972: 39. 
42 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 139 session, 2ýme partie, 15 March 1961. 
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feared? -)43 As the Commission's president, Hallstein was more cautious. His views, at 
least regarding questions related to the Comniission's administration and staffing, 
were characterised by pragmatism. Unlike Monnet, Hallstein was, for instance, a great 
advocate of the national balance and of recruiting staff from national administrations. 
His colleague Maýolin, on the contrary, was in favour of choosing and promoting 
staff by taking more the individual qualifications and merit into account and less the 
candidate's nationality. 44 In this respect, therefore, the judgement of Andrew 
Moravcsik - that Hallstein and Mansholt lost their sense of reality and were, in 
contrast to people like Madolin, politically 'unconnected and unconcerned with 
democratic Politi&45 - clearly does not apply to Hallstein, at least in the early years 
of the Commission. Not least, the president was keen to win over public opinion and, 
faithful to a long standing demand of the Christian democrats and of the federalists, he 
sought to strengthen the European Parliament. 46 
The future of the Commission and of European integration was, however, a 
different matter. In Hallstein's opinion, the Commission should be empowered to 
'take all measures necessary for the implementation of the treaty on its own authority, 
without having to rely on special and specific approval by the Council of Ministers ,. 47 
His caution in administrative questions did not prevent him from seeking a greater 
role for the Commission in the future development of the Community. Firstly, though, 
a smoothly running administration had to be created, that was close to, aligned with 
and accepted by the administrations of the member states. 
43 ACDP, 1-659,058/1, J. Rey, Note pour Messieurs les pr6sidents et membres de la Commission. 
D61ib6rations de la Commission au seuil de son second quatriennat, 13 January 1962. See also Conrad 
2006: 86 on Rey urging the Commission to play the role of 'prophets' and not only of the 'clergy'. 
44 Cf. HAEU, DEP EN 720,22.6. -27.7.60 (108' A 114' r6union de ]a Commission), 18 July 1960. 
45 Moravscik 1998: 232. 
' Already at the Schuman Plan negotiations, Hallstein asked for direct elections of the General 
Assembly of the ECSC- Sch6nwald 2001: 154 and 162. 
47 Hallstein 1972: 62-3. 
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2. The establishment of practices and working methods 
2.1 Between collegiality and autonomy: the Commission as a college 
The principle of collegiality was, and still is, a distinctive feature of the European 
administration. The members of the Commission, like the High Authority members, 
chose to act as a college and to take their decisions in common deliberations. The 
members were meant to act in unity and speak with one voice towards the outside 
world. One Commissioner could, in principle, represent the entire college in all policy 
areas. However, the variety and the complexity of the tasks conferred on the 
Commission imposed a compromise solution. The Commissioners were thus 
confronted with the question of how to organize and distribute the work between them 
and, at the same time, respect the principle of collegiality. The Commission 
considered either introducing the Ressort-Prinzip, with each Commissioner taking 
over responsibility for one department, or a working group system, similar to the one 
introduced by the High Authority. The members opted for a modified version of the 
latter. The nine working groups established consisted of three to four members. Each 
working group president was responsible for one administrative unit and not, like in 
the High Authority, for a policy area across several departments. Decisions were 
prepared in the working groups, but the final decisions on Commission policies were 
taken by the college in weekly meetings. 48 
Thus, the Commission initially opted for a combination of a departmental and 
collegial structure. However, Hallstein's chef de cabinet, Berndt von Staden, pointed 
out in 1960 already that the working group system had effectively ceased to function 
" The Commission mentioned the group presidents for the first time in its sixth session: BAC 
209/1980, PV of the EEC Commission, 6 session, 24-26 February 195 8, pt. 10. 
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properly. 49According to von Staden, this was due to the fact that the groups had no 
real purpose as they could not even take decisions on matters of minor importance. In 
his opinion, a delegation of decision-making to the group level was not desirable 
either because of the danger that the groups could act as a miniature Commission. 50 
There are more reasons why the group system did not work properly. As each group 
president had a particular responsibility for one DG, he 'virtually received a 
51 delegation of the Commission to execute the day to day tasks in his sector'. The 
group presidents were reluctant to share this responsibility with their colleagues and 
soon they were de facto in charge of the policy of their respective DGs. 52 The group 
presidents were thus comparable to ministers in national governments. In contrast, in 
the High Authority the working groups were cross-departmental. The members of the 
High Authority could therefore not lay claim to the leadership of a particular 
department and were more inclined to share leadership. In the Commission, a similar 
system would not have been feasible, however. Given the large scope of the 
Commission's tasks, it would have been impossible for the Commissioners to keep up 
to date in every policy area of the Conunission. Moreover, the allocation of portfolios, 
or group presidencies, to the Commissioners had been a struggle in which satisfying 
the interests of national governments had played an important role. In these highly 
sensitive areas the Commissioners were not very enthusiastic about sharing their 
spheres of influence. For example, von der Groeben was a member of the agriculture 
working group and his opinion on the aims of the CAP differed considerably from 
49 BAK, N 1266/107 1, B. von Staden to President Hallstein, 30 May 1960. 
-50 Ibid. 
51 HAEU, DEP EN 800, E. Nodl, Le fonctionnement de la Commission et ses rapports avec les autres 
institutions europ6ennes. Visite d'information d'un groupe de banquiers frangais A la Communaut6 
Europ&nne, 14 November 1958,2. 
52 Nodl 1992: 15 1. 
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Mansholt's ideas. 53 Von der Groeben sought to bring into the Commission a German 
adviser for agricultural policy, Professor Hermann Priebe of Frankfurt University, 
founder and director of the Institute for Rural Development Research. Priebe became 
consultant to DG VI in June 1958 . 
54 The German Commissioner had - in vain - 
promoted Priebe's appointment as the second deputy director-general in DG VI, 
alongside Mansholt's trusted collaborator Berend Heringa and under director-general 
55 Louis-Georges Rabot, to counterbalance the Franco-Dutch influence on the CAP. 
Nevertheless, the Commission took the principle of collegiality very seriously. 
When the administrative units were dispersed across different buildings in Brussels, it 
was considered important that the Commission members kept their offices under one 
roof, while also having an office in the building of their respective DGs. In a 
Commission meeting, Mansholt explained that the unity of the Commission should be 
expressed in the spatial proximity of the Commissioners. 56 This closeness made 
informal and spontaneous communication between the members possible and 
certainly contributed to the good working atmosphere attributed to the Hallstein 
Commission. Finally, like in the High Authority, collegiality served as a shield against 
accusations of partiality. According to Nodl, the Commission always took national 
interests into consideration without abandoning its independence and its impartiality. 57 
This was possible not least because the principle of collegiality inspired trust in the 
Commission. 
53 Von der Groeben 1982: 106-8. 
54 HAEU, DEP EN 702,3.6.1958-15.7.1958 (20 to 24 session), 12 June 1958. 
55 BAK, N 1266/1253, Note Cabinet [Narjes? ] to President Hallstein, 14 June 1962. 
56 HAEU, DEP EN 701,12.4-3.6.1958 (14 to 19 session), 7 May 1958. 
57 HAEU, DEP EN 815, E. Nodl, Le Comit6 des Reprdsentants Permanents. Expos6 fait A I'Institut 
d'6tudes europ6ennes de I'Universit6 libre de Bruxelles, 19-21 
April 1966,12. 
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2.2 Deciding on appropriate working methods (1958-60) 
The Commissioners adopted the High Authority's custom of using Wednesday as the 
jour ftxe for their weekly meetings. Von der Groeben described the Commission's 
deliberations in his memoirs. According to him, Hallstein did not hesitate to bring 
about a decision by vote. While the literature emphasizes Hallstein's aim to maintain a 
harmonious relationship with his colleagues and to avoid voting, 58 von der Groeben's 
view is confirmed by Nodl's handwritten minutes of the Commission's meetings 
which show that the Commission did resort to voting. Simple majority was sufficient, 
according to the Commission's rules of procedure. 59 While certainly seeking to reach 
consent among the members, Hallstein also thought it important that decisions were 
taken quickly. Shelving decisions and postponing matters would give the impression 
that the Commission was not up to its tasks, he feared. 60 
In June 1958 DG IX proposed general rules of collaboration between the 
Commission and the DGs. These stated that the latter were at the disposal of the 
Commission and were given their tasks by the Commissioners. Collaboration across 
DGs was encouraged and desired but in a controlled manner, that is, by respecting the 
hierarchy. 61 For discussing and deciding on practical matters such as working hours, 
the Commission set up an administrative committee composed of the directors-general 
and the executive secretary. Judging from entries in Nodl's diary, the meetings started 
in November 1958 on a weekly basis but seem to have become less frequent. 62 The 
Commission introduced its formal rules of procedure, provided for in Article 162(2), 
58 See for example Conrad 2000: 169. 
59 Von der Groeben 1995: 378. 
60 Ibid. 
61 HAEU, DEP EN 349, Projet de r6glement provisoire d'organisation des services, pr6sent6 par la 
Direction G6ndrale de I'Administration, 24 June 1958. 
62 HAEU, DEP EN 706,19/11/1958-27/12/1958 (39' r6union A 44' r6union), 20 November 1958. 
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EEC treaty, only at the end of 1962.63 One reason for this delay could be that a certain 
amount of experience was needed to reveal best practice and appropriate working 
methods. 
In July 1960 the members held an extraordinary meeting to discuss the 
Commission's working methods and the functioning of the administration. Before the 
meeting, Commissioners Lemaignen and Petrilli distributed notes with their 
observations. These give an insight in the working methods but they also reveal the 
perceived faults of the new European administration. Firstly, both Lemaignen and 
Petrilli were content with the practice of involving the group of the chefs de cabinet 
more in the work of the college, for instance, by asking them to examine and discuss 
documents and problems before a Commission meeting. This method had until then 
only been used in exceptional cases. The main reason for the trust the Commissioners 
placed on their chefs de cabinet was, according to Petrilli, that these shared, unlike the 
directors-general, the political beliefs of the respective Commissioner. 64 The two 
Commissioners were thus in favour of strengthening and enlarging the Cabinets. 
Secondly, given the increasing workload of the Commission, Lemaignen 
demanded a better and more efficient distribution of work. As a result of the need to 
discuss and decide everything as a college, Lemaignen found the Commission's 
meetings too detailed and time-consuming. He deplored that the members did not 
have enough time to concentrate on the overall picture - the political side of their jobs. 
For instance, instead of being absorbed in lengthy Commission meetings, Lemaignen 
would have liked to dedicate more time to cultivating his contacts with political 
63 ACDP, 1-659,058/1, GeschAftsordnung der Kommission (KOM (62) 378), 17 December 1962; 
published in the Official Journal: 116glement 
int6rieur de la Commission des Communaut6s 
europ6ennes, Journal Officiel des Communaut6s 
Europ6ennes, No. 17,31 January 1963,181-5. 
64 BAC 209.80, R. Arena, Nota per il Prof Petrilli per la riunione della Commissione del 18.7.1960,16 
July 1960 (document inserted in PV of the EEC Commission, 112 session, 18 July 1960). 
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leaders in Paris and representatives of French industry. The Commissioners should, he 
suggested, only meet once every two weeks and resort to the written procedure, that 
is, a proposal was not discussed in the Commission's meeting but circulated in the 
Cabinets and, if no one objected, subsequently adopted. Moreover, Lemaignen 
admitted that he ignored for the most part what was going on in the other DGs. Often 
the Commissioners were only confronted with a proposal as the result of the work of a 
DG in their weekly meetings, and then they had to take major decisions. Thus, in 
practice the principle of collegiality did not work very well. Lastly, Lemaignen 
regretted that the Commission had embarked on a process of bureaucratisation. 
Having to produce a receipt for every external phone call would 'at the same time 
harm our means of action and our dignity' and would add fuel to the Commission's 
critics' fire. 
65 
On 18 July 1960 the Commission met in conclave to discuss these issues. First 
and foremost the nine Commissioners committed to the principle of collegiality. It 
was especially the president who stressed the importance of the college structure. 
Contrary to Lemaignen, Hallstein did not think that the Commission was 
'overburdened with work' and was thus not prepared to reduce the number of 
Commission meetings. 66 However, for minor decisions, the Commissioners decided 
that the written procedure should be applied in a more systematic manner, sometimes 
combined with preparatory work by the chefs de cabinet. This resulted in a 
strengthening not only of the role but also of the size of the Cabinets as each 
67 
Commissioner was entitled to add additional Cabinet staff. 
65 BAC 209.80, R. Lemaignen, Note pour le conclave du 18 Juillet 1960,13 July 1960. 
66 For the above see: HAEU, DEP EN 720,22.6. -27.7.60 (108' h 114e r6union de la Commission), 18 
July 1960. 
67 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 112 session, 26' partie, 18 July 1960. 
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As it was intended as a general exchange of views, Rey took the meeting as an 
opportunity to criticize Hallstein's leadership. According to him, only the important 
decisions were taken by the college, the Commissioners otherwise enjoying too much 
autonomy in their sectors. Rey thus backed Lemaignen in arguing that the 
Commission should not aspire to taking every decision of minor importance in the 
college. In essence, Rey stated that Hallstein was overworked because he had taken on 
too many tasks, for example, he aimed at studying most documents the 
Commissioners received from the administration himself, assumed responsibility for 
the external relations of the Commission and headed the administration. Rey 
maintained that the administration suffered from this situation. He suggested that one 
Commissioner should assist Hallstein in managing it. This also resulted in a severe 
critique of the Director-General for Administration, Maurits van Karnebeek, whom 
Rey described as a charming man who was not 'up to his administrative task' . 
68 Vice- 
President Mansholt backed Rey. According to him, the administration was 'the weak 
spot' of the Commission. 69 Also, the administrative committee did not function 
properly, according to Mansholt. Concerning the importance of the administration, he 
stated that 'we are also the slaves of our administration'. He mentioned 'Parkinson's 
law', a phenomenon that civil servants tended to create work for each other and that 
especially in public administrations, 'work expands so to fill the time available for its 
completion'. 70 The political head of the Commission's administration, the college, 
was thus not entirely in control of its own creation which had taken on a 
life of its 
own. 
68 HAEU, DEP EN 720,22.6. -27.7.60 (108' A 114' r6union de la Commission), 
18 July 1960. 
69 Ibid. 
11 C. Northcote Parkinson, Parkinson's Law. In The Economist, 
November 1955. 
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Hallstein acknowledged his colleagues' criticism of DG IX. Also, the president 
said that he would be ready to delegate some of his tasks but at the same time he 
emphasized that he wanted to retain responsibility for the Commission's personnel 
policy. All in all, Hallstein was satisfied with how the Commission worked. He, 
rightly, pointed out that there was no item on the Commission's agenda which had not 
been put there by a member. 71 It was thus their responsibility if the agenda was 
overburdened. But who of the Commissioners was prepared to admit that a matter 
they were dealing with was not important and renounce putting it on the agenda? 
The meeting consolidated basic working methods and showed that the 
principle of collegiality needed to be applied in a more flexible manner. The Cabinets 
as the trusted personal advisory bodies of the Commissioners were strengthened. The 
college clearly saw the inefficiency of DG DC as one of the main problems of the 
administration. The notorious weakness of this DG was partly compensated by the 
executive secretary however with whom Hallstein collaborated closely. 
2.3 The role of the Executive Secretariat under Emile Noel 
While agreeing on the necessity of creating a Secretariat in the Commission, the 
Commissioners decided that the future secretary should not bear the title of secretary 
general. 72 The latter would have corresponded to a position that was hierarchically 
situated above the other administrative units. The Secretariat as conceived by the 
Commission should only be responsible for 'technical aspects' of the Commission's 
activities and would not be in charge of the preparation of the Commission's 
71 HAEU, DEP EN 720,22.6. -27.7.60 (108' A 114' r6union de la Commission), 
18 July 1960. 
72 BAC 209/1980, PV of the EEC Commission, I" session, 16 January 1958. 
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decisions, for instance. 73 Moreover, secretary general was the tide the heads of many 
international organizations bore -a connotation the Commissioners sought to avoid. 
On 26 March 1958 the Commission appointed the Frenchman Nodl who had been 
recommended by Maýolin. 74 Nodl was not prepared to settle for the simple title of 
secretary, however, as in France, this title would appear rather insignificant. Instead, 
he asked to be made executive secretary, a title used in the French civil service . 
75Nodl 
led the Commission's Executive Secretariat, which was renamed Secretariat General 
in 1967 after all, until his retirement in 1987. 
The shape of the Executive Secretariat was, according to Nodl, inspired by the 
French administration, and the French government's Secretariat General in particular, 
and by the British Cabinet Office with which the French government was in close 
contact in 1956/57 when Nodl worked with Guy Mollet, at that time President du 
Conseil, or Prime Minister. 76 It was composed of four divisions: greffe (registry), 
internal relations, relations with the other Community institutions, and a division 
responsible for putting together the Commission's general report. The Secretariat's 
responsibilities comprised preparing and organizing the Commission's meetings, 
establishing the minutes and communicating the college's decisions to the services. 
Moreover, it oversaw the execution of decisions and assisted the services with keeping 
the Commission informed about their work. 77 In June 1958 the Commission assigned 
deputy executive secretary Behr the task of representing the Commission in the 
Coreper on the grounds that the Secretariat was in charge of (administrative) relations 
73 Ibid. 
74 BAC 209/1980, PV of the EEC Commission, II session, 24-27 March 1958; Matiolin 1989: 298. For 
a short biographical article on Nodl's career until 1958 see Previti Allaire 2004. 
75 BAK, N 1266/107 1, Note Naijes to President Hallstein, 2 April 1958. 
76 Entretien de M. No-61 avec le Courrier du Personnel. In Courrier du Personnel, Num6ro sp-6cial << Au 
revoir M. Noldl, no 488, September 1987,13-30, here 16. 
77 HAEU, DEP EN 349, Direction G6n6rale de I'Administration, Projet de r6glement provisoire 
d'organisation des services pr6seW par la Direction G&6rale de ]'Administration, 24 June 1958. 
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with the Council. In the Coreper meetings, Behr was accompanied by the director- 
78 general or another high official of the interested DG(s). The Commissioners 
themselves did not participate in the Coreper. The Executive Secretariat was thus one 
of the intermediaries they were able to use to remain close to, and informed about, the 
member states' points of view. The Secretariat drafted a note after each meeting, 
surnmarising the discussion. This note was then distributed prior to the next 
Commission meeting. 79 The Commission could thus react immediately and give new 
instructions to the executive secretary and his deputy. As Nodl and Behr took part in 
the Commission's meetings, they were equally well informed about the Commission's 
views, and could act accordingly in the Coreper, or advise the officials of the DGs 
concerned. Given the increasing importance of the Coreper in the EEC, 80 this is where 
the Commission's Executive Secretariat differed most from the High Authority's 
Secretariat. 
Beyond the formal tasks assigned to the Executive Secretariat, Nodl soon 
assumed more responsibilities. As seen in the High Authority, administrations develop 
informal structures that fill a gap such as lacking institutionalised communication 
channels. 81 Even though the Commission initially sought to prevent the Secretariat 
from turning into a powerful administrative unit, it underwent a development similar 
to the High Authority's Secretariat. An indispensable co-ordinating unit, it soon took 
over important information and communication tasks and was in charge of the 
distribution of information. For instance, on Nodl's initiative the Secretariat 
78 BAC 209.80/1980, PV of the EEC Commission, 19 session, 3-4 June 1958, pt. 2. See also the 
interview with Behr's successors, Axel Herbst, HAEU, INT-ECH 677, Interview Wilffied Loth and 
Veronika Heyde with Axel Herbst, Bonn, 25 May 2004; and HAEU, INT-ECH 683, Interview 
Veronika Heyde with Helmut Sigrist, Bonn, 7 January 2004. 
79 HAEU, DEP EN 815, Emile No6l, Le Comit6 des Repr6sentants Permanents. Expos6 fait A l'Institut 
d'6tudes europ, 6ennes de l'Universit6 libre de Bruxelles, 19-21 
April 1966,35. 
80 See Ludlow 2005a. 
81 Downs 1968: 63. 
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distributed regular notes with information on the Commission's and the other EEC 
institutions' activities to the directors-general, directors and heads of division. Tle 
Commissioners approved of this initiative. 82 By 1960, the Secretariat sent weekly 
notes to the heads of division and monthly reports to the directors-general to keep 
them informed. 83 From mid-1958 onwards, Nodl held weekly meetings, on Friday 
84 
mornings, with the assistants of the directors-general. They discussed administrative 
questions but also the outcome of the Commission's gatherings and what was 
generally happening in the Commission. These meetings were a means to keep the 
directors-general and thus the Commission's services informed. One former assistant 
called the group of assistants a phalanx and a co-ordinating element in the 
Commission. 85 Another official from the Executive Secretariat and close collaborator 
of Nodl went so far as to call the assistants the Hausmeier, or major-domo, of the 
Commission and Nodl's source of power. 86 These meetings were also important at a 
psychological level. They facilitated contact between officials across DGs and left 
them feeling informed about what was going on in the Commission. Later on, and at 
first only infrequently, Nodl also held meetings with the directors-general 87 and the 
chefs de cabinet. 88 In fact, it was only under the presidency of Jean Rey, after the 
82 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 35 session, 29/30 October 1958, pt. 5. 
83 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 112 session, 2ý' partie, 18 July 1960. 
'4 See for example HAEU, DEP EN 2122 (Agenda 1958), according to Nodls 
diary entries, the first 
session was on the 26 September 1958. 
85 Interview K. S. with Helmut von Verschuer, Nentershausen, 16 February 2004. Nowadays the 
assistants still hold their meeting on Friday mornings although their role 
has changed slightly from an 
administrative to a more political role. See Anonymous. 
Coordinating the coordinators. In Courrier du 
C ersonnel no 70,23-29 October 1997,4-5. 
Interview K. S. with Henri Etienne, Brussels, 7 March 2005. 
87 Interview K. S. with the assistant to the director-general of DG IV, Brussels, 
14 April 2004. 
88 See for example HAEU, DEP EN 2124, Agenda 1960, entry of 
25 April. 
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merger of 1967, that the weekly meetings of the chefs de cabinet were 
89 institutionalised. 
Nodl was thus an indispensable source and also recipient of infonnation. He 
had a major role in designing the Commission's administrative structure. According to 
Hussein Kassim, the Secretariat 'played a crucial role in institutionalizing the 
Commission: establishing and regularizing its procedures, [and] shaping an 
independent administration [ ... 1'. 
90 This was also possible because of the close 
relationship between Hallstein and Nodl, which allowed the Secretariat to develop into 
this important co-ordinating unit. Moreover, Nodl's experience and his intimacy with 
the French political scene made him a valuable collaborator. 91 He advised the 
members of the Commission and Hallstein in particular, who observed 
retrospectively: 
Originally, this Secretariat was meant to be little more than a technical body to 
assist the Commission as and when required; but under its outstanding French 
Secretary-General, Emile Nodl, it soon acquired a more important role and, 
though hardly ever noticed by 
2 
the general public, became an essential part of 
the Commission's machinery. 9 
The Secretariat was a central instrument for Hallstein to realise his aim of building an 
important administration, matching those of the member states. Moreover, Nodl was 
important for the creation of the Commission's institutional identity. Through 
collecting and distributing information, 'the Secretariat established, and at the same 
time became keeper of, the Commission's institutional memory'. 93 What is more, the 
executive secretary assumed an important role in the Commission's external 
89 HAEU, Int 30, Emile Nodl (Serie 06 - , Les origines de Fadministration communautaire", 
Table 
ronde organis6e par NUE, 06/07/1991). 
90 Kassim 2004: 48. 
91 Von der Groeben 1995: 379. See also chapter BII for a short biography of 
N0161. 
92 Hallstein 1972: 61. 
93 Kassim 2004: 52-3. 
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representation. It was him who received groups of visitors (for example students or 
members of parliaments) and who explained to them how the Community worked. 94 
Nodl thus acted as an informal ambassador. By receiving visitors, giving talks and 
writing articles about the Community and the role of the Commission, he promoted 
European integration. For instance, his piece, 'How do the European Communities 
work'95 was widely read. Finally, Nodl played a crucial role in the staff policy of the 
Commission. He kept an eye on the distribution of posts between nationals of the 
member states and discussed suitable candidates with the directors-general and the 
Cabinets. 96 
2.4 The role of the Cabinets 
Introduced by the High Authority, the Commissioners' Cabinets became one of the 
most important and perhaps also one of the most contested characteristics of the 
European administration. In the first Commission meeting, the members agreed on 
appointing a small number of personal staff to assist them. 97 At the beginning, these 
Cabinets were composed of a chef de cabinet and a deputy chef de cabinet, while 
98 Hallstein was granted a third A official. They were attributed the grades A2 (chef de 
cabinet) and A3 (deputy chef de cabinet), 99 corresponding to director and head of 
division in the hierarchy of the administration, thus inferior in rank to director-general. 
94 See for example the documents in HAEU, DEP EN 2667,1960-1976. 
95 No-dl 1963. 
96 Kassim 2004: 54. See also the interviews K. S. with Eduard Brackeniers, Brussels, 10 March 2005 
and Manfred I-Ahnstein, Hamburg, 19 December 2005. 
97 BAC 209.1980, PV of the EEC Commission, I" session, 16 January 1958, pt. 12. 
98 BAC 209.08, PV of the EEC Commission, 40 session, 6 December 1958, pt. 13. 
'19 See for example HAEU, DEP EN 705 1/10/1958-19/11/1958 (31' A 38' r6union de la Commission), 
15 October 1958. 
153 
While at first it appeared that Hallstein imposed his view that the Cabinets 
should have little importance in the Commission, 100 they rapidly gained influence. The 
reasons for this development are diverse. As in the case of the Executive Secretariat, 
another informal structure developed in the administration to fill a gap and to respond 
to a certain need. The principle of collegiality left the Commissioners with the 
obligation to keep themselves informed on other policy areas. With the growing 
workload of the Commission, the Commissioners tried to delegate tasks and attributed 
more responsibility and power to their personal collaborators on whom they relied for 
advice and assistance. The Cabinet staff vetted information such as incoming 
proposals from other DGs. It made sure that these did not contain aspects which could 
be problematic or were not acceptable for their Commissioner's home government. 
The Cabinet staff largely ended up deciding which pieces of information would reach 
the Commissioner. It is not surprising that most Cabinet staff shared their 
Commissioner's nationality. Petrilli's note for the conclave, which was ironically 
drafted by his chef de cabinet, showed that the Italian Commissioner trusted his 
personal collaborators more than the director-general heading his DG; the former 
shared his political beliefs and his national background and the latter did not. 101 In his 
memoirs, von der Groeben underlined the important role of Cabinet members as 
trusted advisers in a multinational administration - advisers usually of the same 
nationality. 
102 
The Cabinet members' role as trustees of the Commissioners was enhanced by 
the fact that they could represent their member in the Commission's meetings. 
100 IISH, Archief van Sicco L. Mansholt, No 97, J. J. van der Lee, Memorandum voor Dr Mansholt, 23 
April 1958. On Hallstein's desire to keep the personal collaborators of the Commissioners to a 
minimum see also the passage in Lemaignen 1964: 49-50. 
101 BAC 209.80, R. Arena, Nota per il Prof Petrilli per la riunione della Commissione del 18.7.1960,16 
July 1960 (document inserted in PV of the EEC Commission, 112 session, 18 July 1960). 
102 Von der Groeben 1995: 303. 
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Although deprived of the right to vote, they were allowed to speak and articulate their 
member's opinion. The role they wished to assign to their Cabinets depended largely 
on the Commissioners themselves. For instance Alfred Mozer, Mansholt's chef de 
cabinet, was neither a specialist in agricultural policy nor in administration. In charge 
of promoting European integration and of the vice-president's relations to social 
democrats and other politicians across Europe, he took pride in never having attended 
a meeting of the chefs de cabinet. 103 
In the early 1960s the chefs de cabinet only met infrequently before the 
Wednesday sessions of the Commission to discuss a specific problem. However, when 
the Commission's workload increased, and as alternative co-ordinating bodies were 
lacking, these meetings became more important. The Commissioners introduced two 
categories of decisions, A and B. Decisions of the A category would only appear on 
the Commission's agenda for the weekly meeting if one of the Commissioners wished 
to further discuss the topic. Otherwise the chefs de cabinet would decide. ' 04 By circa 
1965/66 the Cabinets started preparing the decisions of the college. In a report of 
1967, Wellenstein, secretary-general of the High Authority, Giulio Guazzugli-Marini, 
secretary-general of the Euratom Commission, and Nodl qualified the weekly 
meetings of the chefs de cabinet as the most important and efficient preparation and 
problem solving method in the Commission. 105 
The Cabinets also played a vital role in the Commission's staff policy. 106 Here, 
their role differed most from Cabinets in national ministries and their influence was 
probably most pronounced. They observed the national balance of staff and put 
103 Wielenga 1997: 29. 
'04HAEU, DEP EN 720,22.6. -27.7.60 (108' A 114' r6union de la Commission), 18 July 1960. 
105HAEU, DEP EN 21, Rapport du Secr6taire g6n6ral de la Haute Autorit6 et des Secr6taires ex6cutifs 
des Commissions de la CEE et d'Euratom sur lorganisation des services de la Commission des 
Communaut6s Europ6ennes, Bruxelles, I July 1967,12. 
106HAEU, Int 30 Emile Noel. 
155 
forward candidates, especially for A4 and A3 posts. The presidential Cabinet was 
particularly influential in this area. 107 The chefs de cabinet discussed the 'nationality 
of a vacancy' with Nodl. 108 Cabinet members then looked for suitable candidates in 
the Commission first, and then in the member states. According to Mozer, the 
Cabinets had a Vorschlaprecht, or the right to nominate suitable candidates for 
leading posts in the Commission. 109 
The influence of the Cabinets and the increasing exclusiveness of the 
relationship between the Commissioners and their Cabinets to the detriment of the 
directors-general triggered problems and jealousy as some Cabinets attempted to 
control the access to their Commissioner. Moreover, former Cabinet members were 
likely to be promoted to a higher position in the administration once their service in 
the Cabinet ended, for instance when their Commissioner left. Careers via the Cabinet 
became an important and contested issue. ' 10 The increasing power of Cabinets was 
also a result of the weakness of the Commission's administration. In this fragmented 
administration into which the Commission developed, policy proposals were often 
prepared and discussed in one DG without consultation of other DGs. Therefore, the 
Cabinet meeting was often the first occasion where a proposal would be discussed 
across different DGs. 
2.5 The role of high officials 
Like in the High Authority, the employees of the Commission were divided into four 
different careers: A, B, C and D. The A career required a university degree and 
107 Coombes 1970: 153. 
108 Interviews K. S. with Franz Froschmaier, Brussels, 15 April 2004 and with Manfred Lahnstein. 
109 IISH, Archief van Alfred Mozer, No 5, Letter A. Mozer to Klaus P6hle, 14 October 1964. 
110 Ritchie 1992: 105. Cf. in the evolution of the Commission's cabinets Donnelly and 
Ritchie 1994: 
40-48. 
156 
comprised eight grades: director-general (A I), director (M), head of division (mainly 
A3, but initially also A4 and A5), principal administrator (A4/5), administrator (A6/7) 
and, later, assistant administrator (M). Young graduates with no or very little 
professional experience were employed as A6/7, later as A8. After the personnel 
statute entered into force in 1962, Ag to A3 officials were in principle recruited 
through a competitive entry examination, the concours. For Al and A2 posts, or the 
6political posts', this recruitment procedure did not apply, however. 'Political post' 
means that a candidate external to the European administration could be appointed 
('parachuted in') and that A I. and A2 officials could be dismissed from the service in 
the Commission with only a short period of notice. ' 11 However, in practice A3 posts 
were often enough considered as 'political posts' although not labelled as such in the 
statute. 
Directors-general were the most senior category of officials in the 
Commission. They headed a DO and worked closely with the member responsible for 
the policy area of their DG, the president of the working group. In order to ensure 
impartiality, the Commission decided that the directors-general had to have a different 
nationality from the respective president of the working group. " 2 Sometimes they had 
different political convictions as well as in the case of von der Groeben, a Christian 
democrat and the director-general of DG IV, Pieter VerLoren van Themaat, a 
socialist. In some cases, this affected the relationship between a Commissioner and the 
director-general. For instance, Commissioner Petrilli suggested that the directors- 
general should not be involved in political decisions of the Commission because they 
III Article 29(2) of the statute. Statut der Bearnten der EuropAischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und der 
Europifischen Atomgemeinschaft. Official Journal of the European Communities, No 1389/62,14 June 
1962. 
112 BAC 209/1980 No 1, PV of the EEC Commission, 6 session, 24-26 February 1958, pt. 4. 
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normally did not share the political beliefs of the respective Commissioner. ' 13 
Generally speaking, the relations between Commissioners and their directors-general 
seem to have become more distant over the years. 1 14 Yet, Hallstein called the 
directors-general the 'elite' of the administration because the scope of their 
competencies was comparable to that of an entire ministry in the member states. He 
compared them to 'Permanent Under-Secretaries' in the United Kingdom's 
administration. 1 15 Directors-general had an important role in the formulation of the 
Commissioner's preferences and they represented the authority of the Commissioner 
vis-A-vis the administrative services. 116 In 1960, Lemaignen deplored that there were 
hardly any links or cooperation among the directors-general themselves. Therefore, 
according to Lemaignen, they did not form a 'corps' while this kind of solidarity had 
become 'almost instinctive within our Commission and between our Cabinets'. ' 17 ThiS 
suggests that already in the early 1960s the directors-general acted like 'dukes' 
defending their duchies within the administration, something von der Groeben 
deplored in 1966.1 18 As the directors-general usually remained in the administration 
for a longer period of time than the Commissioners, Lemaignen thought that the 
'corps' of the directors-general should develop into the conscience of the Commission 
and its 'keeper of experiences and tradition'. 
' 19 Yet it seems that they mainly 
conserved the experiences and traditions of their own DGs. 
113 BAC 209.80, R. Arena, Nota per il Prof Petrilli per la riunione della Commissione del 18.7.1960,16 
July 1960 (document inserted in PV of the EEC Commission, 112 session, 18 July 1960). 
114 BAC 25/1980, No. 1608, Proposition en vue du renforcement des liaisons entre la Commission et les 
Directeurs g6n6raux (Projet de note du Pr6sident de la Commission), 20 November 
1968,114-119. 
115 HAEU, DEP EN 702,3.6. -15.7.1958 (20e bis 24e r6union), 24 June 
1958. 
116 HAEU, DEP EN 720,22.6. -27.7.1960 (108' A 114' r6union de la 
Commission), 18 July 1960. 
117 Ibid. 
118 ACDP, 1-659,05111, H. von der Groeben, Vermerk Frijhjahr 1966, undated [spring 1966], 38. See 
also Peterson 1971: 128. 
119 BAC 209.80, R. Lemaignen, Note pour le conclave du 18 Juillet 1960,13 July 1960 (document 
inserted in PV of the EEC Comn-dssion, 112 session, 18 July 1960). 
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Hierarchically positioned between the director-general and the heads of 
division and presiding over several divisions, the tasks of the directors were otherwise 
rather ill-defined. For instance, the German Commissioners do not seem to have 
expected them to conceptualise policies. Von der Groeben deplored that the directors 
played too important a role in devising policy proposals. For him the heads of division 
alone should be Thomme de conception"20 , the ones to formulate policies as in the 
German administration. There clearly was a misunderstanding resulting from 
variations in the administrative cultures between the member states. Naýes explains 
this difference: '[T]he division head from France or Italy approached his new, 
expanded duties and his greater freedom guardedly and in disbelief at first, while the 
German division head felt treated like a child. ' 121 The Commission considered the 
division as the core unit of the administration and consequently attributed an 
important role to the heads of division which was later on sanctioned in the 
Commission's rules of procedure. 
122 
The assistants to the directors -general were an unusual category of officials. 
Initially, they were A4 or A3 category staff as they should not compete with the 
directors and become 'assistant directors-general'. However, they were considered as 
potential future heads of division or even directors. ' 
23 In charge of the secretariat, the 
administration and the organization of work in a DG, the assistant was directly 
responsible to the director-general. 124 The assistants supported them in their daily 
tasks and maintained relations with the Commissioners' Cabinets and the other 
120 HAEU, DEP EN 720,22.6. -27.7.60 (108' A 114' r6union de la Commission), 
18 July 1960. 
Underlined in the original text. 
12 1 Narjes 1998: 113. 
122 ACDP, 1-659,058/1, Geschdftsordnung der Kommission (KOM (62) 378), 17 December 1962, 
Article 20. 
123 BAK, N 1266/1264, Note to President Hallstein, no author [Cabinet Hallstein] 13 November 1962. 
124 BAC 209/1980, PV of the EEC Commission, 14 session, 21-24 April 1958, pt. 7. 
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services of the Commission. They also advised the directors-general in questions of 
staffing. However, the nature of tasks and responsibilities the assistants were given 
depended on the director-general. For example, Helmut von Verschuer in DG VI was 
more concerned with questions related to the CAP than Charles van Aken with 
questions related to competition policy in DG IV. 
125 Through their weekly meetings 
chaired by Nodl, the assistants had important co-ordinating functions in the 
Commission and were a source of information for their directors-general. 126 
Competent leading staff, directors-general, directors and heads of division, 
were vital for the overall performance of the Commission, the performance of a DG 
and for the motivation of other employees in an administrative unit. Playing an 
important role in the administration and being treated with respect and esteem has an 
effect on individuals. Not least it facilitates the development of loyalties towards an 
organization. The EEC treaty comprised an annex, the 'Protocol on the Privileges and 
Immunities', which said that the Commission members, and a group of officials to be 
defined by the Commission, would benefit from laissez-passers as valid travel 
documents within the member states. 127 Likewise, a group of officials would be 
declared immune from legal proceedings 'in respect of acts performed by them in 
their official capacity'. 128 These measures should guarantee Commissioners and high 
officials the necessary independence when executing their tasks. Apart from sharing 
the European status and diplomatic immunity with the Commissioners, high officials 
were entitled to represent the Commission at external events. 
' 29 They were also 
occasionally present in the weekly meetings of the Commission. However, it seems 
125 CEAB 2 1672, CEE, Euratom: statut, d6scription des tAches pour la cat. A (1959), undated. 
126 BAK, N 1266/1264, Note Smulders to President Hallstein, 12 November 1962. 
127 EEC treaty, Protocol on the privileges and immunities, Chapter 2, Article 6. 
128 fbid., Chapter 5, Article 11. 
129 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 67 session, 8 July 1959, pt. 5. 
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that they did not participate as freely and frequently in the discussion as in the early 
days of the High Authority. As a general rule, the executive secretary, his deputy, and 
the greffe were the only officials present in the Commission's meetings on a regular 
basis. Directors-general, directors but also heads of division and sometimes even 
lower ranking officials were invited to participate in a meeting if their area of 
expertise was discussed and if a member required their assistance. ' 30 However, this 
presence of non-members in the sessions did not remain uncontested. In September 
1959 Hallstein deplored that, compared to Cabinet meetings of national government 
ministers, too many officials took part in the Commission's meetings. 131 While in the 
conclave of July 1960 the Commission confirmed the presence of officials in the 
weekly meetings in principle, after an incident where information from a meeting was 
leaked the Commissioners tried to restrict the presence of officials in their 
meetings. 132 Instead, the members were allowed to bring a member of their Cabinet to 
assist them. Even if in practice officials continued to take part in the weekly sessions, 
this incident strengthened the role of the Cabinets as the Commissioners trusted 
collaborators to the detriment of high officials. 
If they could not participate regularly in the Commission's meetings, the 
Commission thought it nevertheless necessary to keep the officials up to date on 
Community matters. For instance, it organized meetings of A officials up to heads of 
division at which one Commission member would talk about a current problem of the 
Commission. President Hallstein thought this was necessary not least because he often 
considered drafts coming from Commission officials as 'naive' and not taking 
into 
" See for example BAC 209/1980, PV of the EEC Commission, 15 session, 
28-29 April 1958. 
13 1 HAEU, DEP EN 711,22.7.59-22.9.59 (69' A 74' r6union de la Commission), 
7 September 1959. 
132 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Comn-fission, 140 session, 26me partie, 22/23 
March 1961. 
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account cuffent Commission policies. ' 33 He thus had high expectations of the 
Commission's staff which they could not always fulfil. 
The quality and abilities of the high officials first appointed varied. With the 
personnel statute imminent in late 1960 and early 1961 the Commission tried to 
evaluate its personnel and attempted to dismiss incapable staff. The danger was, 
according to Maijolin, that with the continuous presence of mediocre staff the 
Commission's services would end up being inferior to national administrations. It 
would also signal to the more talented and hard working staff that there were no 
sanctions for weak performance. 134 Thus, the Commission established a commission 
d'intJgration for the personnel statute, which should assess the Commission's A 
officials up to heads of division. 135 The college itself decided on the fate of the 
directors-general, directors and some heads of division. In a meeting in February 
1962, each Commissioner submitted problematic cases in his directorate-general. The 
college also tried to consider the possible implications of a decision to dismiss 
someone: consequences for the national balance and social considerations were 
weighted against harm for the Commission's performance and reputation. For 
instance, Schaus pointed out that if he sent directors home, there was no guarantee that 
their successors would be more capable. According to him the Commission could not 
always choose the most capable people because of 'political pressures'. 
136 Therefore, 
the cases of non-integration in the statute were the exception. Some officials were 
offered a lower grade (diclassement), however. Also, for the cases of social 
hardship, 
the Commission suggested solutions such as a research contract. 
' 37 Financially, this 
133 HAEU, DEPEN720,22.6. -27.7.60(108' A 114'r6uniondela 
Commission), 18 July 1960. 
134 HAEU, DEP EN 724,14.12.60-1.2.61 (128e A 133e r6union de la Commission), 
21 December 1960. 
135 HAEU, DEP EN 322, R6union de la Commission, 23 February 1962. 
136 HAEU, DEP EN 323, Wunion de la Commission, 28 
February 1962. 
137 Ibid. 
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must have been a considerable loss for the Commission but it allowed the officials 
concerned to save face. Solidarity with personnel who had spent four years in the 
administration and fear of political consequences guided the Commission's decisions. 
However, the Commission was stricter towards its personnel than the High Authority. 
A High Authority source suggested, but did not specify further, that the Commission 
undertook a thorough investigation into their staff s background before they were 
given the status of civil servants. 
138 
The minutes of this Commission meeting of February 1962 indicate that inept 
members of staff were distributed unequally across DGs. For instance, Rey, 
responsible for DG 1, complained about two of his directors, Robert Faniel and 
Riccardo Luzzato. 1 39 Likewise, Schaus was not satisfied with any of his three directors 
in DG Transport while there were few complaints about DG IV and DG VI staff. 
Vice-President Mansholt thought that this was due to the careful choice of 
collaborators by his director-general Rabot. The one case discussed for DG VI 
concerned the Belgian Director for Agricultural Structures, Roger Grooten. Mansholt 
thought that he was not the ideal man for the post. According to him, in the domain of 
agricultural structures there was an expert community within and outside the 
Commission of which Grooten was not part and which he was not capable of 
joining. 140 The fact that Grooten was not part of this network was considered harmful 
for the Commission's structural policy in agriculture. 141 This shows the importance of 
contacts and networks of leading Commission officials for the Commission's success 
in a policy area; contacts which they either had before entering the Commission or 
138 CEAB 2 558, G. Signorini, Vermerk für den Herrn Präsidenten und die Herren Mitglieder der Hohen 
Behörde, 7 January 1963,13-4, here 13. 
139 HAEU, DEP EN 322, R6union de la Comrrüssion, 23 February 1962. 
140 Ibid. 
141 HAEU, DEP EN 323, R6union de la Comn-ýssion, 28 February 1962. 
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which they had to acquire subsequently. The college decided that Grooten should 
remain in his post until DG VI was restructured and a more suitable position was 
found for him. However, two years later, Grooten was still the director of the 
Directorate for Agricultural Structures. 142 Confronted with member states' demands, 
the Commission had to compromise. Determination to act as expressed in the 
Commission's meetings was therefore not always followed by consequent action. 
Under these circumstances, the Commission's administration perfon-ned. surprisingly 
well. The examples of DG IV and DG VI show that it was possible to choose well 
qualified staff even when under external pressure. In an interview, the director-general 
of DG W, Pieter VerLoren van Themaat, prided himself that he successfully 
appointed qualified personnel while at the same time abiding by the rules of national 
balance just like any other DG in the Commission. 143 This is confirmed by a 
contemporary statement of President Hallstein: 'There are few cases in DG IV but not 
because of generosity but because of careful recruitment. "44Thus, if the director- 
general was capable, and if the Commissioner and the director-general collaborated 
closely, it was possible to put together a competent team. 
The Commission's civil servants were regarded as the institution's memory 
and a guarantee for continuity. Shortly before Hallstein left the Commission in 1967, 
Narjes wrote to him saying that it was important to think about ways to place 'reliable 
Europeans' in the Commission so as to guarantee that the highest ranks in the 
administration ensured continuity of the integration policy 
independent of the change 
in political leadership, that is, after Hallstein's departure. 
145 
142 BAK, N 1266/1254, K. Meyer to President Hallstein, 9 April 1964. 
143 Interview K. S. with Pieter VerLoren van Themaat, Bilthoven, 29 April 
2004. 
144 HAEU, DEP EN 322, Wunion de ]a Commission, 23 February 1962. 
145 BAK, N 1266/1105, Note K. -H. Nujes to President Hallstein, 
7 January 1967. 
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3. Towards a European administrative staM. Recruitment patterns and 
personnel policy 
3.1 The beginnings of the Commission's staff and recruitment policy 
The effectiveness of an administration depends significantly on the skills of its 
personnel. Therefore, recruitment is of vital importance to any organization. 146 The 
Commission started appointing personnel from early 1958. However, the personnel 
statute introducing a standardised. selection procedure for European civil servants only 
came into force in 1962. Hence, between the Commission being set up and the statute 
entering into force lay four years of more or less unregulated recruitment. As Gaudet, 
the head of the Commission's Legal Service, emphasized in March 1959, the absence 
of a personnel statute gave the Commission great freedom in recruitment matters that 
was only limited by budgetary restrictions. 147 
The first appointments were meant to be for a limited period of time only. 
Many of the first Commission officials remained, at first, in the service of their home 
administration. However, the Commissioners were aware of the fact that these 
appointments could create a certain prerogative for a job in the Commission. 
148 A 
careful selection of these collaborators was thus necessary. The Commissioners' 
expectation proved to be accurate. Although initially appointed on the basis of 
temporary contracts, the first Commission officials were for the most part transferred 
to the status of permanent officials during 1962.149 Moreover, they often stayed 
in the 
Commission for the remainder of their professional careers, many of them reaching 
leading positions in the administration. According to David Coombes, only seven per 
'46 Downs 1968: 228. 
147 HAEU, DEP EN 708,25.2.59-11.6.59 (5 VA 58' r6union de la Commission), 
18 March 1959. 
148 Ibid. 
149 BAK, N 1266/1267, Personalangelegenheiten 1961-63. 
Note W. Hallstein to the members of the 
Commission, 2 May 1961. 
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cent of A posts between 1962 and 1967 were filled through a concours, a competitive 
entry examination, or with people from outside the Commission generally. The other 
posts were filled through internal promotion, internal concours or transfers from other 
Community institutions. 150 Analysing the initial recruitment patterns of the 
Commission's top-level staff is thus paramount when considering the long-term 
service of some of these officials and the influence they therefore had on the 
administration and, what is more, on Commission policies. 
The Commission's initial staff consisted of the Commissioners' personal 
collaborators they had brought with them to Brussels. Likewise, the High Authority 
provided the Commission with staff, either on a permanent or temporary basis. This 
core group had to be extended, however. In their first meeting, the Commissioners 
defined three sources of potential collaborators for the Commission: national 
governments, international organizations and independent candidates. 151 
When selecting and recruiting its first staff, the Commission benefited from, 
and was dependent on, the assistance of member state governments. In March 1958 
the Commission asked for the personnel files of suitable candidates pre-selected by 
national administrations. ' 52 Initially, the Commission was all the more dependent on 
assistance from the member states because it did not yet have a human resources 
department able to deal with the 15 to 18,000 applications the Commission 
received. 153 Nevertheless, the Commission wanted to quickly regularise and centralise 
the recruitment procedure and DG IX was to play an important role in this. The 
150 Coombes 1970: 142-3. 
15 1 BAC 209.1980, PV of the EEC Commission, I" session, 16 January 1958, pt. 12. 
152 The government of the Federal Republic submitted several lists in February and March 
1958. See 
BAK, N 1266/1092. BAC 209/1980, PV of the EEC Commission, 7 session, 5-6 March 1958, pt. 6. 
153 HAEU, DEP EN 352, Rapport dVtude preliminaire sur 1'efficaciti de Vorganisation du travail ez la 
Commission de la Communaute Economique Europeenne a Bruxelles, Raadgevend Efficiency Bureau 
Bosboom en Hegener NV, Amsterdam, 29 May 1959,28. 
166 
Commission asked the other DGs to collaborate closely with DG IX. 
154 However, the 
fact that the Commission had to remind the DGs on more than one occasion of 
working together with DG IX shows that it was often circumvented by the 
autonomously acting DGs. Staff matters were of high political importance. As 
Coombes has argued, as a result, 'less real power has been delegated from 
155 Commission staff here [to DG DC, K. S. ] than anywhere else'. The nine 
Commissioners discussed and decided personally on the recruitment of A officials in 
their weekly meetings 156 while B and C staff were initially appointed by a detached 
Belgian official in collaboration with Hallstein. 1 57 Later, B officials were appointed in 
regular meetings of the president and the vice-presidents while DG IX appointed C 
staff. 
158 
Nodl described the first year of the Commission as a great 'recruitment 
rush' . 
159 This can be put down to the initiative of President Hallstein who wanted to 
create a fait accompli vis-A-vis the member states. 160 In November 1958, Hallstein 
urged his colleagues to tap the full potential of the budget for 1958 that provided for 
off CialS. 
16 1,231 11 By the end of 1958, the Commission had already appointed most of 
the directors, heads of division and other leading officials, 399 A officials in toW. 
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In February 1959, the total number of staff amounted to 1,108 officials. 163 For 1959 
154 BAC 209.80/1980, PV of the EEC Commission, 24 session, 9-11 July 1958, pt. 4. 
155 Coombes 1970: 152. 
156 BAC 209.08, PV of the EEC Commission, 18 session, 20-22 May 1958. 
157 BAC 209/1980, PV of the EEC Commission, 4 session, 7-10 February 1958. 
158 CEAB 2 4334, R6ponse A la question 6crite no. 55 pos6e par MM. Vals, Leemans et Thom, undated 
[ca. September 1963], 234. 
159 HAEU, Int. 30, Emile Nodl. 
160 Ibid. 
161 HAEU, DEP EN 705,1.10. -19.11.1958 (3 1' A 38 e r6union de la Commission), 12 
November 1958. 
162 HAEU, DEP EN 707,7.1. -25.2.1959 (45' A5 1' r6union de la Commission), 21 January 
1959. 
163 EWG-Kommission, Zweiter Gesamtbericht Ober die Tdtigkeit der Gerneinschaft (18. September - 
20. Mdrz 1959), Brussels, 1959, p. 17. 
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Hallstein recommended prudence, however. 164 7he Commission recognised the 
danger of paralysing the administration by recruiting too many people in too hasty a 
manner. Recruitment continued in the following months and years but there were now 
restrictions set by the Council and the Commission had to reduce its demands. 165 The 
times of abundant and generous recruitment were over. In early 1959 the Council 
established an Expert Committee for Budgetary Questions which made 
recommendations to the Commission. While willing to take these recommendations as 
a basis for discussion, the Commission rejected the committee's suggestion of 
introducing an average cost per official and to limit the overall number of officials to 
1,300 in 1959.166 Moreover, in order to circumvent the restrictions set by the Council, 
the Commission invented ruses such as systematically appointing young university 
graduates in the B, instead of the A career. 167 However, attempts to obtain the 
transformation of B posts into A posts from the Council were only partly 
successful. 168 Finding an agreement on the Commission's budget and staff numbers 
became an annual challenge and a source of conflict not least because budget debates 
always had political implications. The Commission saw itself as a victim of the 
member states whose motives were more often than not guided by domestic political 
and financial considerations. ' 69 In Hallstein's perception, the denial of additional posts 
by the governments of the member states was directed against the dynamism of the 
Commission. He considered that refusing the Commission the necessary staff 
164 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 36 session, 5 November 1958. 
165 See for example HAEU, DEP EN 710,17.6.1959-22.7.1959 (64' A 69' r6union de la Commission), 
17 June 1959. 
166 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 46 session, 26me partie, 21 January 1959, pt. 8. 
167 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 54 session, 16-18 March 1959, pt. 20. 
168 BAC 209-80, PV of the EEC Commission, 85 session, 16 and 18 December 1959, pt. 12. 
169 HAEU, DEP EN 722 21.9. -9.11.60 (117' A 123 e r6union de la Commission), II October 1960 and 
BAC 209-80, PV of the EEC Commission, 77 session, 26' partie, 12 October 1959. 
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constituted a violation of the treaty. 170 The Commission was thus in a constant 
dilemma between striving for autonomy and budgetary dependence. For the Council, 
the budget was an important means to control the Commission. 
3.2 Attracting high-flyers: the Commission's strategies and expectations 
According to Coombes, 'the main qualification for inclusion [in the Commission's 
administration, K. S. ] was to be "pro-European"' . 
17 1 But was being 'pro-European' a 
key prerequisite for future European officials? 'Iliere is no evidence in the sources that 
European commitment was among the decisive factors for recruiting candidates. 172 
Expertise and language skills were the only criteria the Commissioners agreed 
upon. 173 The personnel statute was even more vague, merely stating that the applicants 
had to have the citizenship of a member state and the necessary language skills. 174 
This lack of concrete criteria suggests that the whole recruitment procedure was based 
on informal rules, personal preferences and also, no doubt, political consensus. For 
Hallstein, service in national administrations was a good preparation for a job in the 
Commission. For example, he did not want to support a young German applicant who 
lacked this experience: 'He should serve for a couple of years in a firmly organized 
175 
German administration', before applying for Brussels, Hallstein wrote. 
But how could people be attracted in case the European idea was in itself not 
reason enough for well qualified staff to come to Brussels? 
The Commission thought 
that a high salary would facilitate their decision. For 
instance, the concern that the 
170 HAEU, DEP EN 722 21.9. -9.11.60 (117' 
A 123' r6union de la Commission), 14 October 1960. 
171 Coombes 1970: 142. 
172 For one of the rare discussions on staff skills see 
for example BAC 209/1980, PV of the EEC 
Commission, 7 session, 5-6 March 1958. Compte-rendu confidentiel. 
173 HAEU, DEP EN 704 9/9/1958-1/10/1958 (29' A 30' r6union), 
II September 1958. 
174 Personalstatut 1962, Art. 28. 
175 BAK, N 1266/1113, Letter President Hallstein to the state secretary 
in the German ministry of 
justice, Walter StrauB, 10 June 1958. 
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Commission would not attract a sufficient number of high calibre staff guided the 
college's discussion about the members' and officials' income tax levels. The net 
income should ensure 'the recruitment of quality personnel in all the member 
states'. 176 The salary should neither be inferior to the ECSC nor to European 
intergovernmental organizations and the Permanent Representations as these were the 
institutions with which the Commission thought it had to compete. In mid-1959, the 
Commission submitted a letter to the Council, asking for an advantageous income tax, 
a residence indemnity and family allocations for its personnel which it considered 
necessary for 'psychological reasons'. 177 By 1964, however, the initial difference 
between the salary level in the member states and the higher salary level in the 
Commission seems to have dwindled. 178According to Mansholt's chef de cabinet, the 
Commission had severe problems attracting high calibre staff because the salaries in 
the member states had increased by circa 30 per cent since 1958 compared to 8 per 
cent in the Communities, 179 not least because of the favourable economic situation in 
most western European countries in the 1960s. The Commission had, in particular, 
difficulties recruiting A 1, A2 and A3 officials from member states' administrations. ' 80 
The distribution of grades and salary levels, or so-called echelons, to the newly 
appointed European officials was a delicate matter. In September 1958 the 
Commission still had not established criteria for the classification of candidates. 
' 81 
The Commissioners even feared that this insecurity could be an obstacle to the 
176 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 41 session, 26"' partie, 10 December 1958, pt. 9. 
177 BAC 209.80, W. Hallstein to M. Couve de Murville, 26 June 1959 (document annexed to PV of the 
EEC Commission, 65 session, 26me partie). 
178 According to a table comparing salaries in the German civil service with those of the 
Commission. 
BAK, N 1266/1268, Aufstellung vom 15.5.1964. 
179 IISH, Archief van Alfred Mozer, No 5, Letter A. Mozer to K. P6hle, 
14 October 1964. 
180 BAK, N 1266/1264, Aufzeichnung betreffend die Notwendigkeit und die Möglichkeit einer 
Verbesserung der Besoldungsregelung des Statutenentwurfs für die 
Spitzengrade der Kategorie A, 
undated [19611. 
18 1 BAC 209.80/1980, PV of the EEC Commission, 24 session, 9-11 July 1958, pt. 
4. 
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recruitment of capable people. ' 82 DG IX then established guidelines for the 
classification of appointees but this led to inequalities in rank between officials who 
had similar qualifications. As a result, the Commission had to proceed to a 
reclassification in early 1960.183 However, the problem was not only DG IX. Wanting 
to guarantee the Commission the service of quality staff, Commissioners readily 
argued in favour of attributing a candidate a high grade and salary level by referring to 
their international and professional experience or their special knowledge. 184 
In the member states' civil services, classification of officials was handled in 
different ways, and, resulting from this, the Commissioners had diverging views 
which had to be accommodated in a common solution. 185 Concerning age or seniority 
as a possible criterion for classification, Maýolin demanded the greatest possible 
flexibility, preferring that the previous careers of the candidates should be decisive. 
He thought that it would be better to have an anciennetg professionnelle instead of an 
anciennetJ d'idge, the former being an advantage for the young French 'high flyers' in 
the Commission. Hallstein, on the other hand, stated that the Commission should not 
be too generous when classifying its officials because the Commission was closely 
interrelated with national administrations where seniority always played a role. ' 86 
Finally, the Commission decided that age should be one of the criteria to judge a 
candidate. In one of the next meetings, the college adopted a wage scale related to 
seniority with the possibility of handling this in a more flexible manner for AI and A2 
officials where the individual situation of the applicant would also be taken into 
182 HAEU, DEP EN 703,15.7 - 7.9.1958 (25' A 28' r6union de la Commission), 4 September 1958. 
183 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 92 session, 26"' partie, 10 February 1960. 
184 BAC 209.08, PV of the EEC Commission, 41 session, P' partie, 10 December 1958, pt. 10. 
185 See for example the discussion whether age should be a criterion for classification, HAEU, DEP EN 
702,3.6. -15.7.1958 (20e A 24e r6union 
de la Comn-dssion), 24 June 1958. 
186 HAEU, DEP EN 717,2.3,12.4.60 (95' A 10 1' r6union de la Commission), 9 March 1960. 
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consideration. 1 87 A promotion to the next point on the pay scale, or echelon, would 
automatically take place every two years. 1 88 This corresponds, for instance, to the 
career system in the German civil service. 
While the Commission tried to attract able people by offering them a good 
salary and other advantages, in return it required them to be independent. When in 
1960 it turned out that some of the detached officials in the Commission continued to 
receive salaries from their home governments, the college sought to put an end to this 
practice. 189 According to Rey and Mansholt, the Commission officials should be 
entirely independent from the governments and it would be intolerable if anyone 
depended on a national administration for their salary. 190 In February 1960 Hallstein 
wrote letters to the governments of the member states in which he argued that these 
payments could 'give the impression that they call into question the Commission's 
independence which is an essential character of the administration 9.191 
3.3 Personal contacts and networks resulting in appointments 
Initially, recruitment for the Commission was based on personal contacts, networks, 
recommendations, and sometimes even haphazard encounters. For Monnet, the 
negotiations leading to the ECSC treaty had been a source of 'European spirit' and a 
source of European officials. Hallstein had also played an important role in the Val 
Duchesse negotiations. However, the sources do not explicitly narne the treaty 
negotiation as an important source of staff for the Commission. This might be because 
187 HAEU, DEP EN 705,1.10,19.11.1958 (3 1' A 38' r6union de la Commission), 2 October 1958. 
188 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 26 session, 22 and 24 July in Paris, 26 July 1958 in 
Brussels, Annexe I, pt. 4-5. 
189 HAEU, DEP EN 715,6.1.40.2.1960 (86' A 92' r6union de la Commission), 23 January 1960. 
190 HAEU, DEP EN 706,19.1l. -27.12.195 8 (3 9' A 44 
e r6union de la Commission), 10 December 1958. 
191 MAEF, EU Europe 1956-1960, G6n6ralit6s, Vol 191, Letter W. Hallstein to M. Couve de Murville, 
29 February 1960. 
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Hallstein's role in the negotiations and in the preparatory phase of setting up the 
Commission cannot be compared to Monnet's fundamental role in founding the 
ECSC. However, it might simply have been understood by then, also because of the 
High Authority's experience, that experts participating in the negotiations made 
excellent staff for the European administration. The fact is that leading Commission 
staff had participated in the Val Duchesse negotiations - Franco Bobba, Jean-Frangois 
Deniau, Ernst Albrecht and Theodor Hijzen, to name but a few. 
In order to fill the organizational chart with appropriate personnel, the 
Commission proceeded in a top-down mode. In the Commission's twelfth session, on 
9-10 April 1958, the directors-general were officially nominated. 192 They then assisted 
the working group presidents in recruiting leading staff for their respective DGs. 1 93 
Unfortunately, the exact circumstances of the Commission's first appointments, 
especially the appointments of directors-general and directors, are far from 
transparent. Due to the informality of the selection process and due to the political 
importance attached to these posts, the sources do not reveal much information about 
this procedure. The decision about which candidate of which member state was to 
head a DG was certainly guided by particular interests of the member states. The 
V-- 
FiLench government, for example, thought it paramount that a French candidate was 
appointed at the head of DG Agriculture. 194 Mansholt and Maýolin therefore proposed 
Rabot, an experienced international civil servant whom Mansholt already knew from 
the Green Pool negotiations. As will be shown in more detail in chapter BIII, 
international expert networks formed at international negotiations on agriculture were 
crucial for recruitment in DG VI, which was composed of leading officials with a 
192 BAC 209/1980, PV of the EEC Commission, 12 session, 9-10 April 1958, pt. 8. 
193 Von der Groeben 1995: 302. 
194 HAEU, Int 30, En-We Not]. 
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similar background and with a similar outlook on the CAP to be created during the 
1960s. 
A slightly different example is DG IV. Before 1958 there was hardly a 
competition policy community in Europe to speak of Moreover, von der Groeben 
himself was rather inexperienced in this field. For him it was more difficult to find 
personnel with a suitable background or previous knowledge in the matter. The 
German cartel office, the Bundeskartellamt, and the Dutch cartel office were a source 
of recruitment for DG IV, but von der Groeben also had to appoint officials from other 
member states that did not have competition legislation and where competition law 
was not part of the university curriculum. However, as will be shown in chapter BIII, 
von der Groeben was determined to transfer the German concept of competition to the 
European level. In the case of DG IN it is therefore more appropriate to speak of a 
network, composed of Commission officials, lawyers, judges and national civil 
servants, that was constituted after the establishment of the Commission and after the 
first successes in the common competition policy rather than a network that already 
existed as a primary source of recruitment. 
3.4 Member states, parties and interest groups 
Member state governments, political parties and party networks, industries and trade 
unions sought influence on the Commission's administration by putting forward 
candidates for the Commission's services who they thought would represent their 
interests at the European level. In addition to a balanced distribution of posts between 
nationalities, there was a 'political balance' for high-level posts which the 
174 
Commission observed from the outset. 195 First and foremost, the nine seats of the 
Commission were distributed among the important political parties ruling in the 
member states: Socialists, Christian democrats and Liberals. For Belgian candidates 
there was even a balance between candidates in tenns of language and regional origin 
from Flanders or Wallonia. However, matters were more complex than this. There 
was an overall national and political balance between the members of the High 
Authority, the Euratom and EEC Commissions. Moreover, interest groups such as 
trade unions and industry had to be satisfied as well and Petrilli, in charge of DG 
Social Affairs and Lemaignen, respectively, were meant to be contact people for these 
groups in the Commission. 
196 
This complexity was reflected at the level of high officials. From the second 
half of 1957 onwards the recruitment of leading staff for the Commission had been 
discussed in the member states. 197 European Christian democrats met several times 
during 1957 just for this purpose, as Kaiser demonstrates, 198 but no decisions for 
staffing the new European administration were made as the treaty accorded the 
Commission the authority to decide on appointments. Notwithstanding this legally 
granted autonomy, the interests of the governments of the member states were 
discussed in the Commission's meetings and the Commissioners kept in close contact 
with their respective governments while these decisions were being taken. 
For 
instance, for the first meeting of the Working Group Administration on 25 January 
1958, Maýolin drafted an organizational scheme for the Commission. The following 
195 IISH, Archief van Sicco L. Mansholt, J. van der Lee to S. Mansholt, 15 January 
1958. 
196 Cf. Condorelli-Braun 1972: 81; 90. However, no member of the Hallstein Commission was a trade 
unionist. With the German Wilhelm Haferkamp a trade unionist entered 
the Commission only in 1967. 
See ibid., 89-90. 
197 See for example BAK, N 1266/1462, Dok. I. 
Welche Aufgaben ergeben sich nach Inkrafttreten der 
Verträge über den Gemeinsamen Markt und Euratom? undated 
[ 1957]. 
198 Kaiser 2007. 
175 
day, Hallstein and von der Groeben returned to Bonn to discuss this scheme with top- 
level officials of different German ministries. These German officials discussed the 
upcoming meeting of the Commission as well as German and what was perceived as 
the other member states' 'interests' and possible candidates for leading posts in the 
Commission. '" The French Commissioners Maýolin and Lemaignen had similar 
discussions at the Quai d'Orsay. 200 Most likely, staff questions were discussed in a 
similar manner in the other member states. As these matters were often informally 
discussed, they are not always reflected in the written documentation. Back in 
Brussels, the Commission members had to be considerate of these interests. In this 
respect, the nomination of Grooten as director in DG VI is symptomatic. Here, the 
Commission was under pressure from the Belgian government, with Rey underlining 
'the extreme political importance of the nomination of Mr. Grooten for the Belgian 
side . 
201 
In member state governments and ministries there was also the opposite 
reaction. Some of the German ministries did not want to loose their best civil servants 
to 'Europe'. The ministry of agriculture seemed downright hostile towards the EEC, 
and one official, who chose Brussels over Bonn, felt treated like a Volksverrdter, a 
traitor of his country. 202 Rudolf HfittebrAuker, state secretary in the agricultural 
ministry between 1962 and 1968, recalls that his ministry prefeffed sending less 
199 BAK, N 1266/1092, Aufzeichnung Ober Organisations- und Personalfragen von EWG am 26. Januar 
1958,27 January 1958. See also ibid. Protocole of a meeting between Hallstein, MUller-Armack, 
40 hills, Carstens, Estner, von der Groeben and others in Bonn, 27 January 1958. 
Lemaignen 1964: 5L In an interview Frangois Muller refered to a working group in the Quai 
d'Orsay which preselected French candidates and submitted a list to the commission. Interview 
K. S. 
with Frangois Muller, Strasbourg, 19 March 2005. 
201 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 42 session, 26me partie, third session, 17 December 
1958. 
202 ACDP, 1-659,122/2, Vermerk über eine Besprechung [of Hans von der Groeben] mit Herrn Hans 
Broder Krohn, ehemals Direktor der Landwirtschaftsabteilung der EWG, dann Generaldirektor 
für 
Entwicklungsfragen (pensioniert etwa 1977) in Brüssel am 15. Januar 1981. See also the interview K. S. 
with Hans-Broder Krohn, Gbttingen, 
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capable civil servants to Brussels in order to get rid of them. 203 Compared to this 
situation, the French ministries seem to have been more aware of the potential 
importance of the Commission and thus proposed good candidates. When the future 
director-general for DG VIII, Helmut Allardt, examined the French candidates for his 
DG recommended by the Commissioner in charge, Lemaignen, he reported to 
Hallstein that the French candidates 'made on average an excellent impression and 
will - because of their qualifications and technical know-how - very likely dominate, 
something I anticipate not without concern'. 204These examples suggest that member 
states differed in how seriously they took the importance of staffing the 
Comn-dssion. 205 However, to claim that France proposed good candidates throughout 
while Gennany only wanted to get rid of its lame ducks would go too far. For the 
German economics ministry, Bernhard Uffler insists on the openness of at least the 
departments concerned with European questions and the enthusiasm of the civil 
servants working therein. These officials spent a significant part of their work life 
abroad, be it by attending meetings and negotiations in Luxembourg, Strasbourg and 
Brussels or by spending a couple of years as detached officials in the European 
administrations. 206 This suggests that there was not only a frequent exchange between 
ministries in Paris and the Commission but also between the Commission and some 
ministries in Bonn. 
Political parties were equally interested in being adequately represented in the 
new Commission. For example, the Nouvelles Equipes Internationales (NEI), the 
203 See BAK, Kleine Erwerbungen 927-3, NL HfittebrAuker, Deutsche Agrarpolitik in den Jahren 1962- 
1968: Heft 1: Streiflichter auf besondere Ereignisse: Heft 2: Anlagen dazu. This is confirmed by Krohn, 
see the interview K. S. with Hans-Broder Krohn. 
204 BAK, N 1266/1216, H. Allardt to President Hallstein, 29 April 1958. 
205 Officials in interviews often referred to the young French 'geniuses' in Brussels such as Francois- 
Xavier Ortoli, Jean-Frangois Deniau, Eniile Nodl, Michel Gaudet and U)uis Georges Rabot. See for 
example the interview Sibylle Hambloch with 
Manfred Caspari, Bad Honnef, 16 October 2002. 
206 L6ffler 2002: 208-9; 571. 
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European network of Christian democratic parties, attached great importance to the 
new European administrations. 207 It is difficult, if not impossible, to assess the 
outcome of the efforts to influence recruitment by political parties, transnational party 
networks and interest groups. However, the following example shows that the 
Commission at least tried to comply with their demands. In May 1958, Lucien de 
Groote, a collaborator of NEI President August de Schryver, met Natjes, then 
Hallstein's - Christian democratic - deputy chef de cabinet, to discuss the 
organization's representation in the Commission's administrative services. 208 
Although Naijes did not promise de Groote any appointments in the Commission, 
shortly after this encounter de Schryver expressed his gratitude in a letter to Hallstein 
for appointing one candidate supported by the NE1.209 Hallstein and others in the 
German government involved in the European integration process like Heinrich von 
Brentano, the minister of foreign affairs between 1955 and 1961, were key members 
of the NEI. The example of the NEI shows that these parties were at times more 
concerned about promoting Christian democrats for key posts in the Commission than 
about advancing candidates of their respective nationalities. One of the reasons is that 
the number of higher-level appointments in the administration assigned to every 
member state was limited. Therefore, the NEI tried to support candidates who shared 
their political and ideological beliefs. From 1957 onwards, the NEI organized 
meetings to prepare for the founding of the EEC. They expected the administrations of 
Euratom and the EEC to grow to 10,000 officials within five years, more than 
Hallstein could have drewned of. When it came to the distribution of these posts, the 
207 Gehler and Kaiser 2001: 777; for the NEI see also the 
introductory chapter in Gehler and Kaiser 
2004 and Kaiser 2007. 
2'58 BAK, N 1266/1281, Note K. Naýes to President Hallstein, 2 May 1958. 
2m BAK, N 1266/1290, Letter A. E. de Schryver to President Hallstein, 
6 June 1958. 
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NEI thus asked for quotas not only regarding the nationality of the candidates but also 
an ideological quota, regarding political and social tendencies. 210 
The Socialist parties did not want to leave the battlefield to the CMstian 
democrats. First of all, European Socialists promoted the candidature of Mansholt as 
Commission president. In May 1957 Jaap van der Lee of the Dutch Socialist Partij van 
de Arbeid (PvdA) met Nodl, at that time chef de cabinet of Mollet. Mollet should try 
to convince 'the Germans' to support Mansholt, van der Lee demanded . 
21 1 Also, 
Monnet's Action Committee was involved in these negotiations. Mansholt and van der 
Lee met Monnet and Kohnstamm. in October 1957.212 However, Mansholt, 'a fanner 
and a socialist', was not acceptable to Chancellor Adenauer, a Christian democrat. 213 
In May 1958, Mansholt's departing chef de cabinet, van der Lee, recommended that 
Mansholt should employ a Catholic as his successor in the Cabinet because he might 
be dependent on the support of the Dutch Katholieke Volkspartij, the main coalition 
partner of the PvdA until December 1958, in case he wanted to stand for Dutch Prime 
Minister or become the first Socialist Commission president. 214 Against van der Lee's 
advice, Mansholt chose the Socialist Mozer. However, as deputy chef de cabinet he 
ap ointed Willem van Slobbe, a Christian democrat, who had also been proposed by Jr'p 
215 
van der Lee. Whether a Christian democrat as Mansholt's chef de cabinet would 
have raised Mansholt's chances of becoming Commission president is doubtful. Yet, 
this episode illustrates the importance of the particular political constellation in the 
Commissioners' home countries for the Brussels administration. 
210 KADOC, Archief A. E. de Schryver, 7.4-1.4., Vorbereitungstreffen der NEI zur EWG-Griindung, 
BrUssel, 29 July 1957. Printed in: Gehler and Kaiser 2004, Dokument 159,501-2. 
211 IISH, Archief van Sicco L. Mansholt, No 62, Letter J. van der Lee an J. A. W. Burger [Dutch 
Minister of State], 20 May 1957. 
212 Ibid., J. van der Lee to J. A. W. Burger, II October 1957. 
213 This is cited on several occasions, for example Mansholt 
1974: 85; HAEU, Int 654, Jaap van der 
Lee. 
214 IISH, Archief van Sicco L. Mansholt, No 97, J. van der 
Lee to S. Mansholt, secret, 9 May 1958. 
215 Ibid. 
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As to the trade unions, judging from documents of the European Trade Union 
Confederation, the influence of trade unions on the common market, for instance in 
216 the EEC treaty negotiations, seems to have been less important than in the ECSC. 
At the level of the Commission members the trade unions did not have a candidate. 
However, Pasture believes that the only times trade unions collaborated successfully 
internationally 'were primarily aimed at ensuring trade union representation in the 
European institutions or the nomination of trade unionists in the European 
administration'. 217 Indeed, there are examples for Commission officials with a trade 
union background having reached top-level posts in the Commission. For instance, 
Willy Schlieder, an official in DG IV and later director-general for Competition had 
218 been the personal collaborator of Alfred Rosenberg, leader of the DGB. In a 
nutshell, the Commission's administration reflected to a certain extent the power- 
balance between political parties and interest groups in the member states. By obliging 
requests of parties and interest groups, the Commission tried to recreate a miniature 
image of member states' societies at the European level, not least with the intention of 
obtaining greater legitimacy for the European administration. 
A couple of years later, in 1964, accommodating political party interests 
within the Commission's recruitment and promotion mechanisms seems to have 
become routine and was institutionalised. It was mainly via the Commissioner's 
Cabinets, but also through high officials, that the respective parties sought backing. In 
a letter, the member of the executive board of the DGB, Waldemar Reuter, named the 
German officials van Doellen, Hitzelberger, Kraus and Rogalla as influential in the 
216 IISH, ETUC, No. 86, Document: Les cons6quences pour les syndicats des nouveaux Trait6s sur la 
Communautd Econornique Europ6enne et Euratom. Rapporteur: H. Strater, membre du Comit6 d'I. G. 
Metall, RFA, 18 July 1957. See also Pasture 2000: 88. 
217 Pasture 2000: 96. 
2 18 HAEU, DEP EN 722 21.9. -9-11.60 (117' A 123' r6union 
de la Commission), 20 October 1960. 
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German personnel policy in the Commission in the sense that they had orders from 
'Bonn' to promote Germans who shared the political orientation of the federal 
government, at that time a coalition of Christian democrats and Liberals . 
219 According 
to Manfred Lahnstein, former chef de Cabinet of Commissioner Wilhelm Haferkamp 
in the 1970s, the German staff policy in the Commission increasingly concentrated on 
furthering the careers of promising young professionals who had received a 
scholarship from the party foundations Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and Konrad- 
Adenauer-Stiftung. 220 
3.5 National balance 
While Monnet liked to emphasize that nationality did not play a role in the distribution 
of posts in the High Authority, Hallstein had a more pragmatic attitude: 
I have never shared the view that in selecting its civil servants the Commission 
could loftily dismiss the question of the nationality of the candidates, by simply 
saying: "We recognize only Europeans. " Such an attitude appears to me not only 
to be naive and dogmatic but also to ignore political reality. 221 
According to the president, the Commission followed a 'rough and ready rule of 
thumb in filling posts in its Civil Service'. 222 From the outset, the Commission 
observed an informal national balance for the distribution Of Posts . 
223 Later on, this 
objective was fixed in the personnel statute: recruitment should be based on a wide 
219 IISH, Archief van Alfred Mozer, No 5, Letter W. Reuter to H. Schmitt-Vockenhausen, 22 April 
1964. 
220 Interview K. S. with Manfred Lahnstein. 
22 1 Hallstein 1972: 61. 
222 [bid. 
223 BAC 209/1980, PV of the EEC Comrnission, 4 session, 7-10 February 1958, pt. 10. 
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geographical basis among the member states. 224 Although there was never an official 
quota, this rather vague formula was more than a 'rule of thumb'; it was applied 
thoroughly to the overall number of staff appointed in all categories and all DGs. 225 
The national balance was particularly strictly observed with regard to the Al, A2 and 
A3 posts. 
There are good reasons why the Commission thought it necessary to respect a 
national balance. Firstly, a strong disequilibrium. within the administration to the 
detriment of one or more member states might lead to distrust vis-A-vis the 
Commission and its policies; a situation that could prevent a proposal from being 
adopted in the Council. Secondly, and linked to this, for the Commission the national 
balance was a means to maintain its independence. It was a shield against allegations 
of partiality. Thirdly, it enabled the Commission to reject clientelist demands for 
giving jobs to unsuitable candidates by stating, for example, that this job had to go to a 
member of a different nationality. And finally, the member states should be 
represented in the Commission's services particularly in policy fields where they 
made a major financial contribution to the budget. Accordingly, the French 
Commissioner Henri Rochereau, Lemaignen's successor, responsible for DG VIII, 
stated that he would only accept a German as the German director-general Heinrich 
Hendus' successor because 'since Germany was the greatest net contributor it had to 
occupy a position of responsibility in the development fund'. 226 
The great disadvantage of this system was that the need for constant 
surveillance of the balanced national distribution of posts required substantial 
224 Verordnung Nr. 31 (EWG), Nr. 11 (EAG) über das Statut der Beamten und über die 
Beschäftigungsbedingungen für die sonstigen Bediensteten der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft 
und der Europäischen Atomgemeinschaft. (1385/62), AM 27. 
225 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 34 session, 21-23 October 1958. 
226 BAK, N 1266/1293, K. Naijes to W. Hallstein, Bericht über die KomMissionssitzung, 23 February 
1967. Rochereau's predecessor, Lemaignen, was of the same opinion. See Lemaignen 1964: 57. 
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administrative resources. 227 For instance, one official of DG IX was in charge of the 
surveillance of the national balance in each and every administrative unit of the 
Commission and the Commission received monthly reports on the situation. There 
was thus a professionalised system of supervision of the national balance, involving 
DG IX, the Executive Secretariat and the Cabinets. In their weekly meetings, the nine 
Commissioners spent a large amount of time calculating and discussing the just 
distribution of posts in the Commission. As the Commissioners were assigned a 
particular responsibility for the candidates and officials of their respective countries of 
origin, each Commissioner defended the alleged interests of his country. 228 Generally, 
no candidate for a higher level post was to be appointed without consulting the 
Commissioner of the candidate's nationality. 229 The Commission even resolved to 
create supplementary posts in order to satisfy a country's demands or to respect the 
national equilibrium. In DG VI, for instance, an AI post for a conseiller was created 
which went to the Italian Mario Bandini . 
230 This was a costly solution which was one 
of the causes why the administration expanded rapidly. 
Despite the fact that no post was to be 'reserved' for candidates of a certain 
country, 231 in practice the DGs became fiefdoms of the member states, and sometimes 
even of a ministry within a specific country. For instance, the post of director-general 
for DG VIII had been filled with people from the German AA when in 1964, State 
Secretary Rolf Lahr said that the AA would 'cede' this post to the economics 
ministry. 232 Rey severely criticized this system. He deplored that the Commission had 
227 Olivi 2000: 23 1. 
228 See for example HAEU, DEP EN 706,19.1l. -27.12.1958 (39' A 44' r6union de la Commission), 17 
December 1958. 
229 BAC 209.08, PV of the EEC Commission, 20 session, II- 12 June 1958, pt. 13. 
230 HAEU, DEP EN 706,19.1l. -27.12.1958 (39' A 44'r6union de la Commission), 17 December 1958. 
231 Verordnung Nr. 31 (EWG), Nr. 11 (EAG), Art. 27. 
232 BAK, N 1266/1280, Note K. Naýes to W. Hallstein, 18 January 1964. 
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off CialS. 
233 
established an 'Europe des Patries' for its top-level I Also, Rey was a strong 
advocate of internal recruitment, that is, filling a vacancy for a leading post in the 
Commission with an internal candidate, thus aflowing the growth of 'home-made' 
European officials. When Hallstein suggested appointing Axel Herbst from the AA as 
a successor to deputy executive secretary Behr, Rey gave his consent but only on the 
condition that the Commission sought to appoint an internal candidate for the next 
vacant PoSt. 
234 The Commission, however, only paid lip service to the practice of 
recruiting staff first and foremost within its own administration. What is more, it 
proved practically impossible to change the deadlocked initial arrangement with the 
nine director-general and other leading posts distributed among nationals of the Six. 
Even if not able to put forward a suitable candidate, the government of a member state 
was often not prepared to (even temporarily) renounce a post. It was often assisted in 
this attitude by the Commissioner of the country who took up the case in the 
Commission meetings, arguing that his country would be disadvantaged if it could not 
keep the post. For instance, the quest for a successor for the Italian director-general in 
DG VII, Giuseppe Renzetti, proved to be a nightmare that lasted several months. As it 
turned out to be difficult to find a suitable successor with an Italian passport, the 
Commission first considered the possibility of swapping directors-general in order to 
be able to appoint a director-general of a different nationality for DG VII and at the 
235 
same time respect the national balance. After this solution proved to be too 
complicated, the college discussed the candidate suggested by the Italian government, 
Tergia, from the Italian ministry of transport. However, after the Commission had 
compromised on many candidates before, this time it wanted to make a point and only 
233 BAK, N 1266/1293, Note K. Naýes to W. Hallstein, 23 February 1967. 
2-34 HAEU, DEP EN 716,17.2. -2-3.1960 (93 eA 95' r6union de la Commission), 24 February 1960. 
235 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 112 session, 26' partie, 9/10 November 1960. 
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accept someone of 'adequate rank and character. Our prestige is at stake. 236 And 
Tergia was, according to Hallstein, not up to the difficult tasks facing DG VII. Finally, 
the Commission persuaded Renzetti, who was due to return to the Italian 
administration, to stay in the Commission for another year. 237 After that he was 
succeeded by Bruno Minoletti who also did not last long. In 1965, the Commission 
appointed a fonner head of division as Director-General for Transport, the Italian 
238 Paolo Rho , to succeed Minoletti. The DG remained in Italian hands. The case of the 
Renzetti succession shows that the Commission was torn between keeping its 
independence, appointing the best candidate and satisfying the requests of a member 
state. Despite declarations that the quality of the directors-general was vital for the 
Commission's success, 239 Commissioners had to give in to pressures from the member 
states. 
This bargaining certainly disadvantaged suitable internal candidates working 
already in the services of the Commission. Maintaining the national balance was 
undeniably a factor causing immobility and inflexibility within the administration. 
Having the right passport and the right contacts sometimes proved more useful than 
skills, especially when it came to reaching a position above the grade of A4. One 
official explained that, for those lacking (political) backing, reaching A4 was already 
an achievement . 
240 No doubt, the national balance led to frustration among the civil 
servants. Von der Groeben detected a 'justified malaise among the competent 
236 HAEU, DEP EN 722,21.9. -9.11.60 (117' A 123' r6union de la Commission), 9 November 1960. 237 Ibid., 8 December 1960. See also HAEU, DEP EN 724,14.12.60-1.2.61 (128' A 133' r6union de la 
Commission), 21 December 1960. 
238 CEAB 4335, Information A la presse, 4 February 1965,21. 
239 HAEU, DEP EN 723,10.11.60-14.12.60 (123 ea 128' r6union de la Commission), 16 November 
1960. 
240 Interview K. S. with the assistant to the director-general of DG IV. 
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officials', and he called for more internal recruitment for leading PoStS. 241 In 
retrospect, though, the Commission's officials tend to defend the underlying system Of 
national balance. In an interview one official argued that every culture and every 
tradition should be represented in the European administration, as its personnel stood 
for the diversity of Europe. 242 Others maintained that it would have been impossible to 
proceed differently in a multinational administration. 243 The national balance became 
an integral part of the European administrative culture. A member of Hallstein's 
Cabinet tried to explain the typical 'European' ways of the Commission's 
administration to the newly appointed deputy executive secretary, Helmut Sigrist: 
All this [turning down suitable internal candidates in order to appoint Sigrist, an 
external candidate, K. S. ] should not alarm you but rather demonstrate that staff 
management in a Eupopean Community follows entirely different rules than in 
the Auswartiges Amt. 244 
3.6 Towards a personnel statute 
The personnel statute, which entered into force on I" January 1962, resulted, like in 
the High Authority, in the creation of a European civil service. This was an event of 
major importance for Commission officials. Job security and a career were 
guaranteed. In short, the statute created the framework for providing the Commission 
with an independent and stable workforce. It is not possible to discuss the 
establishment of the personnel statute in detail . 
245 It is important, however, to outline 
some of the underlying ideas and discussions accompanying its ea oration. 
Work on the common personnel statute for Euratom and the EEC, and initially 
also the ECSC, began in late 1958 with the establishment of a working group 
241 BAK, N 1266/1293, Note K. Naýes to W. Hallstein, 23 February 1967. 
242 See for example the interview K. S. with Giampiero Schiratti, Brussels, 22 April 2004. 
243 See for example the interview K. S. with Georges Rencki, Tervuren, 5 April 2004. 
244 BAK, N 1266/1214, Letter [Nujes? ] to H. Sigrist, 21 January 1964. 
245 On the personnel statutes of the ECSC, the EEC and Euratorn see for example Sassi 2000. 
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composed of national experts and representatives of the EEC and Euratom 
Commissions . 
246For 
the Commission, job security and autonomy for its employees 
were important issues. A delicate problem was, therefore, whether only internal or 
also external candidates should be considered for a post in the Commission. In this 
respect, detachment was also an important topic for the Commission. Member states' 
legislations concerning detachment differed considerably. 247 The French legislation 
was the most advantageous for the officials as it facilitated their reintegration in the 
home administration. On their return, detached French officials received their full 
248 
salary until a post corresponding to their former rank was available. The Dutch law 
was the most disadvantageous. Dutch officials who entered the services of an 
international organization could take six months of extraordinary leave . 
249After 
this 
period of time they had to choose between the national and the international 
administration. French officials, on the contrary, could maintain indefinitely their 
links with the national administration while serving the international administration. 250 
Not surprisingly, in the Coreper working group 'Statute' the opinions diverged. The 
iu__ 
Fiench and German governments were advocates of a 'continuous osmosis' between 
the national and the European administration. They were backed by the Luxembourg 
government which feared that its administration could be drained of the best people. 
'In contrast', wrote the French permanent representative, 'my Italian, Dutch and 
Belgian colleagues have pointed out that they were very firm partisans of a statute 
246 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 48 session, Annexe, Rdponse A la question No 29 du 29 
d6cembre 1958 adress6e A ]a Commission par M. Bertrand, membre de I'Assemb]6e Parlementaire 
Europ6enne (adopt6e par la Commission le 4 d6cembre 1958), 7 February 1959. 
247 BAC 118/1986, No. 1076, Groupe de travail "statut", Note pr6seW par la d6l6gation allemande, 12 
June 1959,9-12. 
248 Ibid., Groupe de travail "statut", Note introductive de ]a d6l6gation francaise, 20 February 1959,18- 
21. 
249 All above, see ibid., Annexe, La situation des fonctionnaires d6tach6s des administrations nationales 
ou internationales, undated, 23-27. 
250 BAC 118/1986, No. 1076, H. Buurman, Memorandum to M. le Pr6sident [Euratom] et de M. le 
Commissaire-Europ6en Sassen, 23 March 1961,53-55. 
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which would guarantee the gradual establishment of a corps of European civil servants 
completely independent of their respective governments. 251 The Euratom 
Commission supported the latter approach while the EEC Commission was more in 
favour of the French and German position, although initially it was divided. Hallstein 
had a very pragmatic attitude in this question. According to him, imposing the 
obligation to quit the national civil service permanently would considerably limit the 
choice of candidates willing to come to Brussels. Rey, however, doubted the 
independence of detached officials and he thought that they should opt either for 
Europe or their home administration. 252 Hallstein dismissed these objections as 
'understandable in theory' but 'unrealistic'. 253 Finally, his colleagues agreed and the 
final version of the statute allowed for detachment. 254 However, the detachment rules 
and conditions remained different in the member states. In 1963, Hallstein's Cabinet 
deplored the disadvantageous conditions for detached officials from Germany. These 
would deter people from coming to Brussels and they would obstruct the 'German 
personnel policy: the constant circulation of qualified officials between the Federal 
Republic and the European Communities (and international organizations) as well as 
between these Communities (and organizations) and the Federal Republic'. 255 The 
German govenunent, despite being in favour of an exchange, did nothing to facilitate 
it. Even Commissioner von der Groeben, a former civil servant in the economics 
ministry, was refused a promotion in absentia. 256 
25' MAEF, EU Europe 1956-1960, Gdn6ralit6s, Vol 191, Letter of the Permanent Representative of 
France at the European Communities to the French Foreign Minister, 13 February 1959. 
252 HAEU, DEP EN 712,22.9.59-24.10.59 (75 eA 78' r6union de la Commission), 30 September 1959. 
253 HAEU, DEP EN 719,31.5. -14/15.6.60 (105' A 107' r6union de la Commission), 15 June 1960. 
254 Articles 37-39. Statut der Beamten der Europaischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und der EuropAischen 
Atorngemeinschaft. Official Journal of the European Communities, No 1385/62,14 June 1962. 
255 BAK, N 1266/1268, Aufzeichnung Ober den Vorschlag des Bundesministerium des Innern vom 
16.1.1963,18 March 1963. 
256 See the article , Karriere 
hat Ruh"', in: Der Spiegel, No. 39,26 September 1963,29-30. 
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After the statute came into force, the Commission criticized that it did not 
allow for a 'dynamic' personnel policy and was not suitable for a young and fast 
growing administration. 257 Mozer complained, for example, that the recruitment 
procedure was very slow and that the Commission tended to fall back on recruiting 
258 
people under the label of 'experts'. This way, it could circumvent the lengthy 
concours procedure and instantly fill a vacancy. This implies that advertised posts 
were often a farce and already filled with this 'expert'. The normal concours 
procedure consisted of initially advertising a post internally in the Commission. If no 
suitable candidate was found, then officials from the other Community 
administrations were invited to apply. If this failed to produce a suitable candidate, the 
vacancy was made public in the Official Journal. 
Even if the statute made 'parachuting' of external candidates into posts in the 
Commission more difficult, it was still possible to feign a recruitment procedure, 
ruling out internal candidates and appointing an external candidate, as seen in the case 
of Sigrist. For the officials already in the Commission, both practices obstructed their 
chances of promotion and led to frustration. The Commission gained staff which 
brought in different experiences and new ideas. The question is, however, if it was 
possible to create a unified European civil service with detached and 'political' 
officials. 
257 BAK, N 1266/1266, Ka [Kalkbrenner] to President Hallstein, 17 July 1963. 
258 IISH, Archief van Alfred Mozer, No 5, Letter A. Mozer to K. P6hle, 14 October 1964. 
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4. Inflexibility, inefficiency and dissatisfaction: reforming the administration 
Reforming its administration and working methods have been objectives for almost all 
Commissions to date. Public management expert Les Metcalfe argues that 'until now, 
reform of the Commission has been discussed in a ritualistic way without any real 
expectation that action would follow'. 259 These attempts may have been ritualistic. 
However, if over the decades the different 'reformers' addressed similar problems, it 
shows that the initial arrangements concerning working methods and administrative 
structures were persistent and engraved in the Commission since its early days. The 
next section will look at what three of these reform attempts between 1958 and 1972 
reveal about the persisting long-term problems in the administration and the changes 
and developments in the Commission's organizational structure. 
4.1 The Bosboom en Hegener report of 1959 
Since March 1958, the Commission was aware of the fact that its organizational 
scheme ran the risk of duplicating tasks in the different DGs. 260 Moreover, partly due 
to the careful application of the national balance, the administration lacked flexibility 
from early on. As a result, during 1958-59 the Commission discussed measures for 
improving the efficiency of its organization while continuing to develop it. One of the 
main concerns was the malfunctioning of DG IX which is one of the reasons why, in 
early 1959, the Commission charged the Amsterdam based management consultants 
group Raadgevend Efficiency Bureau Bosboom en Hegener NV with undertaking a 
preliminary analysis of the efficiency of the organizational structure and working 
methods. It was an opportune moment for assessing what had been achieved so 
far: in 
259 Metcalfe 2001: 416. 
260 BAC 209/1980, PV of the EEC Cornrrýission, II session, 24-27 March 1958, pt. 6. 
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early 1959 the establishment of the Commission's complex administrative machinery 
was already quite advanced and, at this early stage, adjustments could still be made 
quite easily, or so the college believed. 
On the one hand, the decision of calling in external advisers accounts for the 
Commission's openness and the importance it attached to the administrative services 
and their smooth running. On the other hand, it suggests that not even one year after 
its establishment the decisions taken in organizational questions had left the 
Commission with serious efficiency problems which, once engrained in this already 
quite large administration, would be difficult to remedy later on. 
The Rapport d'etude preliminaire sur Fefficacite de Forganisation du travail A 
la Commission de la Communaut6 Econornique Europeenne a BruxeHes, or Bosboom 
en Hegener report, was composed of two parts. 261 The first part, submitted in May 
1959, provided an analysis of DG IX whereas the second part, completed in August of 
the same year, was concerned with the general organization of the Commission. The 
analysts first identified two internal obstacles to efficiency to which there was no 
remedy: multinationality and national balance. 262 The consultants did not see the 
diversity of mentalities and languages as an asset because, according to them, the 
officials tended to consider the working methods of their home country as the ideal. 
Instead of looking for the most adequate working procedures in the Commission, they 
preferred to stick to the methods with which they were familiar. 
263 In 1959, the 
Commission was thus far from being a unified administration with well developed and 
261 HAEU, DEP EN 352, Rapport d'itude priliminaire sur Vefficacitj de Vorganisation du travail ii la 
Commission de la Communaut, 4 Economique Europ6enne 6 Bruxelles, Raadgevend Efficiency Bureau 
Bosboom en Hegener NV, Amsterdam, 29 May 1959; and DEP EN 353, Rapport d'itude priliminaire 
sur 1'efficacit, 4 de Vorganisation du travail 4 la Commission 
de la Communauti Economique 
Europienne a Bruxelles. Deuxiýme partie: Vorganisation g, 4ngrale, Raadgevend Efficiency Bureau 
Bosboom en Hegener NV, Amsterdam, 6 August 1959. 
262 HAEU, DEP EN 352, Bosboom Report, Part 1,5. 
263 Ibid., 5. 
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accepted 'European' working methods. As to the second factor, the consultants 
thought the national balance should be applied in a less dogmatic manner as this 
would allow for better matches between an employee's qualifications and a job. 264 
However, all in all they were impressed with the quality of the Commission's staff. 
This demonstrates that the initial recruitment had, after all, provided the Commission 
with mainly adept and motivated staff: 
The enthusiastic manner in which the large majority of officials conceive of 
their task and their average high level of expertise justify the prediction that it is 
possible to continue developing this administration in a harmonious and 
successful manner. 265 
The Commission's main tasks would be to keep the growing organization under 
control and to constantly adapt it to different and changing tasks. Here again, the 
consultants were optimistic because the Commission had succeeded in recruiting well 
qualified Staff. 
266 This also implied a danger, namely that officials could be tempted to 
usurp tasks which did not fall into their competence. As long as the administration 
was still rather small, this was not considered a problem. The consultants, however, 
did see this as an increasing problem. 267 The Commission officials were thus very 
enthusiastic, worked more than required and tended to extend their area of 
responsibility. 
As to the question of how the Commission could improve its organizational 
scheme, the report suggested several possibilities derived from classical organization 
theory, for example, to organize the administration according to the objectives of the 
treaty, or to group all activities concerning one object -a country, for example - in 
264 Ibid. 
265 HAEU, DEP EN 353, Bosboom Report, Part 2, p. 4. 
266 Ibid., 7. 
267 Ibid., 7-8. 
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one administrative unit. 268 The Commission had opted for the first possibility which 
was a logical choice but entailed difficulties, according to the consultants. Whereas in 
some policy sectors the treaty set a strict working schedule for the Commission, it 
granted more freedom of manoeuvre in others. A structure exclusively based on 
objectives was therefore not appropriate, the analysts thought, because the 
Commission's administration had to remain flexible to accommodate new taSkS. 
269 
Moreover, an organization based on objectives required great co-ordination efforts. 
However, as radical restructuring would have considerable consequences for the 
administration, and might also not result in a logically structured organization, the 
analysts did not make recommendations for a different organizational structure. 270 in 
other words, they did not have a solution for the Commission's efficiency problems. 
However, they suggested that short-term tasks should be addressed by temporary 
committees. This would avoid creating new and permanent administrative units. Later, 
these units would be called 'task force', the first dealing with the British application in 
1961. 
For the analysts, the Commission's ever increasing staff budget was an 
indicator of weak leadership. They thus recommended establishing a strong 
centralized power that should transform the general objectives of the treaty in a 
working programme and control the execution and outcome of it. 
27 1 Therefore, by 
delegating some of its power and refocusing the college's tasks, it should become an 
effective authority-exerting body. The results of the Bosboom en 
Hegener report were 
taken into account by the comitd de rationalisation. 
268 Ibid., 24. 
269 Ibid., 26. 
270 Ibid., 30. 
271 Ibid., 34. 
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4.2 The comiti de rationalisation and the Ortoli report (1960-61) 
In February 1960, Hallstein established a committee composed of three directors- 
general: Franco Bobba, Frangois-Xavier Ortoli and Pieter VerLoren van Themaat. The 
main task of this comit6 de rationalisation was to make suggestions for rationalising 
the administration and, in particular, for reducing the DGs' demands for more staff . 
272 
The Commissioners were aware that tasks in the Commission were not evenly 
distributed. Some officials were overworked while others were underemployed. 
Maýolin stated that he had experienced a similar situation at the OEEC. As a result, 
they had simply dismissed one third of the staff after the first three years because the 
focus of tasks or the tasks themselves had changed. The Commission, however, was 
not inclined to take such radical measures. Moreover, Hallstein criticized that, while 
everybody was in favour of rationalisation, nobody was inclined to make the sacrifices 
in their own services. 273 This would have meant ceding staff, and people were 
associated with power. 
In December 1960, the Commission charged the rationalisation committee 
with producing a report on the functioning of the Commission's services. 274 The 
study, submitted in May 196 1, was based on a questionnaire distributed to all A and B 
275 
officials, excluding Al and A2, of which about 700 were returned . Compared to the 
Bosboom Report, which was based mainly on interviews at director level, this 
approach added a different perspective on the Commission's organization. Also, this 
was an internal report, established by officials employed by the Commission who 
knew the organization from the inside. The authors concluded that the external 
272 HAEU, DEP EN716 17.2. -2.3.1960 (93' A 95' r6union de la Commission), 
24 February 1960. 
273 HAEU, DEP EN 722,21.9. -9.11.60 (117e A 123e r6union de la 
Commission), II October 1960. 
274 BAC 51/1986, No 495, Note A I'attention de Monsieur von Goeler, 25 May 1961. 
275 Ibid. Rapport sur l'organisation des services de la Commission, pr6seW par A 
Ortoli (apr6s 
premier examen par le Comit6 de rationalisation), 1. 
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reputation of the Commission was excellent. On the inside, however, this perception 
had to be at least modified. While great successes had been achieved in some policy 
areas, in other sectors a kind of 'international routine' had kicked in. Some officials 
did not know their exact task and as a result, wrote studies and reports that were often 
unnecessary. 276 The committee made three main suggestions for improving the 
situation. Firstly, dismissing superfluous or underqualified staff; secondly, 
reorganizing the administration; and thirdly, reorienting its activities. The first 
measure concerned mainly the so-called 'mediocre staff' who, as shown above, were 
often kept in the Commission out of reasons of 'humanitarianism, political 
considerations or lack of courage of the superiors'. 277 The second suggestion involved 
a reorganization of the administrative units, which had become necessary after three 
278 
years because duplication of work had occurred. As to the third recommendation, 
according to the report, the Commission lacked a programme prioritising certain 
activities or policy areas. Instead, it would treat all aspects of the EEC treaty as being 
equally important. 279 The report described the Commission as a very heterogeneous 
administration with some units performing extremely well and others less so. As to 
personnel policy, the report predicted that in the future there would be a 'blockage of 
careers'. As the Commission had recruited the bulk of staff in a short time span with 
little staff being over the age of 50, hardly any movement could be expected in the 
leading positions in the foreseeable future. 280 
In June 1961 the Commission discussed the results of the rationalisation 
committee and its consequences. The college set up a working programme and 
276 Ibid., First part, 3. 
277 [bid., 4. 
278 Ibid., 6. 
279 Ibid., 12. 
280 Ibid., 2 1. 
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procedures allowing the judgement, evaluation and dismissal of insufficiently 
qualified officials and employees as the introduction of the personnel statute was 
imminent. 281 
The Bosboom en Hegener report and the Ortoli study were the last attempts of 
reform the Commission undertook in the 1960s. Few of the suggestions of the 
Bosboom and Ortoli reports were implemented. The reasons for this lack of 
determination to actually implement changes could be that change would affect the 
power structure within the Commission. Individual interests of Commissioners were 
at stake and directors-general were also not prepared to abandon competencies and 
power. Also, the 1960s were a busy and active period for the Commission. As long as 
the DGs that were regarded as successful in terms of output - the Ortoli report named 
DG Agriculture - continued to work smoothly, the Commissioners tumed a blind eye 
to these weaknesses. It was only after the merger of the executives and with the first 
enlargement looming that the Commission under President Franco Maria Malfatti 
(1970-72) charged external experts with another analysis of the organization. 
4.3 The Poullet report of 1972 
The Poullet report is beyond the time-frame of this thesis. However, while it pointed 
out administrative problems of the early 1970s, these were the result of decisions and 
developments in the 1960s. Contrary to the Bosboom and Ortoli reports, this study 
dealt with an established administration of 14 years. A comparison between the 
previous studies and this report could thus reveal continuing and persisting problems 
from the late 1950s to the early 1970s. 
28 1 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 150 session, 26me partie, 14 June 1961. 
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In March 1972 the Malfatti Commission commissioned a report on the internal 
functioning of the post-merger Commission from Edouard Poullet, Professor for 
Public Administration at the Universite Catholique de Louvain. The outcome of this 
analysis, the so-called Poullet report, was published in November 1972.282 The lack of 
flexibility of the administrative structure in adapting to new tasks, already pointed out 
in the Bosboom and Ortoli reports, was now more apparent. In particular, the Poullet 
report took into account the Commission's dual responsibility for the elaboration and 
the co-ordination of policies on the one hand and the administration of these policies 
on the other. 283 The study thus looked for a 'strategy of organization', the aim being to 
match the organization with its tasks and to suggest refon-ns accordingly. Professor 
Poullet's team derived its information essentially from discussions with the 
Commission's Co-ordination Committee, 284 founded for this purpose, and from 
interviews with high officials. 
The first chapter of the report analysed the internal functioning of the 
Commission's services. Again, the Commission was complimented on its staff. 'One 
cannot help but underline, on this occasion, the great motivation of the leading 
European civil servants [ ... y285 But at the same time, the 
Commission was described 
as an extremely hierarchical, centralised and also fast growing administration. Within 
ten years, the number of officials had tripled, increasing from fewer than 2,000 in 
286 
1962 to nearly 6,000 in 1972. This rapid growth had an effect on the structure of the 
organization as well as on social relations and career management. The merger of the 
282 BAC 158/1990, No 19, Universitd de Louvain, A. U. R. A. (Association Universitaire de Recherche 
en Administration). Rapport A la Commission sur le 
fonctionnement interne de ses services. Novembre 
1972. 
283 Ibid., 1. 
284 The committee was presided over by Nodl and it was composed of 
leading officials such as von 
Verschuer and Wellenstein. 
285 BAC 158/1990, No 19, Rapport A la Commission. 
286 Ibid., 8. 
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executives led to a further destabilisation of the organization, according to Poullet. 
Taking into account the history and the external enviroru-nent of the organization, the 
study was the first, of the reports discussed here, to acknowledge that external factors 
influenced the administration. The Commission's structure was thus primarily seen as 
an answer to its position and tasks in the Community. 287 One external factor was the 
diversity, extent and complexity of the Commission's tasks. This made it more 
difficult to find a suitable organizational structure, a problem that had already been 
pointed out by the Bosboom en Hegener analysts. However, especially the difficulty 
to accommodate the two tasks of innovation on the one hand and administration on the 
other, seems to have become more pressing as the former required more supple and 
flexible structures than the latter. 
288 
The challenges of multinationality were a second factor. Compared to the 
Bosboom en Hegener report, there was a change in tone, however. In 1972, the 
Commission was already an established and experienced multinational organization. 
It seems that the results are particularly good [in the Commission, K. S. ]. The 
interpersonal relations develop, it seems, in a spirit of confidence and co- 
operation. No doubt, the institutional loyalty of the employees and their feeling 
of being part of a common enterprise play an important role in this situation. 
289 
However, like the Bosboom report, Poullet pointed to the negative aspects of 
multinational ity such as the national balance and the college structure. The latter had 
an impact on the internal functioning of the services, and had resulted in a 
centralisation of the organization . 
290 Furthermore, the report warned not to 'reserve' 
287 Ibid., 6. 
288 Ibid., 9- 10. 
289 Ibid., 10. 
290 Ibid. 
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posts in the administration, in particular at the higher level, for certain nationalities 
which was detrimental to the atmosphere in the organization. 291 
By 1972 the Commission's administration was subdivided into circa 150 
administrative units, including some very small ones. 292 This increase was partly a 
consequence of the limited availability of leading positions in the Commission already 
pointed out as an increasing problem in the Ortoli report. Moreover, the report 
criticized the fragmentation of the administration. There was hardly any cross-DG 
collaboration when it came to the preparation of a proposal. Instead, one DG would 
employ what the report called 'the tactics of the fait accompli'. 293 As a consequence, 
collaboration was only maintained via the top level posts, the Commissioners and 
their Cabinets, which had led to a centralization of the administration. This problem, 
already detected in 1959, had therefore been aggravated. The compartmentalisation 
was also enhanced by the fact that some DGs were more important than others. Some 
had access to more resources and power and were thus not dependent on cross-DG 
collaboration. As a remedy, the report suggested establishing a central authority which 
would overlook the administration and encourage cooperation: the Secretariat 
General . 
294 This would further enhance the important co-ordination function the 
Secretariat had acquired since the establishment of the Commission. Moreover, the 
Poullet report shows how much the meetings of the chefs de cabinet gained in 
importance compared to the early 1960s. Their weekly meetings were now an 
integral 
part of the Commission's working methods and compensated 
for the lack of co- 
ordination between the DGs. 
295 
291 Ibid., p. II 
292 Ibid., 14. 
293 Ibid., 17. 
294 Ibid., 22. 
295 Ibid., 25-6. 
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The next part of the report dealt with how the administration's fragmentation 
influenced the performance of the Commission. Policies were conceptualised mostly 
in one single DG and were thus coined by the style of this DG and were not part of an 
overall political programme or strategy. For this reason, it was difficult to present 
coherent proposals and to set priorities. 296 This fragmentation therefore had an 
important effect on policy outcomes, because this kind of organization more or less 
excluded a profound discussion on general policy directions. In its weekly meetings, 
the college mainly decided on proposals from the different administrative units. A 
single Commissioner, together with his DG, was thus able to exert a major influence 
on the policy orientations of his area of responsibility. 297 
The third part of the report was concerned with the need to reconsider and 
enforce the role of the Commission as Europe's policy initiator. In general, according 
to Poullet, the Commission's administration seemed more designed for administrative 
tasks than for developing policies. 298 The Commission would need a detailed working 
programme, something the Ortoli report had already demanded. Poullet recommended 
using methods derived from economic planning. The Commission had already 
decided to adopt PPBS (= Planning-Programming-Budgeting System), a management 
system guided by management by objectives . 
299The 
report thus suggested enhancing 
co-ordination and flexibility by reinforcing the Secretariat General, inter-DG working 
groups and task forces or study groups. In a long-tenn perspective, the report 
suggested a regrouping of the small administrative units into larger and better 
structured units. According to the report, the administrative structure of the 
Commission (sub-divided in DG, directorate and division) invited 
296 Ibid., 33. 
297 Ibid., 37. 
298 Ibid., 6 1. 
299 Ibid., 55. 
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300 compartmentalisation. Better management would be the answer in the long run. In 
summary, the Poullet report shows that many problems of the early 1960s persisted or 
had become worse in the early 1970s, such as the lack of co-ordination and the 
fragmentation of the administration. At the same time, the Commission officials 
appear to have developed strong loyalties with the institution. They also seemed to be 
as motivated in the early 1970s as they were in the late 1950s. 
Conclusion 
Regarding the administration, the decisions taken in the late 1950s and early 1960s by 
the Hallstein Commission were characterised by prudence and pragmatism, 
accommodating the interests of member state governments. Hallstein's pragmatic 
attitude dominated over calls for more independence from member states by 
Commission members like Rey. The Commission quickly developed into a large 
bureaucracy. Hierarchies were introduced resulting in a high degree of rigidity, 
compartmentalisation and reluctance to reform and change. The Executive Secretariat 
and the Cabinets took over important co-ordinating tasks, thus fiRing gaps in the 
organization. Similar to the High Authority, the main characteristics of the 
Commission as a supranational. administration were the principles of national balance 
and collegiality. 
The years of the Hallstein Commission can be qualified as a success, even a 
striking one, according to Ludlow. An administration was set up from scratch, the 
CAP and the customs union were successfully implemented. '[F]or much of its first 
decade of operation, the Brussels institution gained a reputation for administrative 
300 Ibid., 83f 
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activism and efficiency rather than bureaucratic inertia. 301 Yet, it is doubtful wheflaer 
this goes for the Commission as a whole. Some DGs were more successful than 
others. The Commission was not a homogeneous administration. This chapter has 
shown that from very early on, the administration was fragmented with the different 
DGs acting autonomously and defending their spheres of influence. Within the DGs 
there was sufficient space for the development of DG-specific identities and cultures. 
-r Before studying the examples of the DGs for Competition and Agriculture in chapt. 
BIR, the next chapter will deal with the European high officials who made possible 
the success of the Hallstein Commission and who were affected by these 
administrative structures. 
301 Ludlow 2006b: 41. 
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11. Biographical studies: high officials in the Commission 
Introducing the 'Eurocrats' 
Technocrats, Eurocrats and apatrides - these are some of the terms attributed to 
Commission officials. In July 1961, the Economist described this new species, the 
European civil servant, or 'multilingual tough-minded European', as characterised. by 
youth, European spirit and enthusiasm. I In their study of 1969 on European elites, 
2 Daniel Lerner and Morton Gorden simply qualify the Eurocrats as the 'EC elite' . 
They argued that the European civil service differed from its national counterparts by 
being composed of officials with a higher average education and a lower average age. 
The study also ascribed the Eurocrats 'an impressive esprit de corps' and a 'deep 
sense of identification with the Community'. 3 The term Eurocrat thus has a positive 
connotation and stands for a strong identification of the European civil servants with 
the European cause. It describes a European official imbued with the values of the 
European Community. The term technocrat could have an equally positive 
connotation. For the federalist Henri Brugmans, technocracy was a modem - and 
better - form of bureaucracy. 
4A technocrat was superior to the bureaucrat as the 
latter, a product of nationalism, stood for the old divided Europe whereas the former 
represented innovation and team spirit. For Brugmans, Monnet was the model 
1 'The Eurocrats', The Economist, 29 July 1961,449. 
2 Lerner and Gorden 1969: 262. 
3 Ibid., 263-4. 
' Brugmans 1967: 338. See also Lerner and Gorden 1969: 283. 
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technocrat. Finafly, the term apatride was used by General de Gaulle to express his 
contempt for the Commission and its personnel. All three expressions have something 
in common. They imply a shift of solidarity from the national to the European level 
and account for supranational socialisation processes. 
The biographies of Commission high officials are the focus of this chapter. 
The first section explores the biographical background of these civil servants, 
establishing similarities and differences in their lives and careers, such as generational 
experiences and motivations to work for 'Europe'. These are called internal factors of 
Europeanization. The officials' lives as expatriates living and working in Brussels, 
constitute external factors of Europeanization. These will be analysed in section two. 
The third section will discuss exemplary biographies, illustrating different sociological 
types of officials. The concluding fourth section of the chapter will introduce 
examples of different identities that were present in the Commission, and civil 
servants' images of Europe. 
Before beginning with the analysis, the group of officials studied here needs to 
be defined more closely. A sample of 109 A officials, including Cabinet staff, from 
the DGs IV (57 officials) and VI (52 officials) fonns the basis of this chapter. These 
officials entered the Commission between 1958 and 1963. Some officials from the 
Executive Secretariat have been included as well. The data is based on memoirs, 
interviews and archival sources such as personal papers or CVs. Given the limited 
number of officials in the sample, the aim of this chapter, as in chapter AH, cannot be 
a quantitative sociological study of the Commission's high officials in the 1960s. 
Instead, it is a qualitative study with an in-depth analysis of the biographies and 
careers of a small group of European civil servants. The focus on staff of two DGs 
Ibid., 339. 
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allows for a comparison of their backgrounds and permits the biographies and careers 
to be linked to the policies of these DGs. The latter will be attempted in chapter BIH. 
Responsible for the CAP and competition policy, DG VI and DG IV were, and still 
are, among the most important DGs in the Commission. An analysis of the 
administrative staff of these two DGs is important in that it may contribute to a better 
understanding of how these two policies were developed, and by whom. 
1. Internal factors of Europeanization: biographical background 
The profession of the father, or the parents, usually determines the social background 
of an individual. However, data on the family background of the high officials is 
virtually non-existent. The lack of a larger set of data means that this question has to 
remain open here and, if at all, can only be taken into account in the individual 
biographies in section three. As to the generation which constitutes the group of high 
officials analysed here, the average year of birth of DG IV officials is 1924, while that 
of DG VI officials is 1922.6 These average years conceal the fact that the officials 
were bom between 1905 and 1935. There was thus a possible age gap of up to thirty 
years between them. However, the breakdown of the years of birth shows that the 
majority of officials were born in the 1920s. In DG VI, two were born between 1900 
and 1909, ten between 1910 and 1919,17 between 1920 and 1929 and six in '10.30 and 
after. In DG IV, the oldest was bom in 1910, three between 1910 and 1919,17 
's - between 1920 and 1929, and five were bom in 1930 and after. The leading of.. cio.. In 
-o týie both DGs, the directors -general, directors and heads of division, tend to I. -elleng i. ' 
6 These figures have been established from average years of birth of 26 (DG IV) and 3-5 ý: f.., --izls 
VI). 
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older age group, those who have experienced the inter-war period and Wcrld War --. 
The leading officials - A3 up to A1 and Cabinet staff - were on average bom in 1 ? 22-0 
in the case of DG IV and 1917 in the case of DG VI. 
1.1 War 
Recurring themes in memoirs and interviews can point to the existence of similar c. r 
typical experiences and similar attributions of meaning of a social group. " What, then, 
were e experiences and the 'baggage' the officials took with them into the 
Commission? As the years of birth show, the first Commission officials belonged to 
the war generation. However, in terms of formative years and events, there is a 
difference between those bom 1905 and those bom after 1930. Mozer, for instance, 
born 1905 in Munich, lived through World War 1, the crisis years and the downfall of 
8 
the Weimar Republic. While lacking experience reaching this far back, those born 
between 1910 and 1928 often actively participated in World War H. For those bom 
later, the war provided for strong and formative memories in their childhood and 
youth, Without doubt, the experience of the war had an impact on all of them. As the 
data sample comprises only one woman, war experience here has to be understood as 
the experience of young men in World War H. For the officials from DG IV and DG 
VI this encompassed military service as well as experiencing persecution, captivity, 
expulsion, forced labour, occupation and torture. The members of the Com--mssion 
IL also went through the 'school of war'9. For example, former Resisiance ': g`, ý; - 
and died &: z' tr. e zg, t, Rasquin suffered t'he consequences of Gestapo torm: 7. 
7 See Kruse and Schmitt 1999: 16 1. 
8 On Mozer see also Wielenga 1997a. 
See the interview K. S. with Henri Etienne. 
101 , emaignen 1964: 55, 
pI, 
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to the Commissioners responsible for DG IV and DG VI, von der Groeben served in 
the Wehrmacht while Mansholt was active in the Dutch Resistance. " Moreover, being 
born in 1907 and 1908, respectively, both men had memories of World War I and had 
experienced the crisis years of the late 1920s and 1930s. 
Like in the High Authority, National Socialism and the potential involvement 
and guilt of German officials must have been topics in the Commission. During the 
1930s and 1940s, some future Commission officials supported and spread Nazi 
ideology. For example, the lawyer Arno Schulze-Brachmann wrote a legal essay in 
1940 full of anti-democratic comments about the 'German party state', referring to the 
Weimar Republic. 12 Other examples are the future directors-general Helmut Allardt 
and GUnther Seeliger. Their PhD theses dealt with the German Volksgemeinschaft, or 
ethnic community, and defended the NS economic policy, respectively. Both include 
passages full of contempt for market economy and individualism. 13 Moreover, 
German officials born up to the year 1928 most certainly participated in the war, 
either as soldiers in the Wehrmacht, as Flakhelfer, young men, often teenage boys, 
deployed as helpers at the flak defence, or in the Reichsarbeitsdienst, the Reich 
Labour Service. 14 The younger ones belonged to the so-called 'Flakhelfer generation' 
that survived the war relatively unscathed and politically relatively uncompromised. 
These 'Flak-democrats' are said to have played an important role in the rebuilding of 
I-; '01 ''. ! 11 . "', 
, ý_ 
11 See von der Groeben's biography 1995 and Mansholt's biography, Merridnboer 
2006. 
12 Arno Schulze-Brachmann (1941). Die Durchfuhrung der Kriegspreisvorschriften in den Reichsgauen 
der Ostmark, im, Reichsgau Sudetenland u. in den eingegliederten Ostgebieten, in: Max Metzner, Heinz 
Müller (Eds. ). Die Preisbildung im Kriege. Preissenkung und GewinnabjVhrung. Berlin, Leipzig, Wien: 
Otto Elsner Verlagsgesellschaft, 126-129, here 126. 
13 Lbffler 2002: 185-6. 
14 In Nazi Germany, students born between 1926 and 1928 were recruited for the 
flak once they turned 
16 or when even younger. Since 1943 the Notabitur, or emergency 
A-levels, was the normal way to 
leave the Gymnasium (grammar school). See the cases of GUnther Fitterer (born 
1928), Ivo Schwartz 
and Helmut von Verschuer (both born 1926). 
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Germany after 1945.15 Older officials sometimes held high ranks in the Wehrmacht. 
Hans-Broder Krohn, for instance, director in DG VI, had been an officer in the 
General Staff; likewise deputy executive secretary Behr. 16 There are at least two cases 
that are more problematic: Siegfried Korth, head of division in DG VI, was a SS- 
Obersturmfiffirer based at the eastern front during the war. His SS-career can be traced 
in files held by the Bundesarchiv. However, they do not contain any evidence of war 
crimes. 17 Friedrich Amsmeyer, also a DG VI official, was a Stammphrer in the 
Hitlerjugend. Eleven grades above a simple Hitlerjunge, this was a high position in 
the hierarchy of this nazi youth organization. He became a member of the National 
Socialist party at the age of 17.18 None of these four seems to have committed war 
crimes, however. At least, the responsible institutions in Germany did not have 
incriminating information on any of them. 19 It is unlikely that individuals would have 
been considered for a post in the Commission if it had been known that they had 
committed war crimes. The sources do not reveal whether the Commission had an 
official policy regarding fon-ner German soldiers or members of the National Socialist 
party. The college appears to have decided each case individually. A former member 
of the SS could apparently enter the Commission's administration if he was, able to 
obtain the clearance certificate. 
On the other side were those officials who had fought against Germany, or 
suffered from German occupation or atrocities. The Belgian Raymond Craps had 
15 See for example Bude 1987. 
16 There is no evidence that Krohn or Behr were members of the 
NSDAP. See the letter to K. S. from the 
Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde (henceforth BA Berlin), 16 November 2007. 
17 The SS file of Siegfried Korth, BA Berlin, NSDAP-Zentralkartei. 
18 For Arnsmeyer see the interview K. S. with Friedrich Arnsmeyer, 
Porta Westfalica, 9 February 2004. 
However, the BA Berlin could not confirm Arnsmeyers HJ-membership. 
It is certain, however, that he 
became a member of the NSDAP in 1943. BA Berlin, 
NSDAP-Gaukartei, Arnsmeyer, Friedrich. 
19 Information of the BA Berlin. 
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participated in the liberation of his country, occupied by the German army. 20 Mozer 
survived the German occupation of the Netherlands hidden in a mental health hospital. 
in interviews two Belgian officials recalled their experiences of the occupation in their 
home town Brussels. 21 The family of Maurice Barth6lemy, the son of a Lotharingian 
farmer, was expelled by German troops while VerLoren van Themaat's academic 
mentor, Benjamin Telders, died in the concentration camp Bergen-Belsen in April 
1945. Mixing these officials who directly or indirectly suffered the cruelties of the 
Nazi regime with a former member of the Waffen-SS or a former leader of the Hitler 
youth was potentially an explosive combination. What role did the war play in 
everyday working life? What mechanisms allowed trust to form between former 
enemies? 
It is remarkable that in interviews some non-German officials recall and 
recount the war experiences of their Gennan colleagues, especially their experiences - 
and suffering - on the eastern front. 22 In interviews the Belgian official Frans de 
Koster spoke about German Commission officials who allegedly 'hid' in the 
Wehrmacht in order not to be compromised by the Nazi regime. De Koster recalled 
Behr's past more than forty years after Behr had left the Commission and he named 
others, like Schnippenkbtter, Naýes and Krohn who allegedly also tried to keep a low 
profile by volunteering for the Wehrmacht . 
23 Thus, even non-German officials such as 
de Koster adopted the image of the 'clean' and 'uncompromised' soldier of the 
Wehrmacht, which was constructed and nurtured in the west German society in the 
20 Interview K. S. with Raymond Craps, Brussels, 16 April 2004. 
21 See the interviews K. S. with Eduard Brackeniers and Jean Dubois, Brussels, 20 April 2004. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Interview K. S. with Frans de Koster, Brussels, 6 April 2004. De Koster repeated this in an interview 
in November 2004, HEAU, INT-ECH 692, Interview G6rard Bossuat and Myriarn Rancon with Frans 
de Koster, Brussels, 14 November 2004. 
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1950s and 1960s to foster integration and social peace . 
24 'Having seried. in L 
Wehrmacht was seen as normal and even positive. 
Moreover, many officials considered for this chapter cite the war as their main 
incentive to 'make Europe'. For some, European integration brought about the end of 
a thousand years of 'civil war' and was a guarantee for lasting peace betw%-Ien 
European countries . 
25 Without overemphasizing the influence of this aspect on the 
everyday work of the officials in the Commission, this was an important motive for 
officials from diverse national and cultural backgrounds making the effort to 
collaborate. It is justified to speak of World War H as a shared generational 
experience and a major source of social identification. Former officials themselves 
used the term 'generation' when describing the group of the first European officials. 
For instance, Rudolphe Dumont du Voitel wrote on the occasion of his retirement in 
1987: 
We belong to a generation that went through a lot. As young people we 
experienced the war, we were shocked by this excessive nationalism. We 
realised that Europe will not be able to survive without a reconciliation of the 
European people and countries and I believe that this experience has influenced 
26 us decisively. 
0- 
For many civil servants 1945 marked a break and the European institutions were a 
guarantee to maintain peace in Europe. A. D. Moses characterises Germans born 
between 1918 and 1930 as '45ers' because 1945 marked the most important turning 
point in their Hves. 27 There are good reasons for applying '. his denon-iI*, ia%,,; -r 
.. M, first Commission officials. Working in the Commisson implied pursuing C! 7r-; 
24 This image of the 'clean' Wehrmach't has recently been over: hsrown by 
cxample Browning 1992; Hanib-. rgerInstitut MrSozi0forschung 1996; M011-rz. 1, 
* V61 
25 Interviews K, S. w4h Ernst Albr-echt, Beinhorn, 27 April 2005 7, ear 0_, -.: s. 
26 Dumont du Voitel, ein engagiert,. -., r Eurepaer, In Les Anciens, Bu'lekin 
No 6, Kfiq 
27 Cf. Moses 1999. 
-. I 
.I.. 1(11 , III 
1 1). \-ý 116,1 , 'I, . it .II 
common goal, namely preventing European countries from starting a new war. The 
origins of the legendary 'team spirit' of the Eurocrats lie at least partly in the shared 
generational experience and similar socialisation during World War H which resulted 
in shared norms and values and the conviction that building Europe was a means to 
avoid future armed conflicts in Europe. 28 It gave their work meaning beyond the daily 
routine. The fact that people had fought on different sides did not lead to division. On 
the contrary, this shared experience seems to have furthered understanding, especially 
in the case of German officials who had been 'simple' soldiers. The idea of the 'clean' 
Wehrmacht seems to have been widely accepted in the Commission and certainly 
facilitated the integration of the German officials. This potential for reinterpreting 
history and for accepting a discourse which was dominant in Germany at the time was 
a necessary precondition for the integrative success of the Community. Otherwise, the 
administration could have fallen apart, or at least split into two camps - the Germans 
and the rest. 
1.2 Education, professional background and entry age 
The civil servants in DG IV and DG VI for whom information was available, obtained 
their degrees from 48 aifferent universities across western 96rope and''the'Usk"Ifik 
thus . difficult to make out patterns. The universides'in Pa? is, 
however, 
-ar6'bý'Ni tht 
most Prominent with eleven officials having graduated there. The next in line are 
Bonn with four, Tfibingen and Gbttingen with three and Leuven, Brussels, Munich, 
Stuttgart, Rome, Leiden, Utrecht and Bordeaux with two officials. Compared to 
France, the other member states did not, and still do not, have such a centralised 
28 See also Guieu, P. (1997/98). La Commission europ6enne et Fharmonisation fiscale. In 
http: //www. uai-fi-ance. com/i-edac/print-art. php? artld=8 (accessed 8 July 2008). 
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university system. This explains the diversity of places of study in these countries. 
However, the German universities named above were those with a good reputation, as 
were Leiden, Leuven, Utrecht and Rome. 
The distribution of types of university degrees in DG IV and DG VI varies 
between the two DGs. This can be explained by the different requirements of expertise 
in these policy areas. 
Table 1. Distribution of university degrees in DG IV and DG VI 
DG Law Economics/ Law/ French Agriculture Other 
Political Economics Grande 
economy tcole 
DG IV 10 9 5 1 (1 College 
of Europe 
29 
DG VI 7 1 3 5 15 3 
In the group of DG VI officials, the number of generalists, who studied law, 
economics or held a degree from a Grande Ecole, slightly exceeds the number of 
specialists who had a degree in agriculture (16 versus 15). 30 Moreover, with two 
political scientists DG VI counted another two generalists, not to mention Mozer, an 
autodidact journalist. Yet, DG VI was mainly concerned with highly technical matters. 
Even with their preponderance in the group studied here, generalists in DG VI 
sometimes felt inferior because of their lack of technical background. 31 In DG IV, 
degrees in law, economics or a combination of both dominated. 32 The official with a 
degree in agriculture also had a degree in economics and a postgraduate degree from 
the College of Europe in Bruges, founded in 1949/50. Among the Gennan civil 
29 This official also had a first degree in agriculture. 
30 This information was available for 34 of the 52 DG VI officials studied in this chapter. It is difficult 
to compare university courses across countries. For example, the Grandes 
tcoles taught a broad mix of 
subjects and a law degree in France and Belgium is often combined with economics while in Germany 
the two subjects are hardly ever combined. 
31 See for example the interview K. S. with Georges Rencki. See also Coombes 1970: 211. 
32 This information was available for 26 of the 57 DG IV officials studied in this chapter. 
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servants in DG IV the number of law graduates was particularly high with six plus 
another one with a combined degree in law and economy. 
The types of degrees correspond to what one would expect to find in a national 
civil service. The high percentage of law degrees reflects the dominance of law 
graduates in the German civil service, which was often seen as the equivalent to a 
degree from a French Grande Ecole or an English Oxbridge degree, with its graduates 
making a similar claim of belonging to an elite of generalists, ready to take over 
leading functions in state and society. 33 Among the French officials in DG VI, four 
graduated from the ENA or from one of the other Grandes tcoles, which in France 
was, and still is, the entry ticket to the highest ranks of the national civil service. 
Obviously, in the Commission there could be no dominant type of official, such as the 
lawyer in the German adnumstration. Commissioners and those responsible for 
recruitment fell back on the qualifications they were familiar with, thus reproducing 
patterns from the member states' administrations. In the case of DG IV with its 
mixture of lawyers and economists, von der Groeben most likely brought his 
experience from the German economics ministry to Brussels. In the ministry in Bonn 
he had experienced the collaboration between lawyers and economists as 
uncomplicated and enriching for both sides, 
34 as had the Dutch director-general 
VerLoren van Themaat who, like von der Groeben, had worked as a lawyer in an 
economics ministry. 
Even though the sample of officials studied here is too small to make far- 
reaching and generalising conclusions, the distribution of university degrees suggests 
that the Commission officials reproduced, or were part of, the patterns of elite 
33 Uffler 2002: 137. See also Page and Wright 1999: 8. 
-34 LMer 2002: 140. 
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formation in their countries of origin. While pioneers of European integration such as 
Brugmans emphasized the fresh start made in the Brussels' administration compared 
to national administrations, which were, according to him, 'creations of the 19'h 
century', 35 a 'fresh start' was not what could possibly be achieved in the Commission. 
This becomes even more evident when looking at the age and the professional 
background the officials had when starting to work for the Commission. 
The average age of the officials who entered the Commission's services 
between 1958 and 1962 was quite low. For DG IV it was 34.7 years and for DG VI 
36.9 years. This confirms the impression many observers in the 1960s had of the 
Commission as a young administration. 36 Naturally, an average age of 35 includes the 
25 years old graduate as well as the 60 years old veteran. These figures, therefore, 
suggest that most officials did not start their careers in the Commission coming 
straight from university, which would perhaps have allowed for a 'fresh start'. This 
made the Commission's staff more experienced on the one hand but it may also have 
made the officials less flexible in adapting to the new multinational surrounding and 
working patterns on the other. What is more, if they had circa eight to ten years of 
previous professional experience, they may have already undergone strong 
socialisation in their previous appointment. In terms of socialisation it is revealing to 
look at the employment of officials immediately before they entered the Commission. 
The knowledge and previous experience of the officials were an important 
asset for the Commission on which it relied and which it utilised. This could be the 
intimate knowledge of a national administration, an interest group or an international 
35 Brugmans 1967: 336. 
36 See for example the Economist, June 1961; see also Merriiýnboer 2006: 249. 
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network. The distribution of the types of previous occupations in Tables 2 and 3 
shows that the national civil services were clearly the main previous employer. 
Table 2. Last position DG IV o, ý 37 fficials held before entering the Commission. 
Country 
of 
origin 
National 
civil 
service 
Cartel 
office 
Interest 
groups 
International 
organization 
Business University/ 
Research 
Other 
NL 2 1 
F 2 1 
B 4 
D 4 3 1 2 3 
1 2 1 
Lux I 
Total 17 5 5 3 1 5 
Table 3. Last position DG VI officials held before entering the Commission. 38 
Country 
of 
origi 
National 
civilservice 
Interest 
groups, 
parties 
International 
organization 
Business University/ 
Research 
Other 
NL 3 2 1 
F 6 2 2 
B 2 1 
D 8 1 3 
1 2 1 2 1 
Lux I 
Total 1 21 5 4 4 4 1 
An impressive number of 21 officials of DG VI had worked in the national civil 
service before coming to Brussels (table 3). The number is equally high for DG IV 
when adding the five officials who had worked for national cartel offices to the 17 
from the national civil service (table 2). In DG IV, interest groups and university or 
research come next, with five recruits each. International organizations follow with 
three while only one official came from private business. This is remarkable as one 
should think that private companies were the main 'clients' of DG IV. Fear of being 
accused of partiality may have prevented the Commission from employing more 
37 This information was available for 37 of the 57 DG IV officials. 
38 This information was available for 39 of the 52 DG VI officials. 
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people from private business. Also, the lacking appeal of this new European civil 
service in terms of salary and, initially, job security compared to private business may 
have hampered recruitment among this group. In DG VI, interest groups also come 
second with five recruits, followed by international organizations, private business and 
university or research with four recruits each. A German research institute for 
agriculture provided the Commission with three officials, two of them future heads of 
division. Finally, neither in DG IV nor in DG VI international organizations seem to 
have been the preferred recruitment ground. An obvious question would then be 
whether the European officials possessed international experience of another kind. 
1.3 European and international experiences and political background 
The question whether Commission officials had previous international experience and 
were thus already internationally socialised before entering the Commission is 
important as this would indicate an ability to adapt to new situations and to succeed in 
a multinational administration such as the Commission. This experience encompasses 
dealing with individuals of different national, cultural and linguistic backgrounds and 
can thus be seen as a preparation for working in the Commission. 'International 
experience' includes university studies in a foreign country, service in international 
organizations, participation in negotiations at the international level, military service 
and employment in a foreign country. 
At least 23 of the future DG VI officials had some kind of international 
experience. 39 Three worked in international organizations, six studied abroad, seven 
participated in international negotiations, for instance in the framework of the OEEC, 
and seven had other experiences such as a job abroad. In DG IV the number of 
39 Of 26 it is not known, 3 had no international experience. 
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officials with international experience was considerably lower. Of the DG IV sample 
group, a minimum of 16 had international experience. 40 Five worked in international 
organizations such as the Council Secretariat of the ECSC in Luxembourg, the High 
Authority or the OEEC, six studied abroad, mainly in the United States, and three 
participated in international negotiations, in the OEEC or the Benelux customs union. 
One Belgian spent his military service in Germany and another Belgian worked in 
Germany. Deprived of the possibility to study in their home country, for officials from 
Luxembourg undertaking university studies necessarily implied moving abroad. After 
the war they were mainly attracted by French universities or Grandes tcoles. They 
were fluent in French (and German) and familiar with the particular working methods 
taught at these universities. 
Given that in the 1950s it was far from common to study or work abroad, this 
proportion both in DG VI and DG IV seems rather high. In fact, it might have been 
higher as for many officials it is not known whether they had previous international 
experience. Unfortunately, there are no comparable studies on national 
administrations showing the percentage of national civil servants with international 
experience which could establish whether this degree of international experience of 
Commission officials was exceptional or not. In any case, prior international 
experience certainly facilitated understanding among colleagues of different national 
and cultural backgrounds. Sometimes these experiences had resulted in the formation 
of transnational networks, for instance in the negotiations on the Green Pool in the 
early 1950s, which certainly provided for a kind of pre-socialisation and was a 
preferred recruitment ground for DG VI. 41 However, multiple international experience 
40 Of 36 it is not known, 4 had no international experience. 
41 See chapter B111. 
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was the exception. Thus Albrecht studied in the United States and in Switzerland, 
worked for the Secretanat of the ECSC Council of Ministers and was the secretary of 
the Internal Market group at the Val Duchesse negotiations. 
A surprisingly small number of officials were active in groups and networks 
furthering European integration such as the European (student) Movement. In DG VI 
these were Georges Rencki, Mozer, van der Lee and Franýois Muller. In the sample of 
DG IV officials, there is no comparable case. Barthelemy, another DG VI official, was 
active in a Franco-German student movement. 42 He is not the only one emphasizing 
that his interest in 'Europe' was triggered by the aim of Franco-German 
reconciliation. In his study on French elites in the European Communities, Bossuat 
also emphasizes this aspect: 'For some, the emergence of a European Community 
culture was directly linked to the experience of the Franco-Gennan conflict. 943 
European integration was a means for many - in particular French and German - 
officials to overcome this Franco-German antagonism. All in all, the divide between 
DG VI and DG IV is interesting and difficult to explain. It is possible that Mansholt, a 
federalist, attracted more individuals with a well developed interest and activism in 
European groups than von der Groeben, who was clearly pro-European but not as 
ideologically committed. 
If federalist commitment was not very pronounced among officials, how about 
their political beliefs? It would be naYve to believe that European civil servants, 
especially in the higher ranks, were politically neutral. However, as the topic was not 
openly discussed in the Commission, it is difficult to determine the political 
background of high Commission officials. As shown in chapter BI, the Commission's 
42 Interview K. S. with Maurice Barth6l6my, Brussels, 13 April 2004. 
43 Bossuat 2006: 57. 
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way to deal with the diversity of opinions, Political convictions and social groups in 
Europe was to include as many of them as possible in the administration. One 
example is the director-general in DG FV, VerLoren van Themaat, who, close to the 
Dutch Socialist PartY44, was most probably also recruited to counterbalance von der 
Groeben, a Christian democrat. 45 However, people might not want to admit that they 
obtained their posts because of their political affiliation as this would imply that their 
skills were less important. Moreover, the Commission wanted to preserve an image of 
neutrality of their high officials. For instance, on the occasion of the appointment of 
B. M. Smulders as director-general in DG IX, Rey criticized the Conunission's press 
communiqu6 announcing his appointment for containing information on Smulders' 
previous political posts. 'The Commission specifies that no mention of a possible 
political affiliation should figure on any document or communication of an official 
nature issued by the Commission's services. 946 
Political ties were particularly important in countries such as Belgium and 
Italy, where sometimes even for the lower ranks of the national civil service party 
47 
membership was a necessary precondition for recruitment. These principles seem to 
have been transferred to the Commission. For instance, the Belgian de Koster was a 
socialist. In 1957, he entered the Cabinet of the Flemish socialist minister Henry Fayat 
at the ministry of external trade. When in June 1958 the sociali st- liberal coalition was 
replaced with a Christian democratic government, he had to give up his post. As a 
compensation, however, he found himself on Rey Is list for a job in the Commission. 
48 
44 Interview K. S. with Pieter VerLoren van Themaat. See also the interview 
K. S. with Ernst Albrecht, 
Burgdorf/Beinhorn, 27 April 2005 who states that VerLoren van Themaat was a socialist. 
45 However, von der Groeben was not a party member of the 
CDU while a Commissioner. See for 
example von der Groeben 2002: 47-8. 
46 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 146 session, 2ýme partie, 
17 May 1961. 
47 Page and Wright 1999: 8. 
" Interview K. S. with Frans de Koster. 
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1.4 Motives 
The officials' motives for entering the Commission were diverse, combining different 
elements of personal and career considerations. They were very subjective. Finding 
out about motives is particularly problematic if officials try to recall them in 
retrospect, with a time gap of up to 45 years between now and the events. For 
example, pecuniary or personal motives such as problems in the previous workplace 
most likely are omitted in these recollections. Nevertheless, this section attempts to 
outline possible incentives that may have encouraged the officials to work for the 
Commission. Motives of staff are important in that they impact on the Commission's 
overall performance. According to Robert Peterson, a mixture of career and ideational 
motives were most beneficial for the Commission as these officials would perform 
best in the job. 
49 
The experience of World War H and the aim to overcome the Franco-German 
divide as a strong incentive to work for Europe are the main ideational reasons given 
in interviews and autobiographical writings. However, there were other significant 
motivations to work for the Commission. Curiosity and a sense of adventure were 
certainly among them. In interviews, a number of former civil servants claimed that 
they were interested in working in an international context in general, and for 
European integration in particular . 
50 Another recurring theme in interviews is that as 
young people they did not care what the salary would be or whether the 
job was 
secure, as long as it was interesting. 51 The answers in interviews Peterson conducted 
in 1964/65 with A-officials of the Commission are strikingly similar to what officials 
49 Peterson 1974/75: 31-33. 
50 See for example interviews K. S. with Franz Froschmaier, Franqois 
Muller and Georges Rencki. 
51 See the interviews K. S. with Aurelio Pappalardo, Brussels, 8 March 
2005, Franqois Muller, Eduard 
Brackeniers, Giampiero Schiratti, Franz Froschmaier, Henri Etienne and No Schwartz. 
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chose to tell much later in life, namely that they were excited about their tasks in the 
Commission which they considered as pioneer Work. 
52 This consistency makes 
interviews conducted with Conunission officials in a later stage of their life more 
credible. For some officials the salary was certainly an incentive or a bonus to work 
for the Commission, even if it is something they do not readily admit. 53 The salary in 
the Commission was, at least initially, considerably higher than for comparable posts 
in national administrations. Interestingly, career prospects were hardly ever named in 
interviews as a main motive to move to Brussels. The reason might be that at the 
beginning it was not certain whether having a career would be possible as the success 
of the institution was not guaranteed from the outset. For the officials studied here, 
who entered the Commission in the set-up period, it was often a step into the unknown 
with important consequences for their private and professional lives. Then again, once 
the Commission was established, having a career may have been something many 
considered as understood. Some officials had more specific reasons to enter the 
Commission. For one, the Commission presented the opportunity to become a civil 
servant, as the German civfl service in 1958 was more or less closed as long-serving 
soldiers and returning prisoners of war received preferential treatment for a long 
time. 54 For another, Europe was a family matter. Jean Dubois's father had participated 
in the Val Duchesse negotiations as a Belgian civil servant and his brother worked 
for 
the High Authority. Dubois himself entered the Commission in December 1958.55 
This section has shown the officials' awareness of belonging to one generation 
and of sharing a life-shaping experience, World War II. 
Moreover, the future 
52 Peterson 1974n5: 27. 
53 Olivier de Vos is one of the few to admit that it were also 
financial reasons that made the post in 
Brussels attractive. Interview K. S. with Olivier de Vos, 
Breda, 25 February 2005. 
"4 Interview K. S. with Kurt Lennart Ritter, Brussels, 3 March 
2005. 
55 Interview K. S. with Jean Dubois. 
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Commission officials had similar university degrees and comparable previous 
professional experience, with the national civil service dominating. They were 
experienced individuals, but at the same time young and flexible enough to adapt. 
Previous international experience has certainly led to a certain openness and curiosity 
which could help them overcome conflicts resulting from their different cultural 
backgrounds. These are biographical factors, or internal preconditions, which made 
the officials predisposed towards engaging in a new task and, possibly, eventually 
adopting new values. Much depended on what they would find in the Commission. 
2. Space and time: external factors of Europeanization 
Trondal emphasizes the power of institutions to transform actors' identities and 
allegiances. 56 The Commission officials could then have formed a 'socio- 
psychological community', based on 'sentiment, affect, shared values - the kind of 
solidarity characteristic of Church, family or nation'. 
'7 Accordingly, if integration 
were to succeed, Hallstein thought it necessary to create new identities and to redirect 
loyalties towards the Community. "Which factors could have triggered or intensified 
such a process among European civil servants? 
2.1 Careers in the Commission 
The first factor is time. Long-term exposure to institutional dynamics increases the 
likelihood of being affected by them. Moreover, long careers of 
European civil 
56 Trondal 2004: 75. 
57 Shore 1995: 219. 
58 See White 2003: 12 1. 
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servants could be an indicator for a high degree Of loyalty towards the Commission 
and a high degree of job satisfaction. Indeed, long careers in the Commission seem to 
be the norm for the officials studied. The majority of the officials entered the 
Commission in 1958: 28 of DG IV and 20 of DG VI. In 1959, another eleven entered 
DG W and eight DG VL-59 Officials who commenced their service in DG IV remained 
in the Commission for another 25 years on average - the time of service ranging from 
four to 38 years. The average time of service is comparably long for officials who 
started their careers in DG VI. They stayed for an average of 22 years, the length of 
service extending between eight and 34 years . 
60 The relatively young entry age of the 
first European civil servants made this long service in the Commission possible. This 
high level of stability suggests, moreover, that the officials identified with the 
Commission, or at least they thought that the career prospects there were good enough 
to stay. However, a lack of alternatives and the comparably high income may also 
have been motives to remain in the Commission. It was only between 1984 and 1996 
that a large proportion of this 'pioneer' generation finally retired and left the 
Commission. 61 These officials therefore blocked upper grades in the Commission's 
administration well into the 1980s and early 1990s. This long-term service of the first 
European civil servants is striking and the stability of personnel also accounts for 
continuity in the Commission's common agricultural and competition policies. 
The civil servants in DG Agriculture were particularly committed to staying in 
62 
their DG. Only five officials left DG VI for another DG. This stability is certainly 
59 In 1960 six in DG IV, respectively eight in DG VI; 1961 eight in DG IV respectively six 
in DG VI, 
four in 1962 in DG VI and none in DG IV; three in DG VI in 1963; and one in each 
DG after 1963. DG 
VI was the fastest growing DG in the Com-mission; thus, the number of A officials 
in DG VI increased 
more rapidly than in DG IV during 1960-63. 
60 These numbers are based on information on 22 officials in DG IV and 
26 officials in DG VI. 
61 17 out of 26 in DG VI and 17 out of 22 in DG IV. 
62 Of 26 officials analysed five left DG VI. 
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due to the specialisation of many of DG VI's officials. However, they also seem to 
have identified strongly with this DG and the CAP. Of the officials who left, three 
moved to DG VEII, one to DG Regional Policy and one, Pierre Malve, left to serve in 
the Cabinets of Commissioner Deniau and Commission President Ortoli in the 1970s. 
DG Development had, of course, also to deal with problems concerning agriculture. 
Hence, it was probably the first DG outside DG VI officials considered moving to. 
Moreover, like civil servants in DG VI, DG VIR officials strongly identified with their 
policy area. 
63 
It is more difficult to assess the stability of DG IV officials as this DG was 
reorganized in 1967 when the Directorates for Tax Harmonisation and Approximation 
of Laws were assigned to DG Internal Market (DG XI). Of 22 DG FV officials, twelve 
moved to another DG. Four moved to DG XI, three to DG Financial Institutions and 
Taxation (DG XV), one to Industry (DG III) and two to DG VIII. Franz Froschmaier 
left DG IV to work for the Commission's information office in Washington and 
Manfred Caspari became Deputy Director-General for External Relations before 
returning to DG IV as director-general. DG IV's first director-general, VerLoren van 
Themaat, encouraged his officials to move to other DGs to build a network of allies 
throughout the Commission. 64 The officials who left DG IV should spread the 
economic concepts of competition and market economy in other parts of the 
Commission. 
The long-term exposure of the officials to institutional structures, both in the 
Commission and in the DGs, increased the likelihood of being affected 
by institutional 
dynamics and of developing strong loyalties with the institution. 
However, the time 
63 See Dimier 2004. 
64 Interview K. S. with Eduard Brackeniers. 
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effect alone would certainly not have been sufficient to create loyalties if career 
chances were not satisfactory. 
When studying the career patterns of the first European civil servants, it seems 
that career opportunities were quite good for officials who started their careers in the 
late 1950s or early 1960s. As to the starting positions, in DG VI there were two 
officials in the Cabinet as well as five A7/6, twelve A5/4, five A3, five A2 and one AI 
(table 4). At the end of their careers, apart from three A4, all of them reached a rank of 
head of division (eight A3, plus one head of division with grade A4) and above (table 
5). The figures for DG IV are very similar. At the end of their careers, one official 
reached A4,13 became A3, eight ended up as A2 and six became AI while two 
reached the rank of conseiller principal (tables 6 and 7). 
Table 4. Entry position of DG VI officials65 
Cabinet Al A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 
NL 2 1 1 
F 2 2 2 
B I 
D 2 2 
1 2 
Lux 
I Total 1 2 1 5 5_ 7 3 2 
Table 5. Final position of DG VI officials66 
Cabinet Conseiller 
Principal/ 
Al A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 
NL I I 
F 3 
B I 
D 2 2 
1 2 1 
Lux I 
Total 1 6 10 8 
65 Entry Positions in DG VI for 30 officials out of 52. 
66 Final position in DG VI for 29 out of 52 officials. 
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Table 6. DG IV Entry position 67 
Cabinet Al A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 
NL I T- - 
F 
B 2 
D 2 1 2 2 
Lux 
Total 2 1 3 
Table 7. Final position of DG IV officials68 
Cabinet Conseiller 
Principal 
Al A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 
NL 1 3 
F 1 3 3 
B 1 1 3 
D 4 3 4 
1 1 
Lux 
Total 2 6 8 13 1 
Although in interviews many officials accounted for the great job satisfaction they 
experienced when working in the Commission, careers in the European administration 
were and are subject to particular practices and differed from those in national 
administrations. As pointed out in chapter BI, not every official had the opportunity to 
reach a post of head of division or above. Multiple factors influenced career decisions 
in the Commission. Many A4 officials were aware of the fact that, because of their 
nationality and because of the political importance of the posts above A4, they could 
not become head of division. Peterson gives the example of an A4 official who stated 
that he would stay in the Commission in spite of his blocked career, because of the 
great work satisfaction and 'believe it or not, a commitment to working for a united 
Europe I. 69 
67 Entry position in DG IV for 30 out of 57 officials. 
68 Final position in DG IV for 30 out of 57 officials. 
69 Peterson 1971: 134. 
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It is often emphasized that service in a Cabinet is a career booster . 
70 However, 
in DG VI, apart from van der Lee, Mansholt's Cabinet staff was stable and did not 
, jumpý to other high positions in the Commission's administration. The situation is 
different for DG IV. No less than three future Directors-General for Competition - 
Albrecht, Schlieder and Caspari - went through service in the Cabinets of von der 
Groeben and Wilhelm Haferkamp who succeeded von der Groeben as German 
Commissioner. In addition, Froschmaier ended up as Director-General for 
Information, Communication and Culture after having served in the Cabinets of these 
two Commissioners. Service in a Cabinet usually improved the position of an official 
by one or two steps in the hierarchy. However, furthering a career with help from a 
Cabinet was not popular. According to Peterson, 'when administrators refer to their 
own contacts with Cabinets, they are often apologetic or deny that these contacts 
involved attempts to obtain promotion. In general there is a norm of non-recourse to 
the cabinets. ' 71 It was also possible to get from A7 to the top of the hierarchy without 
having served in a Cabinet as the example of Eduard Brackeniers shows, who ended 
up Director-General for Translation. 
As many officials chose to spend the remainder of their careers in the 
Commission, post-Commission occupations are not the norm. However, many 
officials retired rather early, around the age of 60. The early retirement age can be 
explained by the workload with which leading officials had to cope throughout their 
careers which led to exhaustion, and, importantly, by the fact that due to enlargements 
the Commission had to free posts for officials from new member states. 
72 Some 
officials chose to withdraw gradually from Community affairs and they 
became 
70 Cf. Donnelly and Ritchie 1994. 
71 Peterson 1971: 132-3. 
72 See the examples of Christopher Audland, Daniel GuggenbUhl and 
Helmut von Verschuer who 
retired aged 60; others such as Ivo Schwartz and Jean Dubois retired at the age of 
65. 
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73 74 special advisers to the Commission, or to a Commissioner. The Commission thus 
utilised their know-how and experience. Others went into politics. Van der Lee 
became mayor of Dordrecht and Eindhoven and held a seat in the Dutch Raad van 
State, the Council of State, between 1979 and 1988. Albrecht was minister president 
of Lower Saxony from 1976 to 1990 while Froschmaier became minister of 
economics and finance in the German Land Schleswig-Holstein. Some moved into 
academia. Three officials taught at the College of Europe in Bruges and the Universit6 
Libre de Bruxelles. Nodl became president of the European University Institute in 
Florence and VerLoren van Thernaat accepted a professorship in International Law at 
Utrecht University. Another official, Pappalardo, set up a law firm in Brussels. 
Generally speaking, a transfer to private business was less frequent. One German 
official became a freelance councillor for agriculture, helping individuals, federal 
states and national ministries in dealing with European legislation, thus cashing in on 
his special knowledge of the Brussels maze. 
2.2 Living and working in Brussels 
'Bruxelles, I'Europ6enne' is the title of a book edited by the Belgian historian Michel 
Dumoulin. 75 it is very likely that Brussels and its specific urban and social 
environment had an impact on the officials. As highly paid expatriates, they were 
sometimes detached from the reality in their home countries and from the Belgian 
population of Brussels. Often, they led a kind of 'bubble life' in a golden cage. 
Albrecht has recalled that his family leaving Brussels was not an easy step 
for them as 
they also left behind the community of officials of six 
different countries. He 
73 Schwartz, Ritter, von Verschuer, Rencki and Nicolas BeL 
74 For example Dubois to Karel van Miert. 75 Dumoulin 2001. 
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described his return to Lower Saxony and to politics as a Riickkehr ins Volk, or return 
to the people, 76 as opposed to the privileged and aloof existence of a European civil 
servant. While the officials underwent supranational socialisation when working at the 
Commission, they also socialised with people from different national and cultural 
backgrounds, meeting in clubs, churches and schools. A particular European culture 
developed in Brussels and the officials were part of it. Abeles and Bellier call it an 
institutional, administrative and political culture. 77 
As shown above, most people attracted by a career in Brussels were fairly 
young and flexible. They were either single or married but with a young family, which 
was easier to relocate. When coming to Brussels in the late 1950s, many officials and 
their wives perceived the Belgian capital as a provincial town, particularly when they 
were from cities such as Paris or Berlin. Especially for the officials' wives, most of 
whom stayed at home, life in Brussels was a harsh contrast to what they were used to 
78 
and they felt isolated, not least because of the language barrier. In the early years, 
the provinciality of Brussels was overcome - according to eyewitnesses - by an active 
social life. One 'cocktail' followed the other. 79Those who were single and came to 
Brussels when they were in their early and mid-twenties savoured this new freedom. 
80 
However, this probably reflects more the experience of officials who did not have a 
leading position in the administration at the beginning, as those at the top of the 
hierarchy usually emphasized that they did not have much of a social life while 
76 Albrecht 1999: 44. 
77 CC Ab6lýs and Bellier 1996: 436. 
78 See for example the conversations with Mrs Imbert and 
Mrs Gleichmann, widows of deceased DG IV 
officials. 
79 For example the diaries of Jean Schwed, an official 
in the Executive Secretariat, of 1960 and 
conversation K. S. with Mrs Schwed, Brussels, II March 
2005. 
so Interview K. S. with an official of DG V, Brussels, 8 December 
2003. 
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working for the Commission. 81 Nevertheless, at the beginning, the Commission was, 
like the High Authority, a small administration where people got to know each other 
well. Frangois Muller remembered that he and others had a 'great thirst and an 
immense pleasure to get to know' people with different backgrounds. 82 Some 
Commissioners invited high officials to their homeS83 and sometimes a close contact 
between Commission members and high officials developed. However, this rosy 
picture of intercultural understanding has to be put into perspective. Despite attempts 
to bring together the members of the international community in Brussels, for example 
in the European Club, 84 some officials recount that people of different nationalities 
rarely mixed in their private life. 85 One official qualified his life in Brussels as 
'predominantly marital'; 86 this withdrawal into the family could also be observed for 
officials in the High Authority. However, one of the means of socialising with 
officials, including those of different nationalities, were precisely their children. 
The European schools had a great symbolic value for social integration and 
Europeanization of European officials and their families. Aimed at providing a 
European education for the next generation, they brought children and families of 
different national and cultural background together. In order to cater for the 
educational needs of the officials' children, in mid-1958 the European institutions in 
Brussels decided to create a European school, which opened its doors in 1958 in the 
81 See the interviews K. S. with Ernst Albrecht, Franz Froschmaier, Frans de Koster and Henri 
Etienne. 
82 Interview K. S. with Franqois Muller. 
83 IISH, Archief van Sicco L. Mansholt, No 97, Letter van der Lee to 
Mansholt, 8 November 1958. 
84 The European Club in the ChAteau de Saint-Anne in the Val Duchesse was founded in 1961 on the 
initiative of the European Movement in Brussels. PAAA, Pol 
04 22, No 218, R. Lahr to Auswlftiges 
Amt, 25 August 1961. 
85 HAEU, INT-ECH 68 1, Interview Wilfried Loth and Veronika Heyde with Klaus-Otto 
Nass, Paris, 2 
April 2004 and ibid., INT-ECH 680, Interview Wilfried 
Loth and Veronika Heyde with Klaus Meyer, 
Bonn, 16 December 2003. 
86 Interview K. S. with Kurt Ritter. 
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suburb of Ukkle. 87 Marcel Decombis, co-founder of the European school in 
Luxembourg, was convinced of these schools' Europeanization effects, as a European 
88 
spirit would essentially develop through education. All in all, the European school 
was another place to meet and mix for European officials and furthered integration 
through the children. While praising the benefits of the European school, not all 
parents sent their children there. It was an all-day school and some, especially German 
parents, were not used to this concept and thought it was hard on their children. 89 
Some preferred national schools such as the German school or the Lyc6e franqais in 
order to facilitate reintegration of their children in the school and university system of 
their country of origin. 90 Another option was to send the children to a Belgian school, 
a decision which showed these officials' willingness to integrate in the Belgian 
society. 91 In particular for the Dutch officials the Flemish speaking schools were an 
attractive alternative. 
92 
Like in Luxembourg, the relationship between the native Bruxellois and the 
'Eurocrats' was not without strain. The new inhabitants of the Belgian capital were 
met with indifference and sometimes even hostility. Their high salaries and 
advantages of tax-free shopping and cheap petrol caused envy among the locals, 
according to officials interviewed. Many mentioned that they had problems 
integrating in the Brussels society or did not make an effort. A contemporary 
newspaper article confin-ns that the officials mainly lived 'on the margins' of the 
87 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Commission, 25 session, 15-16 
July 1958, pt. 7. 
88 Marcel Decombis, Il ya trente-cinq ans naissait itcole europ6enne. 
In Les Anciens, Bulletin no 8, 
May 1988,7-8, here 7. 
89 See for example HAEU, INT ECH-682, Interview 
Veronika Heyde and Myriam Rancon with Ivo 
Schwartz, Brussel, 16 January 2004. 
90 See for instance interviews with Frangois Muller. 
91 Conrad 2001: 141. 
92 Interview K. S. with Olivier de Vos. 
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Brussels society. 93 However, the prejudices seem to have been reciprocal. The Belgian 
society was seen as conservative and closed. One official explained, moreover, that in 
'the European milieu with all these different nationalities, with activities that were 
open towards European and global problems, there was already such a diversity 
between us that there was little need to f 94 ind contacts among the locals'. For others, 
however, the motto was to 4go native'. One official organized Commission teams that 
participated in public events such as marathons. This was considered a good publicity 
for the Eurocrats and an opportunity to get to know the local population. 95 Another 
means of integrating in the Belgian society were the church parishes. 
However, for many French officials and Commissioners, Paris remained the 
place where one spent weekends and holidays. 96 This might explain why they did not 
make more effort to integrate in the Belgian society. The evening train between 
Brussels and Paris, the 'Transeuropean Express', has become legendary. It provided 
not only a speedy means of transport between the French and the European capital, 
but it was also an important informal place to meet, where matters could be discussed 
in private amongst officials, Commissioners, representatives of interest groups and 
joumalists. 97 
While the fact that the Commission was a multinational and multilingual 
administration caused many difficulties, it was at the same time an opportunity to 
build trust and solidarity. In interviews, officials account for the fact that they assisted 
each other in coping with working in a foreign language by translating and explaining 
93 BAK, N 1266/1268, 'Les forictionnaires europ6ens et nous'. In La Demi&e Heure, 17/18 January 
1965. 
94 Interview K. S. with Frangois Muller. 
95 Interview K. S. with Henri Etienne. 
96 See for example HEAU, INT-ECH717, Interview Ghjiseppu 
Lavezzi with Georges Rencki, Tervuren, 
13 January 2004, and ibid., INT-ECH767, Interview G6rard 
Bossuat and Anais Legendre with Jean- 
Frangois Deniau, Paris, 3/10 November 2004. 
97 Lemaignen 1964: 43-44. 
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for eac other. 98 From today's perspective, however, these are part of the myth of the 
pioneer generation of the Commission and all statements about how smoothly 
everything worked have to be handled with care. Another factor in this respect are the 
long working hours. Most officials, when interviewed, stated that they voluntarily 
renounced spare time and regular working hours because they were so engaged with, 
and so enthusiastic about, their work. 99 This may well be true. However, the long 
working hours were also a source of concern, as they had repercussions on the 
officials' health and family life. In 1962, the Commission's medical examiner 
diagnosed a large number of cases of psychological strain, having led to some 
breakdowns as a consequence of long working hours. 100 Many Commission officials 
were simply overworked and this made it difficult for them to settle and integrate in 
Brussels. 
2.3 Socialisation and Europeanization mechanisms in the Commission 
The previous two subsections argued that the time factor, combined with job 
satisfaction and the particular environment of living and working in Brussels had an 
impact on the officials. This subsection deals with other socialisation factors, such as 
expert culture, role models and working methods. It also explores the limits of these 
socialisation factors. 
In the Commission, what could be called an 'expert culture' developed. This 
led to an identification of officials with the institution, combined with a strong 
identification with Commission policies. In 1965 Albrecht judged the Commission's 
expertise to be one of its main assets through which it could gain credibility and 
98 Interviews K. S. with Olivier de Vos and Frangois Muller. 
99 See for example interviews K. S. with Giampiero Schiratti and 
Franz Froschmaier. 
100 BAK, N 1266/1268, Hitzelberger to von Staden, 29 September 1962. 
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recognition as a Community actor. 101 Moreover, the expert culture enabled the 
officials to overcome prejudices and to perceive the other simply as a colleague. 'O' It 
certainly helped to bridge the cultural and linguistic divide, which could have led to 
misunderstandings and conflicts. These difficulties were overcome, it seems, mainly 
through collaboration and through the sense of working for a cause adopted as 
common and worth pursuing. In an article of 1967, von Verschuer attempts to explain 
the dynamics, difficulties and challenges of multinational cooperation. 103 He is one of 
the few who reflected on these problems while still an active official in the 
Commission. The views expressed in his article somewhat differ from the ideal of 
multinational solidarity and cooperation that comes across in some of the interviews 
with officials long after their retirement. Verschuer observed that the cooperation of 
people with different national backgrounds required patience and the will to engage 
with other people. He concluded, however, that the strongest link between people of a 
different kind would develop through a common mission. For him, a DG VI official, 
the CAP was the ideal example for a task behind which people of different national 
and cultural backgrounds could rally. 104 Decades later, DG VI officials such as 
Barth6l6my spoke of the strong will to collaborate with each other and to achieve 
something together. 'Because there really was this will, this will to succeed, to achieve 
results [ ... J. There was this strong sense of 
being able to construct something together, 
1()' ACDP, 1-659,062/2, Vermerk über eine Besprechung der Herren von 
der Groeben, Mestmäcker, 
Albrecht, Caspari, Schwartz, Nass und Albert am 17, Dezember 1965 über 
innerhalb der EWG- 
Kommission gegebene Möglichkeiten, längerfristige 
Konzeptionen zu entwickeln und in allen 
Sachgebieten durchzusetzen, 21 December 1965. 
102 Ab61ýs and Bellier 1996: 433 and 437. 
103 Verschuer 1967. 
104 Ibid., 5. 
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of having to accomplish a common creation. ' 105 Other officials also emphasized this 
enthusiasm of shaping a policy or, rather, creating European policies. 106 
Beyond the expert culture, the fact that the first European civil servants 
belonged to one generation with shared experiences such as the war has to be 
considered as a strong factor of socialisation. Shortly before his retirement in 1988, 
Gerard Imbert, Director in DG XV, looked back at what brought the Commission 
officials together apart from the expert culture: 
We have lived through nationalist experiences which have let everyone of us 
down because we were children of the war. It was thus an irnmense hope for us 
to find ourselves together [in the Commission, K. S. ]. The European spint 
emerged thanks to the high degree of trust and the relations that have developed 
among us and which have facilitated greatly finding solutions for certain 
problems within the Commission's administration. 107 
According to Imbert, this esprit de corps of the early generation has disappeared 
gradually with every enlargement of the Community. 108 Officials would cling to these 
early memories, this 'unique moment in time"09, in the less 'golden' 1970s and 1980s. 
According to Albrecht, he and his colleagues in the Commission in the late 
1950s and early 1960s believed that they were writing history. For him, this explains 
why nobody complained about the long working hours. 
110 The sentiment of being able 
to change the course of history, even if it was in small steps and even if it took years 
until a policy was finally adopted and implemented, is a factor of 
Europeanization. 
Although not everybody was as conscious as Albrecht of their 
'contribution to 
105 Interview K. S. with Maurice Barth6l6my. 
106 See the interviews K. S. with Giampiero Schiratti, Hans-Broder 
Krohn, Franz Froschmaier, Maurice 
Barth6l6my, Ivo Schwartz and Jean Dubois. 
107 Institutions financi6res, interview with G6rard Imbert in Courrier 
du Personnel, undated [ca. 1988], 
kindly provided by Mrs Imbert. 108 Ibid. 
109 Interview K. S. with Giampiero Schiratti. 
110 Interview Sibylle Hambloch and Gerold Ambrosius with Ernst 
Albrecht, Beinhorn, 22 March 2002. 
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history', many felt that they participated in something new and important. Moreover, 
as shown above, the officials were conscious of the past and the war experiences of 
their colleagues. Lastly, moving to Brussels in the late 1950s and early 1960s was 
considered an exceptional career move. This view has been upheld, and even picked 
up by the children of European officials. For instance, the son of a French 
Commission official, who spent his childhood in Brussels, referred to his father's 
years in the Commission as an 'adventure' even though his father had a long, stable 
and successful career of 29 years in the Commission. "' 
The time factor, good career prospects, living and working in Brussels, 
commitment to an expert culture and shared generational experience have to be 
complemented by another socialisation factor. There had to be someone to animate 
and motivate the officials. European role models, therefore, count as a sixth factor of 
socialisation. While officials refer to Monnet, Schuman, Adenauer, Philip and 
Brugmans as what could be called 'eternal' or 'spiritual' role models, ' 12 there were 
also, and perhaps more importantly, role models within the Commission. The close 
collaboration between Commissioners and the civil servants of their DG, especially 
during the first years, facilitated the formation of loyalties. For instance, Mansholt was 
perceived as being approachable, enthusiastic and assertive, and this seems to have 
V, off made a deep impression on DG ICialS. 113 Moreover, leading officials such as the 
directors-general of DG VI and IV, Rabot and VerLoren van Themaat, served as role 
111 Email from Laurent Imbert to K. S., I January 2005. CV G6rard Imbert, honorary director-general of 
the Commission, kindly provided by Mrs Imbert. See also HAEU, 
INT-ECH 683, Interview Veronika 
Heyde with Helmut Sigrist, 7 January 2004. 
112 The latter two were named by Rencki, see HAEU, INT-ECH717, 
Interview Ghjiseppu Lavezzi with 
Georges Rencki, Tervuren, 13 January 2004. 
113 On Mansholt see for instance Thierneyer 2005. See also the 
interviews K. S. with Raymond Craps, 
Helmut von Verschuer, Georges Rencki and Marice Barth6l6my. 
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models, too. 
114 Nodl, the 'eminence grise' of the Commission, as he is sometimes 
referred to, apparently had become a legend while still working in the Commission. 
As he recalled in an interview, Lahnstein, who entered the administration in the mid- 
1960s, already then thought of Nodl as the Ur-Europder, or prototype European. " 5 
The reasons why a person was considered a role model are diverse. It could be their 
European conviction but also outstanding expert knowledge and hard work as in the 
case of Berend Heringa, deputy director-general in DG VI. 116 The presence of role 
models motivated officials, triggered social learning and facilitated socialisation. 
The working methods introduced by the Commissioners in DG VI and DG W 
seem to have encouraged discussion and inspired creative policy solutions. They count 
as a seventh socialisation factor. Mansholt's so-called 'round table', for instance, has 
become legendary and is discussed in more detail in chapter BIH. 117 The CAP was 
principally elaborated in this intimate circle. Such an environment gave even lower 
ranking officials the feeling that they were participating in creating and shaping the 
CAP. Taking part in decision-making, or at least having the impression that one was 
involved in decision-making, was important for creating solidarity with the policy and 
the institution. Von der Groeben established similar working methods in his DG W, 
also creating an atmosphere of open-mindedness and discussion. 
" 8 High officials 
account for the great freedom of manoeuvre they had especially at the beginning 
where even A5 or A6 officials could have a lot of responsibility-' 
19 In Coombes's 
study, Commission civil servants highly rated having some initiative in the decision- 
114 For example the interviews K. S. with Raymond Craps, Hans-Broder 
Krohn and Marice Barth6l6my- 
115 Interview K. S. with Manfred Lahnstein. 
116 See for example the interview K. S. with Maurice Barth6l6my. 
117 The 'table ronde' was composed of Mansholt, his Cabinet, 
Heringa, Rabot and his assistant von 
Verschuer as permanent members plus the directors and other officials concerned with 
the matter to be 
discussed. 
118 See for example the interviews K. S. with Aurelio Pappalardo and 
Eduard Brackeniers. 
119 Interview K. S. with Franz Froschmaier. 
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making process and some gave the prospect of this as a reason for having joined the 
Commission in the first place. 'The chief motivation of these officials was far more a 
desire to participate in a new and interesting undertaking, and to be given the 
opportunity to take some initiative in the policy-making process. ' 120 According to the 
available eyewitness evidence, this sense of camaraderie and common purpose 
contributed to forming an esprit de corps among the early European civil servants. 
Long-term service and job satisfaction, particular living and working 
conditions in Brussels, expert culture, a shared generational experience, pioneer spirit, 
the presence of role models and participatory working methods contributed to a strong 
identification with the Commission and European integration and count as 
socialisation factors that have facilitated Europeanization. What factors, however, 
could have obstructed Europeanization? The uncertain career prospects in the 
Commission's administration, mentioned already, have to count among the obstacles 
to Europeanization. Often posts above A4 were 'reserved' for members of a certain 
nationality. It was therefore unlikely that, for instance, a French A4 would succeed his 
or her Italian head of division. One official gave a blocked career as the main reason 
for leaving the Commission with a golden hand-shake in 1973 on the occasion of the 
first enlargement. 12 1 Advancing in the career required great flexibility and the 
willingness to move to another division or DG, which could be difficult for highly 
specialised officials. The reluctance of the other Community institutions such as the 
Council to commit to European integration and support Community policy solutions 
were certainly factors prone to cause frustration. It was uncertain 
if a proposal, often 
elaborated in hard work and lengthy negotiations, would 
finally be adopted and 
120 Coombes 1970: 215. 
121 Interview K. S. with Friedrich Arnsmeyer. 
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implemented. If it was adopted at all, it could take years and sometimes decades to get 
a proposal through the Council. Patience was clearly one of the qualities a European 
official needed. Another factor which may have obstructed Europeanization was the 
change of climate in the 1970s and early 1980s, accounted for in interviews. An article 
in Le Monde of 1979 criticized the loss of role models, the lack of independence of the 
Commission and the lack of Community spirit. '[N]umerous officials deplore the 
present weakness of the Commission and they regret the loss of the energy and the 
independence of Commissioners such as the Dutchman Sicco Mansholt, the father of 
the common agricultural policy. " 22 In 1984, Imbert gave a talk about the difficulties 
of realising the free movement of services. After the Commission had made - in his 
eyes -a good proposal for a flexible directive already in 1976, eight years later the 
negotiations had come to a standstill. For Imbert, the main reason for the failure of the 
negotiations was that 
the attitude at the level of the experts [of national administrations, K. S. ] has 
changed. [ ... ] Because at the moment, I regret having to say this, [ ... ] instead of 
coming with an open mind, they tend to consider their own legislation as a kind 
of bible and they try to impose their bible to the other member states. 123 
Also, the working methods, where even an A7 official would get to see, and be heard 
by, the Commissioner, could not be sustained forever. At the beginning, the size of the 
administration was limited and personal relationships among the civil servants could 
develop more easily. As the administration grew, the feeling of belonging to a kind of 
'family' subsequently diminished. 
122 Francesca Barbarelli, Qui sont les 'Eurocrates' de la Commission? De vrais fonctionnaires 
nationaux. In Le Monde, 6 February 1979,19. 
123 G6rard Imbert (1984). Contribution in: Diritto e pratica nell'assicurazione, a cura del Centro Studi Sez oni Assicurativi, Avv. Emilio Pasanisi. Numero Speciale dedicato al Convegno dell'A. I. D. A. Sez 
Friuli-Venezia, Guilia e Lombarda sul tema AttivitA Assicurativa, 
Trattato di Roma e libertA di 
prestazione. 19-20 ottobre 1984, Trieste. Milan: Estratto, 293-305, 
here 297. 
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A strong pre-socialisation in another institution could make Europeanization 
difficult, if not impossible. Especially temporary Commission officials could resist the 
Community socialisation mechanisms. Coombes identifies a specific type of official 
who did not integrate in the 'common culture', the French 'ENA graduate'- type. 
According to Coombes, this type existed in civil services in all member countries. 
While these officials possessed great technical skills and competence, they 'lacked the 
sense of adventure and shared undertaking, which so many officials enjoyed even in 
senior positions'. 124 The next section presents six types of officials, the 'ENA-type' 
among them. 
3. Exemplary biographies of high officials 
This section proposes a classification of officials into sociological types, a concept 
used in qualitative biographical sociology which refers to the variants, or types, 
occurring in a certain sphere of activity or society. Contrasting these types with each 
other allows the construction of a typology. 125 It is not easy, however, to classify 
people with different talents, complex thoughts, ideas and behavioural patterns. Yet, 
the previous sections have revealed some key similarities between officials as to their 
background, personal and professional experiences and motives for working in the 
Commission. Establishing Sociological categories for Commission officials could help 
to obtain further clarifications about the nature and outlook of the Commission's staff. 
The categories are derived from the findings presented in the previous two sections: 
events in the biographies and lessons the officials have drawn 
from them; early career 
124 Coombes 1970: 213-4. 
125 Fuchs-Heinfitz 1999: 9. 
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patterns and previous socialisation; motives for working in the Commission; 
ambitions for their careers; and, last but not least, their stance on European integration 
and the Commission's role in this process. Not every Commission civil servant fits 
entirely into one of the categories outlined below. Most officials combine elements of 
two or more categories. However, this section will primarily discuss examples of 
officials who come close to ideal types of Commission officials. 
Six categories emerge from the analysis of the officials' biographies; these can 
be arranged into opposing pairs. The first pair is constituted of the 'expert' and the 
6political official'. While they are distinctive, they are in some respects also 
complementary. Both have the aim of furthering European integration. They differ, 
however, with regard to the means they employ to realise this goal. Whereas the first 
focuses on defending the rights of the institution as they are defined in treaties and 
Community legislation, the political official campaigns for extending the power of the 
institution and takes part - visibly or covertly - in the political struggle between 
member state governments and the Commission. While political party membership is 
not necessarily a criterion for political officials, they often spent part of their career in 
a Commissioner's Cabinet. Examples of political officials are Ernst Albrecht, Franz 
Froschmaier, Klaus Meyer, Manfred Lahnstein, Karl Heinz Nmjes and Henri Etienne. 
Among the experts are Pieter VerLoren van Themaat, Ivo Schwartz, Berend Heringa 
and Maurice Barthel6my. 
The second pair is constituted of what could be termed 'novice' and 'veteran'. 
The first came straight from university and was, as regards the professional career, 
entirely socialised in the Commission. Eduard Brackeniers, Franqois Muller, Aurelio 
Pappalardo and Kurt Ritter are examples of this type. The 'veterans' are represented 
by someone like Hans-Broder Krohn, an officer during World War Il and a civil 
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servant in the German agricultural ministry, who entered the Commission at the age of 
45, or Alfred Mozer. Veterans have diverse personalities and motives for working for 
the Commission. Some, like Mozer and Krohn, entered the Commission as a 
consequence of their previous personal experience. Others were sent by their 
governments after they had served in national administrations for many years. Some 
of the latter managed to adapt to the Commission, others failed to do so and returned 
to their home countries. 
Finally, the last two types could be called 'realistic idealist' and 'pragmatist'. 
While the first put themselves into the service of European integration and often 
developed strong loyalties to the Commission, for the latter the Commission was a 
career step or booster. There are French examples for both groups: Emile Nodl and 
Georges Rencki rank among the first category while especially the so-called French 
high flyers such as Jean-Frangois Deniau, Frangois-Xavier Ortoli and Alain Prate fall 
into the latter category. In the following, I will present one exemplary biography for 
each of the categories: the political official (Albrecht), the expert (VerLoren van 
Themaat), the novice (Brackeniers), the veteran (Krohn), the realistic idealist (No8l) 
and the pragmatist (Deniau). 
Ernst Albrecht represents the political official with a mission. For Albrecht, a 
federal state was the ultimate goal for Europe; a federal state in which the regions 
were to play an important role under a European roof but in which the nation states 
would continue to exist. Accordingly, he organized his memoirs 
into three sections: 
Europe, Lower Saxony and Germany. 126 While Germany comes last in this list, 
it 
takes up the largest space in Albrecht's autobiography. 
In it he argues that German 
federalism should be a model for the organization of 
Europe. Albrecht was very 
126 Albrecht 1999. 
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attached to his region, Lower Saxony, of which he became minister president in 1976. 
He strove to turn Lower Saxony into an 'autonomous, self-confident component in the 
multi-level structure of a united Europe'. 127 
Born in Heidelberg in 1930, Albrecht grew up in Bremen, a Free city in 
northern Germany. As a teenager during the war, Albrecht was trained as a medic and 
deployed to give first aid after bomb raids; this experience, he said, had a profound 
effect on him as he was directly confronted, and had to cope with, the horrors of war. 
It caused Albrecht to adopt a 'never again' attitude. 128 After the war, he became 
interested in philosophy and theology - his way of coping with the disorientation 
resulting from the lost war and the Nazi regime. 129 He studied theology, philosophy 
and political economy at the universities of Tfibingen, Cornell, Basel and Bonn. In 
Basel he was taught by the philosopher Karl Jaspers and the Swiss theologian Karl 
Barth, one of the founders of the Bekennende Kirche, or Confessing Church, a 
Protestant Confessional Resistance movement. 130 
During his stay in the United States in 1949-50, Albrecht recalled, he was 
frequently asked to explain the situation in Europe rather than just Germany. He thus 
came to see himself as a kind of ambassador of both Europe and Germany. Albrecht 
qualified this experience as a turning point at which he decided that he wanted to work 
for European unity and for the west German Federal Republic that had just been 
founded. 131 In order to be able to join the civil service and work for the common 
welfare, Albrecht abandoned philosophy to study political economy. This change of 
direction also appears to be a result of his reflection that the economic crisis of the 
1271bid., 48. 
123 HAEU, INT-ECH 671, interview Jan van der Harst and Veronika Heyde with Ernst Albrecht, 
Burgdorf/Beinhom, 4 March 2004. 
'" HAEU, Int 640, interview Wolf D. Gruner with Ernst Albrecht, Hanover, 7 August 1998. 
130 Cf. for die Bekennende Kirche Henley 2007, Hey 2005. For Karl Barth: Bautz 1990. 
131 Albrecht 1999: 9. Cf. also the interview K. S. with Ernst Albrecht. 
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Weimar Republic had caused its downfall and that a similar outcome had to be 
avoided for the young Federal Republic. ' 32 Albrecht considered the Schuman 
declaration of May 1950 as an important event that confirmed his desire to work for 
European integration. 133 He chose the following topic of his dissertation: 'Is Monetary 
Union the precondition for Economic UnionT In 1954, Albrecht was appointed by the 
ECSC Council Secretariat in Luxembourg. Two years later, he became the secretary in 
the negotiations between Adenauer and Mollet about the restitution of the Saar to 
Germany. This is where Albrecht met Adenauer whom he admired and whose policy 
of anchoring the Federal Republic of Germany in the west and pursuing a policy of 
reunification from a 'position of strength' he supported. For Albrecht, the well-being 
of Germany was inextricably linked to a strong and prosperous western Europe able to 
attract the central and eastern European states as expressed in the so-called 'magnet 
134 theory' . At the Val Duchesse negotiations Albrecht 
became the secretary of the 
Internal Market Committee. Von der Groeben, who presided over this committee, then 
recruited him as his chef de cabinet in the Commission. When von der Groeben took 
over DG Regional Policy in 1967, Albrecht succeeded VerLoren van Themaat as 
director-general of DG IV. However, having reached the top of the Commission's 
administrative hierarchy at the age of only 37, Albrecht left the Commission in 1970. 
He sought to enter politics in his native Lower Saxony and was elected to the regional 
parliament for the Christian democrats. In 1976 Albrecht was elected minister 
president of Lower Saxony. 
As von der Groeben's confidant, Albrecht also played an 
important role in the 
Commission in general. He was engaged in defining and enhancing 
the political role 
132 Albrecht 1999: 11. 
133 HAEU, Int 640, Interview Wolf D. Gruner with Ernst Albrecht, 
Hanover, 7 August 1998. 
134 Albrecht 1999: 26. 
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of the Commission in the Community and was among Hallstein's close advisers. 
hnportantly, he was one of the authors of the proposals Hallstein presented to the 
European Parliament in March 1965 which triggered the empty chair CriSiS. 135 In tWS 
episode Albrecht's role of a political official was most pronounced. For him, the 
Commission was the impartial institution working for the common welfare and 
presenting balanced solutions that were in the interest of all member states. Even 
during the empty chair crisis, Albrecht remained optimistic and expected the role of 
the Commission to expand to other policy areas in a kind of spill-over movement. In 
January 1966 he wrote: 
In the long run, new targets will come up for which we do not yet have [.. ] the 
responsibility, for example the improvement of living conditions [of European 
citizens, K. S. I. To the extent to which the expressly formulated aim of the EEC 
treaty (common market) is realised, it will loose importance vis-ý-vis these 
complementary aims. Then, the problem of the overall political direction will 
have to be addressed in Brussels. ' 36 
The fact that Albrecht envisaged aims that went beyond those fixed in the EEC treaty 
distinguishes him from the expert official described below. 
In a number of interviews in recent years, Albrecht has defended the 
Commission's proposals of March 1965. Moreover, not accepting any criticism or 
remembering any negative aspects of the early years in Brussels, he has tried to 
convey his idealized view of the Commission in discussions with historians. 
' 37 Today, 
Albrecht is worried about Europe's future which, according to him, is still not a 
united, democratic and social Europe, capable of defending human rights and peace in 
135 This is confirmed by Albrecht and numerous eye-witnesses. 
M ACDP, 1-659,062/2, Dringende methodische und sachliche Probleme deutscher und europäischer 
Politik, Entwurf des Protokolls eines Gesprächs bei Herrn von der Groeben unter Teilnahme 
der Herren 
Priebe, M61ler, MestmAcker, Albrecht, Caspari, Schwartz, Nass, 13 January 1966. 
137 Interview K. S. with Ernst Albrecht. See also the interviews with Sibylle 
Hambloch and HAEU, INT- 
ECH 671, Interview Jan van der Harst and Veronika Heyde with Ernst Albrecht, 
Burgdorf/Beinhom, 4 
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the worl . 
138 He fears that a change of attitude of the younger generations, which take 
peace and freedom for granted, could jeopardize the integration process that he and his 
colleagues, who were under the impact of the experiences of World War H, had 
worked for. 
Pieter VerLoren van Themaat, born on 16 March 1916 in Rotterdam, was a 
Dutch lawyer and specialised in cartel law. As an expert, he played a crucial role in 
defining and fleshing out the Commission's competition policy, a policy area where 
the Commission ended up with considerable autonomy and power vis-A-vis enterprises 
and member states. ' 39 It was thus less through direct political intervention that 
VerLoren van Themaat sought to further integration and to expand the power of the 
Commission than through expertise and based on Community law. 
Graduating from school in 1934, in the middle of the economic crisis of the 
1930s, VerLoren van Themaat decided to study law, a subject which he thought would 
guarantee employment. 140 After graduating from Leiden University in 1939, VerLoren 
van Themaat studied for a PhD in international tax law with Professor B. M. 
Telders. 14 1 During the German occupation of the Netherlands, Telders acted against 
the German occupiers by informing the Dutch administration about their rights to 
resist orders by the occupiers on the grounds of the Hague Convention of 19,07. In 
December 1940, Telders was imprisoned and died in the concentration camp Bergen- 
Belsen. VerLoren van Themaat saw Telders as his role model both in terms of his 
moral courage and his legal expertise. 142 In 1946 he obtained his PhD and entered the 
ministry for economic affairs where he became responsible for cartel policy and pnce 
138 Albrecht 1999: 3 1. 
139 See also chapter BIR. 
140 See the interview Hambloch/Ambrosius with VerLoren van Thernaat- 
141 P. J. G. Kapteyn (2007). Obituary Pieter VerLoren van 
Thernaat. In 
littp: //www. knaw. iii/publicaties/pdf/20051115-16. pdf (accessed on 
2 March 2007). 
142 VerLoren van Themaat 1995: 1558. 
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control. 143 VerLoren van Themaat was instrumental in designing important economic 
legislation for the Netherlands and he served as an adviser to the Dutch delegation 
during the negotiations leading to the ECSC and EEC treaties. 144 In 1957 he became 
head of the working group 'cartels' in the negotiations for a European Free Trade 
Area which eventually failed at the end of 1958.145 
VerLoren van Themaat entered the Commission in April 1958 as director- 
general of DG IV. As a lawyer, he saw the EEC treaty as the basis of Community law 
and its principles had to be defended. He therefore had little understanding that 
political considerations or necessities could influence decision-making. An article in 
the German weekly, Der Spiegel, of December 1959 demonstrates this. When the 
French government introduced tax concessions in favour of certain products, such as 
machines, to compensate for the ten per cent tariff reduction in the common market, it 
violated Article 92 of the EEC treaty on state aids, the application of which fell into 
the responsibility of DG IV. Following this protectionist measure, VerLoren van 
Themaat wrote a protest letter to the French government asking it to lift the tax 
abatement. The letter was kept secret in the Commission as Hallstein wanted to avoid 
showing France up as breaching the treaty but it was leaked to the press. When the 
French government failed to react, VerLoren van Themaat considered proposing legal 
action at the Court of Justice. However, von der Groeben, Hallstein and the 
German 
government sought to avoid this. VerLoren van Themaat, according to 
Der Spiegel, 
wrote to von der Groeben that the German government seems to 
be 'anxious to limit 
143 p. VerLoren van Thernaat (1966). Economische Aspecten van 
de Kartel- en Concentratiepolitiek in 
de E. E. G. In Voordrachten van het Studiecentrum voor bank- en 
financiewezen, no. 116,15 June 1966, 
3-3 1, here 5. 
'44 Interview K. S. with VerLoren van Themaat. 
145 Ibid. 
247 
the Commission's means of intervention if these would seemingly entail curtailing 
member states' national sovereignty'. 
146 
VerLoren van Themaat left the Commission in 1967 to become a professor of 
Dutch, European and International Social and Economic Law at Utrecht University. 
Between 1981 and 1985 he was Advocate General at the European Court of Justice. 
The post had been created following the accession of Greece to the EC. According to 
VerLoren van Themaat, the Council of Ministers had discussed whether the 
appointment of a fifth Advocate General, who should be from a small member state, 
would disrupt the balance between small and large member states at the Court; a 
concern for which VerLoren van Themaat lacked sympathy: 'As if for a Court the 
national background and the political orientation [of a Court member, K. S. ] would 
play a role. ' 
147 
During his career, VerLoren van Themaat served at two European institutions 
and taught European law. Moreover, he was part of a transnational network of lawyers 
and European law experts which developed as a consequence of European integration. 
For instance, he was instrumental in setting up the London-Leiden meetings, a forum 
for discussing and developing the law of the Communities and from which the 
Common Market Law Review emerged. 148 Moreover, in 1973, the Commission 
charged him with a report on economic legislation in the member states. 149FrOM 1970 
onwards, VerLoren van lbemaat co-edited a commentary on European Community 
law. 150 In 1974 he became a member of the Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van 
Wetenschappen. In an article in 1995, he reflected on the future of the European 
146 Gerneinsamer Markt. Pinays Zehnter. In: Der Spiegel, Vol 50,9 December 1959,40-4 1. 
147 Interview K. S. with VerLoren van Themaat. 
148 Ibid. 
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Union after Maastnc t. As to the role of the Commission, he thought that it should 
remain as small as possible to guarantee its independence and enable it to develop 
objective and high quality policy solutions while it was controlled by the European 
Parliament and the Court. 151 Ivo Schwartz, VerLoren van Themaat's collaborator in 
DG IV, can also be counted among the experts. For Schwartz, the Commission as a 
non-elected body had to gain legitimacy and reputation through expertise. 152 Schwartz 
and VerLoren van Themaat, the law experts, aimed at contributing to this. They were 
what could be called institutionalists, praising the independent 'expert Commission' 
and a Community based on law. 
The Belgian Eduard Brackeniers entered the Commission as a young 
graduate at the lowest level (A7), terminating his career as director-general (A 1). A 
novice in the world of employment, he thrived in the Commission's career system, 
always keeping his eyes open for opportunities and often being 'at the right place at 
the right time'. 153 His loyalty belonged to the Commission as a whole, not to one DG. 
Brackeniers thought of himself as a generalist, a type of official who knows how to 
change and develop. 
Born in December 1931 in Antwerp, Belgium, Brackeniers received a 
bilingual education. After attending the Flemish Jesuit College Notre Dame in 
Antwerp, he studied at the Francophone University of Namur for two years. He then 
graduated from the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in Flanders with a PhD in law (in 
Flemish) and a degree in economics (in French). Before entering the Commission 
Brackeniers worked briefly at the Institut Catholique des Hautes Etudes 
Commerciales 
in Brussels. His recruitment for the Commission was informal, typical 
for the early 
151 VerLoren van Themaat 1995: 1554. 
152 Interview with Ivo Schwartz. with Eduard 153 The information in the following paragraph is derived from: Interview 
K. S 
Brackeniers. 
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recruitments for the Commission and typical for a small country such as Belgium. 
When Baron Jean-Charles Snoy et d'Oppuers from the economics ministry, the former 
head of the Belgian delegation at the Val Duchesse negotiations, looked for young 
graduates for the Commission, he asked for suitable candidates at the universities of 
Leuven and Brussels. Brackeniers' professor at Leuven suggested him. In an interview 
Brackeniers emphasized that he was already then interested in Europe and that he had 
discussed questions of European integration with this professor. Entering the 
Commission in early 1959, Brackeniers started working for DG IV. However, he did 
not become particularly passionate about competition policy. Brackenier was less 
interested in theory and meticulous interpretation of case law and treaty articles. His 
strengths lay in organizing and communicating. Unlike many of his colleagues, 
therefore, he was not very attached to DG IV. He admired VerLoren van Themaat and 
von der Groeben but he also mentioned that VerLoren van Themaat encouraged 
people to leave DG IV in order to have allies in other DGs, a suggestion Brackeniers 
took up. As career opportunities in DG IV were not good for Belgians, he concluded 
that to advance in his career he needed to move on and apply for posts in other DGs. 
In 1973, he became assistant to Fernand Braun, director-general in DG Internal 
Market. Under President Delors, Brackeniers was promoted to director in human 
resources. Finally, Brackeniers became first Director- General for Informatics and then 
for Translation. While he did reach the top of the Commission's administrative 
hierarchy, he was never in charge of one of the politically important DGs such as 
Internal Market or Competition. For a career entirely within the Commission, without 
service in a Cabinet, it seems that this was as far as one could get. 
When Brackeniers 
retired in 1996 he had spent more than 37 years in the Commission. 
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Working in an international context was a new experience for Brackeniers, 
when he entered the Commission in 1959. To him, at first, the Germans seemed the 
most 'foreign' among the foreigners in the Commission. With Belgium occupied 
twice by German troops and his family suffering bombing raids and food shortage 
during the war years, he met his German colleagues with reservation. According to 
him, however, they discussed these problems, sharing their personal experiences; this 
led to mutual understanding. For Brackeniers 'building Europe' to maintain peace was 
therefore an important motive to work for the Commission. Another novice, Klaus- 
Otto Nass, admitted that he had not been interested in European integration when 
entering the Commission as a young graduate with one year of experience in the 
German economics ministry. However, Nass accounted for the great socialisation 
pressure - in a positive sense - in the Commission. According to him, one would get 
'infected' with this contagious European spirit at the Commission. 154 
Hans-Broder Krohn was bom in 1915 in Bredstedt, Northern Frisia, 
Germany. 155 Unlike the novice Brackeniers, Krohn entered the Commission following 
a career as soldier and civil servant. A veteran such as Krohn brings in a wider range 
of personal experiences, and it were mainly these experiences which incited him to 
make a radical career change and work for European integration. 
Krohn graduated from school in 1934. For a time after his graduation there is a 
gap in his curriculum vitae. An orphan, Krohn was raised by his grandparents, and it is 
likely that he worked for his grandfather for a while, a veterinary doctor and merchant. 
Krohn joined the Wehrmacht in 1939 where he reached a position of officer in the 
154 HAEU, INT-ECH68 1, Interview Wilfried Loth and Veronika Heyde with 
Klaus-Otto Nass, Paris, 2 
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Wehrmacht chief of staff. 156 After the war, until 1946, Krohn was a prisoner of war of 
the British army. As a consequence of his role as a former o icer in ff] the chief of staff 
he was not allowed to enrol at any German university immediately after the war. As 
he intended to study agriculture, Krohn worked as a farm labourer for four years, 
between 1946 and 1950. At the age of 35 Krohn began studying at the University of 
G6ttingen, from which he graduated in 1954. He then became assistant to Professor 
Arthur Hanau, one of the founders of the landwirtschaftliche Marktlehre, or market 
theory in agriculture. According to this theory, agriculture was a sector of the 
economy like any other and should not receive subsidies or special treatment. Krohn 
accompanied Hanau. to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in Rome and 
became interested in world agricultural affairs, publishing a comparative analysis of 
international agricultural markets in 1957.157 In 1956-7 he entered the German 
ministry of agriculture to become head of section at the OEEC, where he was 
responsible for agricultural analyses and statistics. In 1957, Krohn became the 
personal aide of Agricultural Minister Heinrich LUbke. He accompanied Lifte to the 
Stresa conference in June 1958. When Ltibke, who supported the integration of the 
Six, became President of the Federal Republic in 1959, Krohn entered the 
Commission. According to Krohn, he chose Europe deliberately because of his 
personal experiences in World War ]1.158 Another reason that facilitated this decision 
was that European integration was a taboo subject in the agricultural ministry. Krohn 
stated that he had not been very popular among his colleagues as he was open-minded 
about European integration and, faithful to the theories of his academic teacher Hanau, 
Is's Information provided by the Deutsche Dienststelle für die Benachrichtigung 
der nächsten 
Angehörigen von Gefallenen der ehemaligen deutschen Wehrmacht. 
157 Krohn, H. B. (1957). Futtergetreidewirtschaft der weit 1900-1954. Berichte über Landwirtschaft, 
N. S., Special Issue No. 165. Hamburg and Berlin: Paul Parey. 
158 Interview K. S. with Hans-Broder Krohn. 
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opposed agricultural protectionism. Krohn vividly recalls that when leaving the 
ministry in Bonn, State Secretary Theodor Sonnemann called him a 'Volksverriiter', 
or traitor of his country. 
However, there was another reason that could have facilitated Krohn's 
decision to leave the ministry and the German civil service. Krohn had not been a 
typical German Beamter as he had not followed the normal career path for civil 
servants. Ltibke wanted Krohn to become a civil servant and to enter the ministry at a 
high level on the grounds of his professional experience. However, this was the 
exception in the German civil service at that time and the staff council of the federal 
government only offered Krohn a position as Oberregierungsrat, merely one rank 
au bove the entry level for graduates, thus very low given Krohn's age and 
experience. 159 Krohn rejected the offer but continued working in the ministry as 
Lifte's personal aide. It is doubtful whether he would have had a future in the 
ministry after Ubke left. This episode can also explain Krohn's negative judgement 
of the closeness and small-mindedness of the German civil service and his 
unconditional praise for the Commission's administration and its - as he perceived it - 
flexibility. 1 60 
Krohn entered the Commission as head of division in DG VI. He made a fast 
career, being promoted to Director for Economy and Agrarian Law in 1963 and 
deputy director-general subsequently. He belonged to the inner circle of DG VI and 
frequently participated in Mansholt's table ronde. However, when it became evident 
that the Commission was not able to push through its ideas vis-a-vis the member states 
and farmers' lobbies, and that the EEC would end up with a protectionist agricultural 
159 Ulrich Breuer (1970). Die Bdrokraten inurren. Widerstand gegen die Personalpolitik der Minister. 
In 
Die Zeit No. 12, accessible at http: //www. zelt. de/1970/12/Die-Buerokraten-mui-ren 
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policy, Krohn left DG VI. 'The CAP was only for the farmers and this is the 
development I opposed, ' he said in retrospect. 161 In spite of the weaknesses of the 
CAP, Krohn admired Mansholt and the fact that he had established the CAP out of a 
set of vague treaty articles. In a text of 1970 Krohn regarded the CAP as the motor of 
the integration process in the 1960s. 162 He criticized the increasing technicality of the 
subject, however, which in his view prevented political progress. 163 The lessons he 
had drawn from his personal experience in World War H and the German agricultural 
ministry had raised high expectations in him as to how the Commission should work 
to create a united Europe, starting with a common agricultural policy. Disappointed, 
he left DG VI and became Director-General for Development in 1970. In DG VIII 
Krohn negotiated and concluded the Lome treaty of 1975. 
The example of Krohn shows that perceptions can guide action. He felt 
mistreated in the German agricultural ministry and found a new home in the 
Commission. For him, this experience resulted in the fervent adoption of 
supranationalism, Allegedly, Krohn was one of the authors of the Hallstein proposals 
of March 1965.164 Krohn strongly identified with the Commission, to which he 
retrospectively referred as 'we'. After working for Hanau and Lubke, who he both 
admired, Krohn found a new role model in Mansholt. In an interview, Krohn 
emphasized the positive experience of collaborating with people from six different 
countries who, according to him, all shared the same thought 'we want to make 
Europe'. In his opinion only people who became independent of 'their' government 
deserved admiration. He cited Rabot, the director-general of DG VI, who, according 
to Krohn, 'never saw himself as part of the French government', but was 'a real 
161 Ibid. 
162 ACDP, 1-659,030/2, Hans-Broder Krohn, "Bilanz 1970", 5 June 1970,1. 
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European'. 1 65 Krohn compared himself to Hallstein, who he thought had suffered a 
similar fate: 'The people in Bonn wanted to get rid of him and sent him to 
Brussels. ' 166 Krohn retired from the Commission in 1978 and taught at the College of 
Europe in Bruges until 1992. 
A prominent example of a realistic idealist is E"Ie NoO, perhaps the 
Commission's best known, and in many ways its 'model' official. 16' For nearly three 
decades Nodl was the conscience and memory of the Commission. Extremely hard 
working, Nodl was committed to the European cause and to the Commission which 
for him embodied this cause. No6l was born on 17 November 1922 in Constantinople 
(renamed Istanbul in 1930) and grew up in southern France. A graduate of the French 
elite education system, he held a degree from the Ecole Nationale Sup6rieure in maths 
and physics. 
168 During World War II, Nodl was active in the French Resistance. 
169 
Two causes emanated from this experience and he pursued these after the war: Europe 
and the youth. After the war, Nodl became secretary general of the youth movement 
Camerades de la Libert6, which developed out of the Resistance. 170 Invited by 
Georges Rebattet, a former Resistance leader and deputy secretary general of the 
European Movement, Nodl got involved in the movement in early 1949. Like Rencki, 
another realistic idealist, it was thus out of the French Resistance that Nodl became 
interested and involved in European integration. Nodl started working for the Council 
of Europe at the end of 1949 and becwne the secretary of the General Affairs 
165 Interview K. S. with Hans-Broder Krohn. 166 Ibid. 
167 As the only Commission high official, Nodl was dedicated a chapter 
in the recently published 
History of the European Commission, entitled 
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Europe'. Bossuat 2007. 
168 HAEU, DEP EN 1254, Curriculum Vitae of Emile Noýl, 17 June 1945. For biographical information 
on Nodl see also Previti Allaire 2004 and Bossuat 2007. 
169 HAEU, DEP EN 1254, Curriculum Vitae of Emile Nodl, 17 June 1945. 
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Committee. 171 Greatly in favour of European political integration, he was disappointed 
by the limits of the Council of Europe, however. 172 During that time he came into 
contact with European federalists like Alexandre Marc and Brugmans who, according 
to the historian Catherine Previti Allaire, had a profound effect on Nodl, 173 as had the 
integration initiatives of the early 1950s. During this period, he collaborated closely in 
the development of a European Political Community. From 1952 to 1954 No6 was 
seconded to the Ad hoc Assembly of the ECSC which was in charge of elaborating the 
EPC. Temporarily unable to attend the meetings, Nodl wrote to the Belgian federalist 
0- Fernand Dehousse: 'Brand [a colleague, K. S. 1 keeps me informed about the war 
machines you set up against the national fortresses. I hope to be back in time to 
witness them collapsing. ' 174 A socialist himself, Nodl met the French socialist 
politician Guy Mollet in the International Secretariat of the European Mouvement in 
1949. Mollet recruited him as his chef de cabinet in 1954 when he was President of 
the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. Nodl was also a technical 
adviser to the Secretariat of the Common Assembly of the ECSC in 1955 and became 
the First Secretary in the Council of Europe in 1956. In early 1956 Mollet, then prime 
minister, called him back to Paris and made him first his chef de cabinet and then 
deputy director of his Private Office. In this capacity, Nodl supervised and co- 
ordinated the French delegation to the common market and Euratom negotiations. 
Nodl's early years of European commitment were at least in two ways a 
preparation for his later role in the Commission. Firstly, he was able to 
build a 
network of important individuals involved in European integration. 
Secondly, his 
tasks were similar to those he would later assume 
in the Commission, namely co- 
171 Kassim 2004: 52. 
172 Previti Allaire 2004: 83. 
173 Ibid., 8 1. 
174 Nodl cited in ibid., 86. 
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ordinating and advising - in short, pulling the strings in the background. For example, 
during the Val Duchesse negotiations he acted as intermediary between the French 
delegation, the French government and Avenue Foch, the headquarter of Monnet's 
Action Committee. 175 No6l knew Monnet well and was in close contact with the 
Action Committee throughout his career. In the months before he was appointed 
executive secretary, Nodl's diary entries show that he met with Monnet several times, 
most likely discussing possibilities of him entering the Commission. Later, in the early 
1960s, Kohnstamm visited Nodl regularly in Brussels. 176 Even though it was Madolin 
who proposed him as executive secretary, No6l was already a well-known figure in 
Europe and had close contacts with Monnet and other key personalities. 
Nodl combined experience in European integration and administration with 
intimate knowledge of the French administration and political scene. As executive 
secretary he could utilise this knowledge and contacts at national and European levels 
to the benefit of the Commission and to expand his influence within the institution. 
Nodl developed a deep sense of solidarity with the Commission. He thought the 
institution was 'irreplaceable and its role vital', as it 'best serves both the Community 
and its Member States. The Commission must be a living force; it must assert itself 
politically [ ... ]. 
ý 177 He expected this loyalty from other Commission officials. 
According to him, a pronounced European conviction was necessary to be able to 
accept the negative sides of working in the Commission, such as the national 
175 Ibid., 89; see also HAEU, DEP EN 349, Documentation 
Presse, Index Quotidien de la Presse, 'Les 
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balance. 178 sa compensation, however, the officials would find great satisfaction in 
their work. For Nodl, being able to work for the Commission was a privilege. 179 
A federalist, Nodl qualified the 1960s as a 'pre-federal phase' where features 
such as the national balance and the principle of collegiality were necessary to create 
trust in the member states. 180 In a speech he gave in 1962, Nodl was explicit about the 
political nature of the Communities when he invited his audience to consider the 
advantages of a European federal ministry of agriculture. 18 1 Nodl saw the EEC as a 
future global player and he expected further and deeper integration to develop in a 
kind of 'mathematical certainty', 182 similar to Hallstein's Sachlogik. This was in 1962, 
at the height of Commission optimism. In May 1963, after the first setback of de 
Gaulle's veto on British accession, No6l gave a talk about the prospects of the EEC. 
While he considered that the Community was recovering from a crisis of confidence, 
he remained optimistic that integration would continue through the creation of 
iffevocable acts such as the customs union. The inevitable political impact of these 
would strengthen the Community institutions. Furthermore, Nodl anticipated the 
introduction of majority voting in 1966 which would bring about further progress for 
the integration of Europe. ' 83 Even in the aftermath of the empty chair crisis, when 
majority voting was informally shelved, his speeches reflect his faith in the 
178 En-file Nodl, 'La fonction publique europ6enne', allocution prononc6e le 25 octobre 1981 A 
l'occasion de la remise de ]a m6daille Robert Schuman par Gaston Thom, pr6sident 
de la Commission. 
In: Hornmage A Emile Nodl, Luxembourg, Office des publications officielles des Communaut6s 
euroP6ennes, 1988,153-157. 
179 Penaud 1993: 55. 
180 HAEU, DEP EN 815, Emile Nodl, La fusion des Communaut6s Europ6ennes, talk given at the 
Centre Europ6en Universitaire, Nancy, undated, University year 1965/66,7. 
181 HAEU, DEP EN 800, Journ6es d'information sur les problýmes europ6ennes, 23-24 mars 1962. 
Samedi 24 Mars 1962: Discusion sur les problýmes Europ6ens prdparde par A Emile Noýl, 
12 1. 
182 Ibid., 124. 
183 HAEU, DEP EN 804, Emile No6l, Discours devant la Commission parlementaire de 
I'association de 
la Grece A la Communaut6,6 June 1963,4. 
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institutions. He was certain that a solution to the crisis could only be found within the 
existing institutional framework. 
184 
For Nodl, like for Albrecht, European integration was a means to avoid 
repeating the same mistakes as in the inter-war period, that is humiliation of the 
vanquished and economic protectionism, which in his view had led to the economic 
and political crises of the 1920s and 1930s. The integration of Germany in a European 
structure had already been discussed in the Resistance and Nodl had participated in 
these discussions. 185 For him, Europe's future lay in a European federal state. In 1975 
Nodl presided over a group called 'European Union' that was set up by the federalist 
Commissioner Altiero, Spinelli. The group's report suggested setting up a European 
government, endowing the European Parliament with full legislative powers, and 
extending the powers of the Community to foreign affairs and security. 186 While in the 
early 1980s Nodl was pessimistic regarding the future of the Community, 187 he 
regained his optimism after the Single European Act was signed in 1986. He 
immediately demanded that people should set their aims higher and extend integration 
to defence and security Policy. 
188 In 1990, Nodl looked back on his career and 
concluded: 
I have indeed been fortunate in being able to combine my work with my 
personal commitment in the service of such an enterprise. I can assure you that, 
wherever I may be my commitment to the institution and to those who direct 
and represent it is as strong today as on the day I joined. 
189 
184 See HAEU, DEP EN 816, Emile Noýl, Quelques aspects institutionnels de la crise des 
communaut6s. Le fonctionnement des Institutions pendant la crise, 
15 September 1966. 
185 HAEU, Int 66, Emile Nodl A I'OURS (Paris), 19 June 1989. Round-Table-Discussion of the 
Fondation Guy Mollet about 'Les socialistes et la construction europ6enne 
1946-1956'. 
'86 Previti Allaire 2004: 91. 
187 Nodl 1990b. 
188 NM 1990c: 158, 
189 Nodl 1990: 58. 
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Nodl retired in 1987 after 29 years of service to become President of the European 
University Institute in Florence. 
An ENA graduate, Jean-Franýois Deniau advanced fast in the French civil 
service after entering the Inspection des Finances in 1950. A member of the French 
administrative elite, he stands for the pragmatist in the Commission. Pragmatists are 
not characterised by their lack of interest in European integration but by the fact that 
they did not commit their career fully to the service in the European institutions. 
Deniau held multiple loyalties. Born in Paris in 1928, he was raised and socialised in 
the French university and administrative systems. In the late 1940s Deniau served in 
the French army in Indochina and, in 1963, became the French ambassador to 
Mauritania. He thus acquired a broad outlook beyond the borders of Europe with the 
French colonial empire crumbling but still existent. However, Deniau was interested 
in European affairs as well. In the French administration he was one of the few who 
volunteered to participate in the Val Duchesse negotiations. 190 In 1958, at the request 
of Marjolin, he entered the Commission as director in DG External Relations at the 
age of 29. In 1961 he was promoted to Al and in charge of the first accession 
negotiations with the United Kingdom. As a Gaullist, however, he was personafly 
opposed to British accession to the EEC. After de Gaulle's veto in 1963, which 
Deniau personally supported, he accepted the post in Mauritania. Unlike Nodl, Deniau 
did not choose to stay in the Commission permanently. In 1963 Deniau returned to the 
French civil service because, as he later explained, he knew how Brussels worked. 'I 
have spent enough time there', he declared. 
191 In 1967, on his return from Mauritania, 
he did not know whether French Prime Minister Georges Pompidou would give him a 
190 HAEU, INT-ECH 767, Interview G6rard Bossuat, Anais Legendre with Jean-Franqois Deniau, Paris 
3/10 November 2004. 
191 Ibid. 
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post as a minister in e French government or whether he would become a 
Commissioner in Brussels. Deniau did not seem to have had any preference, either. He 
was made Commissioner in 1967 and stayed in Brussels for another six years. 
However, he stood for the Gaullists in the French elections in 1968 as he could not 
understand why one should choose between Europe and the nation: 'It shocked him 
[Rey, K. S. ] when I presented myself at the elections in France in May 1968. [For Rey, 
K. S. ] [olne had to choose between the national and the European sphere. ' 192 In 1973, 
he returned to Paris to take up a high position in the French administration. During the 
1970s and 1980s Deniau served as minister in several French governments. Moreover, 
a successful author, Deniau was elected member of the Acad6mie Frangaise in 1992. 
Deniau played an important role during the negotiations leading to the EEC 
treaty as well as in the early Hallstein Commission. No doubt, he was loyal to the 
Commission while an official and a Commissioner in Brussels. For him, however, the 
tasks he was confronted with were first of all an intellectual challenge. Many of his 
colleagues in the Commission have praised the competence of Deniau and his 
colleagues from the French administration. 193 However, according to Herbst, for 
instance, they were 'lone warriors' and did not like teamwork. 194 Von Staden, later 
Hallstein's chef de cabinet, worked with Deniau in DG External Relations. Ten years 
his senior, von Staden wrote in his memoirs that he learned to admire Deniau who 
introduced him to the method of thinking of this 'exceptional type of human being', 
the graduate of a French Grande Ecole. 'I marvelled at this director who resembled an 
192 Ibid. 
193 Cf. the interviews K. S. with Ernst Albrecht and Ivo Schwartz and 
HAEU, INT-ECH 765, Interview 
Michel Dumoulin and Julie Cailleau with Fernand Braun, 
Brussels, 8 December 2003. 
194 HAEU, INT-ECH 677, Interview Wilfried Loth and Veronika Heyde with Axel 
Herbst, Bonn, 25 
May 2004. 
261 
exotic being from another planet, ' wrote von Staden. 195 Interestingly, in a long 
interview Denlau gave Bossuat in 2004, there is no allusion to what European 
integration meant to him and what his vision was for a united Europe. Neither in his 
book, L'Europe interdite, published in 1977, nor in the interview does he profess any 
kind of sentimentality about his time in the Commission. For other officials, the 
experience of working with people from different backgrounds - some of them former 
enemies in World War Id - to create common policies from scratch, count among the 
main reasons for their fascination with their work in the Commission. For Deniau, the 
Commission seems to have been a space which one can conquer and where one can do 
interesting work. In L'Europe interdite he defended the quality and the work of the 
Commission, not least because he contributed to it. To a certain degree the 
socialisation mechanisms of the Commission seem to have worked even in the case of 
a pragmatic enarque. In his book, Deniau is more explicit about his views on Europe's 
future than in the later interview. His view is pragmatic in the sense that it does not 
prescribe one ideal state of Europe in the future and in the sense that Deniau refuses to 
define the geographical boundaries of Europe: 'Everybody is European who considers 
himself or herself to be European. ' 196 This has to be seen in connection with Deniau's 
Gaullist outlook on Europe's role in the world. Europe should be united and 
strengthened in economic, social and military terms. Most of all, it should 
be 
strengthened to be able to stand up against the USA. The Europeanness of the citizens 
of the European countries had to be nurtured, but nurtured against the 
USA. 197 Europe 
should be established as the 'other', offering a third way 
between the two 
195 Von Staden 2002: 178-9. 
196 Deniau 1977: 46. 
197 Ibid., 246; 270. 
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superpowers. In the late 1970s, Deniau thus falls back on solutions of the 1950s and 
early 1960s. 
Pragmatists like Deniau were useful for the Commission as they were often 
exceptionally ambitious and talented officials. Ortoli, who at the age of 33 became 
director-general of DG Internal Market, is comparable to Deniau. Ortoli left the 
Commission in 1962 to serve in Pompidou's government in France. Between 1966 
and 1972 he held several portfolios in the French government before returning to 
Brussels in 1973 as Commission president. Pragmatists do not necessarily have to be 
IU__ riench ENA graduates, however. Commission officials who came from the AA, such 
as von Staden, Schnippenk6tter, Herbst and Sigrist can also be counted among them. 
For them, the Commission was a step in their careers, often leading to posts as 
ambassadors. On the one hand, pragmatists were important in that they brought fresh 
ideas into the administration. On the other hand, they were often parachuted into top- 
level posts in the administration and thus obstructed career opportunities for the 
Commission's 'home grown' officials. Moreover, they were not willing to commit 
themselves to staying in the Commission and they remained loyal to the institution 
they worked for before. Thus, they were prone to introduce different and often 
conflicting identities into the Commission. 
4. Identities, images and roles of Commission officials 
This section explores, firstly, the Commission's dilemma in 
dealing with its officials' 
identities. It secondly discusses the different roles officials could assume 
in the 
administration, not least because the Commission utilised 
its civil servants' identities. 
263 
The section finally investigates what 'European attitudes' European civil servants had 
or what they perceived as such. 
4.1 Identities in the Commission 
Identities are multiple and never static. The Commission officials analysed in this 
chapter have European, national, regional but also institutional identities of a different 
nature and degree. Therefore, it is impossible to speak of the officials' European 
identity as monolithic without variations. It is possible, however, to give examples of 
different kinds of identities within the Commission. Hallstein aimed at rapidly 
creating an independent administration with a distinct (institutional) identity. 
However, as shown in chapter BI, he was not in favour of creating a sealed off 
European civil service. What is more, with his preference for officials from the AA, 
he did not hesitate to bring civil servants with a strong institutional identity of their 
own into the Commission. Hallstein, himself from the AA, thought that these officials 
were best suited to work in a European administration. This is reflected in the 
recruitment pattern of leading German officials. Hallstein's Cabinet staff, 
Schnippenkoetter, von Staden, Naýes, Meyer and both first German directors-general 
in the Commission, Allardt and Seeliger, came from the AA. Another example is the 
nomination of Herbst as deputy executive secretary and successor of Behr. 
198 Herbst's 
successor, Sigrist, again was a diplomat from the AA. He was already acquainted with 
the members of the 'small group of the Auswdaiges Amt' in the Commission 
before 
coming to Brussels. 199 Another stronghold of these people was DG 
VIR where the 
director-general, Hendus, himself from the AA, sought to replace departing German 
198 HAEU, DEP EN, 716 17.2. -2.3.1960 (93 eA 95 
e r6union de la Commission), 24 February 1960. 
199 BAK, N 1266/1214, Letter Cabinet Hallstein to Helmuth Sigrist, 
21 January 1964. 
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officials with AA diplomats. 200 Civil servants coming from the German diplomatic 
service may have been well qualified to work in the European civil service but at the 
same time they had a strong AA identity, and many of them only stayed in the 
Commission for a short period of time. The AA sent people to Brussels and called 
them back to Bonn, as in the case of Hendus, 201 Schnippenkbtter and von Staden, 
while Allardt returned after falling out with his Commissioner, Lemaignen. The 
Commission thus resembled a post among others in a diplomatic career. Socialisation 
and development of loyalties through, for example, long-term exposure to the 
Commission's administration, was difficult to achieve. Advising a young diplomat, an 
official from Hallstein's Cabinet said that 'in the foreign service you will find a home 
[Heimat] which despite all the optimism has, according to my feeling, still somehow 
more of a solid basis and constitutes more of a family than our European 
institutions'. 202 
The situation was similar, if not more pronounced, in the French 
administration. A memorandum of the French foreign ministry shows that it made 
abundant use of the detachment procedure with the explicit aim to serve the interests 
of the French government from within the European administration. The attitude of 
French personnel policy towards international administrations was to 'place officials 
in the different international secretariats who are able to act in favour of French 
interests, but who at the same time comply with the requirements of the international 
203 civil service'. The Grandes Ecoles and the Grands Corps in the French civil service, 
200 BAK, N 1266/1287, Letter of H. Hendus to the Cabinets of President Hallstein and 
Commissioner 
von der Groeben, 19 September 1961. 
20 1 BAK, N 1266/1280, Narjes to President Hallstein, 18 January 1964. 
202 BAK, N 1266/1214, [Narjes] an Stijlpnagel [Commission Sprechergruppel 10 
November 1960. 
203 MAEF, DE-CE, Coop6ration 6conomique 1945-1966, Communaut6 6conomique europ6enne - 
CEE 
- Euratom, Vol 644, Note pour la Direction g6n6rale 
du personnel de la Direction g6n6rale des Affaires 
Aconomýiques et financi6re. Service de coop6ration 6conomique, 
31 January 1958. 
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such as the Inspection des Finances, have to count as a source of identity and of a 
certain vision of the world. Michel Mangenot has described the ENA concours as a 
rite of passage signifying 'the entrance into technocracy'. 204 The ENA is the 
reproduction mechanism of a social elite and of a certainfacon d etre. 205 Indeed, 
Coombes calls the type of official not affected by the Commission's culture the 
'French ENA official'. This strong socialisation mechanism certainly made it difficult 
for the Commission to supersede this identity and to Europeanize officials from the 
French administration. 
Hence, there were strong identities of national administrations in the 
Commission which could slow down the Europeanization of these officials. However, 
while the Commission created a European civil service, it also wanted to keep open 
ways to provide its services with experienced external staff bringing in new ideas. 
This was a dilemma. Lemaignen believed that officials who chose to spend their entire 
career in the Commission served the European cause loyally while others, who 
expected to return to their home administration, were less independent in their 
206 
thoughts and daily work . For people 
like von Staden or Deniau there was always an 
open backdoor leading back to (higher) positions at the national level. All in all, they 
were too implicated in the networks and reward systems of their home administration 
to cut all ties, and career chances seemed better there than in Brussels. 
However, it is 
still possible that these temporary officials served the 
Commission loyally and, 
moreover, helped to disseminate European convictions and consciousness 
back in 
their home administration. Von Staden, for instance, 
is reported to have 'missed' the 
20'Mangenot 1999: 93. 
205 Ibid., 94. 
' Lemaignen 1964: 72. 
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Commission when back in the AA . 
207 It is likely, however, that officials who were 
recruited through a concours or who entered the Commission as novices developed 
more of a European or institutional identity because they owed the Commission their 
career and professional identity. At the same time, the Commission did not want to 
employ apatrides as these were not very useful for developing common policies. 
4.2 European officials as negotiators and go-betweens 
As it was one of their tasks to forge compromises, European officials who were able 
to switch between their different identities were regarded as particularly useful for the 
Commission. This becomes evident in the following example. In his function as a 
member of the 'merger working group' of the Commission, the Luxembourger 
Etienne met with Jean Dondelinger, then a Luxembourg diplomat, 'as a compatriot 
and friend but also as a civil servant interested in the smooth running of the 
Communities'. 208 Etienne discussed with Dondelinger possible compensations 
Luxembourg could receive after the merger of the executives, stating that 'on this 
occasion the compatriot was not in conflict with the Commission civil servant 9- 
209 
Etienne was able to interpret and translate the 6emotional' state of his compatriots 
for 
Nodl . 
21 0 The executive secretary used the information provided by Etienne to respond 
to a request of Hallstein, namely to make proposals 
for possible compensations for 
Luxembourg which was about to loose the High Authority. 
21 1 The Commission 
utilised the national background of its collaborators 
in order to obtain insider 
207 BAK, N 1266/1214, Narjes to Stillpnagel, 9 June 1964. 
208 HAEU, DEP EN 313, H. Etienne, Note A Fattention de M. 
Noiýl, strictement personnelle, 8 February 
1965. 
209 Ibid. 
210 HAEU, DEP EN 306, Note H. Etienne to E. No6l, 27 
January 1965. 
211 Ibid., E. No6l, Note pour Monsieur le Pr6sident 
Hallstein, strictement personnelle, II February 
1965. 
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information and subsequently form an opinion about the political and psychological 
situation in a member state. 
The official as negotiator and go-between was therefore important for the 
success of Commission policies. This is how the Commission's administration could 
best utilise its bureaucratic power. The officials' expertise but also their special 
knowledge of their home country or of a particular interest group were crucial in this 
respect. One official recounted how the CAP was realised, by sending Commission 
212 
officials in their respective countries of origin to explain a proposal. What is more, 
the officials naturally brought in their viewpoints - shaped by their socialisation in the 
different member states - when elaborating European solutions in the Commission 
and this was what was expected of them. As one official put it, there was no 
'European' type of official emerging in Brussels: 
Instead, a healthy rootedness in one's own nationality has proven to be an 
advantage for a constructive collaboration of individuals with different 
nationalities. This rootedness bears the invaluable advantage that one has at 
one s disposal national experiences, detailed knowledge of national and even 
regional conditions and access to national networks [ ... 
j. 213 
One could derive from this statement that the Commission, as it represented all the 
member states adequately and competently, was most competent for finding European 
solutions and creating European policies. The European civil servants, and the 
national balance, thus legitimised the Commission to act in the name of the member 
states. To capture this Conu-nission strategy, Scheinman utilised the term 
'bureaucratic 
interpenetration'. 214 This interpenetration was based on 1nstitutionalised contacts but 
also on private networks and friendships between the 
Commission and national 
212 Interviews K. S. with Frangois Muller and Ernst 
Albrecht. 
213 Von Verschuer 1967: 5. 
214 Scheinman 1971: 204-5. 
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administrations. Gaining information and keeping partners in national administrations 
infonned reduced the risks of policy failure and deadlocks. The Conunission needed 
to develop into an expert administration in order to gain credibility and to develop and 
secure its role in the institutional interplay of the EEC. An example of what made the 
6 expert Commission' were the DG VI officials who, as the apparently disinterested 
party, forged package deals to guarantee a successftil outcome of Council meetings. 215 
Albrecht has confirmed the Commission's advantage of 'being in the know' and its 
216 
ability to come up with compromise solutions in the Council . European officials 
were go-betweens, mediators and diplomats. They were part and masters of what 
could be called the Community's compromise culture. 'Everything one does is a 
compromise, 9 one official said, 'if you cannot live with this, you become unhappy. ' 217 
4.3 European attitudes of high ojj)'tcials 
In 1965, according to the study of Lerner and Gorden based on interviews with 
Commission officials, 93 per cent of the 'Eurocrats' were in favour of a Monnet- 
inspired United States of Europe, whereas only 5 per cent supported de Gaulle's 
Europe des Patries solution. More than two out of three officials opted for a 
federation as a political model for Europe. 
218 However, there was a gap between the 
officials' daily routine work, which was often very technical, and more 
far-reaching 
political aims such as a federation. One official, who worked under the 
federalist 
Commissioner Spinelli, stated that he appreciated Spinelli's enthusiasm 
for the federal 
cause. However, he thought that it went too far when 
Spinelli asked him to insert into 
215 See chapter B111. nh 216 Interview Sibylle Hambloch/Gerold Ambrosius with Ernst 
Albrecht, Bei om'22 March 2002. 
217 Interview K. S. with an official from DG V. 
218 Lerner and Gorden 1969: 264. 
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his technical papers and proposals paragraphs with Political messages that Spinelli's 
Cabinet had prepared .2 
19 Thirty years on, Abel6s and Bellier observed a pragmatic 
attitude of Commission officials in their study. However, they also have a strong 
political message: constructing a Europe of peace in this fast changing world and the 
permanent search for the 'smallest common denominator'. 220 It was through realistic 
policy solutions and compromises that Europe could progress but not through 
inserting political messages in a technical proposal. 
At a more individual level, there are, however, some attitudes and character 
traits that seem to reflect certain values of European civil servants. These can be 
identified in interviews but also in articles in the employees' newspaper of the 
Commission, the Courrier du Personnel, or in Les Anciens, the bulletin of the 
association of the former officials of the EC, the Association Internationale des 
Anciens des Communaut6s Europ6ennes (AIACE). Recurring themes are, for 
example, honesty and ingenuity which was Particularly valued to overcome the 
heaviness and laggardness of the Commission's administration. 221 The fight of the 
officials against the bureaucratic beast, finding pragmatic and practical solutions to 
policy problems and difficulties of administrative life in the Commission was 
considered important. The ability to come up with compromise solutions, for instance 
222 in the Council, was also highly valued . 
Like many others, looking back on forty years of European integration, Paul 
Collowald believed that the period between 1949 and 1989 stands for forty years of 
219 Interview K. S. with Costantino Friz, Brussels, 10 March 
2005. 
220 Abdl6s and Bellier 1996: 442. 
221 See for example In Memoriam. Hommage A Jean-Claude 
More]. In Courrier du Personnel No 229, 
1-7 February 2002,6. 
222 Obituary G6rard Imbert, Courrier du Personnel No 326,4-10 June 2004,7. 
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peace and democracy in Europe. 223 He refers to the beginnings of the Communities in 
Luxembourg, which he calls the ville mythique of Europe where the 'European 
224 
adventure' began. The officials often use terms such as 'adventure', 'pioneer' and 
also battle vocabulary such as 'fight' to describe the process and politics of European 
integration. For Collowald, building Europe was a battle that had to be fought mainly 
against politicians in national governments. Peace, economic growth and stability in 
Europe and in the world through European integration were also important topiCS. 
115 
When in 1987 Dumont du Voitel, who entered the Commission in 1960, became 
president of MACE, he said that one of the aims of his presidency was to support the 
efforts of the Commission to strengthen the reputation of 'Europe' and to ensure that 
the Community institutions worked more efficiently and thus could assume their role 
in the world more effectively. 226 The mission of Europe in the world derived from 
Europe's heritage of the two world wars. Esprit europeen for one official was 'to 
develop this European Union and to make this part of the world a better place'. 227 In 
brief, the analysis of interviews, memoirs and publications suggests that the 
Commission officials formed a 'socio-psychological community', based on shared 
values and ideals. 228 However, this community was shaken by change brought about 
by events such as the enlargements. Especially British accession made an impact on 
the officials and some looked back with nostalgia to the days of the Europe of the 
223 Paul Collowald, Souvenirs (particuliers) et avenir (commun). In Les Anciens, 
Bulletin de 
Vassociation internationale des Anciens des Communautis europiennes, Bulletin No 10, 
May 1989,9- 
11, here 11. 
224 Speech Edmond Wellenstein. In Les Anciens, Bulletin No 9, October 1988,4-5, 
here 4. 
225 This is emphasized by Georges Brondel, Courrier 
du personnel No 318,19-25 March 2004,5-6. See 
also Brondel 2003. See also the interview K. S. with 
Eduard Brackeniers. 
226 Dumont du Voitel ein engagierter EuropAer. In Les Anciens, 
Bulletin No 6, May 1987,7-12, here 9. 
227 Interview with an official from DG V. 
228 Shore 1995: 219. 
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SiX. 229 Moreover, in interviews a number of officials referred to the difference 
between 'now' and 'then'. While younger people at the Commission tended to see the 
Commission merely as a step in their career 'in the past, one entered the Commission 
like one joined a religious order'. DO Also, while acknowledging that the new member 
states had the right to be in the EU, many thought that the EU of today had nothing to 
do with the Europe of the Six anymore - it is cooperation instead of integration. 231 
However, they were tom between the historical debt towards the Central and Eastern 
European countries and a more cohesive smaller community. 
Many people [ ... I tend to find that enlargement has gone too far and too fast 
[ ... ]. At the end of the day [ ... ] these are European peoples that have suffered because we let them down [during the Cold War, K. S. ], because of our egoism 
and our weakness. [W]e have a duty to welcome and include them. 232 
Conclusion 
The Commission was bound by the treaty to submit policy proposals to the Council, 
composed of representatives of the member states. Therefore, the Commission civil 
servants preparing these proposals had to be aware of the preferences of the different 
governments, otherwise the proposals would have had little chance of being adopted. 
Officials therefore could not act detached from interests promoted by national 
governments. Apart from being able to work out European solutions, the officials 
were expected to act as ambassadors or translators of their 
home countries' needs and 
problems. In a similar vein, they acted as negotiators with representatives 
from their 
home countries in order to explain European policies to them. 
The Commission used 
229 Interview d'Albert Copp6 3.12.1984. In Les Anciens, Bulletin 
No 2, May 1985,4-7, here 6. See also 
interview K. S. with Hans-Broder Krohn. 
230 For example interview K. S. with an official 
from DG 1, Brussels, 10 December 2003. 
231 Interview K. S. with Aurelio Pappalardo; see also the 
interview K. S. with Costantino Friz. 
232 Interview K. S, with Frangois Muller. 
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the national identity, special knowledge, and cultural and previous professional 
background of their officials deliberately and did not wish to employ apatrides, or 
deracinated officials. However, this did not necessarily lead to conflicting loyalties 
between 'Europe' and the 'nation' because the first European civil servants developed 
a strong esprit de corps. The origins of this team spirit lie in seven main factors: 
firstly, in the shared generational experience and similar socialisation during World 
War H that resulted in shared norms and values and the conviction that building 
'Europe' was a means to avoid future armed conflicts in Europe; secondly, the long- 
term exposure to institutional structures, combined with thirdly, career opportunities 
and a high degree of job satisfaction; fourthly the emergence of an expert culture 
focused on the shared task of building 'Europe' through Community policies; fifthly, 
the particular living and working conditions in Brussels; sixthly, the presence of 
European role models like Hallstein, von der Groeben and Mansholt, who inspired 
motivation and enthusiasm; and lastly, the participatory working methods these 
Commissioners introduced. The crises of 1963,1965/66 and the first enlargement 
were key events for the officials, however, and they had a negative impact on their 
motivation. 
According to Coombes, despite setbacks in the integration process a 'common 
culture' developed in the Commission. But 'our research suggests that this common 
culture is not an evangelical kind of organization commitment 
[ ... ]. 
q 233 As this chapter 
has shown, however, there was indeed an organizational commitment. 
This seems to 
have originated from a pioneer spirit and the motivation of working 
for a common 
cause and creating European policies together. 
There seems to have been a change of 
atmosphere resulting from the crises of the 1960s, the enlargement 
of 1973 and the 
233 Coombes 1970: 260-1. 
273 
steady growth of the administration which resulted in a less flexible and more 
hierarchical administration. In 1970 Coombes detected among European civil servants 
a loss of institutional identity and a malaise resulting from these factors. 234 The 
findings presented here, however, suggest that the institutional identity that was built 
up during the first 'euphoric' years of the Commission, survived to some extent in the 
long term. It was the reason for many civil servants to continue to believe in the goal 
of ftulher integration and in progress in spite of the manifold setbacks. The presidency 
of Delors proved them right, or so they thought. It is impossible to demonstrate that 
the performance of an official in the Commission is linked to his or her particular 
identity structure, but a war generation identity did link the officials transnationally 
through shared norms and values. This facilitated Europeanization. It is likely, as will 
be discussed below, that this similar mind-set of the officials had an influence on 
policy outcomes. 
Finally, it is at least arguable that the Commission developed an overall 
administrative identity. The loyalties of officials often belonged to their 
Commissioner or the director-general in their DG. The specialisation and 
compartmentalisation within the Commission's administration, which I have pointed 
out in chapter BI, make it likely that, due to overspecialisation, the officials mainly 
identified with political 'sub goals' of the organization, namely those of the particular 
DG for which they worked. 
234 Ibid., 263. 
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111. Institutions, administrative cultures and their role in EU policy- 
making: the examples of DG IV and DG VI 
Introduction: institutions and institutional cultures 
Institutions matter in EU policy-making. In the introduction of their book with the 
programmatic title Rediscovering Institutions, March and Olsen claim that '[s]ocial, 
political, and economic institutions have become larger, considerably more complex 
and resourceful, and prima facie more important to collective life'. ' This is 
particularly true for the institutions of the EU, which have taken over competencies 
from nation states. While these institutions were established to serve a certain purpose, 
scholars of historical institutionalism argue that institutions cannot always be 
controlled but end up gaining autonomy and pursuing their own agendas. 
2 Moreover, 
once in place, institutional structures and, importantly, the policies devised and 
administered by them, are difficult to modify as the political and social costs of 
3 
change and reform become high . According to 
Paul Pierson, early events in a 
sequence of events are disproportionately important, and the longer a particular path 
remains unchanged the greater the likelihood of a solution 
being 'locked in' -a 
phenomenon known as 'path dependence'. 
4 The founding years of an organization are 
therefore vital as they determine the 'path' an organization and 
the policies developed 
by it will take. 
'Marchand Olsen 1989: 1. 
' See Rasmussen 2008: 38-40. 
3 Cf. for example Pierson 2004. 
4 Ibid., 18. 
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Institutions are traditionally defined as 'formal organizations, rules and 
procedures' .5 It is in this sense that the term is used in this chapter. However, while 
organizational structures can be seen as a framework within which policies are 
devised, they are also places of social interaction and socialisation. Institutional 
structures exert pressure on the behaviour and interest formation of individuals, for 
example by rewarding a certain behaviour. 6 This chapter argues that the socialisation 
of administrative staff helped to maintain a particular path as the staff adopted the 
norms and values of the organization. These norms and values were also shaped by 
early policy decisions. The definition of institutions thus needs to be opened up to 
include informal norms, identities and conventions which influence and structure 
7 behaviour of actors, something neo-institutionalists call 'informal institutions' . In the 
context of this chapter this refers in particular to the administrative culture that 
develops within an institution. 
The Commission's administration was fragmented, a development triggered by 
the Commission's initial choices concerning its organization and working methods. 
Already in December 1960 Maýolin complained that the administration was a 'federal 
system - each DG rests upon its Commissioner. There is no "civil service", but 
several civil services having too much autonomy. '8 Contemporary studies such as 
Coombes's also noticed this phenomenon. According to him, the Commission was a 
porous organization [ ... ] 
in which different styles of administration and different 
normative approaches compete for domination'9; thus, each DG can be considered as 
5 Rasmussen 2008: 35. 
6 Wiener 2006: 38. 
7 Pollack 2004: 139. 
8 HAEU, DEP EN 724,14.12.60-1.2.61 (128' A 133' r6union de la Commission), 21 December 1960 
(underlined in the original text). See also Hallstein's comment 
in HAEU, DEP EN 711,22.7-59-22.9.59 
(69' A 74' r6union de la Commission), 29 July 1959. 
9 Coombes 1970: 29 1. 
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an organization in itself. In fact, different administrative cultures developed at the 
level of the DG's which included a 'mission', values and working methods that were 
closely related to a DG's policy area. 
This chapter makes the case that the administrative cultures that developed in 
DG IV and DG VI during the founding years, and the subsequent socialisation of 
officials into these cultures, helped bring about, and keep on track, the policies in 
these areas. It proposes a three step analysis which could help explain how a particular 
path in competition and agricultural policies was chosen and implemented, and why it 
was difficult to modify this path at a later date. The first step consists of determining 
the historical context. Institutions do not materialise from out of nowhere and policies 
are not created from scratch. The shape of both depends on particular political, legal 
and social contexts that are the results of long-term developments. This chapter 
establishes, firstly, the importance of context, previous experiences and events for the 
shape of institutions and policies. This includes previous experiences and ideas of 
Commissioners and leading officials on the one hand and institutional models and 
policies dating from before the set-up of the Commission on the other. These 'pre- 
cultures' were transferred into the Commission and early policy decisions were taken 
in accordance with the pre-shaped views of leading staff. 
Sociological institutionalism argues that ideas, norms and rules are 'forged 
within a social environment"O such as institutions. However, 
ideas and norms were 
also transferred into the institutions and amalgamated with others to shape a new and 
unique 'social environment', an administrative culture. 
The emerging administrative 
cultures contributed decisively to creating and reinforcing policy 
paths. Identifying 
core elements of DG IV's and DG VI's administrative cultures 
is thus the second step. 
'() Wiener 2006: 43. 
277 
Closely linked to this is the third step, the socialisation of actors into these cultures. 
The adaptation of Commission bureaucrats to administrative cultures helped secure 
the continuity of a policy. Actors outside the Commission were also affected by 
socialisation processes, for example through network building. The Commission 
utilised both internal socialisation. and network building as a means to secure the 
longevity and continuity of a particular policy path. 
1. Step one: the legacy of context and previous experiences 
1.1 Hans von der Groeben and the legacy of ordo-liberalism 
Nowadays the existence of a DG for Competition in the Commission is taken for 
granted. However, the following incident shows how a small episode determined 
future developments in European competition policy. In a first draft of the 
Commission's organizational scheme, dating from January 1958, Maýolin subsumed 
responsibility for the EEC treaty's competition rules under a large department for 
political economy and finance that he intended to take over himself Competition 
policy would very likely have evolved differently had Madolin been responsible for 
this area. French competition policy was entirely different from what developed in 
post-war Germany in this domain. In France 'competition law long operated in the 
shadows of dirigiste economic controls [ ... 1. Since the 
inception of the European 
Community, France and French officials have often tended to resist a more vigorous 
role for competition law in the process of European integration. 
"' 
"Gerber 1998: 180. 
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Hallstein and von der Groeben presented Maijolin's scheme to leading 
government officials of the economics and foreign affairs ministries in Bonn. 12 At the 
meeting, the participants demanded that competition should become an independent 
administrative unit, reflecting the importance the German government attached to 
competition policy. The emergence of a German preference at this meeting in Bonn 
laid the ground for DG IV to become the 'German' DG in the Commission. 13 
Competition became a DG in its own right led by von der Groeben, who was a fon-ner 
senior civil servant in Ludwig Erhard's economics ministry. Social market economy, a 
tenn coined by Erhard's State Secretary Alfred MOller-An-nack, and the ordo- 
liberalism of the Freiburg School framed this ministry's policy-making" and became 
equally important for policy-making in DG W. 
Closely linked to neo-liberalism, the ordo-liberal Freiburg School was 
developed in Germany in the early 1930s by an interdisciplinary group of academics 
at the University of Freiburg. Its main protagonists were the lawyers Franz Bbhm and 
Hans GroBmann-Doerth and the economist Walter Eucken. Having witnessed the 
downfall of the Weimar Republic and the rise of National Socialism, these scholars 
were convinced that the main cause of this had been the failure of the legal system to 
prevent the rise and subsequent abuse of private economic power. 15 After World War 
H they aimed at creating a new society with competition at the heart of their economic 
and political programme. A competitive economic system was to the benefit of all in 
12 BAK, N 1266/1092, Aufzeichnung betr. Besprechung i1ber Organisations- und Personalfragen von 
EWG am 26. Januar 1958,27 January 1958. Three days later, on 
29 January, Hallstein also participated 
in the Cabinet meeting of the Federal Government. However, the short 
Cabinet protocols do not reveal 
if the matter was discussed in the meeting. 11. Kabinettssitzung am 
Mittwoch, den 29. Januar 1958 
(>Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung< online), http: //www. bundesarchiv. de/cocoon/barch/ 
0000/k/kl958k/kapl-2/kap2-4/lýndex. htmI (accessed 15 May 2008). 
13 Cini 1996b: 466. 
14 Uffler 2002, see esp. chapter B. 3. On MOller-Armack and 
Erhard see also Nicholls 1994. 
15 For an overview see Gerber 1998: 232-260. More detailed 
is Kolowski 2000. 
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society, they argued. It provided the key to the two complementary goals of economic 
prosperity and political stability. 
Von der Groeben collaborated with MUller-Armack and scholars of the 
Freiburg School at the economics ministry. He shared this outlook on competition, not 
economic planning, as central to the smooth functioning of an economy or a European 
common market. 16 Moreover, from the late 1940s to 1957, a German competition law 
was intensively discussed in the Federal Republic. This also has to be seen in the 
context of Allied deconcentration and decartelisation policies in post-war Gennany. 17 
Other European countries, on the contrary, lacked experience with competition 
legislation. Until 1958 only the parliaments of France and Germany had adopted 
national competition laws, the Dutch parliament enacting a law on cartels only in July 
1958.18 At the European level, the ECSC treaty comprised anti-trust rules in articles 
65 and 66.19 Contrary to other policy areas covered by the treaty, competition policy 
was thus a fairly recent field in which the administrations of member states had little 
experience. The treaty only defined some basic principles which were to be fleshed 
out later on. It was thus up to the Commission, and in particular DG fV, to define a 
competition policy and to make proposals to the Council. 
DG IV was given responsibility for four sectors: restrictive practices and 
monopoly policy, state aids, approximation of laws, and taxation (Articles 85 to 
99, 
EEC). Starting from there, von der Groeben and his collaborators developed a holistic 
competition concept, coffesponding to the ordo-liberal notion of 
16 Von der Groeben 1995: 244-5 and 258-9. 
17 Cf. Murach-Brand 2004 for the evolution of the German competition 
law in this context. 
18 The German Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrdnkung 
(GWB), 27 July 1957; in France the 
Ordonnance No. 45-1483,30 June 1945 and the law of 1953; and the 
Dutch cartel law, 16 July 1958. 
The Italian Codice Civile only included a couple of vague articles on competition. 
19 On the development of these articles during the treaty negotiations and 
the influence of transatiantic 
networks on this process see Leucht 2008b. 
See also the PhD thesis, Leucht 2008a. 
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Wirtschaftsverfassung, or economic constitution, that is, an 'economic order based on 
competition'. 20 They conceptualised the common competition policy with the aim of 
creating a European competition order, or Wenbewerbsordnung. 21 Competition policy 
was considered as being at the basis of a legally protected common market governed 
by a regime of fair competition. 22 
During von der Groeben's term of office important groundwork was 
accomplished. Within the field of competition policy the Commission first focused on 
cartel policy. Article 88 of the EEC treaty provided for authorities in the member 
states to take over responsibility for the application of Articles 85 and 86 concerned 
with restrictive practices and monopolies until the EEC passed a regulation. The 
Commission tried to enforce this and asked the member states to co-operate. 23 This 
turned out to be difficult as only France, Germany and the Netherlands had 
appropriate legislation. Hence, a regulation providing a European solution in cartel 
policy became a pressing need. The Commission's proposal, submitted to the Council 
on 31 October 1960, envisaged a notification system and the general prohibition of 
restrictive practices and agreements with the possibility of applying for an exemption 
(provided for in Article 85(3), EEC). In this draft, only the Commission was 
authorised to grant permission of an agreement. In spite of strong protests against this 
draft by industrialists in Germany, France and Belgium and member state 
governments like France, these three crucial elements of the 
initial draft - prohibition 
of restrictive practices, obligatory notification of agreements to the 
Commission and 
the Commission's exclusive authority over granting exemptions - made 
it into the 
final version of Regulation 17. 
20 Gerber 1998: 241. 
21 Von der Groeben 196 1: 10. Cf. also idem. 1995: 343-4. 
22 Idem. 196 1: 10. 
23 BAC 209.80, PV of the EEC Conunission, 25 session, 
15-16 July 1958, pt. 23. 
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There are three main reasons why, in spite of this opposition, the 
Commission's view prevailed and why it obtained a unanimous Council decision on a 
regulation that determined the path of European competition policy for the next four 
decades. Firstly, the French government was against the Commission proposal as it 
favoured a system of legal exemption instead of the notification regime proposed by 
the Commission. 24 In the domestic context, the French administration had traditionally 
been tolerant towards cartels. 25 The French employers' organization, the Conseil 
National du Patronat Frangais (CNPF), was also in favour of a lenient competition 
policy and of economic integration through industrial agreements. Instead of 
prohibiting cartels, competition rules should encourage this kind of collaboration 
between enterprises. 26 However, the French negotiation position was not clearly 
developed. While the French government criticized the Commission's proposal, it did 
not come up with a convincing alternative suggestion. 27 As to the French business 
representatives, instead of lobbying the Commission and DG IV in particular, they 
relied on the - in this case - passive French government officials to push through their 
views . 
28 Secondly, the Commission was successful in building a coalition in favour of 
its ordo-liberal approach. This coalition included the European Parliament, trade 
unions and, crucially, the German and Dutch governments. The Italian, Luxembourg 
and finally the Belgian governments also eventually rallied to the Commission's 
standpoint. Thirdly, Regulation 17 was not a priority for the French government. 
29 
When it secured major gains in the Council negotiations on the CAP of 
December 
1961 and January 1962, the French govern-ment was in turn prepared to vote 
for the 
24 Hambloch 2002: 891. 
25 Warlouzet 2006: 179. 
26 Idem. 2007, chapter VI-2,6.3 D. 
27 This is explained in detail in ibid., chapter VI-2- 
28 Idem. 2006: 19 1. 
29 Ibid. 
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regulation . 
30 The CAP and Regulation 17 were tied together in a package-deal and the 
Council of Ministers finally adopted the regulation on 5 February 1962. 
In possession of the right of initiative in the Community, the Commission was 
nIN able to shape the draft in conformity with the ordo-liberal preferences of von der 
Groeben and leading DG IV officials. The most important aim for DG IV was to 
realise a common line in European cartel policy. This was the lesson the Commission 
had drawn from the first three years of experience in competition policy, in particular 
with the unsatisfactory application of Article 88 by national agencies. In March 1962 
Regulation 17 entered into force, attributing substantial powers to the Commission in 
cartel policy. 31 The Commission was authorised to grant permission for any agreement 
formed after March 1962. A Court ruling could of course modify or nullify the 
Commission's decision. Regulation 17 clearly had an impact on the 
institutionalisation of DG IV as the Commission's bulwark of economic liberalism 
and it determined the shape of the common competition policy. It was only replaced in 
2003, with Regulation 1/2003. 
1.2 Sicco Mansholt's experience in post-war European agriculture 
The historical context leading to the CAP, and the CAP itself, are among the most 
complex chapters in European integration history. 
32 Focusing on Mansholt's role in 
post-war European agricultural policy contributes a small 
but vital piece to the jigsaw 
puzzle of the historical context of the CAP and 
DG VI's administrative culture. A 
member of the Dutch Social democratic party 
PvdA, Mansholt became Minister of 
30 Hambloch 2002: 895. 
31 Cini and McGowan 1998: 13. 
32 There is ample literature on the subject. Cf. 
for example Noýl 1988 and 1995; Thiemeyer 1999; 
Griffiths 1990a; Griffiths and Girvin 1995a; Hendriks 1999; 
Knudsen 2002, Ludlow 2005c. 
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Agriculture, Fishery and Food Distribution in June 1945 -a portfolio he held 
continuously in various coalition governments until he entered the Commission in 
January 1958.33 One important aim of his agricultural policy in the Netherlands was to 
34 turn agriculture into an effective and productive sector of the economy. Meanwhile, 
however, in the neighbouring countries agricultural pressure groups asked for 
subsidies towards agricultural production and protection against more competitive 
foreign producers, 35 which was to the detriment of Dutch agricultural exports. In his 
efforts to liberalise agricultural trade, Mansholt was backed by the Dutch farmers' 
organizations, of which the Stichting voor de Landbouw, renamed Landbouwschap in 
1954, was the umbrella organization. In the Netherlands, a country with a strong 
corporatist tradition, the Stichting had an important advisory role. 36 There were 
regular meetings between the Stichting and high officials of the agricultural ministry 
and monthly meetings with the minister of agriculture. 
As minister of agriculture, Mansholt became heavily involved in international 
agricultural affairs. The importance he attached to these international questions 
became manifest when he created a department within his ministry concerned with 
external agricultural relations. It was headed by van der Lee, who later followed him 
to the Commission. Mansholt perceived the OEEC and the United Nation's FAO as 
failures. For him, the latter was too technocratic and the former did not make any 
progress in trade liberalisation regarding agriCUtUre. 
37 Thus, he began pursuing a 
European agricultural policy. Inspired by the launch of the 
Schuman Plan in May 
1950, Mansholt drafted a paragraph on agriculture which was 
incorporated in the 
33 For biographical information on Mansholt see Merriýnboer 
2006. 
34 Mommens 1990: 50. 
35 Griffiths 1990b: 94. 
36 Mommens 1995: 116. 
37 See Knudsen 2002. 
284 
Stikker Plan in September 1950. In his plan Dutch Foreign Minister Dirk Stikker 
envisaged the abolition of tariffs on industrial goods among the OEEC countries. 
38 
The core of Mansholt's proposal was the integration of the entire agricultural sector 
into a customs union and the immediate introduction of a European price level. 
However, attempts to reach an agreement on agriculture remained fruitless, for 
example in the so-called Green Pool negotiations between the OEEC member states in 
the early to mid-1950s. 39 Mansholt's position in these negotiations is revealing with 
regard to his ideas on European integration. Firstly, while simple trade liberalisation 
would have been beneficial for the Dutch economy, Mansholt favoured setting up a 
supranational organization, something most agricultural ministers of the other 
participating countries were not prepared to accept . 
40 Secondly, he - unsuccessfully - 
attempted to restrict the Green Pool to the six Schuman Plan countries. He thus 
favoured a smaller supranational organization over a larger intergovernmental one that 
would have provided Dutch agriculture with a larger market, possibly including 
Britain, the most important market for Dutch produce next to Germany. However, 
Mansholt's party, the PvdA, was generally in favour of including Britain in the 
integration process. But the British government undermined any attempt to introduce 
supranationality in the Green pool. 41 Yet, for Mansholt, supranationalism was a 
guarantee that necessary decisions could not be vetoed by member state governments 
under domestic pressure. Hence, he preferred a supranational solution to the autonomy 
of national governments which would too often come under the 
influence of interest 
groups, in particular in the agricultural sector. 
Supranational institutions, on the 
38 Griffiths 1990b: 96-97. 
39 On the Green Pool see Thierneyer 1999 and Noýl 1988. 
40 Griffiths 1995: 25. 
41 Thiemeyer 1999: 266. 
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contrary, would only pursue the common intereSt. 42 Mansholt's experience of the 
failure of the Green Pool negotiations enforced this belief in the necessity of 
supranational institutions. Moreover, his underlying interest in supranational policy- 
making can be seen as a calculation that only a supranational organization could put 
an end to the protectionist national agricultural policies so han-nful to Dutch 
agriculture. According to Thierneyer, '[w1hat Mansholt had dreamed of was a good- 
will dictatorship of technocrats acting only on behalf of a common interest defined by 
reason'. 43 
Another insight Mansholt gained from the failure of the Green Pool 
negotiations was that agriculture could not be treated in isolation from the rest of the 
economy. 44 He was an experienced politician and negotiator and realised that in order 
to advance agricultural negotiations there needed to be some bargaining margin, 
preferably by combining agriculture with other policy areas. Thus, in early 1955, 
Mansholt's hope of realising a common agricultural policy rose when it became clear 
that agriculture would be incorporated in the Benelux proposal. This proposal 
combined the Beyen Plan of Dutch Foreign Minister Jan Willem Beyen for a customs 
union, launched in 1952, and the ideas of Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak 
and his preference for continuing sectoral integration. Agriculture was to be part of the 
common market envisaged in this proposal. When the Treaties of Rome were ratified 
in 1957, some kind of progress in agriculture was therefore guaranteed. 
Agricultural 
policy was locked into a particular institutional framework and 
linked to progress in 
the customs union. 
42 Idem. 2005: 43. 
43 Ibid., 45. 
44 Griffiths and Girvin 1995b: xxxiv. 
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Representing the smallest common denominator between member state 
governments and reflecting their diverging views on the aims of the CAP, Articles 38- 
47 of the EEC treaty on agriculture were vague and only set out some general 
objectives . 
45 From 1958 to 1973 Mansholt was responsible for agricultural policy in 
the Commission. His long experience as minister for agriculture, post-war 
international agricultural negotiations and, not least, his personality all combined to 
contribute to the shaping of the CAP. These factors, along with the working methods 
he transferred from the Dutch agricultural ministry to the Commission, also generated 
a distinctive administrative culture in DG VI. In July 1958, the Commission convened 
a conference in Stresa to discuss the basic objectives of the future CAP with the 
governments of the member states and interest groups such as farmers' and consumer 
organizations. The Stresa resolutions were at the basis of the proposals DG VI came 
up with one and a half years later. These provided for a free exchange of agricultural 
goods within the six member states, a gradual development of the CAP during the 
transition period and the adoption of a common price level for many product groups. 
The first decisions in agriculture had to be taken by the end of 1961, as the transition 
to the second stage of the customs union was due on I January 1962. The first of 
many agricultural 'marathons' started on 15 December 1961 and ended - the clock 
had been stopped on 31 December to allow the negotiations to continue - in the night 
of 14 January 1962. The main outcome of the negotiations was a system of market 
organizations and a price policy that should guarantee farmers' incomes. A system of 
intervention buying would ensure that farmers were able to sell their produce. 
This 
result was enshrined in the so-called Agricultural Code, setting out three principles: 
'the principle of a unified internal market with common prices permitting 
free 
45 See for example Hendriks 1999: 141-2. 
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circulation of goods; the principle of comi-nunity preference ensured by external 
protection; and the principle of financial solidarity through the European Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund (FEOGA)'. 46 The Agricultural Code was the 
foundation of the CAP until the EU agricultural ministers adopted a major reform of 
47 the CAP in June 2003 . 
The first marathon saw the birth of the so-called package deals. This is where 
Mansholt and his collaborators could have an important impact and facilitate a 
successful conclusion of the negotiations. 48 Because he had been instrumental in post- 
war agricultural negotiations, Mansholt understood better than most other policy- 
makers what kinds of proposals were acceptable for the different member states. 
Likewise, DG VI officials had expert knowledge and had often participated in these 
post-war agricultural negotiations themselves. Moreover, DG VI prepared the ground 
for the Commission's proposals in intensive consultations with government officials 
and agricultural interest groups such as the COPA. During the first years of the 
Community, decisions in the Council had to be taken by unanimity. The package deals 
were crucial in this period as, in order to obtain a decision for a certain sector, each 
country had to gain something. Mansholt became a master in the art of forging such 
package deals, not least because he had served as a minister in various coalition 
governments in the Netherlands and was used to this kind of bargaining. 
49He thus 
induced the Council to either accept the Commission's package deal or to go home 
empty handed. On the negative side, this meant that the Commission often had to 
46 Ibid., 143; 147-8. 
47 Cf. http: //ec. europa. eu-agriculture-capreform-index-en. 
htni (accessed 16 April 2008). Among other 
things, this reform entails the payment of subsidies 
independent of the volume of production, thus 
avoiding over-production and a revision of the market policies, 
for example reducing the intervention 
' ces for some produce. V1, 
Mansholt 1974: 111. 
49 Meniftboer 2006: 262. 
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compromise and make sacrifices on the content of their proposals in order to grant 
each minister of the Six a 'success'. 
2. Step two: the emergence of administrative cultures 
2.1 DG TV's administrative culture 
DG IV's administrative culture was essentially an expert culture. This has to be seen 
in connection with von der Groeben's ideas about modem and efficient 
administrations. A classical nineteenth and early twentieth century administration - 
fragmented and hierarchically organized - could not satisfy the needs of the 
contemporary world where the economy occupied an increasingly important role. A 
modem administration required new working methods and clear aims . 
50 Thus, von der 
Groeben was keen to involve experts and academics in policy-making. Because 
competition law was a rather recent area of economic policy in Europe, he thought 
that consultation and advice of external experts were all the more important. 
Consequently, he recruited Emst-Joachim Mestmkker, a fon-ner student of Bbhm. A 
professor at the University of SaarbrUcken, Mestmdcker had familiarised himself with 
cartel law of the 1920s and US anti-trust and deconcentration law during his studies in 
Frankfurt. 51 At first, Mestmacker advised von der Groeben informally. This 
consultancy was institutionalised when he became a special adviser to DG IV in 
1962.52 Other advisers to von der Groeben were the German economist Hans M61ler, 
the agriculture expert Priebe and Jacques Houssiaux, a young economist at 
Nancy 
50 ACDP, 1-659,058/1, H. von der Groeben, Vermerk für die Herren 
Mitglieder der Kommission, Betr: 
Arbeitsmethoden der Kommission, 29 June 1962. 
5ý Interview Sibylle Hambloch with Erich Mestmäcker, Hamburg, 4 October 
2002. 
52 Schwartz 2006: 461. 
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University. 53 These experts mostly met with von der Groeben and his Cabinet and 
partly also with DG IV officials. This is another example of von der Groeben 
introducing an element with which he had become familiar from working in the 
economics ministry, into the Commission. In Germany, experts and academics 
traditionally served as advisers to political bodies. Von der Groeben even sought - in 
vain - to convince the college to institutionalise a board of economic advisers to the 
Commission, consisting of external academics and experts and modelled on the 
Wissenschaftlicher Beirat, or Academic Advisory Board, of the German economics 
ministry. 54 The Academic Advisory Board, which had its origins in the Allied 
administration of the British and American occupation zones, was founded in January 
55 1948. It was initially dominated by the Freiburg School with B6hm as one of the 
56 founders and Mestmdcker becoming a member in 1960. With his insistence on close 
and institutionalised contacts with the academic community and experts, von der 
Groeben was the exception in the Commission in the 1960s. 57 DG IV, like any newly 
founded institution, had to acquire a good reputation. In the long-term this was 
facilitated by collaborating with leading experts in the field. Crucially, seeking 
scientific advice added authority to the Commission's and DG IV's proposals and 
ultimately strengthened their policy preferences. Ordo-liberal experts in DG IV thus 
contributed to consolidating the chosen path. 
Another aspect of DG IV's administrative culture were the working methods. 
Von der Groeben promoted teamwork and was particularly in favour of 
involving 
53 Houssiaux was one of the few French scholars to have published on competition 
policy: Houssiaux 
1960. 
54 ACDP, 1-659,058/1, H. von der Groeben, Vermerk für die Herren 
Mitglieder der Kommission, Betr: 
Arbeitsmethoden der Kommission, 29 June 1962. 
55 Cf. Nicholls 1995: 180-2. 
56 L6ffler 2002: 72. Lbffler calls B6hm and Eucken 'political professors'. 
57 While in 1958 Robert Marjolin appointed the Belgian economist 
Robert Triffin as adviser, he does 
not even mention Triffin in his biography, 
Maijohn 1986. 
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younger officials in the Policy-making process and assigning them their own areas of 
responsibility, thus fighting not only the (as he called it) 'horizontal but also vertical 
58 isolation' The Commissioner organized regular meetings with DG IV officials and 
members of his Cabinet, where current topics and problems of competition policy 
were discussed openly. 59 These meetings resembled the table ronde organized by 
Mansholt in DG VI. 60 To von der Groeben, teamwork was particularly important in a 
multinational administration because the different economic and political 
developments in the member states and the resulting repercussions for EEC-level 
policy-making would require constant collaboration between Commission officials of 
several nationalities. 61 VerLoren van Themaat had similar working methods. He held 
regular meetings at DG IV level and weekly meetings with the directorS62 and he also 
created ad hoc working groups. 63 
Lastly, DG IV's autonomy became part of its administrative culture. Compared 
to other DGs in the Commission, DG IV stands out because of the direct influence it 
could exert on the economy of the common market. Early policy decisions such as 
Regulation 17 were at the basis of this autonomy. Crucially, the Commission's 
independence in this sector was subsequently extended with the help of Court rulings, 
strengthening the Commission's position. 64 
58 ACDP, 1-659,058/1, H. von der Groeben, Vermerk für die Herren Mitglieder der Kommission, Betr: 
Arbeitsmethoden der Kommission, 29 June 1962. 
59 Schwartz 2006: 473-4; Interview K. S. with Aurelio Pappalardo. 
60 See for example ACDP, 1-659,001/1, Zusammenfassung der Besprechung am 21.6.1962 bei Herrn 
von der Groeben, 21 June 1962. See below for Mansholt's table ronde. 
61 ACDP, 1-659,058/1, H. von der Groeben, Vermerk für die Herren Mitglieder der Kommission, Betr: 
Arbeitsmethoden der Kommission, 29 June 1962. 
62 Interview K. S. with the assistant to director-general VerLoren van Themaat. 
63 ACDP, 1-659,002/1, Vermerk VerLoren van Themaat an von der Groeben, Zusammenfassender 
Bericht des Gedankenaustausches zwischen dem Generaldirektor und den Direktoren hinsichtlich der 
Bildung einer beratenden internen Arbeitsgruppe zur Unterstützung 
des Generaldirektors bei seinen 
Koordinierungsaufgaben, 4 November 1964. 
64 For example two landmark decisions were: Commission vs 
Grundig & Consten, Cases 58/64 and 56 
[ 19661 European Court Reports (ECR) 299; Case 6/72, Europemballage Corporation vs 
Commission 
[1973] ECR 215 (Continental Can). 
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2.2 DG VI's administrative culture 
DG VI's administrative culture was significantly shaped by Mansholt and the working 
methods he introduced in his DG. These working methods were partly those he had 
experimented with in the Dutch ministry for agriculture. Two examples of these 
practices are the intense dialogue with interest groups and the table ronde. Cultivating 
close contacts with farmers' organizations was considered vital by Mansholt, who had 
followed the same approach in the Netherlands. This had an impact on the internal 
organization of DG VI: the division concerned with non-governmental organizations 
reported directly to the Cabinet and the director-general without a director being 
interposed. The table ronde was an institutionalised discussion and consultation 
forum. One French official called it the 'Dutch system'. 65 It was composed of 
permanent members - the Cabinet, the director-general and his assistant, Heringa and 
Rencki66 - as well as directors and officials, even lower-ranking ones, invited to 
participate and give a presentation or share their opinion on a given problem. The 
presentation was followed by a lively discussion. However, Mansholt reserved for 
himself the right to take the final decision. The round table of DG VI has become 
legendary. 67 It epitomizes the high degree of participation of officials in the decision- 
making process in DG VI and seems to have encouraged dialogue and creativity. The 
working methods and the atmosphere in DG VI gave even lower ranking officials the 
feeling that they were participating in shaping and creating the CAP. In June 1962, in 
a note to Hallstein's Cabinet, von Verschuer underlined the importance of the round 
65 Interview K. S. with Maurice Barth6l6my. 
Information provided by Helmut von Verschuer in a 
letter to K. S., 4 November 2005. 
67 See for example the interviews K. S. with Frangois 
Muller and Giampiero Schiratti. 
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table for the CAP: 'It was because of the round table that DG Agriculture could 
develop and push through a far-sighted agricultural policy., 68 
DG VI's administrative culture was also shaped by the early successes of the 
CAP. Because agriculture was an important domain for most member states, the 
Commission identified the CAP as a field were it could excel and demonstrate its 
expertise. The policy became a priority for the Commission. According to Hallstein, 
its 'life depended on the CAP'. 69 Ludlow emphasizes the political motives of the 
Commission: 'A major common policy [.. ] would require a degree of political and 
bureaucratic activism, and a common budget high enough to emphasize that the 
Commission was a political player and not just an international civil service. 970 The 
institutional backing for the CAP in the Commission was reflected, for instance, in the 
ever increasing staff numbers of DG VI. 71 Moreover, Mansholt and DG VI were 
perhaps more successful than other DGs in staging agriculture and in linking it to 
progress in the integration process in general. With Mozer, a journalist and well- 
networked politician as chef de cabinet, Mansholt came to be perceived as the 
'European minister of agriculture'. For instance, when asked whether he was content 
with the way the CAP developed, one official acknowledged that not all aspects of the 
outcome were desirable. However, the important point for him was that the 
CAP had 
been '[ ... ] the 
first common policy put in place by the institutions' - the 
Council and 
the Commission. 72 The actual shape of the CAP was thus less important even though 
the policy soon generated major, and very costly, problems. 
These ranged from 
overproduction to the distortion of competition on world markets 
by EEC countries 
68 BAK, N 1266/1253, Note B. von Staden to President Hallstein, 
7 June 1962. 
69 'Notre vie en d6pend [on the CAPF. HAEU, 
Dep EN 720, Wunion de la Commission, 18 July 1960. 
70 Ludlow 2005c: 356. mmission, 153 session, 2t"": part' 71 See for example the discussion in BAC 209.80, 
PV of the EEC Co ie, 
10/ 12 July 196 1. 
72 Interview K. S. with Maurice Barth6l6my. 
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exporting their heavily subsidised surpluses. Nevertheless, throughout the 1960s and 
1970s, DG Agriculture was seen as a successful DG, or even as the Commission's 
6 73 
glamour DG' . The importance and the success of the CAP had a strong impact on 
DG VI officials. 
3. Step three: socialisation processes in DG IV and DG VI 
3.1 Socialisation of DG IV officials 
There were two groups of officials in DG IV. The first group consisted of mainly 
German officials who were already pre-socialised, either into the ordo-liberal concept 
of competition or US anti-trust law, or both. Among these officials were - alongside 
Albrecht - Schwartz and Hermann Schumacher. Schwartz, an official and later 
Cabinet member in DG IV, graduated with a degree in law from the University of 
Freiburg, where one of his teachers was Eucken. He also studied anti-trust law at 
Harvard law school, and was an assistant to Heinrich Kronstein, a German emigrant 
professor and cartel expert at the Institute for Foreign and International Trade Law at 
Georgetown University in Washington. In March 1961, Schwartz drafted an overall 
concept of European competition policy for von der Groeben, which served as a 
basis 
for DG IV's activities. 74 Schumacher was the son of the economist 
Hermann 
Schumacher who had been Eucken's mentor. 
75 He became the director of the 
Directorate for Cartels and Monopolies. Not far from the ideas of these three 
Gen-nans 
were those of director-general VerLoren van 
Themaat who had a longstanding 
73 Michelmann 1978b: 162. 
74 This was published under von der Groeben' s name 
in the EC Bul let1n: von der Groeben 196 1. 
75 http: //www-wiwi. uni-muenster. de/-09/ecochron/personen/pm_euckenl. 
pdf (accessed on 27 
September 2007). 
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experience in competition policy at the Dutch economics ministry. This group of 
officials participated in the development of DG IV's competition policy and served, 
alongside von der Groeben, as role models to the second group of officials. This 
second group was constituted in the main of younger and/or non-German officials, 
like the Italian Pappalardo, who had to familiarise themselves with the predominant 
competition conception in DG IV and in particular with the Freiburg School and its 
protagonists such as Eucken and 136hm. Their writings were part of the underlying 
competition conception in DG 11-V, but were not, for example, part of the university 
curriculum in Italy. 76 Soon, these officials reached a high level of expertise in the 
matter, however. 
Leadership by role models is important for facilitating socialisation processes. 
In contemporary interviews, conducted by Michelmann in the mid-1970s, officials 
emphasized 'the importance of leadership in the early EEC phases for the subsequent 
patterns of policy development in the various DGs'. 77 In DG IV von der Groeben and 
VerLoren van Themaat had an excellent reputation as the founders of the European 
competition poliCy. 78Because they were regarded as successful leaders, they served as 
role-models. Their success triggered processes of imitation and social learning. 
Moreover, frequent and direct contact with these European role models was crucial for 
motivating DG IV officials. Von der Groeben's working methods facilitated such 
contacts. He created an atmosphere of open-mindedness and discussion. 
79 At least 
during the first and crucial years, when competition policy was shaped, officials were 
received and heard by the Commissioner on a regular basis. The feeling of being able 
76 Interview K. S. with Aurelio Pappalardo. 
77 Michelmann 1978b: 170. 
78 Cf. the interviews K. S. with DG IV officials and also Michelmann 
1978b and Cini 1994. 
79 See for example the summary of a discussion in DG 
IV in ACDP, 1-659,001/1, P. VerLoren van 
Themaat, Entwurf, Zusammenstellung der wichtigsten Diskussionspunkte im Rahmen der Besprechung 
mit Herm von der Groeben ober die Wettbewerbspolitik, 
20 March 1961. 
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to contribute to the decision-making process was important and created a strong sense 
of solidarity with the aims and values of DG IV. According to the available 
eyewitness evidence, this facilitated the formation of an esprit de corps among the 
civil servants, especially during the founding period, when the Commission was still a 
rather small administration. 80 
DG IV's autonomy and a sense of 'being different' were deeply engrained in 
the self-perception of DG IV officials. Pappalardo believed, for example, that 
competition was different from other services in the Commission: 'DG Competition is 
an exception in this "mega-mechanism" still today. The competition regulations are to 
a large extent applicable without consent of the Council. 81 DG fV 'celebrates its 
autonomy from the Council', as Michelmann Put it. 
82 The officials took pride in what 
they perceived as their effective and important policy sector. Similarly, the idea of 
being the 'judges' of the Commission was propagated by some officials. 83 After all, 
DG IV had judicial functions and its rulings affected enterprises and the governments 
themselves. Their judge-like tasks had an influence on the officials and their relation 
with the outside world. DG IV officials nurtured an image of the incorruptibles of the 
Commission, 84 or the Commission's watchdog. For the 1980s Michelle Cini's 
observations correspond to these findings: the officials shared a certain vision of the 
world, separating good from bad and seeing themselves as missionaries, spreading the 
values of competition. 85 The French director in DG IV, Armand 
Sacl6, qualified 
80 See the interviews K. S. with former DG IV officials. 
81 Interview K. S. with Aurelio Pappalardo. 
82 Michelmann 1978b: 78. 
83 Interview K. S. with Kurt Ritter. 
84 See for example ibid. 
85 Cini 1996: 465. 
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competition as a Geisteshaltung, or mind-set. 86ThiS statement coming from a leading 
French official in DG IV who did not have a background in ordo-liberalism is an 
indicator for the successful adoption of DG IV's competition ideology by its officials. 
Network formation was another form of socialisation through which actors 
outside the Commission were familiarised with the leading competition concept of the 
Commission. At first especially the directorate concerned with cartel policy focused 
mainly on an academic exchange, something which Scheinman confirms: 'Some 
Community pundits have dubbed the cartel sector as "I'Universite", especially in view 
of its tendency to draw heavily on independent experts in the academic community. ' 87 
The academic nature of the discussions in DG W left the officials with the impression 
that they were the only real experts in the matter in the Community. This resulted in 
the development and the nurturing of a culture of expertise within DG 17V, which then 
became part of the officials' self-perception. The situation seems to have changed 
during the 1970s, however, when DG IV officials appear to have become more 
accessible and consulted more broadly with (external) professionals concerned with 
competition policy. 88 The reason for this could be that by then a community of 
competition experts had formed, consisting of national civil servants, 
lawyers and 
academics, which collaborated closely with DG IV, not 
least because competition 
policy was beginning to have a tangible impact. From 
1958 onwards DG IV organized 
so-called cartel conferences with representatives of national administrations, 
and 
Regulation 17 provided for a committee for cartel and monopoly questions. 
It is likely 
that these forums facilitated the incremental formation of a transnational competition 
network. The Participants were socialised into 
this competition community and 
86 ACDP, 1-659,001/1, Aufgaben der Wettbewerbspolitik 
in der EWG, Niederschrift über die 
Besprechung bei Herrn von der Groeben am 12.6.64. 
87 Scheinman 1971: 212-3. 
88 Michelmann 1978b: 63. 
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developed 'shared causal beliefs and policy aims 189 that eventually resulted in their 
backing of the Commission's competition policy. It is thus plausible that the 
socialisation of DG IV officials into a certain concept of competition was followed by 
the constitution of an expert network transcending the Commission. 
Moreover, socialisation appears to be a long-term process, which is reinforced 
over time. The powers DG IV obtained through Regulation 17 certainly intensified the 
impact of certain socialisation factors. For instance, the factor of autonomy certainly 
grew in importance after Regulation 17 entered into force as this regulation 
constituted the basis of DG IV's independence. Hence, a policy and its effects impact 
on institutionalisation and fuel socialisation processes. 
3.2 Socialisation of DG VI officials 
Negotiations and initiatives in the agricultural sector in post-war Europe had led to the 
creation of an internationally socialised and networked group of agricultural experts, 
When setting up his DG, Mansholt could fall back on this network. The appointment 
of the director-general, the Frenchman Rabot, is one example. On the one hand, 
Rabot's appointment was a politically motivated decision. The French government, 
having a strong interest in the CAP, insisted on providing the Director-General for 
Agriculture. " On the other hand, Rabot had been Director of the International 
Relations Directorate in the French agricultural ministry and participated in the Green 
Pool negotiations. In 1955 he became Secretary General for Food and Agriculture in 
89 Kaiser 2005b: 22. 
90 HAEU, Int 30, Emile Nodl (Serie 06 -,, Les origines 
de I'administration communautaire", Table 
ronde organis6e par IJUE, 06/07/1991). 
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the OEEC. 91 Rabot was thus a well-known figure in the Post-war international 
agricultural negotiations and was also known to Mansholt . 
92 He had an important role 
in recruiting personnel for DG VI. In a Commission meeting, Mansholt emphasized 
that his director-general had succeeded in putting together an apt team of 
collaborators. 93 It is very likely that Rabot relied on pre-existing contacts and 
networks. For instance, the Frenchman Guy Amiet had been deputy secretary general 
at the Green Pool negotiations from 1952-1955. Amiet had also worked for the OEEC 
like his future colleagues in DG VI, the Italian Adolfo Pizzuti, the Belgian Franqois 
94 Stroobants and the German Krohn. Likewise, Rabot's assistant, the German von 
Verschuer, had participated in the Green Pool negotiations where he got to know 
Rabot. 95 Von Verschuer had also taken part in the Val Duchesse negotiations in 1956 
where he met van der Lee. The fact that already in January 1958 Mansholt and van der 
Lee considered him for a post in DG VI shows that he was the young, experienced and 
96 enthusiastic type of expert the Commission sought to employ. in addition, Mansholt 
brought van der Lee, his first chef de cabinet, and Heringa, DG VI's future deputy 
director-general, from the Dutch ministry of agriculture. 
These highly skilled technical experts shared the view that Europe needed a 
common agricultural policy and they had confidence in their own problem-solving 
capacity. The knowledge and previous experience of DG VI officials were an 
important asset for the Commission on which it relied and which 
it utilised. While 
91 See Centre des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), Fontainebleau, No 
19800140, Cabinet du Ministre 
ou du Secr6taire d'Etat. File: Conf6rence europ6enne sur 
l'Organisation des March6s Agricoles. Pool 
Vert. 1953-1954. Document OECE, Con-ýtd Minist6riel de I'agriculture et 
de I'alimentation. 
Nomination of Rabot as Director for Agriculture and 
Alimentation, 3 March 1955. 
92 HAEU, Int 654, Interview J. C. F. J. van Merridnboer and 
J. H. Molegraaf with Jaap van der Lee, The 
Hague, 14 July 1998. 
93 HAEU, DEP EN 322, Wunion de la Commission, 23 
February 1962. See also chapter Bl. 
94 BAK, N 1266/1254, CV Guy Arniet, CV Adolfo Pizzuti, 
CV Franqois Stroobants. 
95 See interview K. S. with Helmut Freiherr von 
Verschuer. 
96 IISH, Archief van Sicco L. Mansholt, J. van 
der Lee to S. Mansholtý 15 January 1958. 
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officials were partly pre-socialised in negotiations and organizations dealing with 
agriculture before entering the Commission, their positive identification with DG VI 
and its aims were further advanced through leadership and participatory working 
methods. Firstly, for the officials the direct contact with European role models was 
important. The personality of Mansholt seems to have made a deep impression on the 
officials of DG VI. His success in building the CAP and his professional and physical 
strength - he was reported never to get tired during Council negotiations - gave him 
prestige. In Mansholt, Mozer admired the 'endless patience of an otherwise impatient 
character who is obsessed with his mission'. 97 Therefore, his collaborators would not 
only see in him the 'rooted farmer' but also a great politician. 98 The image Mansholt 
had among his collaborators was thus one of a down-to-earth farmer who became a 
successful politician because he resolutely fought for two interrelated causes: the CAP 
and European integration. This went down well with his staff, many of whom had a 
farming background and had studied agriculture. One official explained the skills and 
the assertiveness of Mansholt by comparing the successful CAP with the transport 
sector, where the Community had made less progress: '[ ... ] Had Mansholt been 
responsible for transport, then we would have had a Common Transport Policy. '99 
Likewise, the deputy director-general Heringa was highly esteemed for his expertise 
and assiduousness. He was responsible for the market organizations. 
One official 
called him 'the engine of the common agricultural policy' and that through 
his 
example they were encouraged to work 'Saturdays and 
Sundays'. 100 Interestingly, 
Heringa was not a strong Europeanist, according to van 
der Lee. Nonetheless, because 
97 IISH, Archief van Alfred Mozer, No 48, A. Mozer, 
Bauernkrieg und zweite Etappe. Das ministerielle 
16-Tage-Rennen in BrOssel, December 1963. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Interview K. S. with Hans-Broder Krohn. 
100 Interview K. S. with Maurice Barthdl6my; see also 
for example the interviews K. S. with GUnter 
Fitterer, Brussels, 14 April 2004, Frangois Muller and 
Georges Rencki. 
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of his know-how he served as a role model. Director-general Rabot and his assistant 
von Verschuer also belonged to this circle of leading officials who inspired 
enthusiasm and loyalty. 101 In the mid-1970s, Michelmann detected nostalgia among 
officials for the Mansholt era. They feared that DG VI might loose its status as the 
'glamour DG' of the Commission. 102 However, even in the mid to late 1970s, 
leadership was given very high marks in DG VI. The 'leading positions have gone to 
capable men, thus leadership is excellent, ' wrote Michelmann. 103 The tradition of 
good leadership introduced in DG VI in the 1960s thus seems to have persisted. 
In the development of the CAP proposals, the Commission not only relied on 
the officials' expertise, but also on their contacts. This could be the intimate 
knowledge of a national administration, an interest group or of an international 
network. For successful policy-making at the European level it was vital that 
Commission officials possessed the necessary contacts or were able to forge links with 
the actors in question. As shown in chapter BIII, these contacts and special knowledge 
were an important source of information and a tool in Community policy making. One 
official recounts that in order to prepare a decision, Mansholt sent leading officials 
into their home countries to convince their nationals of a particular proposal. 
104 For 
instance, in the highly contested question of the common cereals price, Krohn met 
with a high ranking official of the German agricultural ministry to discuss the Gen-nan 
standpoint on this question. He reported the outcome of the meeting to 
Mansholt who 
was therefore up to date in this matter and could adjust the negotiation position of the 
101 Cf for example the interview K. S. with Raymond 
Craps. 
102 Michelmann 1978b: 162. 
103 Ibid., 139. 
104 Interview K. S. with Frangois Muller. 
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Commission accordingly. Krohn also suggested possible ways of dealing with the 
German delegation in the negotiations. 105 
The CAP was the 'success story, of the Commission and the officials were 
aware of it. In contrast to other supranational policy areas the Commission dealt with, 
the CAP had an immediate impact on individuals and the economy in the member 
states. Whereas other DGs were mainly concerned with studies that did not have a 
direct impact, DG VI produced most of the Community's legislation and administered 
large agricultural funds. In interviews, leading staff of DG VI emphasized the 
importance of the CAP for the Community and for the functioning of the common 
market. 1 06 One official explained that the legal texts they wrote had a large impact on 
Europe. 107 Working in a small expert group and being under the impression of making 
an impact is prone to create solidarity with the institution. Crucially, in the 
Commission the CAP was considered as leading the way to increased powers for the 
Commission in other policy areas. 108 The Commission and the officials in DG VI were 
convinced that the CAP was the key to European integration. In his study of the 
Kennedy Round, Coombes concludes that DG VI officials were more organized and 
had a stronger predetermined departmental standpoint to defend than others. 109 Not 
least, they were inclined to defend this departmental standpoint as they had 
contributed to developing this position within DG VI. 'In the case of Agriculture 
administrative style happened to favour support of the "departmental philosophy"', 
Coombes found. " 0 
105 IISH, Archief van Sicco L. Mansholt, No 114, Document n. a. [Krohn], undated. 
'()6 Michelmann 1978b: 60; see also interview K. S. with Maurice Barth6l6my. 
107 Interview K. S. with Maurice Barth6l6my. 
1 08 IISH, Archief van Alfred Mozer, No 48, Alfred Mozer, Bauemkrieg und zweite 
Etappe. Das 
n-dnisterielle 16-Tage-Rennen in BrOssel, December 1963. 
109 Coombes 1970: 212. 
110 Ibid. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that a re-evaluation of the role and impact of 
institutions, institutional cultures and actor socialisation can contribute to a better 
understanding of the functioning of the early EEC and of how Community policies 
came into being. Such a view on Community policy-making needs to take into 
consideration the historical context of a policy area and the pre-socialisation of 
individuals. Both factors help explain the nature of early decisions elaborated within 
the Commission's services and adopted in the EEC. These early decisions often had a 
disproportionately strong impact in that they implemented a particular path that was 
difficult to revise later on. One of the factors which helped to reinforce a path was the 
emergence of administrative cultures. These were often based on pre-cultures and 
early decisions as demonstrated for DG IV and Regulation 17, and/or on pre- 
socialised and cohesive groups of officials as in DG VI. New officials were socialised 
into these administrative cultures. They internalised the values and aims that were an 
integral part of these cultures. Socialisation processes also affected individuals and 
institutions outside the Commission, for example through network formation. 
According to Antje Wiener the EU creates , interactive spaces for elites who then take 
an active role in diffusing norms, ideas and values through 
interactions back in their 
respective domestic contexts'. "' This shows that the role of supranational 
institutions 
in diffusing and stabilising norms and practices is important and surpasses the realm 
of the supranational administration. Even though 
DG IV and DG VI dealt with 
entirely different policy areas they still contributed 
in important ways to creating path 
dependencies. 
Wiener 2006: 39. 
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However, the situation both DG's faced in their respective policy areas 
differed fundamentally. The first difference concerns the role of pressure groups. In 
competition policy, pressure groups were not as clearly defined and not as well 
organized as in the agricultural sector. ' 12 Business lobbies at the national and 
European levels such as the CNPF and the Union des conf6ddrations de Findustrie et 
des employeurs, d'Europe (UNICE), respectively, were hesitant to embrace the 
Commission's proposals for Regulation 17 which they considered as too rigid. 
However, they did not develop a common strategy to push through their view, nor did 
they come up with a coherent alternative proposal. Also, it is likely that the 
implications of the European competition policy as conceived by DG IV were not 
entirely foreseen (or foreseeable) and understood by some business lobbies and 
member states' governments. The Commission was thus able to shape the common 
competition policy with the help of a coalition in favour of its approach. 
Fanners organizations, on the contrary, had collaborated transnationally since 
before World War ][1.113 Governments of the member states and the Commission were 
confronted with well organized agricultural pressure groups with focussed interests. 
Moreover, farmers were considered an important electorate, in particular for the 
Christian democrats who still governed most member states in the 1960s. An 
agricultural policy in favour of these groups was seen as part of the post-war 
consensus. 114 DG VI and the Commission mainly backed and became an integral part 
of this consensus. With the CAP, national protectionism and the management of the 
... Warlouzet 2007: chapter VI-2. 
113 Cf. Thierneyer 1999: 4. 
114 Griffiths and Girvin 1995: xxxvi. 
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costly agricultural subsidies were transferred to the supranational level. 1 15 DG VI 
helped to shape this important Community policy and ended up administering it. 
The second difference was the degree of pre-socialisation and consciousness of 
officials of the issues at stake in their sector. Before entering the Commission, many 
of the DG VI officials had participated in post-war negotiations or had worked for 
international organizations dealing with agriculture. This experience combined with 
the collaboration with Mansholt in DG VI and the early successes of the CAP 
reinforced their view of a need of a European agricultural policy devised and 
administered by the Commission. Officials in DG W had generally less previous 
experience in their subject matter. In many cases they were entirely socialised into 
accepting competition as the basis of the common market after they were appointed to 
the Commission. The outcome was similar in both DG's, however. DG W and DG VI 
therefore have in common the fact that, within the Commission, their personnel - 
while sharing a particular generational experience - was confronted with role models, 
good leadership and participatory working methods. Commission staff developed a 
high degree of expertise that allowed them to feel as competent actors in the matter, 
able to influence the policy-making process. This facilitated their adopting the 
institutions' norms, aims and values. It also guaranteed the continuity of the 
competition and agricultural policies after von der Groeben and Mansholt left the 
Commission. 
The early decisions in competition and agricultural policy had a long-term 
impact in both Policy areas. Regulation 17 was valid for over forty years and the many 
attemPts to reform the CAP were only executed in a half-hearted manner because of 
the high Political and social costs a more fundamental reform would have entailed. 
115 Thiemeyer 1999: 262-3. 
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The first years of an organization and the first set of personnel are thus crucial with 
regard to getting a policy on track. In the case of DG IV ordo-liberal views on 
competition were introduced and prevailed, not least because of personnel continuity. 
VerLoren van Thernaat's successors in the post of director-general were Albrecht, 
Caspari and Schlieder; all three were German and had been close collaborators of von 
der Groeben. The examples of DG IV and DG VI thus show how a particular path 
reinforced by a particular institutional culture can impact on preference formation in 
institutions and ultimately influence the shape of a Community policy. 
When it came to putting its preferences into practice, however, the 
Commission had to rely on coalitions to get its proposals passed - coalitions formed 
of member state governments, interest groups and expert networks. In the incipient 
multi-level political system of the EEC the success of a Commission proposal 
depended on such coalitions for backing a particular policy. At the same time, the 
Commission and its staff played a pro-active part in forging coalitions in favour of its 
proposals. 
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Conclusions 
The Bosboom report of 1959 was the first in a long series of (largely unsuccessful) 
attempts to restructure and rationalise the Commission's administration. This 
resistance to reform led to a situation in which the structures introduced in the 1950s 
and 1960s were only seriously challenged by Vice-President Neil Kinnock's Task 
Force for Administrative Reform' - perhaps the most radical and successful reform to 
date. The process was triggered in October 1999 and resulted in a number of 
important changes, among them the introduction of new staff rules in 2004, after the 
old statute had been in place for over 40 years. 2 This latest reforrn certainly aimed at 
improving the efficiency of the Commission, but also at changing its culture 3-a 
culture formed and engraved in the institution since the late 1950s. 
In the light of the longevity of administrative structures, cultures and the 
continuity of Commission staff, this thesis makes a significant contribution to EU 
history by analysing the origins and elements of these structures, cultures and the 
background of the administrations' staff. With its original combination of 
administrative and prosopographical. history and an outlook on how administrative 
cultures can impact on EEC and EC policies, it contributes to a better understanding 
of the functioning of the EEC and, ultimately, to writing a supranational history of 
Europe. The following sections will sum up the main findings of these three 
dimensions of the thesis. The final section will address how the findings could be 
utilised for further research. 
1 Neil Kinnock was appointed Commissioner responsible 
for Transport under Commission President 
Jacques Santer (1995-1999). Under Commission President Romano Prodi (1999-2004) he became 
Vice-President for Administration Reform. 
2 http: //europa. eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction. do? reference=SPEECIi/99/118&fonnat=HTN4L&aged= 
I 
&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (accessed 27 March 2008) 
3 Metcalfe 2001: 418. 
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1. European bureaucracies - an integral part of Europe's supranational history 
The chapters on the administrations of the High Authority and the Commission 
systematically analysed the set-up of the internal organization, the introduction of 
working methods and recruitment mechanisms. All three dimensions produced 
elements of a distinct European administrative culture. Put under close scrutiny, many 
of these elements, or main features, of the administrations are linked to the aim of 
gaining legitimacy for the new supranational institutions. 
The central idea of supranationality often had to be traded in for legitimacy. 
The principle of collegiality, introduced by the ECSC treaty and upheld in the High 
Authority by a decision of the college in late 1953, has become a core feature of the 
European administrative culture. Decision-making in the college, where nationals of 
all member states were represented, should increase the lýegitimacy of decisions. 
Juggling between supranationality and the perceived national interests of 
member states was one of the characteristics of the European bureaucracies. In the 
administrative domain, a variety of interests of member state governments, political 
parties and interest groups had to be accommodated. Staff recruitment was in this 
respect an important and highly sensitive matter. The thesis examined these 
recruitment patterns and what was at stake for the Commission and the High 
Authority, on the one hand, and member states and interest groups, on the other. 
Although both the High Authority and the Commission were entitled to recruit 
personnel independently, at the beginning they lacked the necessary administrative 
structures and had to rely on a pre-selection of possible staff 
by member state 
governments. Also, concessions had to be made when 
it came to the nationality of 
staff and special interests of a member state 
in a policy area. Both administrations 
observed the distribution of posts according to an 
informal national balance. This 
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could obstruct careers, but it does not seem to have gravely affected the motivation of 
staff. On the contrary, as each member state was represented in the administration 
according to a certain quota, the national balance was seen as enhancing the 
legitimacy of the European administration. It became another of its core features. 
The European administrations were not created from scratch. Instead, they 
were built on a variety of traditions of national administrations and international 
organizations and on experiences of individuals. In some cases, these experiences 
could reach back into the inter-war period. The thesis has demonstrated that the 
founding presidents of the High Authority and Commission, Monnet and Hallstein, 
had a strong impact on the internal organization of the administrations. When shaping 
them, they took into account pre-existing models - be it the Tennessee Valley 
Authority, the French Planning Commission or the Auswdftiges Amt. Designing the 
administrations along the lines of well-known models increased their legitimacy; this 
was particularly the case for the Commission, which incorporated elements of the 
French and the German administrations. However, at the High Authority, Monnet's 
ideal of a small and flexible administration could not be upheld, as the tasks of the 
High Authority expanded and became more complex. This model thus failed, lost its 
legitimacy and did not become a core feature of the European administrative culture. 
The Commission's administration grew rapidly in size. This was, to a certain extent, 
intended by Hallstein and his colleagues. One of the consequences of the Hallstein 
presidency, though, was that the Commission became a fragmented administration. 
The nine DGs turned into organizations with distinctive administrative cultures. 
This 
affected the legitimacy of decision-making in the college, as 
decisions were prepared 
rather autonomously within the DGs. 
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Both the High Authority and the Commission had to deal with efforts of 
national governments, political parties and interest groups to transpose certain 
political and economic concepts or policies to the European level. The CAP is one 
example, competition policy another. In the High Authority, German officials, who 
were convinced social market economists, were promoted by the German government 
to counterbalance the supposed statism of Monnet and his collaborators. Likewise, 
von der Groeben and his collaborators in DG IV were the bulwark of economic 
liberalism in the Commission. Moreover, in the High Authority, potential candidates 
were brought forward by industrial organizations and trade unions. It seems that the 
recruitment strategy of the High Authority and the Commission, was geared towards 
incorporating these groups into the administration. The aim was to reproduce a 
miniature image of member states' societies at the European level. This, again, served 
the aim of increasing the legitimacy of the European bureaucracies. 
The administrations became more autonomous in their staff policies once they 
adopted a personnel statute. This was an important step towards an independent 
supranational civil service, introducing a career system and the guarantee of life-long 
employment, similar to the national civil service. Moreover, the statute facilitated the 
formation of a group identity and identification with the institutions. While practices 
such as parachuting, detachment or the national balance continued, the thesis has 
shown that conflicting loyalties of officials were a minor problem 
in the European 
administrations. There are few cases where officials were either 
fierce defenders of 
their country's alleged interests or - the other extreme - renounced all 
ties with their 
home country. This was mainly because many officials thought 
that the promotion of 
European policies in the High Authority and the 
Commission was in the long-term 
interest of their home country. As Peterson rightly writes, 
'to contrast national and 
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international attachments, or more crudely, to assume that one must be stateless to 
serve an international master, is to accept a monolithic notion of nationalism, ý4 or of 
identity. A requirement for statelessness of officials would again have undermined the 
European administrations' legitimacy. 
This legitimacy also depended heavily on the expertise of leading staff. 
Expertise seems to have been the main opportunity for European officials to make an 
impact and it became part of the European administrative culture. Arguably, this 
feature became even more pronounced after the crisis of 1965/66, when the 
Commission adopted a strategy of keeping its (political) profile low in order not to 
loose its legitimacy. Expert governance could also undermine the Commission's 
legitimacy, however, and the Commission was regularly accused of suffering from a 
'democratic deficit'. This criticism was not geared exclusively towards the 
Commission. The expert culture extended to member state administrations and non- 
state experts, meeting, for example, in Community committees. The success of the 
expert culture depended not least on role models such as Monnet, Hallstein and 
Mansholt. Expert culture, however, needs to be combined with political leadership 
within and outside of the Commission in order to be effective and legitimate. 
The internal legitimacy of the High Authority and the Commission vis-ý-vis 
their staff was enhanced by a founding myth. The thesis has shown that the early years 
of the European administrations were not only crucial in terms of setting up 
administrative structures and establishing working methods, but also by generating 
such a founding myth. Monnet and, to a lesser extent, Hallstein as the founding 
presidents were crucial in this respect, as they cultivated and at the same time became 
part of the founding myths of the High Authority and the 
Commission. A founding 
' Peterson 1974/5: 2. 
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myth is important for an institution's history and the values emanating from it, and in 
the case of the High Authority and the Commission it facilitated the officials' 
adoption of these values. Regarding the Commission, in particular, the first period was 
extremely successful and almost euphoric. During this period of creation and 
creativity, important capital was accumulated for motivating the administrative staff. 
This legitimised the institution and its actions and resulted in establishing a durable 
relationship of trust between officials and the Commission. Being able to look back at 
the halcyon days of the beginning was important as officials deplored that, after a 
couple of years, the administration of policies replaced the early period of innovation. 
With the loyalty developed during the early phase, officials remained reasonably 
motivated - as for example the Poullet report showed for the early 1970s - even when, 
during the 1970s, progress in European integration stagnated in many areas. The 
regained optimism and the progress made under the presidency of Jacques Delors 
reminded many officials of the early Hallstein years. 
In summary, many features of the European administrations were a response to 
member states' concerns that they could become an unaccountable 'technocratic 
AreopaguS, 5. It was a major aim of the European bureaucracies to be accepted as 
serious and competent interlocutors. This was also achieved by recruiting able staff. 
2. Towards a prosopography of the European Union 
This thesis is the first systematic study of European civil servants and thus introduces 
European bureaucrats into the historiography of the European Union. It contributes to 
answering the question who the first European high officials were, whether they 
shared a strong European esprit de corps and, if so, what the 
factors were that led to 
5 General de Gaulle on 9 September 1965, cited in Touchard 
1978: 218-9. 
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this team spirit. In order to analyse and compare the biographical background and 
attitudes of officials, the concept of generation proved to be a useful tool. Some High 
Authority and most of the Commission officials examined here belonged to the 45er 
generation. The thesis has shown that these officials shared one crucial experience: 
World War II. Profoundly marked by this experience, many of them had idealistic 
motives for entering the Commission from which a strong esprit de corps could 
flourish. A united Europe, after the experience of extreme European disunity, was the 
positive aim with which they all could identify. Moreover, the educational and 
professional background of Commission officials of DG IV and DG VI, respectively, 
were relatively homogeneous. This is an important finding with regard to the internal 
cohesion of the different DGs and, ultimately, their policies. 
The High Authority officials, on the contrary, were more heterogeneous. The 
thesis has demonstrated that the High Authority personnel was split into two groups: 
technicians, mainly of the century generation, and younger generalists belonging to 
the 45ers. This shows that the choice of personnel was adapted to the respective 
6 mission' of the administration. The High Authority needed experienced technicians 
to draw up and administer the common coal and steel policies. These coal and steel 
experts did not necessarily have to be convinced Europeans. The Commission 
attracted mostly younger individuals, often from national administrations and often 
with previous international experience. While these did not necessarily need to 
be 
convinced Europeans either, their younger average age and the 
dominant war 
experience made them more receptive to socialisation pressures within the 
Commission. 
The thesis reached limits in the attempt to analyse the biographical 
background 
of the High Authority technicians. 
The lack of source material inevitably 
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circumscribed the conclusions concerning this group. It would go too far, for instance, 
to claim that these officials generally had less European spirit than their colleagues of 
the 45er generation. The existing source material suggests, however, that a number of 
these technicians was primarily interested in finding and working for a solution for the 
European coal and steel industries, and was less concerned with European political 
unification. Another problem encountered in this research was how to show the effects 
of Europeanization of officials. This is a problem any research concerned with 
individuals and socialisation processes will encounter. In the case of European 
officials, one would ideally have documents available dating from before their entry 
into the European civil service and documents from while they served in the European 
administration, and from which a change of attitude is clearly visible. This is hardly 
ever the case. The thesis has therefore attempted to overcome this difficulty by using a 
wide range of source material and interviews. Based on this material it has developed 
a framework for analysing Europeanization mechanisms, taking internal and extemal 
factors into account that could facilitate Europeanization. 
The thesis has confirmed that there was not one homogeneous European 
identity that supplanted national, regional, local or institutional identities, but that 
identities of European officials were composed of multiple elements. It was in the 
interest of the High Authority and the Commission to employ officials who could 
switch between their identities. However, based on factors such as the shared 
generational experience, a similar socialisation in their home countries, combined with 
factors they encountered in the European administrations such as career opportunities, 
expert culture, living and working in Luxembourg and Brussels, the presence of role 
models and participatory working methods, European civil servants 
developed a group 
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identity. Many saw in Europe an answer to the question 'who are we 6, or, how shall 
we organize our European societies after the catastrophe of World War 11? For some it 
was more a question of idealism, for others it was more a matter of rational choice. At 
the same time, they all grappled with the difficulties encountered daily when trying to 
'make Europe'. National and cultural stereotypes had to be overcome and it seems that 
the most effective way to do this was by working together for a common cause with 
which they could all identify. This did not necessarily have to be something as far- 
reaching as the United States of Europe, but it could well be a policy such as the CAP. 
Social integration within the European administrations and beyond is thus a crucial 
factor in the European integration process. Likewise, when studying the 
Europeanization of societies or societal actors, European institutions should not be left 
out of the equation as they can be seen as a microcosm of social integration and 
possibly as a precursor of the Europeanization of member states' societies. 
3. Institutions and institutional cultures: crucialfor understanding EC policies 
The High Authority and the Commission in particular were major actors in the 
European integration process. European policies could only be as good as the 
European administrations' administrative staff and organization. The concept of path 
dependence, used in historical institutionalism, proved to be a useful tool for 
conceptualising the research questions linked to the emergence of European 
competition and agricultural policies. Departing from the idea that institutions cannot 
always be controlled but develop their own agendas, this thesis has demonstrated in a 
three step model how particular paths in competition and agricultural policies were 
implemented and which factors increased the likeliness that these paths remained 
6 Trunk 2007: 8. 
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practically unchanged and unchallenged for a long period of time. As shown for the 
DGs IV and VI, exploring the role of, and the link between, historical context, 
institutions, institutional cultures and actor socialisation can contribute to a better 
understanding of the origins and paths of Community policies. 
4. Threads forfiirther research 
The findings of the thesis and the conceptual tools that were utilised open up threads 
for future historical research. To start with the last chapter, the three steps developed 
to analyse path dependence, namely context, formation of an institutional culture, and 
the socialisation of internal and external actors into these cultures, could be fruitfully 
applied to other policy areas. More studies along similar lines would, firstly, add up to 
a more comprehensive picture of the origins and developments of Community 
policies. Some work has already been done by Wronique Dimier on DG 
Development. 7 This line of research could be pursued, for example, for DG External 
Relations or DG Economic Affairs. Such studies could, secondly, clarify whether DG 
VI and DG IV were exceptions in the Commission. In particular DG VI was at the 
centre of attention whereas in other DGs arguably not much happened during the first 
years of their existence. It would remain to be examined in what way socialisation 
processes occurred in DGs that were considered less successful such as transport or 
social policy. This could contribute to isolating the interests at stake and to answering 
the question why no European social or transport policies emerged. 
As to the Community bureaucracies, an obvious line of research would be to 
pursue the history of the Commission into the 
1970s. Considered as a period of 
stagnation in the integration process, 
it could be interesting to analyse how this 
Diniier 2004. 
316 
stagnation affected the administration, the policy-making capacity of the Commission 
and, last but not least, the officials. It seems likely that the administrative problems 
inherited from the 1950s and early 1960s were one of the roots of this inertia and lack 
of momentum. Other possible explanations could be the loss of legitimacy of the 
Commission as a consequence of the empty chair crisis 1965/66, which had resulted in 
increased mistrust of the member states towards the Commission, or the lack of 
effective leadership in the Commission. Moreover, scholars of public administration 
such as Downs argue that administrations experience life cycles, that is, ups and 
downs. 8 In this respect it is possible that the Commission experienced a downward 
development during the 1970s, while rising again to become more of a policy 
entrepreneur under the Jenkins presidency and, even more so, in the mid- 1980s, under 
Jacques Delors. 
The approach developed in this thesis for analysing socialisation mechanisms 
could be applied to other EC institutions, committees or even other international 
organizations. This would put the Commission and the High Authority into a wider 
perspective of the founding of international organizations after World War H. 
International bureaucracies with an independent staff developing supranational 
loyalties only began to emerge in the last century with the 'spirit of Geneva', at the 
League of Nations. This was certainly a source of inspiration 
for Monnet and for his 
aspiration that something similar should develop 
in Luxembourg at the High 
Authority. A line of research could therefore investigate how far the 
European 
administrations were unique and in what way the 
European civil servants were 
exceptional. It is likely that it was not only the 
European administrations that had the 
power to redirect loyalties. Other permanent secretariats 
of international organizations 
8 Downs 1967: 20. 
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such as the IMF or the UN had this 're-socializing power" as well. Intemational, 
organizations founded after World War R probably also attracted a very motivated 
staff. Highly idealistic individuals such as the writer Iris Murdoch entered the UN in 
the mid-1940s. This may correspond to the European spirit of the first European civil 
servants in that material gains were less important than a certain spirit of adventure, or 
even idealistic motives such as promoting world peace. The EC administrations 
therefore have to be placed in context and compared with other international 
organizations in order to establish their uniqueness. The 45er generation may well 
have been dominating in these other administrative contexts as well. 
The generational approach could be applied in further research. A crucial 
question would be how the Commission's administration changed under the influx of 
officials who grew up in post-war Europe and for whom World War H was not a 
dominating and life-changing experience. Analysing the '1968' generation as a 
relatively cohesive group seems particularly promising. What were their motives and 
expectations when working for 'Europe' and were they different from those of the 
45ers? Did they have strongholds in the Commission such as in DGs dealing with 
more recent and 'modem' policy areas such as environmental or regional policies? 
When pursuing the aim of writing a supranational and transnational history of 
the EU it is certainly necessary to explore further the interplay between different 
actors in the European Union - Community, state and non-state actors. 
Being able to 
explain the complex system of transfer of ideas - and also 
ideals - from Community 
level to the member states and vice versa could add to the understanding of the 
emergence of a European polity. Moreover, the outreach of 
the Commission's 
administration and its role in the process of 
Europeanization of member state societies 
9 Trondal 2007: 1128. 
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is still largely unexplored. 10 It is likely that European high officials who were 
socialised into defending supranational integration and the powers of the High 
Authority and the Commission in the Community conveyed these attitudes to the 
outside, for example, in negotiations with national administrations or in committees 
operating at the European level. Hence, the officials would act as translators and 
facilitators and they would participate in the transfer of the European idea and of 
European unification as an ideal. The interdependence of Community and national 
officials must have played a role in this process. There was a frequent exchange of 
personnel between Brussels and ministries in the capitals of the Six. It is likely that the 
close collaboration with, and the exchange between, the European and the national 
administrations has contributed to a 'bureaucratic integration' of Europe. " This is 
inextricably linked to the emergence of transnational expert elites in Europe, as Haas 
already argued. 12 Commission officials were part of transnational networks or even 
instigated and facilitated their formation. For such research, the network approach 
could be a useful tool. 13 The importance of networks has briefly been evoked in 
chapter BM for DGs IV and VI. Networks or expert groups such as the Monetary 
Committee were sometimes formally created by the EEC treaty. These networks 
brought together important state and non-state actors, acting within a well-defined 
context of contacts. The Monetary Committee, for instance, was composed of national 
and Community officials and central bankers. A study of this epistemic community 
from its inception in 1958 could shed new light on Community governance on the one 
hand, and the origins of Economic and Monetary 
Union on the other. It is likely that 
shared experiences and expert knowledge 
led to the creation of trust and shared values 
10 Bach 1992: 24. 
11 See ibid. 
12 Haas 1968: 18. 
13 For an introduction to the network concept see 
Kaiser 2008 and Heard-Laur6ote 2005. 
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and norms also in this context and not only among the European 'new race of men' in 
the High Authority and the Commission. 
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